

NATO: STRATEGIC LESSONS FROM THE RUSSIAN INVASION OF UKRAINE



JULY 2022

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NOTICES

The aggressive war launched by Russia against Ukraine and its people has created a grave humanitarian crisis and destabilized the current geopolitical world order. What are the preliminary strategic lessons for NATO Allies regarding this security challenge? A distinguished panel of U.S. and foreign experts discussed the outlook of NATO's mission regionally and globally.

Video of the full conference may be found here: [LINK](#).

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"NATO: STRATEGIC LESSONS FROM THE RUSSIAN INVASION OF UKRAINE"

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I. PREFACE

PROFESSOR YONAH ALEXANDER AND PROFESSOR DON WALLACE, JR.

EDITORS

Recorded history has repeatedly provided tactical and strategic lessons on the nature of political relations within, between, and among nations. Numerous universal postulates for the conduct of statecraft have been offered by philosophers, politicians, scholars, and other observers reflecting on the experiences of diverse societies regarding what does and does not work.

These collective insights focus on the perceived realities of national, regional, and global matters, including the role of history, the supremacy of self-interest, the cost of wars, and the benefits of peace. Other views deal with the nature of diplomacy in the struggle for power, and the value of multinational alliances in securing a stable world order based on the rule of law, the protection of human rights, and the advancement of economic progress and prosperity.

As NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, celebrates more than 70 years of existence, it remains the most significant defensive alliance in the past two centuries. In early 2022, its 30 nation-state members are still facing a broad range of old and new horizontal and vertical challenges. These include piracy, terrorism, regional conflicts, humanitarian crises, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), and cyber threats.

Moreover, NATO's three core tasks, namely, deterrence and defense; crisis prevention management; and cooperative security are being critically tested during the Russian Federation war of aggression launched against Ukraine, a non-member independent country in the Euro-Atlantic region.¹

It is against this background that NATO has acknowledged Russia as its greatest direct security threat. The alliance announced its intention to defend "every inch" of its members' territory. Additionally, Finland and Sweden have officially been invited to join the alliance. Other significant strategic measures have been adopted at the Madrid Summit Declaration on June 29, 2022.²

The current report "NATO Strategic Lessons From the Russian Invasion of Ukraine" (July 2022) held as a Zoom Forum on April 28, 2022 focuses on the above developments and looking forward. This virtual Forum began with opening remarks by Professor Don Wallace Jr. (Chairman, International Law Institute) and was moderated by Professor Yonah Alexander (Director of the International Center for Terrorism Studies and Senior Fellow at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies). The following distinguished panel of scholars and practitioners gave presentations and subsequent discussion; General (Ret.) Wesley Clark (Former Supreme Allied Commander Europe); Ambassador (Ret.) Robert Hunter (Former U.S. Ambassador to NATO); Major General (Ret.) Dr. Mihail E. Ionescu (Professor, National School of Political and Administrative Studies (SNSPA) Bucharest, Romania); Professor Herman Matthijs (University Ghent & Free University Brussels); Professor Natividad Carpintero-Santamaria (Professor at the Polytechnic University of Madrid (UPM) and General Secretary of the Instituto de Fusión Nuclear "Guillermo Velarde"); Professor Shimon Shetreet (Greenblatt Chair of Public and International Law, Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Former Cabinet Minister and MK, Israel); and Bruce Weinrod (Former Secretary of Defense Representative for Europe and former Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and NATO Policy. Closing remarks were delivered by General (Ret.) Alfred Gray, USMC (29th Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps (1987-1991); Chairman of the Board of Directors and Regents, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies).

AN ACADEMIC CONTEXT

Over several decades, numerous interdisciplinary briefs, seminars, workshops, and conferences focusing on NATO-related issues were held at universities and think tanks in the United States and abroad. Additionally, some NATO-designated institutions in Europe and elsewhere have provided academic frameworks for future

¹ www.nato.int/strategic-concept/

² www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_196951.htm

research and other educational purposes. A case in point is the contribution of NATO's Centre of Excellence-Defence Against Terrorism (COE-DAT) in Ankara that facilitated useful courses and workshops on different security concerns. The Partnership for Peace Training Center (PfPTC), also operating under NATO auspices in Ankara, has organized similar relevant activities. One noted event was the Silk Road 2010 Flag Officers seminar on "Towards a New Strategic Concept: The Future of NATO-Partners Relations," held in Çanakkale, Turkey. Over 130 generals, admirals, other senior officers, and ambassadors from some 40 countries participated at the gathering (selected papers presented at the seminar were published in *Partnership for Peace Review*, Vol. 1, No. 1, Fall 2010).³

Consequent to the foregoing and other efforts, the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies (IUCTS) has organized in cooperation with our colleagues at the U.S. Department of State (Office of European Security, Political and Military Affairs- EUR/RPM) several academic undertakings during the past several years.

The first research effort resulted in the publication of a multi-authored book titled *NATO: From Regional to Global Security Provider*, co-edited by Yonah Alexander and Richard Prosen (Lexington Books, August 2015). General (ret.) Wesley Clark wrote an introduction to the study, and the other contributors included James Henry Bergeron, Derrick Busse, Georgiana Cavendish, Natividad Carpintero-Santamaria, Paul Dodge, R. David Edelman, Raffi Gregorian, Enrico Mueller, Patrick Murphy, Leslie Ordeman, Raphael Perl, Stefano Santamato, Carrie Shirtz, George Sinks, Bruce Weinrod, Richard Weitz, and Michael Ziemke.

The other subsequent publications that have been published are "NATO: Confronting Regional and Global Challenges" (January 2016)⁴ Yonah Alexander wrote an introduction, Yonah Alexander and Richard Prosen wrote an overview, and other contributors included Raffi Gregorian, Patrick Murphy, and General (ret.) Wesley Clark. In addition, "NATO's Strategy: Continuity or Change?" (January 2017)⁵ Yonah Alexander wrote an introduction and other contributors included Richard Prosen, Kenneth Wainstein, Joseph Manso, Daniel Hamilton, Jeffrey Rathke, and Jorge Benitez.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The editors acknowledge the contributors' outstanding intellectual remarks with the hope that their insights will stimulate further research.

Professor Alexander wishes to express his deep appreciation for the decades-long academic and professional partnerships with the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies and the International Law Institute. He is most grateful to the late Michael S. Swetnam (CEO and Chairman, PIPS); PIPS's Dr. Jennifer Buss (CEO), General Al Gray (USMC (Ret.), Chairman of the Board), and Gail Clifford (VP for Financial Management & CFO); ILI's Professor Don Wallace, Jr. (Chairman), Robert Sargin (Executive Director), ILI Interns: Roan Daily (University of Illinois, Champaign), Shallum David (Syracuse University, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs) and Ruqi Zhao (American University); Both University of Virginia School of Law Professor John Norton Moore (Director of the Center for National Security Law and the Center for Oceans Law and Policy) and Professor Robert F. Turner (Distinguished Fellow and Associate Director, Center for National Security Law) for all their inspiration and continuing support of our academic work in the field of global security concerns.

Finally, the internship program of the IUCTS, that is coordinated by Kevin Harrington, has provided research and administrative support for this publication. The IUCTS interns include: Adrik Bagdasarian (James Madison University), Steven Bergin (Mercyhurst University), Benjamin Bermann (University of Chicago), William Brooks (George Washington University), Louisa Burch (American University), Matthew Dahan (the American University), Riley Graham (William & Mary), Joshua Isaiah Horton (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill), Harrison Kopitsch (American University), Elizabeth Miller (George Washington University), Avgustina Peycheva (Moscow State Institute of International Relations, PhD), Evan Rohe (University of Kent), Evan Talit (George Washington University).

³ This international journal was published by the Partnership for Peace Training Center under the auspices of NATO. Yonah Alexander, co-founder of the journal, served as Editor-in-Chief.

⁴ potomac institute.org/reports/20-reports/icts-reports/833-nato-confronting-regional-and-global-challenges

⁵ potomac institute.org/reports/20-reports/icts-reports/230-nato-s-strategy-continuity-or-change

II. SELECTED HIGHLIGHTS [DRAWN FROM THE FORUM'S PARTICIPANTS]

1. When the Soviet Union fell, the U.S. got rid of all of its tactical warheads and theater weapons, leaving the U.S. with only its strategic nuclear deterrent.
2. The U.S. never had the means of arms control to encourage the Soviets or Russians to give up their tactical nuclear weapons, enabling the Soviets to continue their tactical nuclear weapon modernization program.
3. In prior years, the Soviet Union knew that it could not stand up to the U.S. because the U.S. had strategic nuclear superiority.
4. Vladimir Putin began a very deliberate program of modernization of the Russian military at all levels, most importantly at the strategic level, by 2008.
5. With the creation of the unstoppable hypersonic 100-megaton torpedo in 2017, Putin became confident that the Russians had what America did not: strategic nuclear weapons, the ultimate arbiter.
6. At the tactical and theater level, the U.S. has nothing but 100 warheads that could be delivered by F-16s while Russia has some 2000 tactical nuclear warheads that could be used.
7. Putin has used Russia's nuclear advantage effectively in the Ukraine crisis thus far.
8. By issuing nuclear threats, Putin undercuts the credibility of the United States and the NATO deterrent because neither the U.S. nor NATO can match them with anything comparable.
9. Putin thinks he's found a hole in the U.S. deterrence, and thus, he believes if he's able to use tactical nuclear weapons, the NATO member states would jump back in fear.
10. The U.S. has had a problem with the concept of extended deterrence since 1950, and it needs to be thought through.
11. The current situation in Kyiv and Ukraine as a whole is a situation of premature exaltation with unmotivated Russian troops.
12. There are many negative reports of the Russian army not being motivated, not being comparable and fighting under a traditional general rather than having Putin taking a hands-on approach.
13. Currently, it is estimated the Ukrainians are outnumbered about four to one in artillery tubes, and they don't yet have the ammunition they need.
14. At any point, the Ukrainian shell of a defense that's trying to block the envelopment of Russian troops could collapse because it's not in prepared defenses.
15. The invasion of Ukraine invites Putin's use of nuclear weapons under the excuse of saving the nations from excessive loss of life by finishing the war quickly or if Russian troops get thrown back.
16. The possible outcomes of Russia's invasion of Ukraine are that the Ukrainians fall apart, the Ukrainians succeed in pushing Russia out and Putin retaliates with nuclear weapons or Ukraine takes back some of their land, making Ukraine landlocked, and Russia decides that is a good enough outcome.
17. The U.S. is going to need to invest more in theater nuclear modernization and tactical nuclear modernization because U.S. deterrence is being questioned.
18. If this can happen in Ukraine, it can happen for the Baltic States, and then how would the U.S. and NATO react?
19. NATO and the U.S. have already given the impression of being intimidated by the Russian nuclear threats; that's why they're being repeated.
20. Russia has given NATO a huge challenge with few viable options.

21. The United States has sent some very bad signals as to what it would do in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
22. U.S. Secretary of Defense, Lloyd Austin, declared war on Russia while in Ramstein, Germany. He was backed by the White House Press Secretary.
23. U.S. Secretary of Defense, Lloyd Austin, stated that the objective of the U.S. is to weaken Russia's capacity of what it could do against other countries in Central Europe and the members of NATO.
24. President Biden backed off the claim Lloyd Austin stated and said, "We are not making war on Russia. We are trying to stop Russian aggression in Ukraine."
25. If there is going to be any communication of authority that comes from the U.S., it needs to come from the President, the Secretary of State, or in some circumstances, the National Security Advisor.
26. The credibility of guarantee from the U.S. is the bedrock of NATO.
27. The U.S. should have started providing a lot more resources and support to Ukraine soon when they showed they are not backing down to Russia.
28. One of the great things about NATO is it has always been bipartisan.
29. In 1989, following the Cold-War, President George H. Bush, in a speech in Mainz, Germany, called for America to stay as a European power, and to preserve the integrated military command system.
30. In 1997, it was understood by NATO and Ukraine that Ukraine could never become a part of NATO.
31. Ukraine will never become a member of NATO because it requires unanimity among the member nations.
32. The big strategic problem for NATO is how do you get across to President Putin that he cannot succeed in Ukraine because if he does then the credibility of the U.S. with NATO will be lost.
33. The U.S. must prevent Russia from succeeding militarily.
34. The U.S. needs to keep quiet about the things they want to do to weaken Russia.
35. NATO needs to adopt a new grand strategy considering recent events.
36. Questions, such as "Is Russia going at this alone or are they working with China to dominate the Eurasia region?", need to be asked.
37. If it has not occurred already, Russia and China will form an alliance to support each other in challenging the global world order.
38. One possible motive for the invasion of Ukraine is to disintegrate NATO and the EU, both of which threaten Putin's regime.
39. The secondary possible motive of Russia, is that if Russia becomes victorious, it would embolden other authoritarian leaders to use military strength to consolidate their spheres of influence.
40. The transatlantic link between the U.S. and EU must become stronger to offer a better defense against Russia.
41. It is now necessary to organize a compelling deterrence on NATO's eastern front, the 1,500 kilometer stretch between the Baltic and Black Seas, given that this area has been neglected by NATO since 2014.
42. Encouraging Finland and Sweden to join NATO is imperative in securing European borders with Russia.
43. Establishing an EU rapid response force is becoming more realistic and needed. Various documents have suggested a force anywhere from 5,000 to 60,000.
44. The Wales agreement in 2014 pushed that NATO members, with the persuasion of President Obama, should have defense spending of 2% GDP.

45. In 2021, we saw that 8/30 members in NATO are at the 2% GDP norm.
46. The number one on the list is Greece, who is always a big spender, then the US, Poland, the UK, the three Baltic states, and Croatia, which makes eight at the national defense budget spending of 2%. 3 countries: Romania, Norway, and France, are at 1.75%.
47. Quite a few members are between 1.5% and 1.75%, which makes 11- 1/3 of the total group under the norm.
48. In 2019, France was at 1.93%, and the Macron government has promised to meet the 2% target, so France will likely meet that obligation soon. Germany is already at 1.49% defense, but the German Chancellor has already declared Germany will reach 2% over the next few years.
49. There was a second guideline in 2014 that NATO members should reach 20% spending on defense investments.
50. In 2016, only nine members reached the 20% norm. Now, in 2021, the yearly report shows that 21 members of NATO have reached this second target.
51. It is also interesting to see the amount of military personnel by NATO members.
52. The US has more than 1.3 million troops, so if you compare for 5 years (2016 - 2021), they have increased by 50,000.
53. The UK also saw an enormous upgrade in military manpower between 2016-2021, from 139,000 to 156,000.
54. Turkey always had enormous manpower in their army due to tension with Greece and the geographic location of Turkey. In 2016, Turkey's army had a manpower of 359,000, and in 2021 it had 439,000- so an upgrade of 80,000.
55. Taking the 27 EU states, including Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Poland, and Belgium, there was in 2021 1.3 million troops and a defense budget of \$230 billion together.
56. Compared to the US there is not much of a difference between EU armies and the US from a personnel perspective. However, there is a large difference between the financial and budget means if you take the US government defense budget and all the 27 member states of the EU.
57. Number 1 in NATO which is the US with \$811 billion from 2021. The most important European army is the UK, with 156,000 troops, and \$66 billion USD military budget in 2021.
58. The 3 Balkan states – Kosovo, Montenegro, and Albania – with Iceland and Norway, all together have 38,000 troops and a budget of \$8.3 billion. Turkey has an enormous manpower army but in budget it is \$7.2 billion.
59. The conclusion is that you can't say Europe hasn't invested troops, with 1.3 million, which may be enough to create a European army but does not have the necessary budget.
60. Germany surpassing France as a defense spender would be a problem for the Macron administration. They asked Macron, who was just re-elected, about a European army if he would agree to transfer French nuclear power to Europe and he said no.
61. There is now, for European history norms, a very long period of peace in Western Europe.
62. Finland has a long, direct 1,300 kilometer border with Russia. Also, Finland has increased their military budget over the last few years. It is already at 2% GDP. In Sweden, they have declared they will upgrade their military budget by 10 million Euros so they can reach the 2% GDP.
63. The Ukraine War will certainly bring an increase in military budget spending for the coming years.
64. The current energy shortage faced by EU member states is a result of Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

65. The supply of Russian energy to Europe is becoming uncertain. Moreover, the conflict has instigated instability for energy markets in the medium-term.
66. Germany has been one of the most affected countries due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
67. The EU's newly introduced "REPowerEU Plan" will shift EU energy supplies away from Russia and toward other sources.
68. The Central Europe Pipeline System (CEPS) is the largest of the NATO pipelines.
69. Constant disputes with Russian Gazprom on the price of gas and its transit through Ukrainian territory led the Ukrainian government to source its imports from European suppliers instead.
70. The use of cyber-attacks represents an important component to the current Russo-Ukrainian war and has thus, precipitated a growing sense of uncertainty about the role of cyber terrorism.
71. Cyber defense represents a core component to NATO's collective defense.
72. The following NATO Cyberdefense Structures represent the key agencies responsible for NATO's cyber defense capabilities: the NATO Communications and Information Agency, the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense of Excellence (Tallin, Estonia), the NATO School Oberammergau (Germany), the NATO Communications and Information Academy (Oeiras, Portugal), and the NATO Defense College (Rome, Italy).
73. There is strong evidence from Ukraine that Russia has committed war crimes and crimes against humanity.
74. Putin may not directly face charges from international bodies but Russian field commanders will.
75. NATO and the West have upgraded their support from "just to providing Ukraine with defensive weapons" to now the U.S. is providing \$33 billion.
76. The U.S. and NATO must have coordinated statements from its leaders.
77. Europe has been "sleeping" for many decades under the protection of the U.S. The European countries must "wake up" to the threat of Russia and future challenges by increasing their defense budget to 2% GDP respectively.
78. NATO obviously is alive and well despite the predictions of a number of commentators and scholars over the years.
79. NATO's enlargement was not a mistake nor did it provoke Russia. Putin would have done what he did regardless.
80. Putin has a fundamentally different conception of European security and what it means than does the West.
81. The origins of enlargement, the concept, really started in the first Bush administration.
82. Regarding what happens with NATO when issues come up, as the Ukraine situation evolves and develops, there's a number of issues that are up in the air and could have a real effect on NATO.
83. Sweden and Finland will be an important issue to NATO as the Ukraine situation continues to develop.
84. The other big issue is in China, how does NATO deal with China?
85. NATO can connect with its own partners in the Asian region—Japan, Australia, New Zealand, et cetera—and it can also work with the so-called Quadrilateral Dialogue members.
86. Another issue is the gap in terms of tactical nuclear capabilities, and that applies to the US and Europe as well with respect to China. That has to be addressed to increase deterrence capabilities.

87. Values are an essential part of, not only the US psyche and DNA, but as well as NATO, from everything that's in the charter itself, the language is there, to everything that NATO has been doing. Free society, democratic values, et cetera, are essential, and that is the motivating factor with Ukraine. This is a values issue.
88. The U.S. and NATO clearly need to have a comprehensive international strategy on this whole affair, not just for the Ukraine situation.
89. The strategy of the U.S. and NATO cannot be solely focused on military. It must consider economic, political, and societal factors in order to be adaptive.

III. CONTRIBUTORS' PRESENTATIONS

This section of the Report consists of presentations made by the contributors at the Special Forum: "NATO: Strategic Lessons From the Russian Invasion of Ukraine" that was held on April 28th, 2022 via Zoom conferencing. Some updates and revisions were made by the invited participants.

GENERAL (RET.) WESLEY CLARK

Former Supreme Allied Commander Europe

I had been Assistant Executive Officer to General Alexander Haig in the 1978-79 period when the Soviet Union brought the intermediate range SS20 mobile missiles in. They had multiple; they had three warheads. They could be hidden. NATO had nothing that was comparable, and there followed an anxious three, four years of debate, started by General Haig, followed by General Rogers that culminated ultimately not only in the GLCM and Pershing II developments, but in the 00 INF Treaty Auction. That was put in in the mid 80s, and by 1991, when the Soviet Union fell, we got rid of our tactical nuclear warheads. And, of course, there were no more theater weapons, the GLCMs and the Pershing II were long gone, so we were left with our strategic nuclear deterrent. It didn't seem to be a problem in the 1990s, but we never had the means of arms control to encourage the Soviets or Russians to give up their tactical nuclear weapons. In fact, they continued their tactical nuclear weapon modernization program.

I was in a darkened hotel lobby in the spring of 2014 in Ukraine after the Ukrainians had called me over to look at Maidan, and a professor came up to me, whose name I don't now have unfortunately, and explained that he had the KGB archives on the Cuban Missile Crisis. He explained it this way, he said, "I'm going to tell you why the Soviet Union lost the Cuban missile crisis." And I said, "Well, I'm not even sure you lost it. We gave up our Jupiter IRBM's in Italy and Turkey." He said, "No, no, we lost it. And I'll tell you why," he said, "Because once Khrushchev got engaged, it wasn't Kennedy's diplomacy. It was the fact that by the correlation of forces, the Soviet Union knew that it could not stand up to America because America had strategic nuclear superiority."

Vladimir Putin is the heir to all that work, and he's begun, starting in 2008 at least, maybe earlier, a very deliberate program of modernization of the Russian military, at all levels, most importantly at the strategic level. And this began to reach culmination in 2017 with the advertisement of the underwater drone 100 Megaton torpedo that can go into New York City, unleash a huge tidal wave and destroy Manhattan and in the hyper-sonics, which would be unstoppable. Of course, most ICBMs are unstoppable anyway. But he was convinced that he had something that we didn't. It gave him a sense of assurance. It freed him to then work at the lower levels. General Haig used to call strategic nuclear weapons, the ultimate arbiter. Well, Putin believes he has the ultimate arbiter today.

At the tactical and theater level, we have nothing but 100 warheads that could be delivered by F-16s if they could be penetrated in. Russia has some 2000 tactical nuclear warheads that could be used, and Putin has used these effectively in the Ukraine crisis thus far. By issuing these nuclear threats, he undercuts the credibility of the United States and the NATO deterrent. Why? Because we can't match them. If he fires 10 40-ton nuclear weapons to say, "Clear the site around Mykolaiv, so we can advance to Odessa." What would the United States and NATO do? We don't have anything comparable. We're not going to cause a Polaris missile to be launched off the coast of France to strike some Russian formation in Ukraine. It would be interpreted as a strategic attack. So, what would we do? Putin sees this. He thinks he's found a hole in our deterrence, and he believes that because of this hole, if he's able to use these tactical nuclear weapons, that NATO would jump back in fear. That the German socialists already would say, "Oh my goodness, Ukraine's not worth it." That the French would say, "Well, they can't come to France because we have our own nuclear weapons." That the Italians would say, "Well, please, let's just go on with business; Ukraine's not that important." And this kind of tactical use has been practiced in the Russian exercises. So, we have a certain problem with the concept of extended deterrence that we've lived with, really since 1950 in the United States. This is a huge challenge to NATO.

Now the current situation in Kyiv and Ukraine is a situation, I believe, of premature exultation. There are too many reports of the Russian army not being motivated, not being comparable. They're only advancing three, four kilometers a day. They have completely reorganized that force since the failures north of Kyiv. Putin turned it over to a general rather than trying to run it hands-on himself. The general went back to traditional formations—big groups of tanks, big, massive artillery, moves slowly, when you hit resistance, call in the artillery fire, blanket the area, every village that could hold ambushes, just level it with artillery. It's not very fast, but it's very effective if you don't run out of artillery or artillery ammunition. And right now, we figure the Ukrainians are outnumbered, maybe three, maybe four to one in artillery tubes. They also don't have the ammunition they need. And for all the announcements over the last week, that stuff is not there yet. So, at any moment the two pincers are coming together to encircle the Ukrainian force in the Donbas. Right now, they're 120 kilometers apart, but that's closing at the rate of four, five, seven, maybe ten kilometers a day. And at any point, that Ukrainian shell of a defense that's trying to hold open the shoulders or block the envelopment, could collapse because it's not in prepared defenses. And as those pincers close in, the Ukrainians are going to be forced to choose: Am I going to stay in an encircled position, and hope I'm going to be relieved? Or am I going to make a mad dash for the Dnieper and get across the bridge at Dnipro?

So, this is a really tough problem, and that's the current status. It invites Putin's use of nuclear weapons in two cases. Number one, in an echo of what was said by the United States in 1945. He starts to make momentum. He encircles the force. He's about to break out and take Odessa. He uses a few tactical nuclear weapons, 40 tons of explosives. Okay, it's bad, but it's not like Hiroshima. And, he says, "I hated to do this, but you know what? This is the best way to save the loss of life. The UN Secretary General told me to get this over with, and this is the fastest way to get it over with, and so that's why we've done this." He could do that. He could also use these nuclear weapons if, for some reason, the Russian advance falters and doesn't achieve the encirclement, and Russia is being thrown back. The Ukrainians will not give Russia a sanctuary. They're going to drive those forces all the way out of Donbas and probably go into Crimea if they have the capacity. And, he considers Crimea, Russia.

Look, we have a deterrence problem that's here. There are three scenarios that could happen. Scenario number one is that the Ukrainians just fall apart. It happens so quickly that Russia doesn't use nuclear weapons, and Russia ends up taking everything but Kyiv. And there's nothing left, and the Ukrainians say, "Just let us leave." I think that's unlikely. I don't think the Ukrainians would do that. I think they'll fight to the bitter end. But scenario number two is that Ukrainians are successful and push the Russians out, and then there's a resort to nuclear weapons. And then what does NATO do? Scenario number three is the mixed message. It's like, he takes the Donbas, the Ukrainians get their forces back. They still have a force; they're not powerful enough to force the Dnieper and regain the Donbas. They've lost Odessa; they're a landlocked country. Does NATO give them the wherewithal to secure their country? Or does Secretary General Guterres prevail and say, "Let's just stop the killing. Ukraine, you're gone. Russia, you're the aggressor nation. You violated all of norms, but go ahead and keep it because we can't do anything about it."

Those are the choices, and that's the dilemma. So, Yonah, I think we have a deterrent problem that has to be really thought through. I think we're going to need to invest in theater nuclear modernization and tactical nuclear modernization if we can't resolve this with Russia some other way, because our deterrence is being questioned. That is, if you're afraid to respond forcefully in Ukraine because Russia is threatening you with nuclear weapons, why is it really any different for the Baltic States? What, because you signed a document? Article five doesn't require you to launch a nuclear war to save the Baltic states. It says you'll do what's necessary in the defense. Maybe the defense is you can't get to the Baltic states, and you say, (motioned with hands to indicate it's not a U.S. problem). "But you know, we're going to put some more brigades in Germany. You won't come to Germany." We've already given the impression of being intimidated by the Russian nuclear threats. That's why the threats are being repeated.

So, we have a deterrent problem. We have an immediate problem of reinforcement to the Ukrainians and really the only viable way through this is that Ukraine forces the Russians out, and Putin concludes there's no point using nuclear weapons. "Let's try to keep Crimea," he says. And we let the diplomats argue over Crimea. I think we've got some serious challenges in these issues.

Thank you for allowing me to make this presentation, and I welcome others who are presenting. I'm honored to be with this distinguished group, and I will be with the discussion as long as I can. Thank you.

AMBASSADOR (RET.) ROBERT HUNTER

Former U.S. Ambassador to NATO

Thank you very much, Yonah. It is an honor as always to be with one of your seminars because over the years you have been a leader on discussion of some of the most critical issues facing this nation and the West, and today is no exception. It comes at a critical moment. I am not going to cover the same grounds as my distinguished former colleague, General Wesley Clark. We served together part of the time when I was the NATO ambassador and part of the time when he was the Supreme Allied Commander Europe. We would sit around the NATO table in the old headquarters – the good ole headquarters across the street from the current one – dealing with some of the more difficult problems, beginning of course with the implementation of the Stabilization Force (SFOR) for Bosnia and leading up to Kosovo (at that point, I had left NATO.)

I will not track over what he said about the dilemmas involved with nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence. I will address the situation short of getting into those questions which, God-forbid, we never have to. I will say one thing that in my long experience – fortunately I was too young for the only nuclear war we had in 1945 – I have been involved in these issues since 1962. Even when I was a mid-level officer at the White House Staff in 1964-5, basically working on education, I also worked on IAEA issues and on the issue of the NATO deterrent, including the mixed-man Multilateral Force (MLF). I did think I played a role in seeing that that did not go to fruition and indeed it didn't – the allies didn't want it. We created instead a NATO nuclear organization, the Nuclear Planning Group, which helped to deal with a requirement, to put it most starkly: "How did the United States convince the Europeans that we would be prepared to commit suicide for the defense of Europe?" That is what deterrence in Europe essentially was. That is what the various NATO agreements on this were and it took us a long time to get it done, and it continued to be an issue right up until the end of the Cold War. I was involved in the SS-20 question back in the late 1970s, when I was the lead official on NATO on the National Security Council staff. I was involved in the early negotiations, particularly with the Germans, the Dutch, and other allies regarding the U.S. deployment of American Pershing II and cruise missiles. Fortunately, that had a happy ending.

We are now in the post-Cold War era, and we may be in the process of leaving it because, let me use an emotive term which is also descriptive: "A naked Russian aggression" against a key part of Central Europe. Ukraine is not a formal member of NATO. We all know that, but it is on the high road, the classical high road for conventional war in both directions, going way back certainly to 1914, between Western Europe and Russia, then the Soviet Union, and now Russia again. As a result, what happens in this corridor stretching from the Russian frontier all the way into the heart of Western Europe is a critical power decision. I think we sent some very poor signals as to what we would do and what the strategic importance was and is of what happens in Ukraine. We are at a moment today as you can tell by watching television, if you saw President Biden earlier today and also the Secretary of Defense, Lloyd Austin, who essentially declared war on Russia. It was nothing short of that when he said our objective is to weaken Russia's forces. He was backed up by the White House Press Secretary who I guess was probably poorly instructed, but then General Austin at Ramstein over the weekend repeated that our objective is to weaken the Russian capacity to do against other countries in Central Europe what it has been doing in Ukraine. That obviously includes the formal members of NATO, but also Transnistria, which is part of Moldova and is a member of Partnership for Peace and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, but is not a NATO member and has never been given even the hint of a NATO security guarantee.

So, in my judgment, General Austin declared war on Russia. President Biden backed off from that, today. He said, "We are not making war on Russia. We are trying to stop Russian aggression on Ukraine." Fortunately, he backed off rather than ratifying what the Secretary of Defense said, which is I think another lesson, a strategic lesson on communications, which is that Secretaries of Defense ought to keep their mouths shut on matters like this. If there is going to be a communication that has authority on something as great as making war, it needs to come from the President or from the Secretary of State, or in certain circumstances, from the National Security Advisor. I doubt General Austin was so instructed. I think it was an unfortunate use of words, but it took the President of the United States until 11:15 this morning to correct the record and keep us from entering a new and uncertain strategic area, in which the United States for the first time since 1919 could get us into war with Russia. (A side comment: when I was with the National Security Council in the 1970s and dealing with Europe, one of the tiny little issues that I had to deal with was Railroad Retirement Benefits for

former U.S. railroad workers who were still alive who had worked on the Trans-Siberian railroad and got as far as Yakutsk in Siberia, as we and others were supporting the White Russians against the Bolsheviks, something almost no Americans know about!)

In my judgment, we need to communicate to Mr. Putin that he has already exceeded the limits beyond which we can tolerate, in terms not just of NATO but also of a strategic and security picture in Europe and more broadly in the world. The credibility of the guarantees from the United States is the bedrock of NATO. It is also a bedrock of what we do elsewhere in the world and, if we do not regain what I believe has been a diminishing of American credibility over the last two months, then we are going to have problems in a lot of places. The President is talking about another \$33 billion today in military and other aid for Ukraine, and when we refer to the meeting in Ramstein (Germany) the other day with 40 countries, including all the NATO allies and, prior to that, the provision of some weaponry to Ukrainian forces, I will argue that that is “a day late and a dollar short.” We should have been providing a lot more weaponry so we would not be talking today about how fast we can get things to Ukraine. We should have done that right from the start and certainly as soon as Ukrainian forces demonstrated that they were not going to lie down and be walked over. We have seen the courage of every Ukrainian, remembering the Holodomor of the starvation of the 1930s and the way in which they had been treated by the Soviet Union and now by Russia. We have also seen the amazing courage of Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and then the defense of Kyiv. It succeeded, not really because of what was provided from outside – which was instrumental – but the courage and determination of Ukraine to stand up. That’s the point at which we should have been rushing the kinds of weapons and other equipment we are now saying we are rushing. Well, “better late than never,” but there is a lesson to be learned, and I fear that this particular administration, like its three predecessors, did not respond as was necessary, not just for Ukraine but for European security overall.

Let me go back to 1989. George H. W. Bush declared as an objective in Mainz, Germany, in May 1989, trying to create a “Europe whole and free,” to which the words “and at peace” were later added. That is a grand strategy. It had a number of components, and I had the privilege of being one of the key architects of implementing that grand strategy when I was NATO ambassador for four-and-a-half years, during the time in which we put all the pieces in place and on which my team at NATO played an instrumental role. General Clark was involved in part of that later on after his predecessor, George Joulwan, had left and, before him, John Shalikashvili, who was one of the truly outstanding individuals that we have ever seen as SACEUR.

A key element of the reform and restructuring of NATO – and this is a central point for today’s discussion – was to reflect on what happened to Germany after the Great War, World War I. A key objective at NATO was to avoid what happened in Germany, and with Hitler, following the War Guilt Clause (231) of the Treaty of Versailles, which required that Germany take full responsibility for starting the war, in order to have a legal basis for reparations, particularly demanded by the French. Hitler went to town on that and it helped produce World War II. (Incidentally, one of the two authors of that clause was a young lawyer named John Foster Dulles.)

George H.W. Bush was determined not to make that mistake again and isolate Russia and treat it like a pariah. His objective was instead to include Russia in arrangements for Europe and its future, not to exclude it. Democrats agreed, and the Clinton administration picked up where Bush left off. One of the great things about NATO is that it has always been bipartisan. I do not think I can think of another element of today’s U.S. foreign policy that has always been bipartisan. It is a great strength for our country and a great strength for NATO and a great deterrent in itself.

There was an understanding that at some point Russia would rise again like the phoenix from the ashes and would become a major power in Europe that we would need to deal with, one way or another, and if at all possible without having a repeat of what happened with Germany after 1919.

So, what were the elements of NATO’s restructuring? Number one, the United States would remain as a European power. We would not leave like we did in 1919 or in part beginning in late 1945 and then coming back again militarily beginning in 1950 with Allied Command Europe. Number two, we decided to preserve NATO’s Integrated Military Command Structure. It is unprecedented in history. I do not need to review that for this group. Third, the “German problem,” – how to deal with a powerful Germany on the European Continent – which started about 1866, was in effect brought to an end. The Russians accepted, under the so-called Two-Plus-Four Agreement, that unified Germany would be within NATO. All of it. Why? So it would be in the NATO

alliance and so the United States could keep watch on Germany. Who was a great champion of that? German Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl.

We then, fourth, had to take Central Europe off the geopolitical chessboard. It had been a proximate cause of the First and Second World Wars and the Cold War. We started with Partnership for Peace, of which I was among a handful of “inventors,” which could well have been sufficient to help countries in Central Europe transform into Western-oriented democracies. But several of them said: “Wait a second, with what we went through in the Second World War and in the Cold War under Soviet domination, we need more than that to feel secure enough to get on with national transformation.” So, we undertook the first NATO enlargement in 1997, for three countries, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. The Russians didn’t like it, but they sat still for it for a simple reason: Poland and the Czech Republic surrounded Germany with NATO and hence also the United States, and that gave added assurance to everybody. So, I used to say, that this generation of Germans would make it impossible for a future generation of Germans, to do what the previous generations of Germans did. Russia has accepted that.

Where the problems began was with further enlargement, to begin with were the Baltic states as special cases. That went all the back to 1918 and then to 1939, with the Nazi-Soviet Pact. We in the West never recognized that they had been incorporated into the Soviet Union. And except for some Russian minorities, they are not Slavic countries. So, there is really no history of internalizing these states, as Putin is trying to do with Ukraine, by representing it as an inherent part of historic Russia and, he claims, thus never having been independent. So, even if Russia could tolerate the Baltic States in NATO, it could not tolerate other countries joining, in what Putin has called the “surrounding” of Russia with NATO. We can object to that characterization, arguing that NATO is not an aggressive alliance, but Putin has still been able to use NATO enlargement at home as a propaganda point.

Given this background, if Putin succeeds in Ukraine, he could well turn his attention elsewhere, by posing either direct kinetic security threats or newer threats like cyber and energy, which he is already doing to some degree. Thus, we thus have to help Ukraine in this war, in part to keep Putin from getting away with it – a first step in deterrence, if you will.

In restructuring NATO after the Cold War, the big issue was about Russia. So, before NATO enlargement came along there was negotiation of the NATO-Russia Founding Act, signed at the Élysée Palace on May 27th, 1997. Go back and read it. It’s got a bunch of principles and 19 areas of specific cooperation, plus a NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, but which had NATO allies all sitting on one side and the Russians sitting on the other. That was transformed at a summit in Rome in 2003, when the NATO-Russia Council was inaugurated. In the NRC, Russia would sit at the table with veto power equal to that of any of the NATO allies. That council is now in abeyance. In moving beyond the current crisis and war, if that is possible, the NATO-Russia Council needs to be revived.

What about Ukraine? It was understood in 1997 by everybody, including the Ukrainians at the time, that Ukraine could never become part of NATO and thus bring the alliance right up against the Russian frontier. So, what does that leave them? Well, one thing was that we were trying to get beyond spheres of influence and balance of power – though in fact Ukraine was to be neutral as between NATO and Russia, everyone understood that. So we negotiated a NATO-Russia Charter, which gives Ukraine all kinds of rights plus cooperation/consultations with NATO, short of full membership. (As the lead negotiator for NATO, I was in Kyiv in 2017 for the 20th anniversary and spoke in the Verkhovna Rada.)

Now, some things went wrong on the Western side. First, beginning in 1998, the people who had understood that you could not drive Russia into a corner because someday it’s going to come back at you, left the government and we were left with people who said, “Okay, Russia lost the Cold War so we can do whatever we want.” They started by attacking Serbia over Kosovo without a UN Security Council Resolution (unlike Bosnia, when Russia had accepted NATO military action and even joined the post-conflict Implementation Force.) The United States abrogated the ABM Treaty of 1972, abrogated the IMF treaty, got rid of Open Skies, and deployed ABM systems in Central Europe. The last were directed not against Russia but against North Korea and Iran. Russia knew that that did nothing to its own deterrent, but it was operating in its own backyard. Go back and look at what Putin said at the Munich Security Conference in 2007. Read that speech. We did not pick up on anything. I was there when it happened, and I was surprised that people just ridiculed Russia as

“just Guatemala with nuclear weapons.” (For its part, Russia left the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty.)

We come to 2008, and we have to review this because it is very important. The George W. Bush administration said, “Well why don't we bring Ukraine and Georgia into NATO?” The allies were horrified. Most of them were simply not going to agree to go to war for either country if it were attacked. But to give President Bush something to take home, politically, the allies agreed that the two countries “will become members” of NATO. In plain English, that was the moment of commitment. That is what the words meant, and they had no other interpretation despite the fact that some people say, “No, it was not really a promise.” But it was. It soon got tested by Georgia's President, Mikheil Saakashvili, who sent troops to try recovering the break-away province of South Ossetia, even though a US Assistant Secretary of State pleaded with him not to do so. When Russia responded militarily, not a single NATO ally did anything other than provide some weapons and ancillary support. It showed that the commitment to bring Georgia into NATO and, by extension, Ukraine was nugatory. Yet NATO, over and over, restated that Ukraine and Georgia “will become members” of the alliance. (Further, it could never happen, anyway, since NATO decisions are taken by consensus, and no consensus would ever be produced to admit either of these two countries. That continues to be true, today.)

I will not try to comprehend why Putin decided to seize Crimea in 2014 and then sent “little green men” to seize the Donbas. Some US/NATO missteps, discussed above, certainly did not help. It was naked aggression, however. NATO at that point did not do enough, clearly not enough, to counter what Russia did. This was a big mistake.

One of the US errors, and you can and look it up on the Internet, is that an Assistant Secretary of State tried to run a coup in Kyiv to put the preferred US candidate in as prime minister. The conversation was put on the Internet by the Russians. Everybody got upset because this person said something unpleasant about the European Union, but you have to listen to the rest of it which is, “We're going to get our guy in power.”

We get to now, when in this last year Putin felt strong enough to invade Ukraine. One incredible thing is that we had made a commitment to make Ukraine a member of NATO, but then did not act on the strategic/political pledge, on the ground that it was not a “legal” agreement.

So, we get to the problem after the war starts. The big strategic problem for NATO was how to get across to Putin that he cannot succeed in Ukraine, in part because we did give it a commitment, but then did not formalize it. That's number one. Number two, as Wesley Clark and others have asked: “Will Putin stop there?” And we are now in a position where we have to demonstrate to Putin that he cannot succeed in Ukraine because, if he does, then NATO's credibility for honoring Article 5 for allies will also be in deep trouble, along with the credibility of the United States. That is why I deeply regret we did not do more early on. The president of the United States, probably correctly, said in the beginning – and we will debate this for years – “No American troops.” He was worried about escalation, potentially even to the use of nuclear weapons by Russia, which Putin has discussed. President Biden is obviously worried about the United States getting into another war anywhere, just after we have gotten out of Afghanistan, and given that the American people do not want war anywhere else unless we are being attacked.

Step number one is we have to prevent Russia from succeeding militarily and we are now a day late and a dollar short. We also, in my judgment, should be keeping our mouths shut about things, like trying to weaken Russia. Of course, we would like to weaken Russia. Of course, we would like to make it more difficult or maybe even impossible for it to do to other countries what it is doing to Ukraine, but you keep your mouth shut about that. You do not force Putin to dig in his heels even more and also for people in Russia, who also, like it or not, most of them will support Putin if only on patriotic grounds. Putin is still 70% popular. It is not just that they are not being told what is going on. It is because they do not want to see their country attacked. That is one reason why we have not countenanced attacks in Russia. A couple of Ukrainians may have done that, but we have not countenanced it. I also regret that two days ago the British Foreign Secretary said, “We have to drive Russia out of Ukraine.” Well, if you are going to do it, do it, but keep your mouth shut about it. Further, it is not good policy if one means all of Ukraine, including Crimea, because if you realize that some form of negotiations are going to be needed to end this war, you certainly don't want to start off by signaling a lasting war with Russia. You have to be very careful what you say.

So, we need to put in whatever we have to and whatever we can in order to keep Russia from prevailing militarily, in its Phase One around Kyiv. We have to make sure it is denied Phase Two, which to start with is to create a landlocked Ukraine. We need to enable Ukraine to prevent Russia from having that land bridge. Third, we have to help Ukraine to make sure that, if the Russians are determined to try consolidating their position in the Donbas, they will pay a heavy, conventional military price.

So, we have to be in this with full-out support for Ukraine as NATO, but with the United States in the lead, because as we all know going all the way back to its founding, NATO has been nothing without the United States. And one little sidebar to make the point: People remember that on September 12, 2001, the day after 9/11, NATO declared Article 5. We did not ask for it. The Canadians proposed it. The allies asked, "Can we do it?" and they came to the United States and asked: "Do you mind if we declare Article 5?" We said "OK, if you want to do it, it is fine with us." Why did they do it? Not because they thought that there were going to be major terrorist attacks in Europe, even though there were some terrorist attacks but nothing of the quality and drama and lasting threat as we saw on 9/11. They got NATO to declare Article 5 on our behalf for one simple reason: They were worried we would become so distracted that we would not focus on the number-one European requirement, which was the defense of Europe against any possible Russian threat and preserving the credibility of the commitment to deal with Russia. Nobody but the US can deal effectively with Russia. The same with 2003, going into Iraq to support the US invasion (where Germany and France turned out to be right), and then getting involved in Iraq afterwards, and then later, of course, the allies sending troops to Afghanistan. They did it again in both circumstances for one reason: because only the United States can deal with Russia.

That is my bottom line right now. For the credibility of the alliance and the credibility of the United States, Russia has to "not succeed" in Ukraine, which means it is going to have to fail in Ukraine. That means getting the Donbas free of Russian forces. I think at the end of the day, frankly, nobody is really going to care if Russia ends up with Crimea. Nobody is really going to care as long as the principle of sanctity of international borders is clear, and Ukraine is in charge of the rest of its country, and it is Russia-free in terms of troops and fighting. So that, in my judgment, is the fundamental strategic posture problem for NATO, without succeeding at which NATO is going to be in deep trouble.

MAJOR GENERAL (RET.) MIHAIL E. IONESCU

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I would like to express my gratitude to be invited to this important reunion, with such distinguished and knowledgeable speakers, to discuss a topic crucial for future decisions in the field of war and peace, in the transatlantic community, and practically in the world. To respond appropriately to this difficult topic, let me define from the very beginning the following points of my attempt.

Firstly, I will concentrate on the political-strategic part of the matter and not on the military strategic (operational) level. In Madrid, in June 2022, a few weeks from now, the NATO Summit will give necessary guidance for at least another decade regarding the essential principles of evolution of this community of 30 nations. It will formulate the common vision regarding the changing global political-military environment and establish strategic-military posture in order to respond to the massive challenges of today and in the future. Secondly, on this conceptual basis, we must address the idea of consolidating NATO in the next decade, on the horizon of the 2030s, taking into account the unambiguous background:

- a common global vision
- ways to strengthen the transatlantic link
- construction of an adequate military strategy and forces
- distribution of the transatlantic burden
- the democratic resilience of our societies

On a personal note, our topic today will be researched and debated by academics, the military, and politicians for years and decades to come, using declassified documents on both sides of the hill, and there will certainly be much controversy, many diametrically opposed interpretations, and varied views. We are now, without any hint about the 'rule of the epilogue,' at the beginning of this process of gradually knowing the truth about these events, and trying to identify, even during their unfolding, what is essential or peripheral.

I also add that I am solely responsible for what I say.

I. QUESTIONS [OF THE TOPIC] TO BE ANSWERED

In this context, both of the crisis leading up to the Russian invasion of February 24 and the evolution of this military confrontation in Ukraine, Allied experts and analysts have been called upon to extract preliminary conclusions, to answer a broad package of questions, and build the vision of a *grand strategy* capable of delivering NATO relevance in the medium and long term.

Just a few such questions that I consider very important within this framework:

1. Did the Russian invasion of Ukraine aim to change only the strategic situation in Europe or, more than that, to change the entire global order?
2. Is this the first "proxy" geopolitical war in Europe, and does it set a model for the medium-term of future geopolitical clashes between the major nuclear powers in the global system?
3. What is the useful and economically and militarily favorable relationship between strategic deterrence and strategic defense in this future geopolitical environment?
4. What 'exits'/solutions observed historically from similar strategic difficulties and geopolitical clashes of the great powers are to be considered now and in the future: Helsinki -1975, Yalta -1945, Finlandization, or Ukraine - 2022?
5. Is there any resemblance of the current crisis in Eastern Europe to other historically registered crises after the Second World War ('Cuban missile crisis of 1962'; 'missile crisis of 1983')?
6. Is it conceivable that a development of events, imposed today on the United States, would eventually lead it to wage a war on two continental fronts, concomitantly, against Russia and China?
7. What is the solution for a US victory in such a confrontation on two fronts: unilateral preparation or readying NATO's robust European component capable, with American support, to maintain its own continental security?
8. Is the Russian-Ukrainian war a kind of prolonged "frozen war" produced by Moscow's strategy to keep for the years to come, or is Europe unstable and insecure, dividing allies and destroying transatlantic links?
9. What changes need to be made to NATO's war-fighting concept and included in the New Strategic Concept as a result of the lessons learned from this Russian-Ukrainian war ?
10. Is a Third World War, undoubtedly a nuclear one, unavoidable, or can diplomatic ways to prevent it be identified? If so, what are they and what suggestions does the current war in Ukraine offer?

And so on.

II. ABOUT THE RUSSIAN GOAL: EUROPE OR THE WORLD?

What have the five weeks of political-military developments of the Ukrainian war shown us, and what lessons can we draw for the future according to the guidelines outlined above?

Before anything else: does the Russian invasion in Ukraine only aim to change the balance of power in Europe or to transform the entire global system? The answer is extremely important because it engages the entire planning of NATO's grand strategy, but also the military and operational strategy and the entire future activity of the North Atlantic Alliance.

Here, in this perimeter, we identify today – namely, to be precise, before the end of the war, two opinions of the experts clearly expressed. The first, because it is the most widespread, is that the Russian invasion of Ukraine is the first phase of a conscious military effort by Russia to position itself against NATO and the European Union, the main continental institutions of Euro-Atlantic security. As one expert recently noted: “Russia’s explicit goal is the disintegration of NATO, the EU and any other structure in the international architecture that gets in its way. Thus, it makes no sense to say that ‘NATO is not at enmity with anyone.’”¹ Such a completely new situation in Europe since the invasion began on February 24 has made the old position of the Euro-Atlantic alliance no longer possible.

This old position was, in the formulation of a group of experts² in charge of elaborating a draft of a new strategic concept, dating from February 3, 2022: “The Alliance will continue to seek dialogue with Russia and honor the NATO-Russia Founding Act, even though Russia continues to breach the values, principles, trust, and commitments outlined in that and other agreed documents that underpin the NATO-Russia relationship.”³ But the same document has an paramount conclusion which has to be strengthened in the New Strategic Concept: “The upholding of the rules-based order will be further assured by reinforcing the transatlantic pact between North America and Europe in which Europeans become ever more central to European defense.”⁴

So, if the biggest war in Europe after the second global conflagration of 1939-1945 signifies that Russia’s position is the recovery of its former sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, then NATO must decide in Madrid, in the New Strategic Concept, that a completely new strategic orientation is needed. And this is to define Russia not as a competitor or possible partner, but as a self-declared enemy.

The second opinion, more recently expressed publicly, including by high-ranking allied politicians and experts, is that Russia’s so-called special military operation in Ukraine is the beginning of a violent challenge to the current global order. Thus, a professor from the University of Turku (Finland) recently wrote on her twitter account: “I’ve been asked in many discussions if I think the European and even global rules-based security order is dead due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. My short answer: it depends on the outcome of the war/ Ukraine’s defeat would encourage authoritarian great powers Russia and China to keep pushing for a revised security order based on spheres of influence and rejecting the values of democracy and human rights. One might argue that Russia and China would establish a different, but still rules-based order, with different rules, but fundamentally it would mean force prevailing over norms.”⁵ She concludes her analysis by showing that in Ukraine with the help of the West: “we can save the rules-based order and give a decisive blow to Russian imperialist ambitions and the spread of authoritarianism.”⁶ The Bulletin for the Atomic Scientists recently published an editorial on the war in Ukraine, in which it stated that: “The war in Ukraine is not only about the future of Ukraine. Both Russian and US leaders are making it increasingly clear that the brutal fight for territorial control inside the former Soviet republic is but part of a larger superpower struggle that will determine a new balance of power around the world.”⁷

¹ Mason, “Ukraine, NATO and a Zeitenwende.” Social Europe, April 11, 2022

²The Alphen Group (TAG) is an informal network of leading strategic thinkers who to considers the future of the transatlantic relationship and European security and defence .The members are:

Ambassador Alexander Vershbow;Lieutenant General (Ret.) ; Arne Bard Dalhaug;Dr. Alexandra Schwarzkopf; Professor Andrew Michta; Anna Wieslander; Professor Beatrice Heuser; Lt. Gen. (ret.) Ben Hodges; Dr. Claudia Major ; Colin Robertson; Edward Lucas; Assoc. Prof. Dr. Franco Algieri ; Professor Emeritus Georges-Henri Soutou ;Admiral (ret.) Giampaolo Di Paola; Dr Hans Binnendijk; Lt. Gen. (ret.) Heiner Brauss; Professor Holger Mey; Professor Jaap de Hoop Scheffer; General (ret.) Sir James Everard;Jim Townsend; Judy Dempsey ;Professor Julian Lindley-French (Chair);Kate Hansen Bundt; Marta Dassu; Professor Neil MacFarlane; Professor Paul Cornish; Professor Paul Schulte; Lord Richards of Herstmonceux; Dr. Colonel (ret.) Richard D. Hooker, Jr.; General (Retd.) Richard Shirreff; Professor Rob de Wijk; General (Ret.) Sir Rupert Smith; Dr. Sarah Kirchberger; Stan Sloan; Ambassador Stefano Stefanini; Professor Sten Rynning; Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff; Trygve Refvem; Professor Yves Boyer Professor Žaneta Ozoliņa-<https://thealphengroup.home.blog/>

³ Lindley-French, The Alphen Group, “The TAG NATO Shadow Strategic Concept 2022: Preserving Peace, Protecting People.” GMF, February 3, 2022

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Raik, "Thread: I've been asked in many discussions if I think the European and even global rules-based security order is dead due to Russia's invasion of Ukraine..." Twitter, April 22, 2022

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Hooper, “In search of a new world order, Russia and China team up to push Ukraine propaganda” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, April 20, 2022

III. BUT IS RUSSIA ALONE IN THIS EFFORT TO CHANGE THE BALANCE OF POWER IN EUROPE AND DEMOLISH THE GLOBAL ORDER?

More and more space in the comments of experts, as well as in those of allied politicians or their positions, is devoted to the thesis of an alliance, formal or informal, between China and Russia. It should not be ignored that Russia, during this Ukrainian war, will be not only declaratively but directly supported by China in its effort to demolish the global order. This is clear from the joint statement signed on February 4, 2022, by the presidents of the two major nuclear powers [China and Russia] that expressly states: *“The sides believe that certain States, military and political alliances and coalitions seek to obtain, directly or indirectly, unilateral military advantages to the detriment of the security of others/.../intensify geopolitical rivalry/.../. The sides oppose further enlargement of NATO and call on the North Atlantic Alliance to abandon its ideologized cold war approaches/.../. The sides stand against the formation of closed bloc structures and opposing camps in the Asia-Pacific region and remain highly vigilant about the negative impact of the United States' Indo-Pacific strategy on peace and stability in the region.”*⁸

The opposition of the signatories, Presidents V. Putin (Russia) and Xi Jinping (China), to NATO enlargement considered as a way to obtain *“military advantages to the detriment of the security of others”* and to US strategy in the Indo-Pacific region, is clear proof of a joint Russian-Chinese program of destruction of today's international order. Here is possible strategic coordination between the two powers shown by a recent statement on the content of the conversation of April 18, 2022 between the Deputy Foreign Minister of China Le Yucheng and Russian Ambassador to China Andrey Ivanovich Denisov: *“Le Yucheng said that under the guidance of President Xi Jinping and President Vladimir Putin, China and Russia maintain high-level development of the comprehensive strategic partnership /.../No matter how the international landscape may change, China will continue to strengthen strategic coordination with Russia for win-win cooperation, jointly safeguard the common interests of the two countries and promote the building of a new type of international relations./.../The two sides also exchanged views on deepening China-Russia cooperation within the framework of the BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as well as the situation in Ukraine and other international and regional issues of common concern.”*⁹ Along this line of finding, an analyst wrote on April 24 in an overview dedicated to the close relations between Russia and China: *“There is a growing trend in the West of treating Russia and China as an increasingly close political tandem, dubbed ‘Dragonbear’, referring to the two countries’ national animals.”*¹⁰ To complete the picture, US Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman said after talks with senior EU officials about China, NATO and the Indo-Pacific in Brussels (April 22) that *“Chinese state media has parroted the Kremlin’s lies and conspiracy theories, including absurd claims that Ukraine and NATO and the EU pose a security threat to Russia.”*¹¹

For NATO, the above mentioned positions are not just points of academic debate, but rather elements of a huge challenge to the very future of the alliance. In the previous two months of the conflict, in the face of Russian aggression, members of the North Atlantic alliance have shown extraordinary and even unexpected unity in supporting the Ukrainian military effort. At the same time, millions of refugees in Ukraine have received necessary support from the NATO states on the eastern flank, all members of the EU showing an unprecedented opening of cooperation between the two organizations.

At the Madrid Summit, NATO must responsibly take the necessary steps to secure its own medium and long-term future in the face of an existential threat. Below is an incomplete summary, not in any order of priority, of some of the challenges highlighted by the Ukraine conflict which the Summit must confront in accordance with the ‘lessons learned’ up to now: strengthening the transatlantic link; consolidating the defense of some regions on NATO's eastern flank of exceptional strategic significance in order to block the spread of Russian aggression; expanding the NATO alliance; building a compelling deterrent to Russia's aggression against Europe; and responding to the Russian-Chinese comprehensive partnership/alliance in the future.

⁸ Russian Federation and People's Republic of China, “Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China on the International Relations Entering a New Era and the Global Sustainable Development.” Russian Federation, February 4, 2022

⁹ MFA of the PRC, “Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China on the International Relations Entering a New Era and the Global Sustainable Development.” MFA of the PRC, April 19, 2022

¹⁰ Brzozowski, “What to make of ‘Dragon-Bear.’” Euractiv Global Europe Brief, April 24, 2022

¹¹ Ibid.

IV. ABOUT A 'PROTRACTED WAR' IN UKRAINE

Could the Ukrainian war be considered a 'frozen war' within Moscow and Beijing's strategy? The concept of the 'frozen war' has been mentioned, in today's circumstances, as a possible alternative for Russia to the military invasion of Ukraine. According to this concept, Russia would have rotated its troops on the border of Ukraine, so as to permanently maintain the pressure on this country and the West. As well-known strategist Lindley-French has written prior to the Russian invasion: *"The cleverest strategy Putin might adopt is to not quite invade Ukraine allowing coercion and the threat of invasion to keep Europe politically off-balance and the wider transatlantic alliance divided."*¹²

The invasion occurred, and in Lindley French's analysis we are in the third phase of the war between Russia and Ukraine (the first in 1914, the second, the invasion of February 24, and the third, launched with the focus of the Russian army on the Donbas and offensive actions already triggered). On the basis of the 'cleverest strategy' already mentioned, Putin could now consider encircling the bulk of the Ukrainian army in the Donbas, prolonging this operation; or, launching another operation also in Ukraine, so as to force the West to multiply aid to Kyiv significantly. This would keep the West busy asking itself 'what's next?' in Eastern Europe and caring all the time about deterring Russia. The West would be dispersing and consuming its own military forces and neglecting the other important global region, India-Pacific, where China could act. Here is the danger of the Ukrainian war for the possible big confrontation on two fronts which the US and its Allies could be pushed to wage: focusing on eastern Europe and losing the global overview of the Russian-Chinese challenge. In such a way, the Russian strategy of keeping Europe off-balance and dividing the transatlantic link could be unfolded up to the desired goal. A recent fascinating report on the war has *"the foremost conclusion"* that "Russia is now preparing, diplomatically, militarily and economically, for a protracted conflict."¹³

I note that in Western Europe, there is a growing dissatisfaction with the attitude of some allies (the case of Germany, which continues to import energy from Russia and thus financially subsidizes the Kremlin's war effort, while refusing to support Ukraine with heavy weapons, which has divided the domestic political scene; it is also worth mentioning France, whose military support does not rise to the expected level, and Bulgaria or Hungary). We must not forget in this narrative the common Russian-Chinese propaganda offensive in support of the actions launched by Russia to challenge the current global order, which is developing in Africa, India, Europe or elsewhere.

At the same time, along with the above, we must take into account the 'war fatigue' that could occur on this trend of incongruity in action across the EU, and even the possible negative impact of the waves of refugees from the war zone intentionally weaponized by Russia. Here is Lindley French's description of this scenario: *"Frozen war would also force risk-averse European leaders with their outmoded Bonsai armed forces, COVID economies and fin de siècle populations to choose between expensive and dangerous confrontation and appeasement. It would reignite the German Question as Germans were once again forced to face possible trauma in the future and the deep, dark traumas of the past. There is no guarantee that German angst would automatically lead to greater resolve to strengthen NATO. Frozen war would also create a new information war designed to stoke a new culture war similar to the public fear which greeted the 1983 deployment of Cruise and Pershing 2 missiles and the mass demonstrations in Western Europe it provoked. Putin is no Gorbachev and the former would like nothing more than to weaken the already frayed political bonds between the US and its Allies, humiliate NATO, and if possible 'decouple' the Americans from the defense of Europe."*

It is important to consider how much is needed, especially concerning the prolongation of the Ukrainian war. There is a careful correlation between forces, means, and political or military risks. If for Russia, a prolongation of the war without a swift victory will appear to be a strategy to reach the final goal, then a protracted war in Ukraine will put the West in a limited situation. Therefore, a quick successful end of the Ukraine war (or even a suitable settlement) is needed, and the increase of Western support in this regard (while avoiding the nuclear threshold), is decisive.

¹² Lindley-French, "Frozen War: The Whiff of Munich?" The Lindley-French Analysis, February 15, 2022

¹³ Watling and Reynolds, "Operation Z: The Death Throes of an Imperial Delusion." Royal United Services Institute for Defense and Security Studies, April 22, 2022

V. STRENGTHENING THE TRANSATLANTIC LINK

The Washington Treaty states that the alliance between the two shores of the Atlantic Ocean is "*founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law*," fundamental values that unite the 30 members. The current global order is an expression of their common political will. In the run-up to the Alliance's New Strategic Concept Summit, an indisputable truth has been stated: "*NATO will remain the unique, essential, and indispensable transatlantic forum for consultations and joint action on all matters related to the individual and collective security of the allies, as set out in Article 4 of the Washington Treaty.*"¹⁴

The war in Ukraine hastened what was already assumed in principle, namely the establishment of a framework for debating the issue of transatlantic security in a NATO-EU context, which was already in the process of implementation. In this context, the EU adopted the '*strategic compass*' last month, practically a security strategy for the organization. Overall, the document is seen as being "*a quantum leap forward*" in the direction of building a "*stronger and more capable EU in security and defense*" and towards increasing its contribution to global and transatlantic security. This dimension of the EU will be definitively complementary to NATO. Among other things, the document provides: training of a strong EU Rapid Deployment Capacity of up to 5000 troops, for crisis interventions; the carrying out of regular training exercises on land and sea; optimizing military mobility, etc.¹⁵ The executive summary of the EU document contains a crucial paragraph for its entire orientation: "*The transatlantic relationship and EU-NATO cooperation, in full respect of the principles set out in the Treaties and those agreed by the European Council, including the principles of inclusiveness, reciprocity and decision-making autonomy of the EU, are key to our overall security. The EU reaffirms its intention to intensify support for the global rules-based order, with the United Nations at its core. It will also reinforce its strategic partnership with NATO and increase its cooperation with regional partners, including the OSCE, AU and ASEAN.*"¹⁶ I mention that in the late 1990s, when the UK was part of the EU, a decision was made to form a 60,000-military Rapid Reaction Force for military intervention as needed. Unfortunately, it was unfulfilled for various reasons. We realize that this level of ambition can be much higher in the perspective of transatlantic cooperation for the defense of the current global order. At the same time, NATO's announcement that the New Strategic Concept will have to debate the world role for NATO shows that this transatlantic cooperation has to become a fundamental pillar to global stability. The NATO Secretary General's participation in the G-7 meeting in Brussels on March 24, 2024 is a proof of that orientation, taking place in a period of effervescent mobilization of NATO, EU and G-7 to assess the global security situation and take action accordingly.

VI. A COMPELLING DETERRENT IN EASTERN EUROPE

During the Russian invasion of Ukraine and in close connection with its evolution, various escalation scenarios were circulated. Among them, on the basis of the imposition of a nuclear alert by the Kremlin (February 27), the dangerous scenario of a nuclear confrontation began to be considered, especially since the Russian leader's medium and long-term intentions were unknown. Then, when Russian troops carried out military operations in both the Chernobyl (closed) and the Zaporozhe (operational) plants, these fears of escalating beyond the nuclear threshold multiplied (use of tactical nuclear strikes by Russia). In addition, the massive Western support sent to Ukrainian defenders in convoys arriving at Ukraine's borders could finally lead the Kremlin to invoke this as NATO participation in the war. This, coupled with the plight of Russian forces on the ground in Ukraine operations, has once again raised fears that tactical nuclear strikes could be used by Russia to force the West to suspend or reduce aid.

The hypothetical escalation and the possibility of a nuclear accident in Ukraine were also arguments - in addition to the possibility of Russia attacking the territory of an alliance member - often imagined when considering the probability of the outbreak of a Third World War. The hybrid war between the two camps has increased the perception of this probability, with some Russian commentators insisting that such a war, while not immediate, is an inevitable one. In the West, this scenario, which encourages growing fears of a global war, has been used by some political leaders to prevent the deployment of high-performance weapons for defense in Ukraine. Germany, after announcing the abandonment of the Ostpolitik assumed in the 1960s and at the

¹⁴ Lindley-French, The Alphen Group, "The TAG NATO Shadow Strategic Concept 2022: Preserving Peace, Protecting People." GMF, February 3, 2022

¹⁵ European Union, "A Strategic Compass for Security and Defense." European Union External Action, March 24, 2022

¹⁶ Ibid.

same time the allocation of important financial funds for the country's military preparation, hitherto neglected for several weeks, despite international and domestic pressure, to deliver heavy weapons (howitzers, tanks) to Ukraine as aid.¹⁷ After the concentration of Russia's offensive military actions in the Donbas, where World War II-type confrontations are specific to the vast steppes here, and the countering of Russian military means requires such heavy weapons, on April 25, Berlin announced that it will deliver heavy howitzers and tanks. The same thing happened in France, where for electoral reasons it was only after the second round of voting that heavy armor was sent to Ukraine (the Caesar howitzer).

As experts noted, in the first eight weeks of fighting weapons were delivered to Ukraine as a symbol of support by the West; especially small arms and Javelin anti-tank armor, which were useful, for example, to stave off the enemy in the Kyiv region. In the last two weeks, the US-Biden administration has sent heavy howitzers and artillery rounds, armored vehicles, counter-battery radars and deadly experimental drones, the type of armaments desperately asked for by Ukrainian field commanders.¹⁸ On the other hand, in order to avoid escalation towards WW3, the request by Kyiv to install a no-fly zone in Ukraine was rejected. But, what was noticed from the beginning of the war in Ukraine was that the NATO forces on the eastern flank were insufficient to be a credible deterrent to the aggressive Russian actions. A more robust NATO military deterrent had begun to be set up after March 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea, but its consolidation had been delayed in recent years. Today, the situation is considered to be dangerous, and during last March the first measures to consolidate it were taken, especially in the southern part. Basically, in March it was decided to double the number of multinational battle groups deployed on the Eastern flank (from 4 to 8), but it is not enough. As mentioned some weeks ago by the US military chief, General Mark Milley, in congressional hearings, after 2005 the number of American soldiers deployed in Europe decreased rapidly, reaching about 30,000, and only recently through new deployments did this number rise to 100,000. According to the Pentagon, a credible deterrent would be the deployment of permanent military bases on the eastern flank in Poland, Lithuania, and Romania, and these changes might be under study at both the Pentagon and NATO headquarters.

As I underlined above, an EU-USA forum for debating security and defense issues has existed since 2021, as an expression of the will to fight together [against] security threats according to mutual ties, values and common interests. The focus of discussions in this forum include cooperation in various fields: cyber defense, climate change, disruptive technologies, etc.¹⁹ The issue of "strategic autonomy" by the EU is expected to be one of the hot topics in this forum, especially since the war in Ukraine has demonstrated the imminent danger of Russian aggression. Furthermore, a common European military force to oppose it is not available, and its construction will take time. The importance of this issue is also mentioned by J. Lindley French, who argues the most comprehensive and efficient deterrent against Russia is related to having an operational and robust European military force, which would be available, in cooperation with American forces, to defend NATO territory on the Eastern flank. Here is Lindley French's opinion on such a force: *"reinforcing the Eastern Flank of the Alliance. That means the strengthening of the Enhanced Forward Presence; the acceleration and expansion of the NATO Readiness Initiative; and by moving HQ Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (HQ ARRC), NATO's most capable non-American deployable corps headquarters from England to near Warsaw reinforced by American, British, German and Polish forces and in support of the EFP forces, HQ Multinational Corps (Northeast) and supported by the Joint Support and Enabling Command (JSEC). HQ ARRC must now be designated as the command and development driver for a new European-led first responder, high end multi-domain Allied Mobile Heavy Force (AMHF) heavy enough to fill the 1500 km gap between MNC (NE) the Black Sea and the Baltic States, maneuverable enough to both deter a high-end aggressor such as Russia, heavy enough to also support front-line states facing terrorism, as well as capable enough of holding the European theatre across the hybrid, cyber, hyper war spectrum in an emergency if US forces are simultaneously engaged in Europe, the Indo-Pacific and elsewhere."*²⁰

In such an era of uncertainty and a lack of international communication between the conflicting camps, such strategies must be adopted quickly and implemented urgently.

¹⁷ Kutschaty, "Video: Wir wollen Deutschland nicht in den dritten Weltkrieg hineinziehen." Welt, April 25, 2022

¹⁸ Miller and McLeary, "Heavy weaponry pours into Ukraine as commanders become more desperate." Politico, April 25, 2022

¹⁹ Brzozowski, "EU-US to start new defence and security dialogue in early 2022." Euractiv, December 6, 2021

²⁰ Lindley-French, "Ukraine and a NATO Theory of Victory." The Lindley-French Analysis, February 24, 2022

VII. NATO ENLARGEMENT

Russia's aggression in Ukraine has condensed decades of historical developments into weeks. Ironically, given the arguments invoked within the proposed Russian draft treaty with NATO in December 2021 (which calls for the abandonment of NATO's enlargement), after the launch of the Ukraine invasion on February 24, Finland and Sweden, neutral countries, have expressed their intent to join the North Atlantic Alliance.

NATO enlargement by including these two Nordic countries expands NATO's eastern flank, but at the same time adds value to both the building of a compelling deterrent and the successful defense of the territory between the Arctic and Black Seas in the event of Russian aggression. The strategic space of defense becomes much wider and more compact, hindering the strategic maneuvers of the enemy, and the military and political impact of the alliance with these two countries cannot be underestimated. In an article published in *Foreign Affairs*, the former Prime Minister of Sweden, Carl Bildt, argues that the accession of these two countries to NATO at the Madrid Summit changes the security architecture in Northern Europe: *"Integrated control of the entire area will make defense of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania easier [... it] will strengthen deterrence and make a conflict there less likely [...] increase the alliance's political strength as the pillar of the defense of Europe and the transatlantic area [...] underlining that "neither Finland nor Sweden is likely to seek any permanent basing of major NATO units in their territory, and both are likely to have the same reservations about housing nuclear weapons."*²¹

PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS

As the Ukrainian war intensifies, both long expected and totally unexpected events are happening. In the first category: the Bundestag motion today to send heavy weapons to Ukraine; for so long this has been refused by the government in spite of domestic and international pressure. In the second: yesterday, statements of some officials in the UK and the US concerning the West's goal in Ukraine have been summarized as the "weakening of Russia." Accordingly, the current analysis has to be refined, and even revised in some details. That is the risk I had in mind when I referred to 'the rule of the epilogue'.

The Ukrainian war, as an unfolding 'proxy geopolitical war,' might be usefully studied according to the theory of the systemic hegemonic war. NATO's NSC in Madrid should be tailored accordingly, preparing the alliance for the future.

Installing a compelling deterrent against Russian aggression against the NATO countries in Eastern Europe should be implemented fast alongside the unfolding Ukrainian war.

²¹ Bildt, "NATO's Nordic Expansion." *Foreign Affairs*, April 26, 2022

PROFESSOR HERMAN MATTHIJS

University Ghent & Free University Brussels

Hello from Belgium, where it is already the evening. I live in the Northeast side about 100 kilometers from the Capital, Brussels, where NATO political headquarters is located. The SHAPE HQ is 75 km located from here! That is approximately 75 kilometers from here. My slides concern the defense spending of NATO members and over the past years I have written a few articles concerning the defense spending of countries in NATO as well as those outside NATO. My source for this contribution is the yearly report of the NATO 2021 of the Secretary General. For my presentation, I want to show you something that happened over the last years with the Wales agreement in 2014 when they decided in NATO, with the persuasion of President Obama, that all the NATO members should have a defense spending of 2% GDP. Also, 20% of the national defense budget should be spent on investments.

The targets of Wales are what we see in the 2021 annual report, which was presented a few weeks ago here in Brussels. In 2021 we saw that 8/30 members in NATO are at the 2% GDP norm. The number one on the “hit list” is Greece, who is always a big spender, then the US, Poland, the UK, the three Baltic states, and Croatia which makes 8 at the national defense budget spending of 2% like was decided in the Wales-Cardiff Summit of 2014. We do find 3 countries, Romania, Norway, and France, who are at 1.75%, and then quite a few members between 1.5% and 1.75%, which is 11 that is 1/3 of the total group under the norm. What is seen from the figures over the last decade is that the lowest points of defense spending were in the year 2017. From 2017 to 2021 there was certainly an improvement in the European members concerning defense budget spending. I have to underline that over the last days and weeks, several European leaders decided that they should upgrade and increase the defense budget. Also, you see from the great European states that only the UK and Poland are over the 2% norm. France in 2021 was 1.93%, so I suppose within the next year, the Macron government will reach 2%. Germany was at 1.49% GDP in 2021, but the German Chancellor has already declared that the federal republic will reach the 2% over the next few years. The German GDP is the greatest in Europe and the second highest in NATO, behind the US. This means that Germany, in a few years' time, will have the most important defense budget in Europe. Then, look at the other greater states in Europe: Italy at 1.54% and Spain at 1.03%. So, still, a lot of necessary improvement to look for more defense means in Spain. Let's say, in the next years, France and the Federal Republic of Germany will reach the NATO 2% guideline.

There was a second guideline in 2014 that NATO members should reach 20% spending on defense investments. In 2016, we see that only 9 members reached this norm. Now, in 2021 the yearly report of the NATO secretary-general, shows that 21 of members of NATO have reached this second target from the 2014 summit. In other words, it is easier to reach the second target of the summit than the first. Here, we see that in a few years, the number of countries will be 25, 26, or 27 that will be at the target. When you also view the yearly report, it is also interesting to see the amount of military personnel. I have taken here the year 2016, which was when most countries were at the lowest point; in other words, the year they had the lowest amount of military personnel manpower and compared to 2021. You will see the US was always more than 1.3 million, so if you compare for 5 years, they have increased by 50,000. In the UK, also, you see an enormous upgrade in military manpower over 5 years, from 139,000 to 156,000. Then you see Turkey always had enormous manpower in their army for tradition. The cycle is always the tension between Greece and the geographic location of Turkey. You see, in 2016, Turkey's army did have manpower of 359,000, and in 2021 it had 439,000- so an upgrade of 80,000. Then take the rest of Europe, which is the EU, Baltic states, and Norway, there is an increase in military manpower. It was 1,218,700 (2017) to 1,263,700 (2021) so a 45,000 increase in manpower from EU states. The conclusion is that it is not a guideline of the Wales summit, but you see that over the last 5 years, except in Canada, there was an increase in investment in manpower.

Over the last few years, there has been a lot of discussion concerning a European Army. There was already a discussion in the 1950's and 60's but let us be honest if you take the 27 EU states, including Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Poland, and Belgium, we had in 2021 1.3 million troops and a defense budget of \$230 billion with all the states together. So compared with the last slide compared to the US, there is not much of a difference between EU armies and the US. But there is a large difference between the financial and budget means if you take the US government defense budget and all the 27 member states of the EU. Of course, I

have to underline the fact that most of the EU states are located with a budget lower than the 2% NATO GDP spending.

The most important European army is the UK. I already said 156,000 troops and in USD, a military budget in 2021 of \$66 billion. There is always a difference between the #1 in NATO, which is the US with \$811 billion from 2021. Turkey has an enormous army, but in the budget, it is \$7.2 billion, which is not the greatest budget. One of the main reasons they are so low is the devaluation of the Turkish currency. Take the 3 Balkan states – Kosovo, Montenegro, and Albania – with Iceland and Norway. These 5 countries have 38,000 troops and a budget of \$8.3 billion. The most important is Norway, of course, with \$7.4 billion. Then you have Canada, but the conclusion is that you can't say Europe hasn't invested troops, with 1.3 million, which may be enough to create a European army but does not have the budget. Also, over the last decades, between the creation of NATO, European security was and is paid for by US taxpayers. That is, I suppose, one of the reasons that the Obama administration said in 2014 that there must be more European money on the table in the Wales Summit.

Moving to my conclusions, let us be realistic. NATO, for the moment, is the only possibility to protect Europe. The budgets in Europe are too small; there was maybe more coordination in the past with European armies, but the main question in the next years will be the political questions and if the German government will increase the German military budget to more than 2% of GDP. Then, the German budget will be a lot higher and more important than the French. That would be a problem for the Macron administration. They asked Macron, who was just re-elected, about a European army if he would agree to transfer French nuclear power to Europe, and he said no. He always says the same thing: France is one of the 5 countries on the UN Security Council with a permanent seat and veto power, and he has said that the security veto seat should stay in Paris. We also have economic, financial, and cultural relationships with North America and Western Europe. Certainly, on the European side, the budgets were and are focused on budget savings. If you compare the lowest point, 2017, and today based on the last figures in the NATO report from 2021. The point is also "what are the declarations of government leaders in Europe from the Ukraine War?" We will see what they will do based on the reality of this war in increasing the military budget. Also, for Europe the fact that in the period of the creation of NATO in 1949 last century to now 75 years later is a very long period of historic peace in Western Europe. Would we have the same peace situation without NATO - I doubt it, really. If you go back in history, the war between France and Germany and WWI was 40 years. Then in 1940, there was only 22 years difference from the first World War. We have now, for European historical norms, a very long period of peace in Western Europe. Then, I want to conclude with a topic from the news. What would happen if Finland and Sweden joined NATO? Don't forget Finland has a long border, 1,300 kilometers, a direct border with Russia. Also, Finland has increased their military budget over the last few years. It is already at 2% GDP in accordance with Wales Summit guidelines. In Sweden, the government has declared that they will upgrade their military budget from 6 billion euros to 10 billion Euros. In that case, this Scandinavian country will reach 2% GDP. I will also underline that Sweden has a very important military industry. Finland, who may be the next member of NATO, has bought the American F-35A jet fighter. Also, Switzerland has decided to buy the F-35A as well. To conclude with that, a lot of European neutral states today - what is the value of a neutral state like Finland and Sweden – who may want to join NATO. They can say bye to neutral state status. There is a demand from the Swiss capital for NATO to make more coordination with NATO, which is very historically for a very neutral state. The conclusion is that with the Ukraine War, we will certainly see an increase in military budgets for the next years.

IV. COMMENTATORS' REMARKS

This section of the Report consists of remarks made by the commentators at the Special Forum: "NATO: Strategic Lessons From the Russian Invasion of Ukraine" that was held on April 28th, 2022 via Zoom conferencing. Some updates and revisions were made by the invited participants.

PROFESSOR NATIVIDAD CARPINTERO SANTAMARIA

Professor at the Polytechnic University of Madrid (UPM) and General Secretary of the Instituto de Fusión Nuclear "Guillermo Velarde"

The Russian-Ukrainian war and the energy emergency for the European Union:

Energy supply is one of the biggest issues for the security of the European Union and the Russian invasion of Ukraine has made this issue a major concern.

Energy prices are currently higher than ever before and continue to be volatile. One of the main reasons for the price increase is the global demand for economies recovering from COVID-19. The other main reason for the energy crisis is derived from the Russian invasion of Ukraine which has aggravated the context of primary energy supply to the EU. Gas prices have risen sharply in the last weeks with today being 40% in US dollars per million Btu more expensive than in 2016 and continue to be alarmingly high for citizens.¹

The uncertainty of supply from Russia, as a main supplier of gas to Europe, is increasing as is the instability of the market in the medium term. In case of a disruption in Russian supplies, the EU would be most vulnerable in terms of diesel, naphtha and fuel oil. According to Eurostat, EU countries imported 58% of their energy consumption in 2020 with Russia being the main supplier of natural gas (46%), oil (26%) and coal (53%).²

However, within the European Union, there are big differences between countries with respect to energy import considerations. One example includes the case of Germany and Spain. Germany is presently in the process of phasing out its nuclear power program which provides almost 12% of its energy generation. In 2021, Germany had six nuclear power reactors in operation that will be permanently shut down by the end of 2022. The country is the biggest consumer of Russian natural gas which accounted for 55% of German gas imports in 2021.³ With respect to coal imports, the situation is the same, Germany imported 45% of this mineral from Russia in 2019.⁴ In contrast, Spain has the largest number of regasification plants in the whole European Union. The latter of which will provide a relief in gas imports for the EU since it will be able to become an alternative instead of importing liquefied natural gas (LNG) from countries such as the United States and others, and distribute it to the rest of the EU.

Last February, after long debates in the EU Parliament, it was decided to sanction Russia by halting the opening of the Russian Nord Stream 2- an offshore natural gas pipeline under the Baltic Sea that would supply gas from northwestern Russia to Germany. Both the Nord Stream 1 and the North Stream 2 offshore natural pipelines were built to alternate the impact of the passing of Russian gas through Ukraine- the main transit country since the Soviet Union period and with a big and powerful gas pipelines infrastructure which presently supplies a quarter of Russian gas import to Europe.

EU POLICY FOR NON-DEPENDENCE OF RUSSIAN FUELS:

The abovementioned situation has led EU countries to draw a new line in energy transition that contemplates an energy diversification with a policy for non-dependence of Russian fossil fuels before 2030. The plan is known as REpowerEU and it focus is twofold: 1) to increase the resilience of the EU's energy system. 2) to import greater amounts of gas and LNG from countries such as the United States, Azerbaijan, Qatar, Japan, South Korea among others. This policy will exponentially reduce the EU's dependence on Russia as a primary source of energy.

¹ <https://en.irefeurope.org/publications/online-articles/article/is-russian-gas-indispensable-for-germany/>

² <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-/ddn-20220328-2>

³ <https://www.businessinsider.com/germany-europe-russia-gas-renewables-oil-energy-security-ukraine-war-2022-4>

⁴ <https://www.dw.com/en/how-can-the-eu-survive-without-russian-coal/a-61379128>

NATO PIPELINE NETWORK IN EUROPE:

NATO pipelines cover 5,200 kms through 10 different networks. They provide fuel for transport, ground vehicles, tanks and aircrafts. The Central Europe Pipeline System (CEPS) is the largest system of NATO and meets operational necessities in Central Europe in cases of conflict, peace and crisis situations. CEPS pumps fuel 24 hours during 365 days with a volume of 13 million cubic meters of fuel per year. NATO also supplies fuel for civil airports in Brussels, Frankfurt, Luxembourg, Schiphol and Zurich. Brussels civil airport has had a NATO pipeline as a fuel supplier since 1993.

UKRAINIAN ENERGY SITUATION:

“Current crisis in Ukraine is a serious conflict due to its international implications. Political instability in the country grew after the so-called Orange Revolution in 2004 and removal of President Viktor Yanukovich in February 2014 has given rise to severe civil confrontations [...] One key factor in this conflict is gas supply.” (NATO. From Regional to Global Security Supplier, 2015). Indeed, deep structural changes and an overall decline in economic activity caused total gas consumption to fall from 50.4 bcm in 2013 to 29.8 bcm in 2019. Since 2008, constant disputes with Russian Gazprom on the price of gas and tariff borders through Ukrainian territory led the Ukrainian government to source its imports from European suppliers instead. Coal production and transportation have also been severely disrupted in the Donbas region and in conflict areas. Due to the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014, Ukraine stopped gas imports from Russia and started gas import supplies from European countries. However, most of Ukraine’s imported gas is still of Russian origin and reaches Ukraine through reverse flows.

CYBER ATTACKS:

Until the present conflict ends, it is difficult to have a complete picture of the cyber-attacks aspect of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Although increasing efforts are being done to protect Ukrainian cyberspace, cyber installations are still rather poorly protected. Since 2015, Ukraine has been the target of several attacks which have been attributed to Russia. Cyberattacks targeting critical infrastructure are of particular concern for the survival of the civilian population. They imply terror and uncertainty for people and governments. According to the Council of Foreign Relations, Russia has been launching distributed denial of service attacks (DDoS), wiper malware, and phishing attacks against Ukrainian websites with some being more successful than others.

In consonance with this situation and under proper debate and considerations, the following statement should be taken into mindful account: “Conflict in Ukraine presents perhaps the most acute cyber risk the U.S. and western corporations have ever faced. The invasion by Russia has led to the most comprehensive and dramatic sanctions ever imposed on Russia, which views such measures as economic warfare. Russia will not stand by, but will instead respond asymmetrically using its considerable cyber capability.”⁵

NATO AND COLLECTIVE CYBER DEFENSE:

Cyber defense is part of NATO’s core task of collective defense. NATO Cyber Rapid Reaction teams with 200 people are on standby 24 hours a day/365 days to assist allies, if requested and approved, and share real time information working by means of a special malware information platform. Allies are committed to protecting their critical infrastructure and IT Infrastructure which covers over 60 different locations (political headquarters in Brussels and military commands to the places of NATO operations). The NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) is based at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe in Mons, Belgium and is in charge of registering suspicious events or increasingly sophisticated attacks. Last 24th of April, NATO incorporated a sophisticated Network Intrusion Protection System and Full Packet Capture System to strengthen cyber technology, so as to face the present challenging security situation.

Main NATO cyber defense structures include: the Communications and Information Agency and the Cooperative Cyber Defense of Excellence (Tallin, Estonia). It is important to remark that on April 27th, 2007 a group of hackers directed numerous DDoS attacks toward Estonia’s essential infrastructure, telecommunications, e-mails, etc. that practically paralyzed the country.

⁵ Paul R. Kolbe, Maria Robson Morrow and Lauren Zabierek Harvard Business Review. The Cybersecurity Risks of an Escalating Russia-Ukraine Conflict. February 18, 2022.

Other NATO cyber defense infrastructure includes the School Oberammergau (Germany), the Communications and Information Academy (Oeiras, Portugal), and the Defense College (Rome, Italy). All NATO agencies are devoted to strengthening and protecting cyber domains; the development of strategic thinking on cyber defense issues; and the education and training capabilities and technological development to defend the alliance's IT and communications systems in land, air and sea operational scenarios.

PROFESSOR SHIMON SHETREET

Greenblatt Chair of Public and International Law, Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Former Cabinet Minister and MK, Israel

Many thanks to the excellent and distinguished speakers before me this evening.

Certainly, the evidence that came from Ukraine gave strong evidence about war crimes and the international bodies in charge of criminal investigations on war crimes are working quite hard to accumulate evidence. It is not clear what the procedure will be. Certainly, it is doubtful whether President Putin himself would be directly addressed as the defendant in these proceedings, but certainly the field commanders and the medium-level people who were on the ground will be exposed to the possibility of being charged with violations of crimes against humanity and serious violations of war crimes. As we have seen in the news, eyewitnesses have reported all these atrocities.

I want to make, with your permission Yonah, a few comments about a number of points that were made. I would like to say that we have seen changing aims of NATO and the West. In the beginning, the wording was, "just to provide Ukraine with defensive weapons." I quoted at the previous discussion on Ukraine "qualified military assistance." In addition to humanitarian and economic measures. The weeks after, Ukraine has shown courage and the ability to withstand Russian forces, the West decided to upgrade Ukraine support and today we heard about the package of \$33 billion by President Biden for Ukraine which I would say dramatic, in the context of the Ukrainian war. I think that it is legitimate to expect more coordinated statements from the West about what the aims are. We heard from Ambassador Hunter about the statements that were made by Defense Secretary Lloyd, "to weaken Russia" and then there's some reservation on the part of President Biden. So, I think what is important is that we should see coordinated statements in communications on this point.

My last point is that I see a direct link between the issue of "deterrence" which was justifiably emphasized by General Clark and then Ambassador Hunter. I see a direct link between their statements in the analysis of professor Matthijs about the defense budget. Europe has been "sleeping" for many, many decades because they were under the shelter or the umbrella of the U.S. protection. Therefore, my hope for the benefit of the democratic and liberty values that the European countries will wake up. It seems that they are aiming at increasing their defense budget to 2% GDP, but I think that this is very important if they want to be ready for the future challenges which are faced by the democratic countries, vis a vis the autocratic countries.

BRUCE WEINROD

Former Secretary of Defense Representative for Europe and former Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and NATO Policy

Thank you, Yonah, and thank you everybody else. This has been a very illuminating discussion and it's great to have a conversation that goes into real depth rather than, unfortunately, a lot of the other short term forums such as Twitter, where people just speak with only a sentence or a paragraph. So, to be able to go into depth is really, really good.

Let me start out, and I'll try to just hit some high points based on what's been discussed already, first of all to note that NATO obviously is alive and well despite the predictions of a number of commentators and scholars over the years. I recently had the opportunity to look back and found that in 2002, a Council on Foreign Relations fellow Charles Kupchan predicted that NATO would have pretty much disappeared by 2010. Richard Hass, the President of the Council of Foreign Relations, wrote an op-ed for the New York Times in 2014, I think it was, asking if NATO disappeared, would anybody miss it? Would anyone feel the need to establish it again? He also said the unfortunate answer to these questions was no. He was wrong and I wrote something at

the time in *The American Interest* disagreeing and explaining why NATO was still very much needed. Now Finland and Sweden along with many other nations certainly appreciate that NATO is around. And then you have professors, the self-styled realists, such as Professor Walt at Harvard who had constantly predicted that NATO just could not possibly continue because it violates his theories of what should happen. He also has been proved wrong. As someone once pointed out, since the beginning of NATO, there's always been an opportunity for a conference entitled "Whether NATO", or "NATO: Problems and Prospects," and we're clearly going to have a continuation of those types of meetings and for good reason.

So, let me now move more into the substance, although I should first say something about my own experience, because I think it's relevant. By whatever chance, appointed by President George H W Bush, I was the senior Defense Department official dealing with Europe and NATO when the Berlin Wall came down, from then through the end of the first Bush administration. So everything that happened, the transitions, the Cold War, the first Gulf War, the breakup of Yugoslavia, all these things I had what I like to call a second-row seat in history. I may not have been at the meeting table – although sometimes I was - but always at least behind the table, and I was at every meeting that Secretary of Defense Cheney had with a European official at the Pentagon or in Europe, for all those years. I was also on every visit by Secretary of State Baker to Europe as the Defense Department representative, so I was at the two plus four talks , and when he tried to mediate in Belgrade, to prevent the breakup of Yugoslavia. This was a fascinating history to be a part of. Years later I was asked, when I came back into the government as the dual-hatted Defense Advisor of the US mission to NATO and the Secretary of Defense Representative for Europe, which is the Defense Department's equivalent of an ambassador. I also served as acting US Ambassador to NATO. And so I was there under Secretary Gates, Bob Gates, and I was there, for example, when the Bucharest NATO summit took place. And I was involved, which I'll come back to, in all the issues that came up during that period, the Soviet incursion in Georgia, et cetera.

So let me go to a few big points, which I can talk about for a long time, and certainly have written about. First, with respect to NATO enlargement, is there any lesson to be learned for NATO's future? Well, some people have been writing and arguing, and some of them have argued in the past, that NATO should never have been enlarged, and it was a big mistake, and that it provoked Russia and Putin. And I just reject that fundamentally and so do many others, and I don't think the case has been made very well. I wrote a rebuttal to Professor Michael Mandelbaum of John Hopkins who wrote recently in *The American Purpose* saying that the enlargement of NATO was the biggest blunder in US foreign policy history. Hopefully just a bit of hyperbole, but basically, most every argument he makes does not stand up under scrutiny. But I will say, the key point is with respect to Ukraine, Putin would have done what he did regardless of what NATO did or did not do. And, if NATO did not enlarge, including the first round in 1999 with Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, then that whole central European region would have been a zone of instability and what's going on in Ukraine would most likely at some points have gone on in central and eastern Europe.

I would just also say that the Putin leadership has a fundamentally different conception of European security and what it means than does the West. I also would just quote Professor Michael McFaul, who was the US Ambassador to Russia, and wrote recently that Putin's underlying goals all along have been "normalizing annexation, denying sovereignty to neighbors, and dissolving NATO." With respect to Ukraine, I will just provide a little bit of context. I was the US Defense Advisor to NATO when the 2008 NATO Summit Communiqué was being prepared ahead of the meeting. Bob Hunter knows better than I do about how these things work. But, in general, NATO communiqués are all agreed to ahead of time, and then the heads of State and Government come to meet and affirm the communiqué and go to their social events. Well this was different. We negotiated—we tried—I say we; I mean the American Ambassador at the time and myself negotiated the communiqué and there was just one section that was not agreed to prior to the Summit, and that was respect to how NATO would interact with Georgia and Ukraine. At the insistence of the White House, this item was designated as something to discuss at the Summit itself. This is rare, very unusual as all issues are almost always agreed to ahead of a Summit meeting. So the question was regarding Ukraine and Georgia—President Bush was the person who pushed this from the top. So when he got to Bucharest in the early evening, normally they have a meeting in the evening, and then they went off to a social event, the heads of state and government. And in this case, President Bush basically said, I think we need to talk about this issue. So, they sat around while the rest of us went to the Bucharest concert hall for a wonderful concert, and they were still there at their dinner talking, and finally the leaders showed up. I think they wanted to go to the social event and get out of there, so what they agreed at that point was let their advisors work out something overnight, and that's what happened. I think Steve Hadley was the key person for the U.S. in this regard, and they were up

most of the night, eventually they came up with the language which some people don't agree with, others didn't go far enough, which said that these two nations, Georgia and Ukraine, will become members of NATO someday. So, for better or worse, that's where things ended up. Nobody thought at the time that Ukraine, or Georgia was going to become a member in the near term or even the medium term. But there was also a feeling, I think, even among some of those who were opposed to the membership at the time, saying that as a bottom line, Russia should not have a veto on who becomes a member of NATO. My view—and not everybody's view—is that Russia and Putin would have done what they were doing anyway, and they would have done it even further to the West if NATO had not brought in the initial group of new members.

I would just note, as a footnote to history, that the origins of enlargement, the concept, really started in the first Bush administration. A question we faced when the Soviet empire dissolved and the Warsaw pact dissolved, what was going to happen? How, if at all, should the US and NATO have any security-related interaction with these newly independent countries, particularly in eastern and central Europe? On this issue within the Bush administration, there were differing views. There were those who thought we have to be very careful, and we can't disturb or provoke Moscow at this point, and we shouldn't give any signal at all that these countries, central European and eastern European in particular, could have any kind of security connection to NATO or the US. I disagreed strongly, some others did as well. And I also visited those countries in central and eastern Europe as the first Defense Department official to go there after the collapse of the Warsaw pact, and everybody I talked to said "we want to get into NATO. When can we get into NATO?" and I actually had to say, "slow down, you may become a member of NATO, but it's not going to come for a long time, and you need to get involved with NATO to show them that you're going to be democratic and resolve your territorial disputes, et cetera." In this regard, an historical footnote. One thing that happened within the Bush Administration at that time was that Secretary Cheney was going to make a speech at NATO to the Defense ministers and some of us thought it would be a great opportunity to push for some types of security interaction between NATO and these newly independent nations. So I asked the Joint Chief of Staff, can you provide some modest examples of things that the US or NATO can do with these newly independent countries, particularly Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia in the security area. And they provided very modest ideas, like search and rescue mission training, et cetera. These were not pure military, but they would be done by the militaries. So I drafted a speech for Cheney, and included these proposed NATO initiatives into Cheney's speech draft. So the day we left, we circulated the draft for review by the NSC. So as I was getting onto the plane, I was handed a message that the National Security Advisor Scowcroft would like that language about proposed new initiatives taken out from the speech draft. So I showed this request to Secretary Cheney, I said this is what Scowcroft wants, he wants it out, and Cheney looked at it and he said quickly to keep it in. And I still remember that.

So he gave that speech, and he said the US supports NATO doing these things, and as everybody knows, if the US suggested these initiatives, NATO was going to agree. So that was the real origin of security connections with the newly independent nations. Then you have the first meeting of the group of Defense Ministers in April 1991, which I'll never forget, because you had in the same room the Defense Ministers of all the countries that were part of the two security blocks, and their goal was to try to figure out to defeat each other and now they were all in the same room, including the Russian Defense Minister. So this is now quite a while ago, but it was an extraordinary story. Then NATO moved to the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and then NATO moved on to be the Partnership for Peace and to NATO membership, which did occur in the Clinton administration, and I think was the right thing to do by far.

Regarding what happens with NATO when issues come up regarding the Ukraine situation there are a number of different issues that are up in the air or uncertain and could have a real effect on NATO. For example, aside from the defense spending and defense capabilities, what the US does now in terms of changing its posture in Europe, you have the question of what about Hungary? How are they going to fit into the coalition against Russia, if you will? How about Turkey? Turkey's been playing a sort of double-triple game for many years, and wants to see where they're going to end up. Germany is crucial. Sweden and Finland are likely to request to join NATO which is historic. I remember going to Finland in 1992 with Secretary Cheney, and even at that time there were op-eds and opinion pieces saying Finland should join NATO and I thought this was extraordinary, because obviously Finland had been a neutral nation for so long. And we visited military facilities in Sweden with Secretary Cheney, which had been set up in coordination with NATO under the radar screen to be ready to be used, in case of a crisis or conflict with the Soviet Union. So Sweden was neutral, but it also has a long-standing cooperation with NATO. And in recent years both Sweden and Finland have had officials in place at NATO, including when I was there. I always made sure to brief these officials after the NATO meetings about

what had happened. They are both very engaged with NATO, and it would just be very significant historically, but in terms of day-to-day, it wouldn't necessarily be that different if and when they join, which I think will happen.

The other big issue is with China and how does NATO deal with China? Before the Russian attack on Ukraine happened, there was definitely a movement in NATO to take on some role and responsibility with respect to China. That should continue. It may be challenging, but NATO can walk and chew gum at the same time. It can continue what it has been doing, which is connect with its own partners in the Asian region—Japan, Australia, New Zealand, et cetera—and it can also work with the so-called Quadrilateral Dialogue members. NATO should continue to maintain its role in China. It will be challenging but it is doable.

The next question is, what deters, if we are looking at Ukraine and trying to draw lessons that may be helpful in terms of ensuring NATO deterrence capabilities. On the plus side, Germany has now decided to acquire the F35 in its dual-capable (for nuclear weapons) configuration. Whether Germany would do this was a big issue for a long time, even when I was in NATO a few years ago, so that's significant. But the gap between NATO and Russia in terms of tactical nuclear capabilities is really, really extraordinary and applies to the US and Europe as well with respect to China. The US gap there has been large - as General Clark pointed out, the U.S. has few very small nuclear weapons, known as tactical nukes. So that has to be—it should be addressed. And the whole question of what deters—what could we, meaning the US primarily, and or NATO, have done prior to Russia's attack on Ukraine to deter? We didn't do all that much. We did some things, but basically the US, the administration announced intelligence that Russia was going to attack. Okay, but then the US didn't do an awful lot in response. So we can never know for sure, but certainly we can question whether stronger actions prior to the actual invasion might have deterred Russia. So I think that's something to be looked at very carefully.

My last point is that I think a lot of the differing perspectives that have come out regarding what's going on with respect to Russia and Ukraine reflect the differences between those who focus more on values, and those who focus more on realpolitik. I happen to be more of the belief that both can be pursued together, but at the end of the day, values are an essential part of, not only the US psyche and DNA, but also as well as for NATO as articulated on the NATO charter itself. Everything that NATO has been doing to encourage democratic values throughout Europe, including in terms of integration and security. The Russian attack is a fundamental attack on the most rules-based international order that's been established at least since the end of World War II. If, for the first time, a nation such as Russia can aggressively use major military force to annex territories of sovereign nations this undermines that international order. This is a values issue as well as a matter of geopolitics and power rivalries.

V. CLOSING REMARKS

GENERAL (RET.) ALFRED GRAY, USMC

29th Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps (1987-1991); Chairman of the Board of Directors and Regents, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies

I think that was certainly a great session. I want to thank all of the speakers for a very informative, and of course, very current seminar. It occurred to me throughout the presentations that we very clearly need to have a comprehensive international strategy on this whole affair, not just Ukraine. What happens after, what the options are, and so on. Above all, we must not focus only on military strategy. More importantly, it must be a comprehensive, all elements, and national powers strategy so that economic, societal, and all fields are included because it has to be very adaptive. One cannot simply come up with a single solution to resolve all of these intricate challenges, but we have to work together. It has to be a continuous and current international, NATO strategic thought process.

VI. ABOUT THE EDITORS

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PROFESSOR DON WALLACE, JR. Yale University BA, Harvard University, LLB, is a Professor of Law at Georgetown University as well as Chairman of the International Law Institute. He is a U.S. delegate to UNCITRAL, vice president of the UNIDROIT Foundation, a member of the American Law Institute, and the former chairman of the International Law Section at the American Bar Association. He is also the author and co-author of several books and articles.

VII. ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

GENERAL (RET.) WESLEY CLARK retired as a four star general after 38 years in the United States Army, having served in his last assignments as Commander of US Southern Command and then as Commander of US European Command/ Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. He graduated first in his class at West Point and completed degrees in Philosophy, Politics and Economics at Oxford University (B.A. and M.A.) as a Rhodes scholar. While serving in Vietnam, he commanded an infantry company in combat. He later commanded at the battalion, brigade and division level, and served in a number of significant staff positions, including service as the Director, Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5). In his final assignment as Supreme Allied Commander Europe he led NATO forces to victory in Operation Allied Force, a 78-day air campaign, backed by ground invasion planning and a diplomatic process, saving 1.5 million Albanians from ethnic cleansing. His awards include the Presidential Medal of Freedom, Defense Distinguished Service Medal (five awards), Silver star, bronze star, purple heart, honorary knighthoods from the British and Dutch governments, and numerous other awards from other governments. A best-selling author, General Clark has written four books and is a frequent contributor on TV and to newspapers.

AMBASSADOR (RET.) ROBERT E. HUNTER was the former U.S. Ambassador to NATO under President Clinton ('93-'98), and represented the U.S. to the Western European Union. He was the principal architect of the "New NATO", leading the North Atlantic Council in implementing decisions of the 1994 and 1997 NATO Summits. He served on Secretary Cohen's Defense Policy Board and was Vice Chairman of the Atlantic Treaty Association ('98-'01).

During his extensive career in the public sector, he served as Special Advisor on Lebanon to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and Lead Consultant to the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America (the Kissinger Commission). During the Carter Administration, Ambassador Hunter served on the National Security Council staff as Director of West European Affairs ('77-'79), and later as Director of Middle East Affairs ('79-'81). He was a member of the U.S. negotiating team for talks on the West Bank and Gaza, directed the 1978 NATO Summit, and was the principal author of the Carter Doctrine for the Persian Gulf. He also served as Foreign Policy Advisor to Senator Edward M. Kennedy ('73-'77) and foreign and domestic policy advisor to Vice President Hubert Humphrey. He served on White House staff (health, education, welfare, labor) in the Johnson Administration ('64-'65) and in the Navy Department on the Polaris Project. Twice recipient of Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service, decorated by Hungarian, Lithuanian and Polish governments, and received Leadership Award of the European Institute. He has written, lectured, and broadcast extensively on foreign affairs and national security issues.

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chaired “Future of NATO” Study Group with the PfP Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes. Between 2006 and 2012 he established and co-chaired the Regional Stability within the Greater Black Sea Area Working Group of the PfP Consortium developing yearly conferences in Baku, Kiev, Kishinev, Istanbul, Tbilisi, and Bucharest. He was a member of the Parallel History Project on NATO and Warsaw Pact and Cold War International History Project, Washington D.C. Has published and coordinated more than 40 monographs and 100 studies on topics related to international relations, security and defense policy, and military history. Recent publications: Eastern Partnership. A Civilian Security Perspective [2017]; The Romanians in the Great War [1914-1919] - six volumes of documents [2015-2021] - available also in English.

PROFESSOR HERMAN MATTHIJS is full professor at the Ghent University and Free University Brussels (Belgium). He teaches the courses: Political and economic structures of the USA, International Economic Organizations, public finances-public budget law and public management. He has published several books and articles concerning defense expenditures, NATO, intelligence services and police institutions.

VIII. ABOUT THE COMMENTATORS

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PROFESSOR SHIMON SHETREET is a Professor of Law at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel. He holds the Greenblatt chair of public and international law and is the head of the Sacher Institute of Legislative Research and Comparative Law. He has in recent years been Visiting Scholar at the New York University Global Law Program, Visiting Prof. at Case Western Reserve University School of Law, Senior Visiting Fellow at the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies at the University of London. He has also been Visiting Prof of law at Tulane University and University of San Diego. He completed his education in Israel and in the US, earning an LL.B., 1968, and an LL.M., 1970, from the Hebrew University. And a Masters., 1971, and a Doctor’s degree in 1973 from the University of Chicago school of Law. He served as Visiting Professor at a number of Universities including NYU School of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, University of Manitoba, Wuerzburg University, Germany and the University of San Diego and New York Law School of Law. He has appeared before the Supreme Court of Israel in a number of landmark cases; was Member of the Chief Justice Landau Commission on the Israeli Court System, 1980; was a Founder Secretary General of the Public Law Association (1987 – 1992); and a Judge on the Standard Contract Court (1981-88). He is President of the Israeli Chapter of the International Association of Constitutional Law. Prof. Shetreet published extensively all the years including when he was serving in high public offices. Between 1988 and 1996 he served as Member of the Knesset the Israeli Parliament. His Past Government Positions include a cabinet Minister in the Rabin Government where he served as Minister of Economy and Planning, Minister of Science and Technology, Minister in charge of the Second Television and Radio Authority and Minister of Religious Affairs. In addition to his distinguished academic career and his public offices he also held high business positions including member of the board of Bank Leumi and Chairman of the Board of Mishaan.

BRUCE WEINROD has taught and lectured on US foreign and national security policy, and he has extensive senior-level US government foreign and national security policy experience. As a senior Department of Defense official, he served as a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense and at a later point as the (dual-hatted) Defense Advisor to the US Mission at NATO and the Secretary of Defense Representative for Europe. On Capitol Hill, Mr.

Weinrod served as a Legislative Director and foreign policy/defense advisor for a US Senator. Mr. Weinrod has also been a Public Policy Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, a Distinguished Research Fellow at the US National Defense University and a Leadership Fellow (based in Japan) of the Japan Society. He has been a US Senate-confirmed member of the Board of the US Institute of Peace and chaired its Research and Studies Committee; and he has published and lectured on US foreign and defense policy issues. In the private sector, Mr. Weinrod is an international business advisor focusing on US national security laws and regulations. A US Army veteran, Mr. Weinrod has a J.D. from the Georgetown University School of Law and an M.A. in International Relations from the University of Pennsylvania. He is a member of the DC Bar and the Council on Foreign Relations.

GENERAL [RET.] ALFRED GRAY USMC serves as Chairman of the Board of the Potomac Institute of Policy Studies [PIPS]. In addition to participating in monthly seminars related to the global terrorism challenge, he oversees the Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities [CETO], which operates as a futuristic think tank for the Marine Corps at Quantico. General Gray has served as Board Chairman and CEO for several public and private companies and has consulted to United States and international industry and government. General Gray's other duties have included service on the Defense Science Board; the Defense Special Operations Advisory Group; the National Security Agency Science Advisory Board; the National Reconnaissance Office Gold Team; the Defense Operations Support Office Advisory Team; and as Director of the Advanced Concept Demonstration Technology for Combat in the Littorals. In 1991, Al Gray retired after 41 years of service to the United States Marine Corps. From 1987-1991, General Gray served as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was the 29th Commandant of the Marine Corps, and was advisor to both Presidents Reagan and George H. W. Bush. Among his awards are two Defense Distinguished Service Medals, two Navy Distinguished Service Medals, Distinguished Service Medals from the US Army, the US Air Force and the US Coast Guard, the Silver Star Medal, two Legion of Merits with Combat "V", four Bronze Star Medals with Combat "V", three Purple Hearts, three Joint Commendation Medals, the Meritorious Service Medal, the Navy Commendation Medal, the Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry with Palm and Star, as well as foreign awards from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Korea and The Netherlands. In 2008, General Gray was inducted into the National Security Agency Hall of Honor for rendering distinguished service to American Cryptology.

