

NATO:

PAST LESSONS AND STRATEGIC MISSION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY



APRIL 2024

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NOTICES

This publication is the second volume in a series focusing on the interdisciplinary aspects of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) over the past eight years. The current publication consists largely of excerpts from multiple reports published by the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies in association with the U.S. Department of State (Office of European Security, Political and Military Affairs- EUR/RPM), the International Law Institute, and the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies.

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“NATO: Past Lessons and Strategic Mission for the 21st Century”

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Professor Alexander and Richard Prosen wish to recognize U.S. Army Captain Michael Manougian, who provided a first draft of the Foreword penned by the Honorable Leon Panetta.

Finally, thanks are also due to Kevin Harrington (coordinator of the IUCTS internship program since January 2021) who provided research and administrative support for this publication in conjunction with our graduate and undergraduate student interns: Rebecca Abbott (John Carroll University); Adrik Bagdasarian (James Madison University); William Brooks (George Washington University); Louisa Burch (American University); Matthew Dahan (the American University); Skyler Edinburg (University of Michigan); Nina Harbison (University of St. Andrews); Grace Johnson (University of Texas San Antonio); Harrison Kopitsch (American University); Nick Markiewicz (University of Georgia); Royon Meerzadah (Carnegie Mellon University); Jordan Schucker (Dickinson College); Daniella Semper (Fordham University); Loren Sera (American University); Harry Thoeny (University of Richmond); and John Watters (Colby College).

IN MEMORIAM

GENERAL ALFRED M. GRAY JR. (1928-2024)

Professor Alexander wishes to express his deep appreciation for the decades-long academic and professional partnership with General Al Gray. Gray was a key advocate and supporter of the ICTS evidenced by his participation in dozens of ICTS hosted conferences and forums. He is also published in over 20 ICTS reports. Gray truly believed in the ICTS mission and will be deeply missed by all.

General Alfred M. Gray Jr., the 29th Commandant of the Marine Corps, died March 20, 2024, at his home in Alexandria, Virginia. He was 95.

Gray enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1950 after dropping out of college to fight in Korea, serving as a radio operator with the Amphibious Reconnaissance Platoon, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.



Over the next 41 years, Gray established a legacy of heroism in combat, deploying eight times to lead Marines in dangerous missions – several of them clandestine. Gray earned the distinction of leading the first independent ground operations by a Marine unit in Vietnam while commanding a composite unit of signals intelligence Marines supported by attached infantry. During his several deployments to Vietnam, Gray pioneered modern signals intelligence collection methods and developed operational employment concepts in which intelligence drove follow-on operations. His lifelong advocacy for such techniques earned him admittance to the National Security Agency's Hall of Honor in 2008 for lifetime achievements in the area of signals intelligence. His early work and establishment of two units, formed the nucleus of what is known today as the Marine Cryptologic Support Battalion.

Commanding at every operational level from 40-person platoon to 40,000-strong Marine Amphibious Force, General Gray reached the pinnacle of Marine Corps leadership when Navy Secretary James Webb selected him to serve as the 29th Commandant of the Marine Corps.

While Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Gray established an unrivaled reputation as a champion of academics and professional education. He federated five of the Corps' formal schools for officers and senior enlisted leaders under the umbrella command of a new Marine Corps University. Hundreds of Marine leaders earn accredited degrees through the university each year as they complete courses of study for promotion and advancement. For Marines of all ranks, Gray implemented the requirement to read at least two books each year from a list he hand-selected. The Commandant's Reading List remains a fixture of Marine Corps professional development.

Gray also led the Marine Corps through the adoption of the doctrinal warfighting concept that serves as the distinguishing institutional and operational philosophy to this day. The Corps' embrace of maneuver warfare doctrine earned it numerous battlefield successes from the 1980s through the modern day. Maneuver warfare continues to be studied not just by U.S. Marines, but by foreign militaries and even civilian business schools around the world. Maneuver warfare emphasizes adaptability, decisiveness, and initiative based on common operational understanding.

Throughout his career, Gray's experience as a junior Marine and a noncommissioned officer anchored his leadership philosophy. In an address to a graduating U.S. Naval Academy class, he advised the newly commissioning officers, "If you come and join my Marines, I want you to know that your 'number one' job is to take care of the men and women you are privileged to lead."

After his military retirement, General Gray served as board chairman and CEO for several public and private companies and was a consultant for several organizations in national and international industry and government. He served on the Defense Science Board; Defense Special Operations Advisory Group; National Security Agency Science Advisory Board; National Reconnaissance Office Gold Team; Defense Operations Support Office Advisory Team; and as director of the Advanced Concept Demonstration Technology for Combat in the Littorals. General Gray was also chairman emeritus of the Injured Marine Semper Fi Fund and America Fund, which help take care of wounded veterans and their families. In addition, he served as chancellor of the Marine Military Academy and chairman of the U.S. Marine Youth Foundation, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, and the Chairman of the Board of the Norwich University Advanced Research Institute.

NATO: PAST LESSONS AND STRATEGIC MISSION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

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I. INTRODUCTION

YONAH ALEXANDER AND RICHARD PROSEN

This publication is the second volume in a series focusing on the interdisciplinary aspects of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) over the past eight years. The current publication consists largely of excerpts from multiple reports published by the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies in association with the U.S. Department of State (Office of European Security, Political and Military Affairs- EUR/RPM), the International Law Institute, and the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies.

Our previous research efforts resulted in the publication of a multi-authored book titled *NATO: From Regional to Global Security Provider* (Lexington Books, 2015) co-edited by Yonah Alexander and Richard Prosen. The book provided a six-part comprehensive analysis of the Alliance's Strategic Concept and served as a relevant study of the most pressing issues facing NATO at the time. General (Ret.) Wesley Clark wrote a foreword to the study, and the other contributors included James Henry Bergeron, Derrick Busse, Georgiana Cavendish, Natividad Carpintero-Santamaria, Paul Dodge, R. David Edelman, Raffi Gregorian, Enrico Mueller, Patrick Murphy, Leslie Ordeman, Raphael Perl, Stefano Santamato, Carrie Shirtz, George Sinks, Bruce Weinrod, Richard Weitz, and Michael Ziemke. Recommendations for consideration and further discussion (i.e., the what and the how regarding future policy options for the North Atlantic Alliance) were highlighted.

The first report in the current work is titled "NATO: Confronting Regional and Global Challenges" (January 2016) was published by the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies, the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, and the International Law Institute. This product highlighted the current challenges and future strategic responses of the Alliance in the aftermath of NATO's Wales Summit held in the United Kingdom (September 4-5, 2014). In this report, Yonah Alexander and Richard Prosen provided an overview of NATO observing that the Euro-Atlantic defensive and offensive alliance is as relevant today as it was during the Cold War. Other contributors included Raffi Gregorian analysis of a case study on the Balkans, Patrick Murphy focused on NATO and Russia relationships, and General (Ret.) Wesley Clark offered insights on NATO's future.

The second report "NATO's Strategy: Continuity or Change?" (January 2017) was produced by the Inter-University Center for Terrorism, the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, the International Law Institute, the Center for National Security Law at the University of Virginia School of Law, and with the association of the U.S. Department of State. This publication was released shortly after the inauguration of the Trump Administration. It is based on a seminar on "NATO: Post Warsaw Agenda" which was held at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies on October 31, 2016. This event followed the Alliance's 28th summit in Warsaw, July 8-9 of that year. Yonah Alexander wrote an introduction and other contributors included Richard Prosen, Kenneth Wainstein, Joseph Manso, Daniel Hamilton, Jeffrey Rathke, and Jorge Benitez. During the event, other colleagues, including Ambassador Kurt Volker (former U.S. Ambassador to NATO; currently, Executive Director of the McCain Institute for International Leadership) and General (ret.) Alfred Gray (Twenty-Ninth Commandant of the United States Marine Corps; Senior Fellow and Chairman of the Board of Regents, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies) participated in the program and provided unique insights. Six months after the release on June 5, 2017, Montenegro joined NATO and several years later, North Macedonia joined NATO on March 27, 2020.

On February 24, 2022, Russia launched a coordinated full-scale invasion of Ukraine making history as the largest attack on a European country since World War II. This aggressive, unprovoked war created a grave humanitarian crisis and destabilized the geopolitical world order. On February 25, 2022, NATO leaders held a 'virtual extraordinary summit' and unanimously condemned Russia's attack on Ukraine – the gravest threat to Euro-Atlantic security in decades – and reiterated their support for Ukraine. NATO also stated that they would make all deployments necessary to ensure strong and credible deterrence and defense across the Alliance.¹ On March 24, 2022, the NATO Brussels Summit was held. There, NATO leaders agreed to a set of proposals under the NATO 2030 reform agenda to: strengthen the Alliance as a forum for political consultations; reinforce collective defense through increased readiness, modernized capabilities and additional investments; and develop Alliance-wide resilience objectives to make societies less vulnerable to attack and coercion. The leaders also agreed that NATO's next Strategic Concept would need to be ready before the next Summit in 2022 (Madrid).²

The third report "NATO Strategic Lessons From the Russian Invasion of Ukraine" (July 2022) was a product of a Zoom Forum held on April 28, 2022, which focused on NATO members' responses security challenges. A distinguished panel of U.S. and foreign experts discussed the outlook of NATO's mission regionally and globally. This virtual discussion began with opening

¹ NATO.int, "NATO summits", https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50115.htm#previous, July 31, 2023.

² Ibid.

remarks by Professor Don Wallace Jr. (Chairman, International Law Institute) and was moderated by Professor Yonah Alexander (Director of the International Center for Terrorism Studies and Senior Fellow at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies). The following distinguished panel of scholars and practitioners gave presentations and subsequent discussions; General (Ret.) Wesley Clark (Former Supreme Allied Commander Europe); Ambassador Robert Hunter (Former U.S. Ambassador to NATO); Major General (Ret.) Dr. Mihail E. Ionescu (Professor, National School of Political and Administrative Studies (SNSPA) Bucharest, Romania); Professor Herman Matthijs (University Ghent & Free University Brussels); Professor Natividad Carpintero-Santamaria (Professor at the Polytechnic University of Madrid (UPM) and General Secretary of the Instituto de Fusión Nuclear “Guillermo Velarde”); Professor Shimon Shetreet (Greenblatt Chair of Public and International Law, Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Former Cabinet Minister and MK, Israel); and Bruce Weinrod (Former Secretary of Defense Representative for Europe and former Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and NATO Policy. Closing remarks were delivered by General (Ret.) Alfred Gray, USMC (29th Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps (1987-1991), and Chairman of the Board of Directors and Regents, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies).

At the NATO Madrid Summit on June 29-30, 2022, the 2022 NATO Strategic Concept was released. NATO's guiding document, reflected on the new security reality that emerged since the previous Strategic Concept was agreed in 2010. It identified Russia as the most significant and direct threat to Allied security, addressed China for the first time, and included other challenges like terrorism, cyber, and hybrid. The Strategic Concept also reaffirmed the commitment by Allies to spend at least 2% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defense by 2024. Finally, Finland and Sweden were invited to join the Alliance. Finland formally joined NATO on April 4, 2023.

The NATO Vilnius Summit was held in Lithuania, on July 11–12, 2023. At the Summit, members boosted NATO's deterrence and defense by approving new regional plans to counter the two main threats to the Alliance: Russia and terrorism. Allies renewed their pledge to invest a minimum of 2% of GDP annually on defense. The Summit leaders endorsed a Defense Production Action Plan to accelerate joint procurement, boost interoperability, generate investment, and production capacity. NATO Leaders agreed on a multi-year assistance program for Ukraine, held the inaugural meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Council, and reaffirmed that Ukraine will become a member of NATO when Allies agree and conditions are met.³

Subsequently, the following events have transpired since the 2023 Vilnius Summit:

The NATO-Ukraine Council vowed to increase surveillance through maritime patrol, aircraft, and drones as all parties strongly condemned Russia's decision to withdraw from the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI) as well as, targeting attacks at key port cities including Odessa.⁴ ⁵ Russian Deputy Prime Minister Viktoria Abramchenko stated that Russia will not renew the BSGI until Russia's conditions are met.⁶ The grain deal, in place for almost a year, had clear benefits for global markets and food security. In the midst of war, it allowed Ukraine to export 33 million metric tons (MT) of grains and other agricultural products from its Black Sea ports—with most going to developing countries. The BSGI also contributed to a decline in international prices of staple foods and helped to sustain global food supplies.⁷

During a meeting of defense ministers, NATO Allies condemned the October 7, 2023, horrific terrorist attacks by Hamas against Israeli civilians and the nationals of several NATO Allies. Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said that NATO condemned the terrorist attacks in the strongest possible terms, adding: “Israel does not stand alone.” Allies expressed solidarity with Israel, making clear that it has the right to defend itself with proportionality against these unjustifiable acts of terror. They called for Hamas to immediately release all hostages, and for the fullest possible protection of civilians. Allies also made clear that no nation or organization should seek to take advantage of the situation or to escalate it. Some NATO Allies made clear that they are providing practical support to Israel as it continues to respond to the situation.⁸

³ Ibid.

⁴ NATO, “NATO-Ukraine Council addresses serious security situation in the Black Sea,” NATO Newsroom, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_217835.htm, July 26, 2023.

⁵ Gray, Andrew, “NATO says it's boosting Black Sea surveillance, condemns Russian grain deal exit,” Reuters, <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/nato-says-its-boosting-black-sea-surveillance-condemns-russian-grain-deal-exit-2023-07-26/>, July 26, 2023.

⁶ TeleSur, “Russia Sees No Prospects for Resuming Grain Deal,” TeleSur, <https://www.telesurenglish.net/news/Russia-Sees-No-Prospects-for-Resuming-Grain-Deal-20240111-0004.html>, January 11, 2024.

⁷ International Food Policy and Research Institute, “End of the Black Sea Grain Initiative: Implications for sub-Saharan Africa”, <https://www.ifpri.org/blog/end-black-sea-grain-initiative-implications-sub-saharan-africa#:~:text=In%20the%20midst%20of%20war,to%20sustain%20global%20food%20supplies>, August 7, 2023.

⁸ NATO, “NATO Secretary General: ‘Israel does not stand alone’”, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_219309.htm, October 12, 2023.

Turkey endorsed Sweden's membership bid into NATO on January 23, 2024. Hungary was the last NATO country to disapprove Sweden's interest to join the Alliance. After 18 months of deliberations, Hungary's parliament debated Sweden's bid for the last time on February 26, 2024, and finally voted to ratify Sweden's NATO membership. Sweden and Finland's decisions to abandon nonalignment and seek NATO membership have resulted in an increased risk of Russian interference and hybrid attacks.

U.S. Army Gen. Christopher Cavoli, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe and Commander, announced that they will conduct STEADFAST DEFENDER 2024, the largest military exercise in Europe since the Cold War. This exercise, involving approximately 90,000 troops from all 31 NATO Allies, as well as partner Sweden, participating, the exercise is poised to test and refine NATO's defense plans for reinforcing European defenses against a near-peer adversary such as Russia. In the initial phase (end of January to mid-March), the focus will be on maritime reinforcement across the Atlantic and in the Arctic. The second phase (mid-February to the end of May) will shift to using deployed reinforcements across all domains, from the Arctic to the Eastern Flank.⁹

Looking to the future, NATO's 75th anniversary will be celebrated at the Washington DC Summit on July 9-11, 2024. Currently, several questions are still pending, including:

- What will the agenda be?
- What are the updated security challenges and threats since the 2023 Vilnius Summit?
- Will Hungary accept Sweden's bid to join the Alliance and be announced at this summit?
- What is the current status of the Russia-Ukraine war and how much more support is needed from NATO members to defeat Vladimir Putin and the Russians?
- When (or if) a peace deal can be reached?

In the meantime, the world will be anxiously waiting for the Alliance leaders to convene.

To provide additional context to the materials covered in this volume, we have included the following appendices, which a breadth of NATO primary documents spanning several years and critical issues:

- North Atlantic Council Statement on the 50th Anniversary of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Mar. 5, 2020)
- Statement by the North Atlantic Council concerning malicious cyber activities (June 3, 2020)
- Statement by NATO Foreign Ministers on Afghanistan (Aug. 20, 2021)
- Summary of the NATO Artificial Intelligence Strategy (Oct. 22, 2021)
- NATO's Overarching Space Policy (Jan. 17, 2022)
- Statement by NATO Defense Ministers on the situation in and around Ukraine (Feb. 16, 2022)
- Statement by NATO Heads of State and Government on Russia's attack on Ukraine (Feb. 25, 2022)
- Statement by NATO Heads of State and Government (on Ukraine) (Mar. 24, 2022)
- NATO's Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Defence Policy (June 14, 2022)
- NATO 2022 Strategic Concept (June 29, 2022)
- Statement by the North Atlantic Council on the New START Treaty (Feb. 3, 2023)
- NATO 2023 Vilnius Summit Communiqué (July 11, 2023)

⁹NATO, "NATO's Steadfast Defender 2024: Unprecedented Military Exercise Signals Alliance Unity and Preparedness", <https://www.act.nato.int/article/steadfast-defender-2024-signals-alliance-unity-and-preparedness/#~:text=STEADFAST%20DEFENDER%202024%20is%20a,of%20the%20Alliance%20to%20Europe, January 26, 2024>.

II. FOREWORDS

HONORABLE LEON E. PANETTA

Former Secretary of Defense and Director, Central Intelligence Agency

NATO IS INDISPENSABLE: NOW AND IN THE FUTURE

NATO remains an indispensable alliance and the foundation of transatlantic security. It exists as a true defensive alliance, committed to peace through deterrence, the preservation of sovereignty, and protection of human rights. In this sense, NATO has in many ways become more than just an alliance. It has become a union of nations linked by democratic ideals, expanding by consensus when candidate countries meet specific, agreed criteria. Beyond ideals, NATO is supported by a robust history of cooperation, undergirded by a proven military operational structure subordinate to the civilian leadership of NATO Allies. Putin's destructive and destabilizing turn as Russia's leader and his miscalculation in his unprovoked and unjustified war of aggression against his neighbor Ukraine has only confirmed the necessity and vital importance of the Alliance. Yet the world is changing, and the Alliance must adapt to this world while remaining a relevant force for good.

NATO today faces growing challenges across the world. The core of NATO in its history has been focused upon transatlantic security through the use of deterrence. The terrorist attacks of September 11th woke the Alliance to the existence of new threats. Yet, as the world appears to be moving toward a multipolar world, dominated by geopolitics, new threats and challenges are emerging. The People's Republic of China (PRC) is rising more on the world stage as it invests in its Belt and Road Initiative, to include within NATO Allied countries. Its new strategic partnership with Russia, embodied by the 2021 renewal of the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation, further threatens the alliance and democratic world order. All the same, new military capabilities and hybrid actions including cyber-based ones further present challenges to the Alliance and its aim of preserving a rules-based world order.

Although the challenges are great, NATO can and will rise to overcome them. In addition to what NATO stands for, it has come to embody key defining attributes that will enable it to overcome challenges. First, the alliance is an adaptive alliance, adjusting both force posture and structure to a changing world. In response to Russia's annexation of Crimea and increased hostility to the West, the Alliance initiated Operation Atlantic Resolve, to maintain a credible deterrent against Russia. A deterrent that has thus far been successful in protecting the Alliance. NATO has adapted further in its response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine through both the extensive supply of sophisticated weaponry and training all while increasing its own force posture across Eastern Europe. As the PRC has risen to power and influence, it has not gone unnoticed. For the first time, the 2022 NATO Strategic Concept names the PRC as a challenge, outlining in detail the threat it poses and vulnerabilities it seeks to support.

The 2022 Summit further demonstrates the Alliance's adaptability that in today's world security goes beyond tanks, aircraft, and warships. It recognizes the need to protect against cyber threats, economies, and other hybrid dangers. As the NATO Alliance has expanded its forward deployed battlegroups in Eastern Europe and the Rapid Response Force, it has also recognized that expanding to counter these hybrid threats is just as, if not more, important. As a political-security-oriented alliance, NATO also recognizes the threat climate change can present to international security and actions to reduce emissions and combat climate change remain an integral part of the adaptive 2022 Strategic Concept.

The NATO Alliance is a learning organization. Evident in how NATO Allies have consistently modified assistance to Ukraine, NATO takes every opportunity to learn from this recent war among others. As such, NATO must draw lessons on tactics that work, vulnerabilities, and emerging capabilities to optimize its defense posture are remain a world-leading alliance. Even after the 2014 Annexation of Crimea, NATO sought opportunities to learn, adapting its opposing forces in training exercises to match any new trends and capabilities being seen.

NATO will also overcome these challenges due to its defining attributes of being partnership-oriented and organized. This occurred first within the Allied countries with their history of support and cooperative culture. As NATO has responded to reinforce Eastern European NATO Allies with battlegroups, this cooperative feature is embodied by the fact that every NATO battlegroup is multinational and from Estonia to Bulgaria. Indeed, all NATO militaries are contributing forces to defend Allies. This goes beyond the Article 5 guarantee that an attack on one is regarded as an attack on all. This cornerstone of the Alliance acts as a deterrence and precludes the possibility of picking off NATO Allies one-by-one.

The use of partnerships extends beyond just the formal members of the Alliance and NATO leverages working alongside nations and international organizations across the world with shared liberal, democratic ideals. With rising security challenges from the PRC, the heads of State and Government of Australia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and New Zealand were all present at the 2022 NATO Summit, embodying how partnerships are core business to the Alliance, not solely limited to NATO Allies. Through strategic partnerships and dialogues, the Alliance is better positioned and capable of countering rising security threats and challenges. Additionally, NATO leverages partnerships through its increasing integration and work with the European Union to mutually beneficial results. Both the President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission were present at the 2022 NATO Summit, illustrating the strategic importance of maintaining a strong NATO-EU partnership. With the same common values and interests, both NATO and the EU will remain essential partners in responding to changes to global security.

As NATO looks forward to the challenges of the future, it will remain an important organization. The Alliance's commitment to a free, international rules-based world order will be all the more important as it provides capabilities to keep such an order secure. No alliance has ever embodied NATO's commitment and obligations. As such, the NATO Alliance as an institution must be protected and supported by its members and the international community. The strength of NATO ultimately rests on the resources and commitment of NATO Allies. NATO must always remain important, relevant, and involved with the citizens it defends.

GENERAL [RET.] WESLEY CLARK

Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander

This section is General Clark's "Foreword" to *NATO: From Regional to Global Security Provider* (Lexington Books, 2015), edited by Yonah Alexander and Richard Prosen.

Founded in 1949, NATO could now be said to be entering old age. But at a time when people of similar age are retiring, NATO is likely to be as necessary in the future as it has proved vital in the past. Over sixty-five years, NATO has survived challenge after challenge to its purpose and structure to prove itself a critical foundation for global security. New, and increasingly complex problems now face the nations of NATO -the subject of this book - and to survive and succeed, NATO must underscore its fundamental principles, learn from the challenges of the past, and then adapt to the current environment.

NATO is a political alliance, first and foremost -not a military alliance. It was formed in post-World War II Europe to deter conflict and help preserve the peace, not to engage in armed combat, though its founders understood that its military potential and capabilities were vital components of deterrence and conflict prevention. Its formation was testimony to the failure of the earlier notions of "collective security," embodied in the League of Nations, to prevent the aggression by Italy, Germany and Japan that gave rise to World War II. Instead, NATO's fundamental principle is "collective defense," captured in the NATO Charter's legally binding, famed Article V, which states "that an armed attack against one or more of them (member states) in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them... will assist the Party or Parties so attacked... including the use of armed force..." There can be no stronger mutual pledge among nations.

When it was constructed, the Charter was written to avoid entanglement in our European allies' colonial problems, whether in Indochina or the Mid-East, so NATO appeared geographically bounded. The word "attack" was deliberately chosen to emphasize the defensive and deterrent nature of the Alliance.

A second NATO principle has been the right of consultation, written in Article IV, which states that "The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened." In practice, this has meant that NATO sits in judgment in appraising the international environment, including geostrategic threats, and any other factors, that might affect the security of their member states. It also wisely provides that NATO must look beyond conventional attacks to include all elements that impact a member nation's "security." And finally, there is the principle that NATO can only act through the consensus of its member states. All actions are taken on the basis of unanimity, so, each state has under the NATO founding act an equal voice in decision-making.

However, with the best of intentions, respective national interests of NATO member states are invariably different. Holding an alliance together in the face of diverging and competing national interests has always been the fundamental challenge for NATO. And as the decades passed, challenge after challenge emerged, driven by differing national perspectives. In democracies, these differences in perspective are often intensified by the political processes, and they become part of the continuing environment in which NATO has operated.

One of the continuing differences has been "burden sharing:" which nation provides what in support of Alliance goals. This was an argument that surfaced early in the Alliance's history. European nations were consumed at the time in decolonization. As Europe became more prosperous, these nations became accustomed to reliance on the peacetime preponderance of U.S. forces, while they themselves hosted forces on their territory, and promised enhanced commitments from reserve and mobilized forces in the case of conflict. In the post-Cold War period, nations reached for their "peace dividend," with most European member states drawing down their force structures and defense investments, even in the face of security challenges. Again and again the U.S. has requested, strategized and chided its European allies in pursuit of greater European military commitments, usually with limited effect. However, its outsized contribution also gives the United States a de facto greater influence in NATO than the principle of one vote-one state and unanimous decision-making would imply, a factor that the Americans use and Europeans sometimes resent.

Another diverging interest has lain in the Mid-East. When France and the United Kingdom invaded Egypt in 1956, to protest Egyptian seizure of the Aswan Dam, U.S. President Eisenhower demanded their withdrawal. Conversely, U.S. support for Israel has always been stronger for Israel than that of most European nations. In the 2003 invasion of Iraq, NATO members France and Germany actually objected to the U.S.-led invasion and refused to participate.

Then there was the nuclear issue. The heart of NATO's deterrent strategy was to couple the U.S. strategic nuclear force to the land-based defense of Europe. This strategy has undergone decades of analysis and refinement. Would the U.S., by its intervention in Europe, actually "trade" New York for Hamburg if conflict with the Soviet Union escalated to a nuclear exchange? Deterrence depended not only on forces, but also on the "credibility" that those forces would be used. One ploy was to have multinational NATO crews on ships that could launch nuclear missiles -the so-called Multilateral Force. But the U.S. then withdrew its offer of shared nuclear weapons control through the Multilateral Force; consequently, France in anger left the integrated military structure of NATO, and the NATO headquarters left France and moved to Belgium.

In the late 1970's the Alliance anguished to craft a response to the Soviet's deployment of the mobile, solid-fueled, intermediate-range SS20 missile into Eastern Europe. After several years -amid vociferous public comment and objections - NATO planned deployment of countervailing cruise and ballistic missiles to Europe, while, simultaneously the U.S.-led Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty resulted in the so-called "zero-zero" option, in which both sides withdrew or cancelled planned deployments.

Trouble in the Balkans in the 1990's constituted another set of divergent issues, with European nations much more directly impacted by the factional fighting and refugee flows than the United States. Facing the challenges there, NATO resolved to go "out-of-area." Forces were raised and committed outside the territory of NATO members, first in a quarantine and patrol, and later to actual bombing strikes. Still, a cross- Atlantic gap in perspectives and engagement persisted for almost four years, with the U.S. refusing to commit its ground forces under UN auspices. And the conflict continued. Only when the United States stepped into the lead with a seven-point peace plan and the promise to commit 25,000 U.S. ground troops was the conflict able to be ended through the leadership of the Dayton Peace Talks and the NATO Stabilization Forces in Bosnia. Later, the United States took the lead in the diplomatic and military efforts with its leadership of the Kosovo Air campaign. Indeed, the Kosovo Campaign was the Alliance's first major military test. It provided proof positive that NATO member nations could, working together, overcome separate political challenges internally to maintain resolve in a crisis.

Then there was the competition from other institutions. The emergence of the European Union, a European Security and Defense Identity was created, without the U.S. as a member, of course, competed with NATO. Especially after the demonstration of U.S. power in the Balkans in the late 1990's, there were repeated calls for a European Rapid Reaction Force, European strategic lift, and other measures to reduce Europe's reliance on the United States. This was an episodic irritant and distraction for NATO-arising whenever political leaders in certain NATO states saw political gain in espousing such ideas - but has never been sufficient-ly resourced to replace NATO's indispensable contribution in Europe.

More recently, we witnessed the challenge of 9/11, and the Western response. NATO invoked Article V for the first time after the terrorist strikes. Under a U.S.-led coalition, NATO nations poured assistance into the U.S. efforts in Afghanistan, after quick U.S. military action toppled the Taliban regime. But NATO was not united in supporting the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. There were strong voices of criticism from several allies. Subsequently, however, NATO came together to deploy its stabilization force into Afghanistan to broaden support for the U.S.-led efforts there.

Holding NATO together while dealing with these challenges has never been easy. Over the decades, voices have been raised, impassioned missives sent, reputations made and broken; but from it has emerged the stark reality: NATO is a kind of "consensus engine." Through its anguishing and sometimes tedious debates, multilayered committee structures, and considerations and reconsideration of policies, statements and positions, and with the leadership of its able statesmen and senior military leadership, NATO takes divergent national perspectives and creates consensus policies that have enabled

NATO not only to survive but thus far to succeed in assuring security in the Euro Atlantic area.

Nevertheless, these threats continue to evolve. From 9/11 came a stunning recognition of the dangers of transnational terrorism, in this case, claiming inspiration from religious sources, which are still bedeviling the United States and its European allies. The explosion of the internet into the critical medium of worldwide transactions brought a new array of threats through cyber networks - everything from thefts of funds and intellectual property, to wholesale attacks on critical national infrastructure, by individuals, criminal gangs, or rival states - without the movement of a single person across an international border. NATO has created a cyber "center of excellence" and implemented other cyber defense policies and measures in response. Then there are more subtle threats - corruption, political manipulation from abroad, migrants, internal insurrection, and, increasingly, a new set of geostrategic challenges centered around Russia, on the one hand, and the conflict between Iran and Sunni Muslim states to the South.

These new challenges and NATO's striving to adapt are the subjects of this book. And adapt NATO will, so long as one element remains constant -the imperative of TransAtlantic unity in security matters. For the United States this means retaining the fundamental lesson of twentieth-century geostrategy -that there could be no security for the United States if Europe (however defined) was under the sway of a hostile power. For Europe, it means resisting the siren call of new Eurovisions or national pride to recognize that the TransAtlantic security linkage to the United States has been the fundamental factor in preserving Europe's freedom and assuring Europe's prosperity since World War II. The U.S. and Europe share a common history of security, much common culture, and deep economic and personal ties. And it is this that has made NATO both possible and essential. Read about the issues contained herein, and prepare for continuing struggle as the consensus engine of NATO meshes different national perspectives to provide security for the Euro Atlantic region in the decades ahead.

This presentation was made by General Clark at the Special Forum: "Post 9/11: Twenty Years of Multilateral Counter-Terrorism Cooperation" that was held on September 9th, 2021, via Zoom conferencing.

It is 9/11 week and of course we are looking back, and we are looking forward and it's natural to ask how far we've come and if we are working better together. The answer is of course yes. We are working better together. We've created a complete set of defenses against terrorism. They are technological, they are institutional, and they are international. So, on the technological side we got security cameras, airport screenings, we got watch lists, we got digital identification, we got facial recognition. We got institutions like the Counterterrorism Center set up. We got NATO more engaged. We are working better internationally with our allies. We've done a lot. This is not 2001. So, I don't think we are as vulnerable to a terrorist strike as we were then, at least not a 9/11 cell strike. It just wouldn't happen.

We moved a long way in terms of increasing the ability of governments, not only the United States but abroad, to know what their citizens are doing. In other words, if there is a tradeoff between security and privacy, we moved it considerably in the direction of security and away from privacy and individual liberties which has its own dangers obviously. But we are stronger. But there are some things that are cutting against us. Social networking provided a great opportunity for terrorists to recruit and also communicate privately. Crypto currencies are a great opportunity for funding and the continuing struggle against the American dollar and the power of the U.S. treasury adds to that. What we know from our work in biology is that we are much more vulnerable to biological terrorism than we've been before. It's not just COVID, it's the ability to manufacture an agent that could rip through the societies with much greater lethality than what we have seen from COVID. It might not be as widespread, but it might have a 50% mortality rate on it, and it would have to affect a small portion. That work, you can be sure, is going on against us right now. And there is the whole realm of cyber threats. So, we know that ransom-ware is out there. We know that our electricity grids are under attack, but it can be done by terrorists.

Now, here is the thing that is different and most disturbing for me. In 2001, we were the sole superpower. Russia was struggling, China was a pigmy. Today, China is a behemoth and Russia is a nuclear modernized disruptive power in world affairs. Just remember, it was Russia that started the old terrorism movement a century ago. Vladimir Lenin put it together. He built Comintern and if you look at the 1960s and 1970s in the Middle East and in Europe it was Russia directly or indirectly behind all that terrorist activity. So we can't think that today in a multi-polar era that terrorism is exclusively the province of Islamist fundamentalists from these ungoverned regions. It may be state sponsored working through them.

So, as you do the discussions in the panel today, I hope you take advantage of this moment to think about the geo-strategic context. Yes, we still have to defend against terrorists. But we also have to be more mindful than ever of the source of terrorism. Not just a religion. Not just fundamentalists. But perhaps the malign design of a rival superpower. So, it's a new and challenging era. We have to evolve with it to keep Americans and Western civilization alive and safe.

This presentation was made by General Clark at the Special Forum: "NATO: Strategic Lessons From the Russian Invasion of Ukraine" that was held on April 28th, 2022 via Zoom conferencing.

I had been Assistant Executive Officer to General Alexander Haig in the 1978-79 period when the Soviet Union brought the intermediate range SS20 mobile missiles in. They had multiple; they had three warheads. They could be hidden. NATO had nothing that was comparable, and there followed an anxious three, four years of debate, started by General Haig, followed by General Rogers that culminated ultimately not only in the GLCM and Pershing II developments, but in the 00 INF Treaty Auction. That was put in in the mid 80s, and by 1991, when the Soviet Union fell, we got rid of our tactical nuclear warheads. And, of course, there were no more theater weapons, the GLCMs and the Pershing II were long gone, so we were left with our strategic nuclear deterrent. It didn't seem to be a problem in the 1990s, but we never had the means of arms control to encourage the Soviets or Russians to give up their tactical nuclear weapons. In fact, they continued their tactical nuclear weapon modernization program.

I was in a darkened hotel lobby in the spring of 2014 in Ukraine after the Ukrainians had called me over to look at Maidan, and a professor came up to me, whose name I don't now have unfortunately, and explained that he had the KGB archives on the Cuban Missile Crisis. He explained it this way, he said, "I'm going to tell you why the Soviet Union lost the Cuban missile crisis." And I said, "Well, I'm not even sure you lost it. We gave up our Jupiter IRBM's in Italy and Turkey." He said, "No, no, we lost it. And I'll tell you why," he said, "Because once Khrushchev got engaged, it wasn't Kennedy's diplomacy. It was the fact that by the correlation of forces, the Soviet Union knew that it could not stand up to America because America had strategic nuclear superiority."

Vladimir Putin is the heir to all that work, and he's begun, starting in 2008 at least, maybe earlier, a very deliberate program of modernization of the Russian military, at all levels, most importantly at the strategic level. And this began to reach culmination in 2017 with the advertisement of the underwater drone 100 Megaton torpedo that can go into New York City, unleash a huge tidal wave and destroy Manhattan and in the hyper-sonics, which would be unstoppable. Of course, most ICBMs are unstoppable anyway. But he was convinced that he had something that we didn't. It gave him a sense of assurance. It freed him to then work at the lower levels. General Haig used to call strategic nuclear weapons, the ultimate arbiter. Well, Putin believes he has the ultimate arbiter today.

At the tactical and theater level, we have nothing but 100 warheads that could be delivered by F-16s if they could be penetrated in. Russia has some 2000 tactical nuclear warheads that could be used, and Putin has used these effectively in the Ukraine crisis thus far. By issuing these nuclear threats, he undercuts the credibility of the United States and the NATO deterrent. Why? Because we can't match them. If he fires 10 40-ton nuclear weapons to say, "Clear the site around Mykolaiv, so we can advance to Odessa." What would the United States and NATO do? We don't have anything comparable. We're not going to cause a Polaris missile to be launched off the coast of France to strike some Russian formation in Ukraine. It would be interpreted as a strategic attack. So, what would we do? Putin sees this. He thinks he's found a hole in our deterrence, and he believes that because of this hole, if he's able to use these tactical nuclear weapons, that NATO would jump back in fear. That the German socialists already would say, "Oh my goodness, Ukraine's not worth it." That the French would say, "Well, they can't come to France because we have our own nuclear weapons." That the Italians would say, "Well, please, let's just go on with business; Ukraine's not that important." And this kind of tactical use has been practiced in the Russian exercises. So, we have a certain problem with the concept of extended deterrence that we've lived with, really since 1950 in the United States. This is a huge challenge to NATO.

Now the current situation in Kyiv and Ukraine is a situation, I believe, of premature exultation. There are too many reports of the Russian army not being motivated, not being comparable. They're only advancing three, four kilometers a day. They have completely reorganized that force since the failures north of Kyiv. Putin turned it over to a general rather than trying to run it hands-on himself. The general went back to traditional formations—big groups of tanks, big, massive artillery, moves slowly, when you hit resistance, call in the artillery fire, blanket the area, every village that could hold ambushes, just level it with artillery. It's not very fast, but it's very effective if you don't run out of artillery or artillery ammunition. And right now, we figure the Ukrainians are outnumbered, maybe three, maybe four to one in artillery tubes. They also don't have the ammunition they need. And for all the announcements over the last week, that stuff is not there yet. So, at any moment the two pincers are coming together to encircle the Ukrainian force in the Donbas. Right now, they're 120 kilometers apart, but that's closing at the rate of four, five, seven, maybe ten kilometers a day. And at any point, that Ukrainian shell of a defense that's trying to hold open the shoulders or block the envelopment, could collapse because it's not in prepared defenses. And as those pincers close in, the Ukrainians are going to be forced to choose: Am I going to stay in an encircled position, and hope I'm going to be relieved? Or am I going to make a mad dash for the Dnieper and get across the bridge at Dnipro?

So, this is a really tough problem, and that's the current status. It invites Putin's use of nuclear weapons in two cases. Number one, in an echo of what was said by the United States in 1945. He starts to make momentum. He encircles the force. He's about to break out and take Odessa. He uses a few tactical nuclear weapons, 40 tons of explosives. Okay, it's bad, but it's not like Hiroshima. And, he says, "I hated to do this, but you know what? This is the best way to save the loss of life. The UN Secretary General told me to get this over with, and this is the fastest way to get it over with, and so that's why we've done this." He could do that. He could also use these nuclear weapons if, for some reason, the Russian advance falters and doesn't

achieve the encirclement, and Russia is being thrown back. The Ukrainians will not give Russia a sanctuary. They're going to drive those forces all the way out of Donbas and probably go into Crimea if they have the capacity. And, he considers Crimea, Russia.

Look, we have a deterrence problem that's here. There are three scenarios that could happen. Scenario number one is that the Ukrainians just fall apart. It happens so quickly that Russia doesn't use nuclear weapons, and Russia ends up taking everything but Kyiv. And there's nothing left, and the Ukrainians say, "Just let us leave." I think that's unlikely. I don't think the Ukrainians would do that. I think they'll fight to the bitter end. But scenario number two is that Ukrainians are successful and push the Russians out, and then there's a resort to nuclear weapons. And then what does NATO do? Scenario number three is the mixed message. It's like, he takes the Donbas, the Ukrainians get their forces back. They still have a force; they're not powerful enough to force the Dnieper and regain the Donbass. They've lost Odessa; they're a landlocked country. Does NATO give them the wherewithal to secure their country? Or does Secretary General Guterres prevail and say, "Let's just stop the killing. Ukraine, you're gone. Russia, you're the aggressor nation. You violated all of norms, but go ahead and keep it because we can't do anything about it."

Those are the choices, and that's the dilemma. So, Yonah, I think we have a deterrent problem that has to be really thought through. I think we're going to need to invest in theater nuclear modernization and tactical nuclear modernization if we can't resolve this with Russia some other way, because our deterrence is being questioned. That is, if you're afraid to respond forcefully in Ukraine because Russia is threatening you with nuclear weapons, why is it really any different for the Baltic States? What, because you signed a document? Article five doesn't require you to launch a nuclear war to save the Baltic states. It says you'll do what's necessary in the defense. Maybe the defense is you can't get to the Baltic states, and you say, (motioned with hands to indicate it's not a U.S. problem). "But you know, we're going to put some more brigades in Germany. You won't come to Germany." We've already given the impression of being intimidated by the Russian nuclear threats. That's why the threats are being repeated.

So, we have a deterrent problem. We have an immediate problem of reinforcement to the Ukrainians and really the only viable way through this is that Ukraine forces the Russians out, and Putin concludes there's no point using nuclear weapons. "Let's try to keep Crimea," he says. And we let the diplomats argue over Crimea. I think we've got some serious challenges in these issues.

III. ACADEMIC CONTEXT:

POST 9/11: TWENTY YEARS OF MULTILATERAL COUNTER-TERRORISM COOPERATION [OCTOBER 2021]

This section consists of presentations made by the contributors at the Special Forum: "Post 9/11: Twenty Years of Multilateral Counter-Terrorism Cooperation" that was held on September 9th, 2021, via Zoom conferencing. Some updates and revisions were made by the invited participants.

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I remember 9/11 in the way that many people remember the summer of 1939. It was one of the most beautiful days I can ever recall, and of course what happens later that day we all remember it in our own ways and probably have very clear, lasting memories of it. This Saturday marks the 20th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. The time for remembrance and tribute to the victims, survivors, first responders, and all those who fight for a world free of terrorism, but it is also a time for reflection about the international response to terrorism. As we grapple to understand what the current situation in Afghanistan means for our collective counterterrorism efforts, we need to assess what we have learned and what we should be doing differently.

To help put things in perspective, let me start with a brief, admittedly somewhat simplistic, overview of modern terrorism and how the United Nations has evolved over the last decades to address it. Let me rewind to the 1960s and 70s for a moment. While the world had already seen primarily post-World War II insurgent groups use terrorist tactics as part of their campaigns, modern "terrorism" and "terrorists" were, in popular conception, generally associated those terms with small radical groups. With no social media to amplify their message, small groups of zealots struggled to gain the public attention they sought for their cause, or to gain leverage against governments and societies they opposed. However, being the golden age of television wire services, they could do something spectacular to grab the headlines like hijack or blow up a plane or take hostages or conduct brazen assassinations of government officials. Indiscriminate mass killing was rarely the point of such terrorism. Rather, it was the psychology of the act itself and the attention it gained that was the point, or more acute goals such as the release of prisoners.

Into the 1960s and 70s, many such terrorist acts were handled by national security forces and or those of a ruling colonial power. International responses, if any, were limited or marked by bilateral frictions between states in which terrorist attacks happen or who lost victims and those that may have harbored or provided support to the attackers. However, truly international responses to terrorism began to emerge when such attacks started to target either people entitled to a special protection in a foreign state, so-called "internationally protected persons", or conveyances in activities that are regulated by international bodies such as transnational flights and, later, airports and ships. International responses of the period were typically prompted by some specific terrorist act or acts which attracted widespread condemnation and led to the adoption of international conventions or protocols. The first of these related to the prevention of hijacking of aircraft and use of explosives against aircraft but were soon followed by the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons and the even more specific 1979 Convention against the taking of hostages—both of which resonated with the horror of the 1972 Munich Olympics Massacre.

Where things really started to change in the early '90s was with the emergence of Al-Qaida from the insurgency against the Soviet-backed regime in the 1980s. In August 1998, the group used truck bombs and near-simultaneous destinations, in what would be an Al-Qaida signature in future attacks, against the United States embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing 244 and wounding nearly 4,500 more. This marked a serious shift from the more calculated and targeted terrorism of the 60s, 70s, and 80s into the era of mass casualty attacks in which the psychology of the act, indeed often the very purpose of an attack, was to kill and maim the largest number of people possible. The embassy bombings prompted the Security Council to adopt Resolution 1267 the following year to create an international sanctions regime against Al-Qaida and the Taliban, who harbored the group in Afghanistan.

In terms of numbers, then, the mass atrocity of 9/11 that we commemorate this Saturday took nearly 3,000 lives in a little more than an hour and wounded and sickened many more from more than 90 countries. It was not only the biggest single terrorist attack, but it made clear that, despite whatever twisted philosophy laid behind it, mass casualties and sheer savagery have become the hallmark of 21st century terrorism, lead first by Al Qaeda and then its Da'esh offshoot. Even the United Nations itself became a target, starting with UN compounds in Baghdad in 2003, Algiers in 2007, Pakistan in 2009, Abuja in 2011, and more recently peacekeepers in Mali and the Democratic Republic of the Congo just to name a few. Only a few days after the 9/11 attacks the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1373, obliging all Member States to criminalize

terrorist activity, including financial support for the harboring of such activities. The Security Council then decided to form its Counter-Terrorism Committee, in part to help it assess Member States' compliance with Security Council resolutions with the support of an Executive Directorate, or CTED. By the way, the Council will hold a session to mark the 20th anniversary of 1373 this coming Monday.

The Security Council has since gone on to adopt a whole series of counter-terrorism resolutions by consensus, finding unity on the issue of terrorism even when it could not agree on how to address the conflicts in Syria and other places where Al-Qaida and Da'esh thrive. For example, Al-Qaida's known interests in weapons of mass destruction led the Council to adopt Resolution 1540 in 2004; it obliges all Member States to adopt legislation and other measures to prevent non-state actors from acquiring and using chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear material. The Council created a group of experts and another committee to monitor its implementation.

The General Assembly was also spurred to action after 9/11, and as the fifth anniversary of the attacks approached in 2006, it adopted, by consensus of all Member States, the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, an important development considering Member States still cannot agree on a comprehensive convention on international terrorism and a definition thereof.

Member States themselves are primarily responsible for implementing the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, but the UN organization also has a role in helping provide technical assistance and capacity-building to states requesting help to implement its provisions on addressing the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, combating terrorism, and upholding human rights and the rule of law. The Secretary-General created a Counter-Terrorism Implementation Taskforce (CTITF) to coordinate the work of relevant UN entities involved in implementing this strategy and other related resolutions.

Five years later, the General Assembly welcomed the establishment of the UN Counter-terrorism Centre (UNCCT), entrusted with promoting international counter-terrorism cooperation and to support Member States in implementing the GCTS. Established within the Department of Political Affairs along with the CTITF Office, UNCCT as it's called, was given foundational financial contributions from the government of Saudi Arabia, which over the past ten years has allowed the Centre to launch capacity building programs and funds.

Now in light of what has happened in Afghanistan—and I think it is worth mentioning just as a footnote here that also in 2011, after Osama bin Laden was killed, the Security Council decided to hive off the Taliban from the 1267 sanction regime, keeping the original one on Al-Qaida but adopting a separate one through Resolution 1988 for the Taliban, including provisions related for delisting sanctioned individuals who met certain criteria indicating a renunciation of violence and commitment to the political processes set forth in the 2010 Kabul conference. As have we seen though, a number of listed individuals now form part of the new Taliban cabinet.

Back to the Security Council in 2014, when we saw the adoption of Resolution 2178 in response to Da'esh's seizure of Mosul in an unprecedented foreign terrorist fighter phenomenon in which more than 40,000 fighters from nearly 100 countries travelled to Syria and Iraq to join Da'esh and other groups. This consensus chapter seven resolution obliges all Member States to criminalize offenses related to the preparation, travel, and other preparatory acts undertaken for the purpose of committing terrorist offenses. As Member States moved to implement its provisions, it contributed to staunching the flow of foreign terrorist fighters to the region.

But the phenomenon remains a massive problem even after the territorial defeat of the so-called Caliphate in March 2019, as thousands still remain in the region along with tens of thousands of associated family members, including many children who were born during the conflict and stranded in camps across northeastern Syria. The Council also adopted a number of other resolutions related to Da'esh as well, including 2199 on preventing the sale of looted antiquities and oil and 2396, which requires all Member States to adopt and use passenger data systems in combination with biometrics, and Interpol and other watch lists, to screen for known and suspected terrorists, especially relocating foreign terrorist fighters.

The UN also needed to adapt to the evolving methodologies of these groups. As an example, the extraordinary rise of global connectivity through social media platforms from the early 2010s onward saw a concurrent increase in sophistication and reach of terrorists' use of the internet for recruitment, particularly to reach otherwise marginalized communities while also glorifying their so-called successes. The emergence of such narratives in a large part contributed to efforts on the prevention of violent extremism, particularly the UN system-wide plan of action on the same addressing the role of social media on terrorist narratives, closely followed by the Security Council Resolution 2354 addressing the critical importance of counter narratives and the role of the media in preventing and countering violent extremism. Similarly, the Women Peace and Security Agenda, particularly UNSCR 2242, has addressed the evolving understanding of the terrorist threat by examining the gendered nature of terrorism and extremism while seeking to ensure the leadership and participation of women in national-level plans for the prevention of violent extremism.

By 2016 though, it was clear that Member States needed to implement UN provisions to counter Da'esh's social media- fueled global reach and the FTF phenomenon quickly exceeded the limits of UNCCT and CTITF as small parts of the Department of Political Affairs.

Incoming Secretary-General Guterres and Member States saw a need to lift UNCCT and CTITF out of DPA and place it into a separate dedicated entity within the UN Secretariat. And so, in 2017, the General Assembly agreed by consensus with the Secretary General's proposal to establish the UN Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT) headed by its own Under-Secretary-General. UNOCT was established to bring strategic leadership and coherence to counter-terrorism policy. We help coordinate the United Nations system in its wide-ranging efforts to prevent and counter terrorism and violent extremism.

Additionally, in December 2018, the Secretary-General set up the Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact to replace the old CTITF. It is now the biggest coordination framework in the UN, including 43 UN and other entities and organizations such as Interpol and the World Customs Organization. Each entity brings its own expertise to various problem sets, and this allows us to coordinate activities across the United Nations' human rights, peace and security, and development pillars in a truly holistic way. Actors like the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Women, the UN Development Program, and the UN Office of Drugs and Crime all ensure a true "one-UN" approach to counter-terrorism aligned with the Secretary-General's vision.

For its own part, UNOCT has added to UNCCT's dynamic capacity-building work a portfolio of globally applied programs tailored for Member States' specific needs. We're almost entirely funded by voluntary contributions from donor states, principally Saudi Arabia and Qatar, but also an increasing proportion comes from some thirty other donors including the United States, Russia, China, Japan, the European Union, and a number of Member States. Our Budapest-based counterterrorism travel program is a good example of one of our global programs.

Working with CTED, UNODC, ICAO, and UN Office of Information and Communications Technology, our Counter Terrorism Travel Program (CTTP) interviews human rights compliance with advanced technology with a multi-agency team that helps Member States comply with UNSCRs 2396 and 2482. These require states to use advance passenger information and passenger name recognition data in combination with biometrics and access to Interpol and other international and national watch lists. The program provides states the legislative assistance, technical training, and software needed to detect and predict the travel of known and suspected terrorists, and other serious criminals, in a way that still respects human rights with data and relative privacies. It represents the best example of a practical and effective multilateral response to a real terrorist threat that leverages Member States' sovereignty and territorial integrity while contributing to a network intended to defeat terrorist networks. It also demonstrates the strength of a cohesive, coordinated UN response.

Another example is our Global Program on Countering the Financing of Terrorism launched last year. Together with CTED and UNODC, we assist Member States to increase their national and regional capacities to counter the financing of terrorism in accordance with UNSCR 2462 and Financial Action Task Force recommendations. It includes new software being developed to help financial intelligence units deal with all sorts of terrorism financing, including on the dark web and with cryptocurrencies.

A third signature program is our Global Victims of Terrorism Support Program. Promoting and protecting the voices and rights of victims of terrorism is a critical priority for us and our partners. We work closely with victims' associations around the world, of course, but we also have work with UNODC and the Inter-Parliamentary Union to develop model legal provisions states can use to implement General Assembly recommendations on protecting and upholding the rights of victims. On September 20th, we will have a joint event with the 9/11 Memorial and Museum to commemorate the victims from more than 90 countries who perished in the 2001 attacks, and next year we will hold the first-ever Global Congress for Victims of Terrorism to provide a platform for victims' voices, but also for governments to learn about their special needs and challenges.

Let me go back now to the "bigger picture". Have we been successful? Are we better off now than twenty years ago? Three weeks ago, I would have said that, globally, terrorist attacks and casualties are down compared to several years ago; although this is in no way meant to diminish the suffering that still goes on in Afghanistan, Iraq, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, Syria, Yemen, nor does it ignore Da'esh metastasizing in Burkina Faso, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Niger, Mozambique. Moreover, the post-9/11 trend of authoritarian regimes and illiberal democracies using counter-terrorism laws and provisions to oppress political rivals and opponents has only increased during the pandemic. Such action is not only in violation of political and civil rights, but it also has sown the seeds for future conflict and, as some studies have shown, can be the tipping point that pushes somebody to adopt violence, including terrorism.

Today, however, any answer to the question is clearly overshadowed by the recent developments in Afghanistan. Not only do they have dire consequences for the safety, security, and freedom of the people of Afghanistan and have considerable concerns about the lives and livelihoods of women, but it may also result in terrorist attacks projected from or through

Afghanistan. The terrorist threat that we have seen growing in conflict zones, particularly in Africa, may well only become more acute as they seek to emulate the Taliban's takeover. We also have to remain particular about the situation at the borders with Afghanistan's neighbors.

The situation in Afghanistan has made it tragically clear that we need to do better to tailor our efforts to the special needs and contexts of each country to ensure national ownership and sustainability of their efforts and our efforts. Like map overlays that are used to plan a military campaign, when Member States and their partners design counterterrorism campaigns, they must also think comprehensively of a country's or region's cultural, cyberspace, demographics, economy, history, language, religion, gender dynamics, and other factors of their own forms of terrain which must be understood in order to maneuver effectively. We need to learn from the past and ensure that our efforts truly have a sustainable long-term, lasting impact.

Let me offer now just a few thoughts on what the next decade of multilateral counterterrorism should focus on. First, the international community must achieve more than just tactical wins against network terrorist archipelagoes that fester and grow in areas of chronic conflict. We must play the long game, with strategic responses towards durable political solutions. That is because while military action is often necessary against terrorist insurgencies or, as in the case of the French intervention in Mali, vital to stopping a terrorist takeover of a state, it has proven insufficient to the state defeating them. At best it can achieve tactical victories, or it can contain a problem for a certain length of time. International partner forces can help keep terrorists off balance in conflict zones like Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen, but they do not in themselves generate the sort of political will or popular allegiance that governments need to make a country inhospitable to terrorist insurgencies. We need to go beyond this approach then to resolve conflicts and address the underlying conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism using all of the political developmental and humanitarian tools at our disposal, including peace building, in order to prevent violent extremism and terrorism.

With respect to military efforts, my personal opinion is that greater unity of effort is needed by international security forces that are helping host countries battle insurgencies. Both the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin are cases in point. Despite numerous international, regional, and bilateral interventions and deployments, the situation has gotten worse—not better. Is it really the best thing to have so many forces operating separately from each other without any clear connection to a political strategy?

Second, more needs to be done to help terrorist-affected countries build relevant high impact capacity to address the issues they face. That is why we are starting to establish field-based program offices to deliver capacity-building assistance that are closer to the beneficiaries, so that it is more impactful and sustainable. One example is our innovative Behavioral Insights Hub in Doha, which is based on an advanced approach on prevention. Another example is our training center in Rabat, which will directly support requesting countries in Africa with the necessary level of specialization on counter-terrorism. And that is why we are currently setting up a program office in Nairobi for East Africa for sustainable capacity-building support on border security management, for example.

Third, and most important, is that we must make the most of multilateral mechanisms to fight terror. Modern terrorists are learning and adaptive groups that exacerbate and exploit conflict and communal tensions. They are not only not constrained by borders, but they also use modern technology to reach global audiences wherever they want to. But whether they are physically or virtually crossing borders to send money, weapons, or messages from one country to another, that is precisely where sovereign Member States acting in concert can be most effective. As General McChrystal observed, it takes a network to defeat a network. That is why our programs are effective and play to a state's strengths with its own networks, but also why linking to bilateral, regional, and international networks. It is why international legal cooperation on things such as battlefield evidence gathered by anti-Da'esh coalition partners and shared through Interpol can be game changers if used properly and in concert.

I mentioned earlier the 7th review of the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. The negotiations on this Strategy were delicate and sensitive political processes, as priorities from 193 Member States differ widely. This year was the most forward-looking review since the strategy was first adopted in 2006. It includes 53 new paragraphs addressing today's most pressing issues on terrorism and violent extremism.

For the first time the Strategy sets the ground to address the rise in terrorist attacks on the basis of quote xenophobia, racism, and other forms of intolerance, or in the name of religion or belief. Yes, neo-Nazis and white supremacists are back. They have learned from Da'esh and have international linkages with multiple nodes. Reaching consensus on action against this will prove to be essential for the adaptability and credibility of international counterterrorism efforts.

With this resolution, the General Assembly also tackles the crucial need to counter the use of new technologies for terrorist purposes such as artificial intelligence, 3D printing, and drones, and the emerging use of new social media platforms including gaming technologies for recruitment. It makes a strong call for cooperative measures to stop the spread of terrorist content

and hate speech online.

There is also the delicate situation of repatriation of children with links to foreign terrorist fighters stranded in camps in Iraq and Syria. It is now included on a case-by-case basis. The protection of human rights and the rule of law have always been key in the strategy, but this review has gone a step further with meaningful advances on human rights including gender equality, the rights of the child and victim, and humanitarian action. It also includes groundbreaking language to ensure compliance with human rights and the rule of law, and this is probably the most important lesson from twenty years of counterterrorism: the failure to protect and promote human rights, especially human rights abuses committed by security forces, give terrorists recruitment tools for free.

To conclude, the work of the United Nations is now more important than ever. As the terrorist threat has evolved, so have we and we must continue to do so. The United Nations and its Member States need to speak and act with one strong, united voice and use all the tools at their disposal. The situation in Afghanistan requires the international community to further step up its work. Such work must be based on the understanding of cultural ethos and on-the-ground realities, the protection of innocent civilians and saving human lives must be our priority, and humanitarian access must be guaranteed.

AMBASSADOR STUART EIZENSTAT

Former Senior Official with Three U.S. Administrations and Ambassador to the European Union

There's clearly been success over the last twenty years in dealing with the threat of terrorism. It comes from a global, radical, Islamic movement. It does not have a central headquarters, but from desperate terrorist groups that share a common anti-western theology and feed on each other's success from the Middle East to Africa and Asia. There has been no repeat of anything like 9/11 to our own homeland or that of our allies, but there are continuing threats.

With the chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan and the rhetoric in the United States on both the right and the left of ending what are called 'forever wars', there is a real risk of thinking that terrorist threats are behind us, and we can go back to business as usual. It is critical that we do not go from one end of the spectrum of major military interventions, which have often been without understanding the countries or cultures in which we intervene, and without matching realistic policy to military force, to the other extreme of withdrawing from the anti-terrorism battlefield.

We need the same long-term staying power as our adversaries. This requires bipartisan support, so our policy doesn't change with each election, and the constant support of our allies in an anti-terrorism coalition with a long-term staying power. And may I just say that I was really inspired by Raffi Gregorian that the UN is in this for the long term. But for the U.S. the Taliban knew they could wait us out, the slogan you have the watch we have the time. For example, President Obama contributed to the surge of troops in 2009 but simultaneously set a public 2011 withdrawal deadline. What signal did that send? President Trump was rapidly drawing down troops and setting a May 1, 2021, for withdrawal while negotiating with the Taliban behind the backs of our Afghan allies. President Biden extended the deadline but again set an arbitrary August 31 deadline which took the backbone out of the Afghan army.

We should focus on some of the following broad goals with our allies, and with the support of Congress, the UN, and the American people. One prime goal is to prevent localized terrorist groups from acquiring weapons of mass destruction that would dramatically escalate the threat to the United States, our allies, and indeed the world.

Another is to strengthen our special military forces and CIA capabilities that can be deployed along with drone capabilities, and recruitment of agents on the ground to monitor and disrupt terrorist groups. So, we don't think our only option is to have a hundred-thousand-person military force.

Third, it is imperative we develop our own over the horizon capabilities that in some way compensate, in part, for the loss of our military presence on the ground. These include cyber disruptions and wherever possible military bases to launch drone surveillance and attacks, if necessary.

Moreover, we must recognize that corruption is one of the greatest barriers to our success in dealing with governments threatened by terrorist groups. Only a fraction of the hundreds of billions of dollars we invested in Afghanistan got to the intended beneficiaries. I've interviewed for a book I'm working on the art of diplomacy, several people doing wonderful work with NGOs but who couldn't scale it up and had to shut down in 2014 with the deterioration of the security in Afghanistan. We should greatly improve our auditing capabilities so we can understand exactly where our taxpayer's money is going and that it's going to their intended beneficiaries.

We often also don't understand the cultures, the history, or the language of the nations in which we intervene to combat terrorist threats. Therefore, the State and Defense Departments and our intelligence agencies should urgently build up the capabilities of our foreign service officers, our soldiers, and our intelligence agents to become more proficient in Arabic and Farsi and in the histories and political dynamics of key countries. While there have been great strides in multilateral cooperation, as described by Raffi Gregorian, this is not always translated into as much success as we might have suspected. And one of the reasons I believe is the problem of inadequate intelligence, which I'll get to in a minute.

Permit me to distinguish between different terrorist threats. One is state sponsorship of terrorist groups. Iran is the greatest state sponsor of terrorist groups Hezbollah, Hamas, and its direct involvement through its own Quds Force in Syria.

Second, are state supported havens for terrorist groups, Pakistan being a clear example. Despite our seeming leverage with our large arms and aid programs we could never put enough pressure on Pakistan through its own ISI intelligence group to stop it supporting the Taliban. That really would greatly impede our military action.

Third, are weak or failed states which become sites for terrorist groups. This was the case with Afghanistan during the rule of the Taliban from 1996 to 2001 and now, as Raffi Gregorian has stated, in the post August 31 Afghanistan, with the Taliban regime, which we drove out after 9/11, and which remains allied with Al-Qaeda that planned the 9/11 attacks. And if its interim cabinet is to be taken seriously as the permanent cabinet, Afghanistan will become a potential breeding ground for terrorist, ground zero. Syria's civil war is another example of a weak state which has become a site for terrorist groups.

Fourth are terrorist groups like ISIS or Al-Qaeda which are significantly self-sustaining. And here I get to intelligence for sound decision making. With my personal experience with President Carter, it became very difficult for him to make sound decisions on Iran. The intelligence on the state of the Shah was very poor, we didn't realize he lost support of major elements of society. We didn't even know he had life threatening cancer, affecting his decision making. Nor did we have a clear understanding of his military leaders until General Heizer's mission. We were surprised at the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

I was present at Dover Air Force base with Secretary Albright when the bodies of those killed in our embassies in Tanzania and Kenya came back. Our response there I have to say frankly was not up to what it should have been, nor was our intelligence of the threat level. Iraq is another example of inadequate intelligence, with supposed weapons of mass destruction. For the book I'm working on I've interviewed scores of people, there was unanimity this was not just a Rumsfeld-Cheney creation. There was unanimity of all the major intelligence agencies, in Germany, in France, in the UK, in the US that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction. What none of them realized was that he had destroyed them all but would not admit it due to his fear of Iran and being perceived as weak in his own country. And here the UN inspectors of course were not allowed to continue their work. Most recently with President Biden, while I frankly disagree with his decision to pull out the three thousand troops, I think we wouldn't have won the war with them, but we could have prevented a total collapse of the Army and the government. But in his defense the intelligence agencies seemed to have agreed that the Afghan army would have lasted many weeks, maybe even months and this led to inadequate planning for the withdrawal. We often intervene without understanding the nature of the countries. In Iraq for example, we did not appreciate what it would mean to remove a Sunni leader in a majority Shi'a country. With Afghanistan the 2001 Bonn agreement negotiated expertly by my predecessor Jim Dobbins as US ambassador to the EU, tried to create a western style democracy for a decentralized tribal society and an Afghan army in our own image as a top-down, technology-driven military.

The policy options are as follows. First is diplomacy. We need to have allied and UN cooperation against state actors. Diplomacy can be combined with positive incentives using the full resources of our trade and financial capacities including USAID, the IMF and World Bank and the regional development banks.

Next, are economic sanctions, using the power of the U.S. dollar, and financial and trade sanctions. I called myself the "sanctions-meister" of the Clinton Administration. Economic sanctions are effective generally only against state actors, and be effective they have to be multilateral including those of our allies, and wherever possible the support of the UN Security Council. They were very effective over time with apartheid in South Africa; in 2003 with Libya helped force Gaddafi to give up his nuclear program; and, in the Balkans they were helpful in Bosnia and Kosovo. With Iran, EU sanctions helped lead to the November 2004 E-3 agreement; one of the great tragedies is that the Bush Administration did not embrace that agreement at a time when Iran's nuclear program was not as advanced as it is now. When the EU joined our unilateral sanctions in the run-up to the JCPOA in 2015, with sanctions on oil imports, on the Iranian central bank, on SWIFT clearances, this is what got Iran to the negotiating table in 2015.

Next, are covert actions. These are harder to do against non-state terrorists. We need more human resources on the ground. This was clearly a factor in Israel's efforts to disrupt Iran's nuclear program through assassination of the head of their nuclear effort and blowing up some of their key facilities, as well as the Stuxnet joint efforts presumably by the US and Israel against Iran's centrifuges.

With military options for state actors, we must be very discerning to clearly define when our national interest is impacted; and then we need to match political goals with military action. We often do not plan before military actions what will happen after them. If we contrast the Iraq war 2003 with the Gulf war in 1991, it was very evident that there were limited political objectives in the Iraq war, along with UN security council resolutions, Congressional support, and some 30 countries who joined, along with a limited political objective—to get Saddam out of Kuwait. Indeed, George HW Bush was criticized: ‘you have Gaddafi by the neck, why don’t you choke him?’. And the Bush administration replied ‘that would break the UN mandate, but it also means we would own Baghdad’ which are lessons completely forgotten in 2003. At the same time, ironically, President Biden decided to pull all our troops out of Afghanistan and decided wisely to keep three thousand in Iraq and that will help, I think, stabilize Iraq.

We’ve had other examples of military actions such as the Israeli attack in 1981 against the reactors in Iraq but again, if you look at the Libya situation this is a perfect example of not thinking through the consequences. Yes, we got rid of Gaddafi, but we unleashed terrorist groups in the vacuum that created. We did not have a plan in advance, what would it mean when the symbol, as awful as he may be, of statehood is removed. We simply don’t make those kinds of calculations. We also have to know when we do military actions, major military actions, there will be civilian casualties with drone and airplane attacks. And we have to avoid trying to be seen as occupiers rather than liberators.

We also need non corrupt states to fight terrorists. We need to do more to fight corruption. Because corruption is in fact the enemy of our efforts. With respect to non-state terrorist groups, we need special forces, we need the CIA, but we have to realize that in places like Gaza with Hamas, Hezbollah in Lebanon, terrorist groups often embed themselves with civilians making air attacks more difficult.

And last is nation building. Here again we should not go from pillar to post; it should not be written off if it is accompanied by security and anti-corruption measures to give it a chance to work. The people of Afghanistan indeed benefited from nation building in terms of increased GDP per capita, education levels, women’s entrepreneurship, and some semblance of governance. And one last point, up to two weeks before our withdrawal the Taliban had not captured one major city and kept it. So we need a smart strategy; we need a coordinated strategy. And it is very important to distinguish between the different scenarios I have discussed, including states like Iran which actively support terrorism.

RICHARD PROSEN

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Please note that my remarks are off-the-record and the opinions and points expressed are my own and do not necessarily reflect the views and policies of the United States government, the U.S. Department of State, or the Bureau of Counterterrorism. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our multilateral efforts to address global terrorism-related threats and challenges. I serve in the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau for Counterterrorism, where I am responsible for helping to coordinate our multilateral counterterrorism engagement across the world. I’m pleased to be here, together with my fellow speakers – critical partners in our collective efforts to fight terrorism and prevent violent extremism.

Under the Biden-Harris Administration, the United States is committed to multilateral engagement and working closely with multilateral organizations. Multilateral cooperation is the preferred and most effective method to address conflict, coordinate humanitarian responses, recognize and defend human rights, and prevent and confront terrorism while striving to build equitable systems of participation worldwide. I’ll discuss my personal views in how the terrorist threat is evolving, share thoughts on progress made, and outline plans regarding how to best address this global challenge going forward.

TERRORISM LANDSCAPE

We have collectively made progress countering al-Qa’ida and ISIS activities and dismantling their networks, exemplified by the success in defeating ISIS’s so-called “caliphate” in 2019. On June 28, the 83 members of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, including NATO, INTERPOL, and other international organizations, declared their joint determination to eliminate this global threat and pledged to strengthen cooperation to ensure that ISIS in Iraq and Syria, and its networks around the world, are unable to reconstitute any territorial enclave or continue to threaten our homelands, people, and interests. However, the ISIS and al-Qa’ida threats continue to metastasize and evolve – with the growing ISIS threat in Africa and al-Qa’ida’s continued operations in Central Asia or through its proxies in East Africa and Southeast Asia. We must remain vigilant: our sustained focus on these groups is needed to further disrupt recruitment and plotting.

COLLECTIVE and UNIFIED RESPONSE

We must also continue our collective efforts to prevent ISIS's resurgence and mitigate the threat posed by the thousands of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) and their associated family members, who are detained in detention centers and displaced persons camps. To date, the United States has repatriated 12 adult U.S. citizens and 16 U.S. citizen minors from Syria and Iraq. The United States also took custody of the two remaining "Beatles" in late 2020 and charged the British citizens for their crimes against U.S. citizens in the Syria/Iraq region. Alexandra Kotey pled guilty to all eight counts in his indictment last week and faces life in prison without the possibility of parole when he receives his sentence in March 2022. He was involved in the kidnapping and murder of American journalists and aid workers – including James Foley, Steven Sotloff, Peter Kassig, and Kayla Mueller – as well as British and Japanese nationals. El Shafee Elsheikh's case is pending in the Southern District of New York (SDNY). We commend all countries which have repatriated their citizens, including Albania, Finland, Germany, Italy, and North Macedonia, and strongly encourage other countries to repatriate their citizens immediately. We support the United Nation's new Global Framework to aid the reintegration of individuals repatriated from Iraq and Syria and encourage others to do so as well. We've focused intensively on building our partners' civilian counterterrorism capacities, particularly in employing "law enforcement finishes," such as investigating, arresting, prosecuting, and incarcerating terrorists.

The State Department has also been working – together with the Departments of Defense and Justice – to build capacity to collect and use battlefield evidence in civilian criminal justice proceedings to increase the effectiveness of prosecutions. NATO, the United Nations, Council of Europe, INTERPOL, and the European Union are all developing new guidelines and standard operating procedures to optimize the use of battlefield evidence in criminal proceedings. This capacity building has been critical in ensuring that FTFs do not escape accountability for crimes committed in conflict zones. These tools have grown increasingly important as the terrorism threat grows more decentralized and moves away from traditional military conflict zones, such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria. We've seen the real-world impact of these efforts in the Philippines, Bangladesh, Mali, Kenya, and Tunisia, inter alia, with our partners preventing terrorist attacks before they take place, responding to terrorist incidents more quickly and effectively, and holding terrorists to account while respecting the rule of law.

Let me offer a few words on the current situation in Afghanistan. The scenes of families agonizing over an uncertain future is heart wrenching for many of us who have worked over the years to improve the lives of Afghans, especially women and children. The United States government (USG) has made clear to the Taliban that they will be held accountable if they fail to uphold their core commitments and responsibilities: 1) continued movement out of Afghanistan of foreign nationals and Afghans who wish to depart; 2) full adherence to counterterrorism commitments; 3) humanitarian access; 4) respect for the human rights of all Afghans, including women and girls; and 5) a peaceful transfer of power to an inclusive government with broad support. It is equally vital for the Taliban to hear a united message from the world that it must respect human rights and deny safe haven to terrorists.

The United States has also been working hard to counter and prevent terrorist travel, including in the development and adoption of UNSCR 2396 in late 2017, which imposed a range of new obligations on governments in response to the phenomenon of FTFs traveling to and from conflict zones. We have been and remain focused on ensuring that this landmark resolution is effectively implemented, including through championing strong ICAO international Standards and Recommended Practices, leading Global Counterterrorism Forum initiatives to develop watchlisting enterprises that are in accordance with each country's international law obligations, including international human rights law, as applicable, and prevent terrorist travel in the maritime domain, and providing direct capacity building to fund INTERPOL I-24/7 connectivity for many frontline states. I would also highlight that the United States is pleased to work with NATO on a whole-of- government project to build counterterrorism law enforcement capacity of NATO Partner nations. These combined approaches are essential to identify and address new and evolving threats.

ADDRESSING RMVE CHALLENGES

Confronting the terrorist threat posed by what the U.S. government refers to as racially or ethnically motivated violent extremist, or "REMVE" actors, is another top priority for the U.S. Administration and will remain so in the years ahead. The January 6 assault on the U.S. Capitol and the tragic deaths and destruction that occurred underscored what we have long known: the rise of REMVE, including the associated violent radicalization of white supremacist groups, is a serious and growing national security threat. U.S.-based REMVE actors have also been known to communicate with and travel abroad to engage in-person with foreign REMVE actors, primarily in Europe and in countries such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa. The USG is adapting its existing tools and authorities to address this transnational threat. On June 15, the United States released the National Strategy for Countering Domestic Terrorism. While the focus of this strategy is on the domestic REMVE threat in the United States, there is also a focus on the transnational linkages – especially the online connections – between violent extremists in the United States and REMVE actors around the world.

Illustrating how seriously the USG takes REMVE as a counterterrorism issue, in 2020 the State Department designated the Russian Imperial Movement (or RIM) and three of its leaders as Specially Designated Global Terrorists – the first time the United States sanctioned a white supremacist organization. RIM is a white supremacist group based in St. Petersburg that trained individuals to commit terrorist acts. After the RIM designation, we engaged U.S.-based technology companies, which subsequently chose to voluntarily remove RIM accounts and content from their platforms. A RIM leader recently told an American journalist that one of the most devastating impacts of the designation was that Facebook shut down its webpage, which resulted in the loss of years’ worth of information and hampered the group’s reach.

Through multilateral efforts led by the United Nations, the Global Counterterrorism Forum, the Aqaba Process led by Jordan, and regional organizations such as the OSCE, we are also leveraging our respective tools and capabilities against REMVE challenges. We supported the International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law’s Criminal Justice Practitioner’s Guide on Addressing REMVE, which includes good practices on the types of counterterrorism tools and legislation that countries should consider to effectively counter REMVE. We also note that the United States has joined the Christchurch Call to Action, pledging with other member governments and technology partners to work together, while upholding the freedoms and protections of speech and association afforded by the U.S. Constitution, as well as reasonable expectations of privacy. Continuing to engage the technology sector to enhance information sharing and identify and counter often vague or coded language and symbols in terrorist and violent extremist propaganda and messaging is also vitally important.

CONCLUSION

By enhancing multilateral engagement, information sharing, and promoting a whole-of government approach, we can collectively and effectively work together to confront these challenges to ensure a more stable and peaceful future.

DISTINGUISHED UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR RITA COLWELL

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Remembering 9/11- where we were when it happened - I was in my office at the National Science Foundation, on the twelfth floor of the NSF building about ten minutes from the Pentagon, in Arlington, Virginia. I was in a conference with White House staff to discuss the budget for the National Science Foundation. At approximately 8:45 a.m. the discussion was interrupted by my assistant, who entered the room to tell us that a plane had crashed into a tower in New York. I turned on the TV just at the time the second plane crashed into the Twin Towers.

There was no communication with the White House for the next two hours that morning. It wasn’t until 11:30 am that we were able, I and the two White House staffers in my office, to communicate with the White House.

There are a few other memorable events that occurred at the NSF that day I’d like to share with you. I was the first woman Director of the National Science Foundation, but more importantly, the first microbiologist to serve as Director of NSF. There had been a biophysicist director, William McElroy, some years earlier, but directors of the NSF traditionally had been (and still are) physicists, engineers, and predominantly from the “hard sciences”.

As General Clark emphasized, we continue to face serious bioterrorism threats of the home-grown variety. I’d like to share with you just such an attack that occurred following the Twin Tower destruction in 2001, namely the Anthrax bioterrorist attack. It was carried out such that it exemplified a “garden grown” variety of bioterrorism. The perpetrator was not al-Qaeda, as was believed initially. At the time the first victim was confirmed to be anthrax, I happened to be attending a committee at the CIA to discuss the potential of bio-threats. Shortly thereafter, Tony Fauci and I - without going into details, which are provided in my book (Colwell, 2020) – agreed that I would serve as Chair of an inter-agency coordinating committee on the anthrax bioterrorism (National Interagency Genome Science Coordinating Committee - NIGSCC). The NIGSCC served as advisory to the government agencies investigating the Anthrax attack.

One lesson to note is that the NIGSCC comprised representatives of ca. sixteen agencies, including NIH, NSF, Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, and other agencies. The committee worked as a team for three years, meeting every Friday afternoon with FBI and CIA agents assigned to the anthrax investigation. We were a coordinating group of agency representatives, neither elected nor officially appointed. It was decided that, although we could have had a Presidential directive, we chose to work as a team of colleagues, representing our respective agencies and to focus on advising the CIA and the FBI on the Anthrax attack.

Anthrax is caused by a bacterium that can be isolated from soil, perhaps almost in any backyard. A person minimally trained in microbiology, perhaps at the high school level, can prepare a culture of Anthrax (Figure 1). Illness associated with the infection characteristically depends on how the spores enter the body of the victim (Figure 2). All types of Anthrax can cause death if not treated quickly and appropriately. The symptoms of Anthrax include cellulitis, if skin infection, or gastrointestinal anthrax if meat from an animal infected with anthrax is not properly cooked. Also, cases of anthrax have occurred by injecting drugs using a contaminated needle. Inhalation of anthrax spores, the dormant stage of anthrax found in soil or on an infected animal most often will be fatal.

Why emphasize anthrax? Because it is easily isolated from the natural environment and can be a powerful weapon since it can be released surreptitiously and can be released as a powder, spray, or aerosol, and can be delivered by airplane, thereby inactivating an entire city. And accomplished without detection by odor or taste. It's an effective agent.

The anthrax drama of 2001 occurred with letters containing anthrax spores being mailed on September 18th. By October, almost a month later, a reporter had died in Florida from inhalation of anthrax spores in a letter mailed to him. A few days later, anthrax spores were detected in the offices of American Media, Florida, where the reporter worked. By this time the FBI was actively investigating the incident. By October 9th, additional anthrax letters had been mailed. By the 12th of October, fourteen people had been infected and three died from inhalation anthrax, in New York, Washington, and New Jersey. In November, a victim -another innocent victim- became the fifth to die from inhalation anthrax, a woman who posted a letter in a postal box in New Jersey that had been contaminated by one of the earlier posted letters containing anthrax powder.

During this period of time, the terror of Anthrax was widespread in the United States. From the anthrax culture obtained from the spinal fluid of Mr. Stevens, the first victim, DNA was extracted, sequenced, and matched with genome sequences of all known reference *Bacillus anthracis*. Because the perpetrator, at first was believed to be al-Qaeda, the CIA prepared to collect soil samples from various countries around the world, a monumental task. However, the genome sequence of an ancestral strain of *Bacillus anthracis* that had been isolated in the United States years earlier proved to be nearly identical to the sequence of the attacks strain. Thus, attention immediately turned to the attack as a local bioterrorism incident.

The reference ancestor strain had been isolated from a dead cow in Texas in 1981. It was mailed in a container labeled "Ames", but it wasn't from Ames, Iowa, hence accidental naming as Ames strain. It must be noted that this was 2001, when the genome sequencing revolution was in its infancy, when less than half the full genome sequence of *Bacillus anthracis* had been determined and the genomes of only a few other bacterial sequences had been determined.

The coordinating committee which I chaired began its work. We were able to fund the genome sequencing through the agencies we represented, the unofficial yet fully functional National Interagency Genome Sciences Coordinating Committee (NIGSCC). Funds were made available to the CDC to sequence every smallpox strain extant. Through auspices of the NIGSCC the anthrax reference strains and strains sent through the mail were sequenced. The sequence of events is shown in Fig. 3.

The source of the anthrax, based on the genomic evidence was concluded to be from a laboratory at Fort Detrick, MD.

Different colony types, morphotypes from cultured spore preparations proved key in the investigation. It linked the anthrax attacks in New York and Washington. I hypothesize that the perpetrator, not being a genomicist very likely believed he would never be identified because petri dish cultures as evidence would not be convincing in a court of law. However, the NIGSCC was able to facilitate sequencing of the DNA of *Bacillus anthracis* isolated from powder in the anthrax letters, where it was determined that mutations were identical to samples from Dr. Ivins' laboratory at Fort Detrick. Details will never be known because Dr. Ivins committed suicide when arrested by the FBI. This work continued for another three years before a report was released by the FBI but it now is history. Scott Decker, who led the FBI investigation, and I have been interviewed and a podcast with details of the Anthrax investigation will be released.

Lessons learned from this "home grown bioterrorist event" are that in a highly polarized society, as General Clark described in this panel discussion, the potential of a bioterrorist attack within the US cannot be discounted. So, what have we learned from the Anthrax attack? First, tremendous advancements have been made in genomics and bioinformatics in the twenty years since that attack. And we have learned all too well the potential of a biothreat. The COVID-19 pandemic in the United States began early in 2020. Since January 2020, the sequences of hundreds of virus strains have been sequenced and the benefit of twenty years' research on messenger RNA vaccines has been achieved. Rapid allocation of funding to pharmaceutical companies to produce vaccine and its subsequent distribution clearly demonstrate the value of biomedical research. We owe much to those scientists who proved the potential of messenger RNA vaccines. Warp speed production and distribution of effective vaccines protect us.

A very important lesson is that we have, as a nation, lost the capability of our public health system over the last several decades due to inadequate funding. We must rebuild the public health laboratory system, state by state. Our public health system desperately needs modernization and expansion. And in a report issued by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (Colwell and Machlis)¹, it is strongly recommended that interdisciplinary coordination of science agencies is a critical need. The Governor of each State in the U.S. should appoint a chief scientist. This would make it possible to coordinate and, during natural disasters, collaborate. It is imperative, also, that federal law be changed to allow federal agencies to share data and to work together, as was done by NIGSCC during the Anthrax bioterrorism. The Federal Agency representatives on the NIGSCC worked collaboratively and effectively to advise the FBI and CIA on the science used to track the source of the Anthrax. We must be able to coordinate, collaborate, and rebuild local, state, and national public health capacity. There will be another pandemic or perhaps within the US another anthrax like bioterrorism threat. We must be prepared as a nation. This is the most powerful of the lessons learned by the Anthrax bioterrorism and by COVID-19.

ENDNOTES



Figure 1. Bacillus anthracis, causative agent grown in laboratory culture. Rasko, et. al., 2011. Bacillus anthracis comparative genome analysis in support of the Amerithrax investigation. Proc Nat Acad Sci DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1016657108



Figure 2. All types of anthrax can cause death if not treated with antibiotics. <https://www.cdc.gov/anthrax/index.html>




Figure 3. The Anthrax drama as it unfolded. Courtesy J. Ravel,

ENDNOTE

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IV. SELECTED INTERDISCIPLINARY CONTRIBUTIONS (2016-2022)

PART 1: NATO: CONFRONTING REGIONAL AND GLOBAL CHALLENGES [JANUARY 2016]

This section of presentations made by selected contributors at the Special Forum: "NATO's Mission in the Old-New Strategic Environment: Confronting Regional and Global Challenges" held on September 17, 2015.

DR. RAFFI GREGORIAN

Director of the Office of Multilateral Affairs, Bureau of Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State.

NATO AND THE BALKANS: A CASE STUDY

The last 25 years of NATO's experience in the Balkans, and some of the highlights and contexts in which NATO found itself in the beginning of the breakup of Yugoslavia, turn out to be relevant even today. Not only in terms of NATO's preparation for everything that came afterwards in Afghanistan and so on, but even today one can see what is going on in the Balkans and the migrant flow and how countries that were on the verge of failing or becoming authoritarian are now handling the migrant crisis in a way that is perhaps much more laudable than some of their northern neighbors that are ensconced in "old Europe."

Also, it is worth noting that recently the Montenegro parliament voted overwhelmingly to join NATO. I think around two-thirds of parliament voted for that. We can expect some good news regarding an invitation for Montenegro to join NATO, perhaps sometime this year or early next year. And that would continue to complete the process that I will describe to you briefly here.

The first thing is to bear in mind where NATO was in 1990 and 1991 when Yugoslavia began to break up and the Cold War was just ending. The Alliance was on the verge of possibly dissolving. In NATO—recall if you will, hard to believe—there was actually a debate whether or not to terminate NATO as an alliance. It was no longer needed, some people said, because the reason it was created in the first place had disappeared. Others were thinking about turning European security over to the Western European Union or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) or looking at a reinvigorated United Nations that had been freed from the shackles of Soviet and U.S. confrontation in the Security Council.

Against that backdrop there is the breakup of Yugoslavia: the first short war in Slovenia, then the conflict in Croatia, and then spreading to Bosnia. It was not at all clear NATO would or should have a role there. Some of you may remember the debates on the issue of the so called "out of area," and that it took quite a few years for the allies themselves to really form a new consensus. And that new consensus was not possible without repeated failures in the Balkans, principally by UN peacekeeping forces. But also, it reflected a doctrinal challenge for both military and political leaders about what kinds of operations NATO would be taking on in the "out of area" sphere. You can see that reflected in the fact that it took about four years for NATO to develop a doctrine for peace support operations; actually SHAPE developed it, but it remained a draft for more than five years after that. So even after troops had deployed into the Balkans—into Bosnia first then Kosovo—the Allies did not have an official peace support operations doctrine. That is not surprising, because there was continued disagreement about what to do and how to do it. This was a debate that was going on globally, as well. The United Nations' revamped peacekeeping operations under Chapter VII mandates in places like Somalia demonstrated the types of environments in which the Security Council members, the United States chief amongst them, felt we ought to be applying international resources and forces there. There were limits to all that, in doctrinal terms as well as political terms. So, it was a struggle to figure out what is the appropriate use of force in such conflict areas or whether or not they should be employed at all.

In the case of NATO in the Balkans, there was a creeping incremental move towards intervention based on the conditions on the ground, principally in Bosnia. The images on everyone's television screens each night of shelling and ethnic cleansing and refugee flows had a major effect on Allies' publics. (While those were astonishing images back then in the 90's, they have been greatly eclipsed by what is happening right now in the span of just a few weeks, with Syrian refugees flowing into Europe.) So, you get to the point where NATO allies have worked out an arrangement with the United Nations to support peacekeepers on the ground with air power. Those peacekeepers, also drawn from many NATO countries, were faced with a seemingly impossible task and a really Hobbesian choice as to what to do between the mandated task of protecting the delivery of humanitarian aid as opposed to the people that were the intended recipients of that aid. It was a really difficult time for the peacekeepers and it was not until the establishment of the UN Safe Areas in Bosnia and some of them being overrun—most notably in Srebrenica—that the alliance reached the point politically that its members had to act on their threats to take action against ceasefire violations and create the conditions for a peace process to take hold, which eventually led to the Dayton Peace Accords

It took something really horrible like the genocide of Srebrenica to be the watershed event for the Alliance. Most people do not know this; the story, the narrative, that people have in their heads about the Dutch peacekeepers there who let the Serbs come in and separate the men and the boys from the women and then killed all the men. That is what happened but there was a lot more too. There was, at the time, an entire NATO strike package flying over Srebrenica for a period of days waiting for the orders to conduct airstrikes to support the Dutch. The Dutch made repeated requests for close air support. That clearly was a horrific event for NATO, and of course for the people who suffered, but it really demonstrated the need to do something. It was at that moment that the alliance really changed course and decided to intervene in a demonstrable way. It was a couple weeks later that intensive airstrikes under Operation DELIBERATE FORCE were launched against Serb forces, which, as mentioned before, eventually led to the Dayton Peace Accords.

That being said, when the Peace Accords themselves were developed there was still an inclination on the part of many Allies, including to some degree the United States as well, that there had to be a clear separation between military and civilian tasks. That is, that the military would be led by NATO, the so-called Implementation Force (IFOR), would go in conduct very specific tasks in terms of disarming and demobilizing soldiers, demarcating the Zone of Separation, and that was going to be it for the military side. I think history bears out quite clearly that that was not going to be the case and that such a separation of the military and civilian tasks would not work in terms of implementing Dayton. NATO agreed in the end to extend the presence of IFOR and changed it into a Stabilization Force (SFOR). There was a recognition by many of the key allies which sat on the Peace Implementation Council Steering Board for Bosnia that there had to be a new way of doing things—that there had to be an active and more forceful way of enforcing the peace, because doctrinally it was considered a peace enforcement mission but it meant most importantly working with the civilian authorities and principally the High Representative in Bosnia to achieve shared aims related to peacebuilding and enforcement of the Peace Accords themselves.

So you begin to see NATO-led forces being much more active in taking on paramilitary groups. A select group of allies begins to launch secret operations to locate and apprehend persons indicted as war criminals, whereas just as a year or two before people like Karadžić and Mladić were able to drive through NATO checkpoints. Now the forces were going after them deliberately and over the course of a number of years brought them all to justice in The Hague. So, I think what we see by the early 2000s in Bosnia, and then as a result of the experience in Kosovo, the alignment of political and military will and capability now working much better. The decisions to intervene in Kosovo are taken much more quickly, with very positive results, that is, the limiting of the amount of killing and destruction, at least as compared to what happened in Bosnia.

You also see a big change politically in the region, with the departure of authoritarian regimes in Croatia and Serbia in particular, but also in moderate governments being elected in their place. In Bosnia, freed from major political interference by its neighbors, the government's orientation demonstrably turned more pro-Western. That creates new opportunities for NATO as a political alliance to start using some of its engagement tools, such as the Partnership for Peace (PfP), Membership Action Plan, and so on, to start engaging both politically and militarily with the armed forces of that region. We see how these tools could be best used in one particular incident, on which Richard Prosen and I worked quite extensively, which was the Defense Reform Commission in Bosnia. There the U.S.-led component of SFOR, acting on information that sanctioned military goods were reaching Iraq from Bosnia (fighter jet engines!), caught the Bosnian Serbs red-handed.

We used the political moment of that scandal to drive massive reform at the state level. Eventually over the course of two years, we managed to negotiate the disbanding of the former warring armies in Bosnia as well as the creation of a NATO-oriented, multiethnic, single armed force for Bosnia. Throughout the region we saw the establishment of NATO headquarters, usually led by a senior military representative (but in some cases by a senior civilian representative), focused on defense reform, security sector reform, and helping these Balkan countries which are now at this point all members of PFP to orient themselves toward NATO membership. By the time you get to the conflict in Macedonia, in the early 2000s, and the insurgency in the Preševo Valley in Southern Serbia, NATO has more or less hit its stride. I think that it is working very effectively; it intervenes early enough in Macedonia that major military forces are not needed, and helps support the development of a framework agreement for peace there as well. It is still holding, and I believe that what NATO directly or indirectly contributed looks is pretty good.

Just think of all the positive things that have happened in terms of marquee issues. We have Slovenia, Croatia, Albania, all now members of NATO. Bosnia has conditional acceptance for a Membership Action Plan, Serbia is in PfP, and Kosovo is committed to and cooperating closely with NATO. And, as I mentioned in the beginning, Montenegro is at the doorstep of joining the Alliance, while all countries are either in the EU or in the process of accession negotiations or at least have a stabilization association agreement with the goal of European Union membership. With the exception of Kosovo, all states contribute to one degree or another to UN, NATO, or EU peace operations in a variety of theaters. Not bad to go from massive international security consumers to now the exporters of it! I just hope that what we have been able to accomplish there over the last 20 years or so stands the test of what is going on now with the huge flow of refugees through the area.

DR. PATRICK MURPHY

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NATO AND RUSSIA: A CASE STUDY

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was established in the first place as a bulwark against the Soviet Union, Russia in its then guise. After more than a decade of engagement in Afghanistan (as Defense Secretary Ashton Carter explicitly notes below), NATO is coming full circle, once again organizing the defense of Europe against Russia. By May 2015 there was talk of a new Russian offensive taking place in Ukraine in the summer of 2015.¹ And yet, things have actually been rather quiet on the Ukrainian front.

The trouble in Ukraine began in February 2014, when the elected Ukrainian President, Viktor Yanukovich, who was backed by the Kremlin, was pushed out of power by a kind of coup, but a coup with enormous popular backing, after he suspended talks on a trade agreement with the European Union. Within a few days Russian President Vladimir Putin took over the Crimean Peninsula from Ukraine and illegally annexed it. This was the first forcible change of borders in Europe since World War II, and cost Putin and Russia the \$40-50 billion in goodwill they had just paid for by supporting the winter Olympics in Sochi. In early April 2014 pro-Russian separatists, together with “little green men” without insignia on them—i.e., Russian soldiers—began operations to take over the Donbas region in Eastern Ukraine, the heart of Ukraine’s industrial area, specifically the oblasts or provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk. On July 17 a Malaysian Airlines plane was shot down over Eastern Ukraine, killing 298 people. There has never been a complete investigation because of Russian and pro-Russian separatist resistance, but it appears without doubt that the plane was shot down, presumably by mistake, by either the separatists or the Russians.

In September 2014, Ukraine did in fact reach an Association Agreement with the European Union, establishing much closer relations with Europe and distancing Ukraine from its Russian invader (Russia was able to get full implementation of the agreement postponed till the beginning of 2016, hoping to cause further mischief, but it seems to have been unable to really cause much trouble). Of course, this successful negotiation negated the moves by Yanukovich against the agreement the previous February, which gave Putin the excuse for provoking all of the Russian-Ukrainian problems in the first place.² Though this agreement did not involve NATO in any official capacity, most EU members are also members of NATO; thus there is a direct parallelism between the two organizations, and Ukraine would certainly like to join both if that becomes possible.

The Minsk I and Minsk II agreements, from September 2014 and February 2015, have had some effect on the level of fighting. The United States has refused to give Ukraine “lethal” weaponry, even “defensive” lethal weapons, but is providing, for instance, 3,000 radios with various levels of encryption to Ukrainian forces, as well as counter-artillery radar to help Ukrainians respond more accurately to separatist shelling.³

As to NATO’s involvement in the Ukrainian crisis, it should be remembered that although Ukraine is not a member of NATO, several countries bordering on Ukraine, such as Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania, are members of the alliance. But NATO has not played a very direct role in the Ukrainian-Russian dispute. It has, however, at times, e.g., in June 2015, made promises of aid. On June 25 the Stars and Stripes reported, NATO members agreed . . . to step up support for Ukraine with more air traffic data and assistance in countering roadside bombs, but member states stopped short of offensive weapons, which Kiev has sought in its battle with Russian-backed separatists.

A new trust fund to be established “will aim at de-mining and also on countering improvised explosive devices. And this is vital for saving lives,” NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg told a news conference after a meeting of the NATO-Ukraine commission.⁴

Note that there was no dollar amount for the trust fund mentioned in the article just cited, and it is not clear whether there has been any follow through. On the other hand, U.S. and European Union sanctions against Russia because of Ukraine continue in place and definitely appear to be having a negative effect on Russia in a variety of ways, not just economic.

But the lack of very much NATO aid to Ukraine does not mean that NATO, and especially its more easterly members, are not extremely concerned about events in that country. In June 2014 thousands of NATO troops were in training in Poland, the Baltic states, and Romania, including the first-ever training by the new rapid reaction NATO “spearhead” force. Both NATO’s civilian Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, and its military commander, U.S. General Philip Breedlove, were in attendance, to underline that NATO “meant business.” In parallel, there were much beefed-up annual NATO naval exercises in the Baltic Sea. Poland, Romania, and the Baltic countries would all prefer permanent NATO bases, including U.S. forces, on their territories, and that may yet come.⁵

During the summer and early fall of 2015 conditions on the Donbas front have remained relatively quiet; there was no large-scale Russian invasion as was forecast in May, and even the Ukrainian port of Mariupol, close to separatist-held territory and subject to shelling, is still nonetheless fully in pro-Ukrainian hands. But the fact remained that by early August about 6,800 people had been killed in the conflict, most of them apparently civilians.⁶ At the same time there were events taking place in Ukraine itself which were both positive and negative for the Ukrainian people.

On August 27th, Ukraine's main creditors agreed to forgive a portion, about 20 percent, of bonds held by Ukraine's private creditors, an important lift to Ukraine's war-burdened economy, which had already showed signs of life after a bad winter. The free-trade agreement with the European Union also goes into effect January 1, 2016, which is a strong positive for Ukraine, both economically and politically. It now seems likely that the remainder of a \$25 billion bailout from the International Monetary Fund, the United States, and Europe, will soon be released to Ukraine.⁷

On the other side, and directly related to the situation in Eastern Ukraine, a hand grenade was thrown into a crowd outside of Ukraine's parliament building August 31, killing one police officer and wounding 122 people. The occasion was the preliminary approval by the Ukrainian Parliament of a bill which would allow a devolution of some powers from the central government to individual provincial governments, a requirement of the Minsk II agreement of February 2015. The hand grenade was thrown by a member of the Svoboda nationalist crowd, which felt that Kyiv was giving too much power to the provinces, including rebellious Donetsk and Luhansk. By the way, the people who were injured were all police officers and reporters, not members of Svoboda. The hand grenade thrower was caught, but both Ukrainian nationalists and Moscow and its Eastern Ukrainian allies have expressed dissatisfaction with the law, for opposite reasons.⁸ Such events do not contribute to the stability of the Ukrainian Government.

One more comment on Ukraine: whatever else Putin has accomplished there, he has certainly cemented Ukraine's strong attachment to the West. Russian-speaking areas under Ukrainian Government control openly fly the blue and yellow Ukrainian flag, and it is said that most of the people left in pro-Russian Donetsk and Luhansk are either too old or sick to travel, or they would already have left for Ukrainian-held areas. For now, the Ukrainian conflict appears to be "frozen," like Putin's landgrabs in Georgia and Moldova. This is especially the case since Putin has begun military operations in Syria.

Aggressive actions by Putin, also including the buzzing of NATO aircraft by Russian planes over the last several months, and the kidnapping by the Russians—from Estonian territory—and trial of an Estonian intelligence officer, have alarmed NATO and its leader, the United States. We have already discussed the NATO exercises in Russia's "near abroad" (Poland, etc.). U.S. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter recently stated, presumably with the backing of the Administration,

. . . Russia poses a [sic] existential threat to the United States by virtue simply of the size of the nuclear arsenal that it's had. Now, that's not new.

. . . Vladimir Putin's Russia behaves, in many respects, as – in some respects and in very important respects, as an antagonist. That is new.

. . . [W]e are adjusting our capabilities qualitative and in terms of their deployments, to take account of this behavior of Russia. We are also working with NATO in new ways, a new playbook, so to speak, for NATO, which has been preoccupied with Afghanistan for the last decade or so, more oriented towards deterrence on its eastern border and with hardening countries at the – on the borders of Russia, NATO member and non-NATO members, to the kind of hybrid warfare influence or little green man kind of influence that we see associated with Russia in Ukraine.

He went on to note that the U.S. is still cooperating with Russia in areas of common interest, such as counterterrorism, North Korea, and Iran.⁹

We turn now to Syria. As you know, hundreds of thousands of Syrians are trying to get away from the civil war in their country, to some quiet place in Europe, preferably Germany. Once again, NATO as such is not directly involved with this refugee stream, the largest since World War II, but its European counterpart, the European Union, certainly is, and the United States, NATO's leader, has announced that it also may take 10,000 Syrian refugees over the next year, as compared with less than 1,500 up to now.¹⁰

But perhaps NATO soon will be somehow involved—in Syria itself. It appears that Russia recently began bombing raids in Syria to aid Syrian President Assad, supposedly on ISIS but really mainly on non-ISIS "moderate" opponents of the regime. It is almost as if, as some speculate, Russia has changed fronts, from Ukraine to Syria.¹¹ It built an air traffic control tower and modular housing units for hundreds of military personnel near Syria's Mediterranean port of Latakia,¹² and then began flying

its bombing raids. There is always the danger of run-ins with U.S. warplanes attacking ISIS, even though Russia itself says it is strongly opposed to ISIS. After the terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015, both France and the United Kingdom, both NATO members, began their own air raids in Syria, though so far NATO itself as an organization does not seem to be involved in that country.

The U.S. asked NATO ally Greece to deny its airspace to Russian planes headed for Syria, and NATO ally Germany has also expressed concern about reports that Russia was involved in an arms build-up in Syria.¹³ And Bulgaria, another NATO member (and formerly part of the Soviet bloc) has already refused overflight rights to Russian planes.¹⁴ On September 13th, Russian news agencies quoted Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov as saying that Russia will continue providing military supplies to Syria.¹⁵ And on September 15th, to quote the Washington Post, “President Vladimir Putin on the 16th defended Russia’s military support for Syria, saying it was necessary to defeat the Islamic State and ‘terrorist aggression.’”¹⁶ At the same time Secretary of State John Kerry was saying that the Russians had suggested “military-to-military” conversations to discuss ways to avoid the kind of possible Russian-U.S. aircraft interference mentioned above. The Washington Post said that Kerry still thought that “meaningful” Russian help could contribute to a political solution in Syria.¹⁷

It would appear that Putin wishes to establish an anti-Islamic State coalition in which the Assad regime could or would play a leading part. It is difficult to imagine the United States officially joining such a coalition, or even unofficially acceding to one, given that shortly after the beginning of the war 4 ½ years ago President Obama said Assad must be removed from office, even if Obama does not seem to have done anything to make this happen. The Washington Post quoted Secretary Kerry as saying on September 19 that “Assad has to go,” but that there “was some flexibility in the ‘modality’ and timing of his departure.” Alluding to the refugee crisis in Europe, Kerry noted, “I just know that the people of Syria have already spoken with their feet. They are leaving Syria.”¹⁸ Of course, most recently, in early 2016, the United States has given the impression that it might tolerate Assad’s remaining in office for the time being. And Russia for its part has said at least once that it could give asylum to Assad, should he leave office.

Thus, it appears that the old saying, “The more things change, the more they remain the same,” is also true in regard to NATO and Russia. If Putin were to go, Russia might change. But we all hoped for that back in the early Nineties as well. We shall see.

ENDNOTES

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¹⁸ “Kerry: Syria’s president has to go, but U.S. is flexible on date,” by Carol Morello, Washington Post, September 20, 2015, p. A18.

PART 2: “NATO’S STRATEGY: CONTINUITY OR CHANGE?” [JANUARY 2017]

This section on, “NATO Strategy: Continuity or Change?” was produced by the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies, the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, the International Law Institute, the Center for National Security Law at the University of Virginia School of Law, and with the association of the U.S. Department of State. It is based on a seminar on “NATO: Post Warsaw Agenda” that was held at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies on October 31, 2016. This event followed the alliance’s 28th summit that was gathered in Warsaw, July 8-9 of that year.

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**** The opinions expressed herein are the author’s alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of Defense, or the United States government.****

I am very pleased to be here today to help moderate today’s event. I want to also express my appreciation to our distinguished panel members and, of course, our host, the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, and offer my welcome to all those here today and those who will be watching this event broadcast over the Internet or on television. The goal of today’s event is simple, yet important. We are here today to take stock of where we are on NATO capabilities, operations, and policies, and provide suggestions on ways ahead for the near future. We are pleased that you could join us here today, and we look forward to a stimulating and thought-provoking discussion from our panel of experts.

NATO as an alliance acquires its potency not only from its military capabilities but also from its democratic ideals – from our belief in human dignity and our respect for human aspirations. In fact, the Washington Treaty, which founded NATO in 1949, emphatically states that our collective defense Alliance is also a community of values “founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law.” We stand today at a pivotal moment for our Alliance. In the nearly 70 years of NATO, perhaps never have we faced such a range of challenges all at once – security, humanitarian, and political. NATO is as important and vital for our security as ever, especially as we face a more dangerous road ahead.

Terrorism affects us all, from Brussels to Nice, Paris, Orlando, and San Bernardino. We stand together in the fight against Da’esh. NATO is stepping up its efforts to support the coalition fighting Da’esh, including by contributing AWACS aircraft to improve our overall intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities. NATO is also moving forward with enhanced information-sharing and other measures. And we have to remember that NATO’s biggest military operation ever– in Afghanistan – was a direct response to 9/11.

As President Obama and other leaders have noted, at Warsaw we did far more than simply reaffirm our Article 5 obligations to our common security. In Warsaw this past July, Allies agreed to the most significant reinforcement of our collective defense at any time since the Cold War. The bumper sticker headline from Warsaw was: An Essential Alliance in a More Dangerous World: Protecting our Citizens & Projecting Stability, which echoed remarks given recently by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at an event hosted by Harvard University in September 2016. Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg reminded us the Alliance is: “standing together as we have always done, stronger together as we have always been.”

In conclusion, then, with renewed strength, resources, and capabilities, NATO will continue to uphold our common values and meet the full range of our shared threats.

HONORABLE KENNETH WAINSTEIN

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Former Homeland Security Advisor to President George W. Bush; first Assistant Attorney General for National Security, United States Attorney for the District of Columbia; General Counsel of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Chief of Staff to Director Robert S. Mueller III; Former Commissioner of the Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense*

Let me just start off by sort of framing a term that was used twice when it was said that I am going to discuss the “broader context.” That is sort of code for I am going to talk about something beyond what we are talking about here today. So, Jonah Alexander asked me about a month ago if I would join this panel. He said, “I have got this great panel of NATO experts and I would love you to join them.” I said, “That is great! I would love to join. Only problem is I am not a NATO expert.” He said, “That is fine. You will provide the ‘broader context’.”

So, what you can tell from my biography is that I am sort of an old law enforcement/intel guy, and that is my background. And in the course of a number of those jobs, I spent a good bit of time working with our foreign partners over in Europe, some under NATO auspices and some otherwise. What I thought I would do in terms of the broader context is discuss NATO and counterterrorism, the challenges, the threat we are dealing with right now, and NATO and the extent to which it is or is not suited to address the current threat. So that is the angle I am going to take. And I am going to do that by drawing on my experiences since 9/11 as part of the law enforcement and intelligence community here in the U.S., trying to take the apparatus we had as of 9/11 – the culture, the counterterrorism process we had at 9/11 – and bring it up to speed so that we could prevent terrorism on our shores. Then I'll draw analogies for what NATO has to do to do the same more broadly throughout the alliance.

If you look back at the history of NATO, as has been said by the panel here, it is a political and military alliance, yet the one time that the Article 5 collective defense provision was invoked was in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. I think since that date we have seen an increasing focus on counterterrorism as part of the Alliance's mandate, culminating in the counterterrorism guidelines that I think were issued back in 2012, and continuing interest and attention being paid to the terrorism threat since then. And that is attention and time well spent because it does not take much thinking to realize how the terrorism threat that NATO across the board is facing is increasing in seriousness, increasing in volume of threats, and increasing in terms of the complexity of the organizations and operations we are facing.

Just go through some of the factors that have come up in the last few years: the rise of ISIS or ISIL, which has obviously been a game-changer. They almost make al-Qa'ida look quaint in terms of their barbarity, their success, frankly, and the level of infrastructure and operational complexity they are capable of. You have got the flow of immigrants – obviously since the Syria crisis – into and throughout Europe. You have got fighters flowing down to join ISIS and fight the wars in Syria, and those same fighters returning – hardened trained fighters coming back to their homeland, wherever they are throughout NATO, and wanting to carry the fight back to the homeland. You have got the homegrown terrorism phenomenon and how that has been, actually, accelerated and exacerbated by the ISIS narrative. You have the fact that ISIS has a caliphate in its eyes and people feel like that is something they can grab onto, that they want to fight for, and I think we are seeing the impact that ISIS is having in terms of really energizing people to become homegrown terrorists throughout the West, including here in the United States. And you have the fact that with the al-Qa'ida core – in other words the traditional al-Qa'ida that was established and really headquartered in Afghanistan and Pakistan – with the diminution of its authority and the greater sort of franchising of al-Qa'ida and then ISIS, which is an outgrowth of al-Qa'ida in Iraq, you see more and more of these threats being franchised around the world. In many ways that is a more difficult challenge to deal with for all of us, including for NATO, than the traditional al-Qa'ida threat like we had on 9/11. So, the long and short of it is, for all of these various reasons, the threat is real and it is only getting more and more serious.

So, what should NATO do about it? And this is where I go back to my initial remarks. There are a lot of things that need to be done to try to beat this threat and what I would like to do is see what kind of lessons we can draw from the experience that the United States went through after 9/11 and that I was a part of.

Just to take a minute to go back and remember the history since 9/11 and what we dealt with here in the U.S. You know, we woke up on the morning of September 12th with around 3,000 people dead and with a clear recognition that we had a counterterrorism system or process that was just not up to the task. It was not capable of preventing that kind of attack again in the future. So, you know, we had to get busy and get to work.

But the challenges were myriad; you had law enforcement and intelligence operations and personnel that were not coordinated. In fact, there was a variety of ways in which they were prevented by law and by regulations from coordinating their operations, even though law enforcement officials were going after foreign terrorists as a criminal threat and intelligence officials were going after the same terrorists as an intelligence objective. They were unable and oftentimes unwilling to coordinate and share information. You had the FBI itself not coordinated internally. You had agents who were focused on intelligence operations and agents who were focused on criminal investigations, and often they did not share information and were sometimes prevented from sharing information. You had federal law enforcement that was not coordinated with local law enforcement – the eyes and the ears, the 700,000- odd officers in the street who are really the ones who are going to detect a terrorist cell in the first place. While there were joint terrorism task forces, the mechanisms for coordination between the federal and the state and local levels were really not sufficient at all. And then you also missing, just on a general intelligence level, coordination and sharing of information among all of the federal actors, much less the federal, state, local, and tribal actors. And so this was the situation that we confronted as of September 11th 2001.

Just to make it clear, this was not the fault of any one administration. It was not that anyone necessarily was terribly shortsighted. Rather, it was a lack of appreciation by the whole country of the severity of the threat. I think we were sort of living off of the post-Cold War peace dividend and did not want to, in some ways, acknowledge the threat that we were seeing with the bombing of the Cole and then the bombing of the embassies. We saw it, but we almost did not want to believe that

it was coming our way and it was going to be as serious as it was, as it became manifest on September 11th.

We needed the political will to make those changes, and we got it. It took the clarion call of 9/11 to do it, but we got it and numerous changes have been made since then. I will tick off a few of them. You have the CIA and the intelligence community, who are generally working with the FBI on a much more regular basis. Joint briefings and information sharing happened almost on day one after 9/11 in a way they have never happened before. You have the National Counterterrorism Center, which is designed to draw together terrorism information from all around the country, all around the federal government. You have the FBI becoming much more of an intelligence-driven agency, not just a law enforcement entity. And you have the federal agencies and the state and local agencies working very closely together with fusion centers, joint terrorism task forces, and the newly created DHS (Department of Homeland Security) working very closely with state and locals. And there even are the sort of mundane things, like more police officers who are receiving clearances so that they can actually get access to terrorism information and intelligence they need to keep their communities safe.

So, you have all of those changes that have been going on since 9/11 here in the United States, and the result is a lot of improvement, but it is still a work in progress. And I say that because, as I look at NATO and our alliance more broadly, we are facing the exact same challenges that the U.S. individually faced on day one. And the challenges really are to develop the coordination that is necessary to prevent terrorism before it happens, not just to go back and investigate it after it happens but to prevent it from happening – whether that is under the official auspices of NATO, or just via cooperation and coordination among all the member states. So, all of those same challenges are there but, actually, there are even more.

This is the sobering part of my remarks, which is that when we were trying to develop more coordination here in the U.S., we were dealing with one country, one same general set of rules. But when we are dealing with 28 different countries, it is just a different ballgame.

I saw this in my interactions with my foreign partners. At a completely fundamental level, even at a definitional level, different countries see terrorism as a different type of problem. I remember in 2006 or 2007, at a meeting with a number of our foreign partners, we were working very closely together, making a lot of operational headway against various terrorism threats, but we were talking about the Military Commissions Act, which had just been passed which set up the military commissions by law or by statute. And it was fascinating because our foreign partners were very upset about that statute. Their point was – these were Western European partners – this is not a war; this is a law-enforcement action, this is not a war. We have seen war on our shores, we have seen what war is and this is not a war. And they saw what we were dealing with after 9/11 as more akin to the Red Brigades or the Baader-Meinhof Gang of the 1970s and less a war. Whereas in the United States, we had done what we often do here. We saw a real problem, in this case one could argue an existential problem, called it a war, and went after it, mobilized our country and went after it. So just that definitional issue, at a very foundational level, causes problems of coordination.

Another challenge is the very different legal systems that we are dealing with among the different countries. Another anecdote: I remember talking to our partners about our effort – the United States' effort – to try to get passenger name record information, the names of people who were on airplanes, manifests information. We wanted this information for obvious reasons, because we were attacked by airplanes on 9/11. And in the American legal culture, third party records, or records that are held by a third party like this kind of information, do not get that much legal protection. That is just sort of the way our culture has developed and that is the Constitutional doctrine. But in Europe, they are very protective of that kind of information. So here we are asking for something that we thought was almost a gimme, and they were saying, “No, that is something we cannot give.” In the same meeting, after having that conversation, we started talking about jihadist websites and how we are dealing with that problem, how to deal with these extremist websites that might not actually be going over the line to affirmatively encourage violence. We were trying to figure out what to do in keeping with our strong principles of First Amendment rights. And a couple of the folks we were dealing with just said, “Oh, we just take them down.” To us that was unbelievable because we have such a strong First Amendment. They just see it differently. So, neither side is right or wrong, but the concern is that when you are dealing with a security effort like this that requires law enforcement and touches on individual liberties, it is a real problem to try to coordinate efforts among different countries with different legal expectations.

And those different expectations also extend to different expectations about classified information, and how to share classified information among different countries. Here in the U.S. we have one classification system established by the federal government and then we share among people we feel are entitled to get that information. Every country has its own system. So, in other words, we have got a number of different challenges for NATO to try to move to the next level in terms of coordination. And coordination is the touchstone of prevention. You cannot prevent an attack, a terrorist incident, unless you coordinate the intelligence collection, targeting, and dissemination, and the operations based on that intelligence.

To wind this up and get past the more sobering part of it, I applaud the fact that there is a new Assistant Secretary General for Intelligence. I think that is a step forward. It will be interesting to see how that position ends up, being defined in practice. I understand that it initially was established with the idea that it would focus on Russian military capabilities, but obviously a big part of that person's mandate is going to be to deal with terrorism threats, in particular the ISIS threat. And that person's job is going to be to try to do something roughly comparable to what we have been trying to do here in the United States for 15 years. And it is a job much more difficult by the peculiar challenges of trying to do this across an alliance, and trying to get different players to work together despite all these various logistical, practical, and legal obstacles. And it is my hope that the member states of the alliance and the public have the will to do that, because there are a lot of tough decisions to be made. But given the threat that we have right now, it is a job that has got to be done.

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**** The opinions expressed herein are the author's alone and do not necessarily reflect the views
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Today's topic is "NATO: Post Warsaw Agenda" and to put this in a little context, I would like to spend a brief moment on what happened just before Warsaw and what happened after Warsaw. So, before Warsaw we had the Wales Summit that had significant accomplishments in three areas. The first area was the strengthening of NATO itself in terms of the tools available to the alliance and the creation of two new programs. One for enhanced opportunity partners, which brought a number of nations much closer to the alliance – Finland, Sweden, Georgia, Australia and Jordan. Each one brought unique capabilities and regional insights, and these nations are now working with NATO in a very close way. It also led to the creation of something called Defense Capacity Building Missions, the thought here being that part of the security toolkit as we look forward is going to be training countries around the world in terms of building their military and security capabilities.

So, these two things were created at the Wales Summit. In addition, of course, Wales came after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and the immediate reaction of the allies, which was quite firm, was upheld at Wales. Part of this was the creation of the Readiness Action Plan and the deployment of allied forces on a rotational basis in certain parts of Eastern Europe, and also the suspension of the day-to-day activities of the NATO-Russia Council, keeping, however, open the possibility of political level consultations at the level of ambassadors. And the third area of work which occurred at Wales, largely on the margins of the summit but did occur there, was the creation of the Counter-ISIL Coalition. So it was a very intense 48-hour period of activity at Wales where a lot got done.

This sets the stage for the Warsaw Summit. Now in Warsaw again, I would divide the work of the summit into three baskets, starting with the work that was done in the east as we move from reassurance to deterrence, and a large part of this is the enhanced forward presence, the deployment of four battalions in four Eastern European countries, the three Baltics and Poland. The U.S., Germany, Canada, and the UK are taking the lead for these battalions, but a number of other allies are also contributing forces.

In addition, we had just before the summit an exercise that certified the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force as part of NATO's rapid reaction capabilities, and we also had an agreement on a tailored presence in Southeastern Europe. So this was part of the package of moving from reassurance to deterrence. There was also a package of measures regarding the south; NATO would continue its Aegean activity. NATO was prepared to offer support to the Counter-ISIL Coalition, in particular in the areas of AWACS flights and defense capacity building. NATO also offered its support to the EU and in particular Operation Sophia in the Central Med. So this was a package of issues related to security challenges coming from the south.

And the third basket of issues I would look at in terms of both new challenges and an increasing focus on more effective NATO-EU cooperation. NATO and the EU issued a joint declaration: they were going to work on a number of areas more closely together. This includes hybrid, it includes cyber, and this is something that we are following very carefully. If we look at the recent Defense Ministers Meeting at the end of October 2016, we see that progress has been made on all these fronts, that indeed the nations that are the framework nations for enhanced forward presence will in the first half of next year be deploying the battalions as agreed into Eastern Europe. These are on a rotational basis. Operation Sophia in the EU has requested NATO support, and NATO has agreed to provide both information sharing and situational awareness as well as logistical support to Sophia. They have also agreed to continue the Aegean activity, and of course NATO is working on furthering its cooperation with the EU, and I would expect that at Foreign Ministers in December 2016 we will see a more detailed report on where we are on implementation of our cooperation with the EU.

Wales and Warsaw, I think together, represent a very significant development in terms of NATO's actual capabilities and the focus of the alliance. NATO has always been a political-military alliance. Allies can come to discuss any security issue that is of concern to them at NATO. NATO has always been able to adapt and has adapted to a new security environment through these two summits.

So finally as we look forward, the Brussels Summit has been agreed for next year. It is a little bit difficult for me to go into a lot of detail on the Brussels Summit for a couple of reasons. One is in fact that allies have not yet agreed formally on an agenda for the Brussels Summit, but also because, as some of you may have heard, we have an election in the United States in the next week and I cannot commit the new administration. What I would say is that it is very likely that allies in Brussels will take a look at the decisions that were made at Warsaw and will take stock of the implementation of those decisions, which do seem to be on track and will be an important part of the Brussels Summit.

I will conclude on a note that I have spent 11 years on and off working on NATO issues, and when you have something like the Consensus Rule where 28 allies have to agree before you do something, it sometimes can seem a bit like herding cats. But I must say that I was very impressed by the mood of the allies at these summits, by the prompt and firm action that they took, by the level of unity and the spirit of unity both in terms of reassurance and deterrence and in terms of the need to take action regarding new challenges in the south. I was also struck by the empathy that allies demonstrated for each other's security concerns, where eastern allies understood that there were different but real security concerns in the south and southern allies understood that there were different but real security concerns in the east. So I would say that NATO, while not a perfect alliance, is a healthy alliance and we can look forward to the next year with some degree of confidence.

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When one considers how NATO is likely to evolve in future, it is useful to look at decisions taken at its past two summits in Wales and Warsaw, and to look ahead to a Brussels Summit in 2017. Since achieving consensus among 28 allies can be strenuous, NATO needs the focus of a summit to force allies to agree on major new evolutions in Alliance approaches. That is one reason why NATO's agenda tends to be advanced through these summits.

Going into the Wales and Warsaw summits, the Alliance had been grappling with two internal tensions. The first was the "in" or "out" tension. For over two decades NATO's mantra has been "out of area or out of business." Following the end of the Cold War, it was time to enlarge the Alliance and to project stability to regions beyond the Alliance, including the campaign in Afghanistan. Yet, at the same time it has become clear that the Alliance also faces challenges to its own populations, territories, and vital functions of its societies. The front line used to be the Fulda Gap; we worried about traditional armies. Today the front line could be the Grand Bazaar in Istanbul. It could be the Frankfurt Airport. It could be the Washington Metro. So I and others have been arguing for some time that NATO's new mantra must be "in area or in trouble." The Warsaw Summit was able to bring these two themes together by agreeing on a set of issues to address both "out of area" threats as well as "in area" challenges. The Alliance does not have the luxury of choosing one over the other, it must do both.

The second internal tension facing the Alliance was between those allies, particularly in the south, which argued that the greatest security challenge facing NATO nations was the host of issues spewing from conflict across the broader Middle East, and those allies, particularly in the east, who argued that the greater security threat was in the east in the form of Russian aggression and instabilities across a growing grey zone of non-NATO Eastern Europe. Here again the Alliance bridged these differences at Warsaw by declaring that NATO must adopt a 360-degree view of the panoply of challenges it faces, and that Alliance solidarity demands that eastern Allies contribute to addressing southern threats and that southern allies contribute to dealing with eastern threats. I would add that not only are both threats highly important, they are also tending to come together in ways that could generate even greater security challenges to the Alliance. The intrusion of Russian state power into Syria, the Mediterranean, and the Black Sea adds new dimensions to ongoing struggles across the Alliance's southern periphery. And displaced persons, super-empowered groups, and hybrid warfare have spread across Europe's east in ways that can confound traditional Alliance approaches to security.

In the meantime, however, we are also discovering a third internal tension, and that is inside the West itself. There has been a lot of verbiage during the U.S. presidential campaign about the value or lack of value of NATO. Many European allies are wondering where the United States really stands and whether its commitment to European security remains as solid as in the past. There is concern that the U.S. has been distancing itself from NATO, driven by the perception that Europe was, in good

Yankee jargon, “fixed,” and that the United States needed to address other priorities elsewhere in the world. Frankly, Americans have been having the same concerns about Europe’s commitment to the transatlantic partnership. Brexit has stolen the headlines, but Europe is also facing many challenges simultaneously, including migration flows, sluggish economies, continued crises in various eurozone countries, populist pressures squeezing the political center, and Russian activities challenging the European project. I am saddened to say this, but I believe that over the next period of time Europe is going to be much more fluid, much more uncertain, much less capable, much less credible. And the continued engagement of the United States is likely to be critical to help our European allies maneuver through their current predicaments. Rooted in this must be an understanding that the United States is not just a power in Europe, it is a European power as such, and one that is critical to the coalitions and compromises that comprise modern Europe.

In short, Europeans and Americans each point to the other side of the Atlantic and shake their heads about how bad things are across the ocean, without stopping to reflect that their allies are saying the same thing about them. We must get beyond this mutual finger-pointing and Schadenfreude, and act as if we have an Alliance that matters.

Coming now to the first 100 days of a new U.S. Administration and the next NATO summit agenda, the most important priority will be a strong mutual affirmation that we stand together as allies, that we agree broadly on the nature of the threats we face, and that we will address them together. We must affirm the credibility not just of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, but also Article 4, Article 3 and all the other articles. The next U.S. president should make this a clear and immediate priority. The next NATO summit should take place as soon as possible in 2017 to project this political message of mutual solidarity and support, rather than a business-as-usual summit that could fall victim to lower-level issues and bureaucratic process.

This strong and broad mutual affirmation will help NATO move forward with the Alliance’s next agenda. There are various priorities. I will highlight three.

The first priority for NATO going forward is in the traditional realm of defense and deterrence. At Wales and then at Warsaw the Alliance has moved to a position of 360-degree defense and deterrence and is now establishing a much stronger forward presence on the territories of eastern allies. The challenge now, however, is to strengthen the Alliance’s capacity to scale up and deploy follow-on-forces to those regions of the Alliance in a situation in which defense and deterrence could come under siege. European conventional forces are no longer in a position to fill this role robustly. This is a high priority for NATO going forward.

The second two priorities are in less traditional realms, and here the priority question to be addressed is not what NATO should do, but where it fits. In traditional areas of defense NATO is more often than not our lead institution. But in less conventional areas, NATO should not necessarily take the lead. It can be important in some areas, it can offer effective support in other areas, but in still other areas it could be useless or irrelevant to the challenge at hand. We must tease out priority areas where NATO should take the lead, where it can be a supportive actor, and where it can be a part of the ensemble of institutions that deals with the challenges.

The question where NATO fits is relevant to the second priority for the Alliance going forward, and that is to promote resilience. I was gratified to see that the Warsaw Summit lifted the theme of resilience as an Alliance priority and set forth seven baseline requirements that each ally should be able to meet under Article 3, which can be considered the “self-help clause” of the North Atlantic Treaty. This is practical work, and should be applauded. But it should be understood only as a first step toward a more effective and comprehensive resilience agenda. Country-by-country approaches to resilience – and that is essentially what the Alliance set forth at Warsaw – are important, but insufficient. Resilience must be *shared*, and it must be projected *forward*.

Resilience begins at home, of course, and is foremost a task for national governments. Yet in an age of potentially catastrophic terrorism, networked threats, and disruptive hybrid attacks, no nation is home alone. Few critical infrastructures that sustain the societal functions of an individual country are limited today to the national borders of that country. This means that traditional notions of territorial security must be supplemented with actions to address flow security – protecting critical links that bind societies to one another. Governments accustomed to protecting their territories must also focus on protecting their connectedness. This requires greater attention to shared resilience. None of the seven baseline requirements for resilience established within NATO in advance of the Warsaw Summit can be met without attention to shared resilience.

NATO and EU members also share a keen interest in projecting resilience forward, since robust efforts by one country may mean little if its neighbor’s systems are weak. NATO allies and EU member states have a vested interest in sharing approaches and projecting operational resilience procedures forward to key neighbors.

Effective resilience should encompass a spectrum that embraces national, shared and forward strategies, and which itself is an integral part of broader “full spectrum” efforts at deterrence and defense.

Forward resilience is a new type of project for the Alliance, but not only for the Alliance, and here we return to the question of where and how NATO fits. Much of the resilience agenda is civilian in nature. The EU also often plays more of a role here than NATO. NATO-EU cooperation will be important. Individual countries can also lend support. For instance, Sweden and Finland each have strong traditions of societal security and total defense, from which NATO allies and EU member states alike could profit. Resilience offers another plank in the web of ties that we are extending between NATO and these two important value-added partners.

The third priority is sorting out how the Alliance fits with regard to the entire basket of challenges and threats to NATO's south. Some argue that NATO needs a southern "strategy." Others say there is not a single southern issue but a conglomeration of issues – and many of them are neither military nor necessary amenable to solution by civil-military tools. NATO will need to find its place in the array of institutions and initiatives the West and its partners are likely to deploy to deal with this vast range of challenges.

The creation of the counter-ISIL coalition illustrates the difficulty of finding a role for NATO. Even though the coalition was formed on the margins of a NATO Summit, NATO is actually not part of the coalition. Many southern European allies are very reluctant to get into new commitments in their neighborhood through NATO. Many Arab states are reluctant to see NATO qua NATO engaged. And if we are honest, the U.S. government also does not know whether NATO qua NATO should be engaged. CENTCOM is reluctant to bring NATO in, while sort EUCOM argues that NATO has capabilities to offer. And since the U.S. has not been clear about its own stake in this issue, that only feeds into the uncertainty about NATO's role.

In conclusion, we need to think harder about where NATO fits in the south. Of course, NATO is already active across the region, but its efforts are eclectic and not held together by any unifying thread. Going forward I would suggest that Alliance members must make it clear that they have the political will to act together in the south, that they are able to forge new cooperative mechanisms with the EU, focusing in particular on best division of labor, that the Alliance will engage in the closest political consultation with such southern partners as the African Union and the Gulf Cooperation Council, and that NATO should step up its game in such areas as countering WMD, maritime patrols, migration control, counter-terrorism, and building partner capacity.²

ENDNOTES

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² For more, see Hans Binnendijk, Daniel S. Hamilton, Charles L. Barry, Lead Authors, Alliance Revitalized: NATO for a New Era, by the Washington NATO Project, available at <https://www.transatlanticrelations.org/publication/alliance-revitalized-2016/>; and Hans Binnendijk, NATO's Future: A Tale of Three Summits. Washington, DC, Center for Transatlantic Relations, October 2016, http://transatlanticrelations.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/NATO-binnendijk-october-2016_v1-1.pdf

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We have heard a bit about NATO's military adaptation since the Russian aggression in Ukraine and some of the military and security issues that will test the next U.S. administration. I agree with the points that have been developed so far. Personally, on that score, my view is that after a lot of very necessary and effective work by NATO, primarily in dealing with the conventional military posture on the land in central and eastern Europe, the most pressing need from a military perspective is for NATO to address its air and maritime posture and its capabilities in the Baltic Sea region and the Black Sea region and in the eastern Mediterranean.

But, if I could take a step back and look at this from a slightly different angle, if we are thinking about the top one or two priorities for an incoming administration – that is, the things the United States government has to get right in order to advance our interests in Europe and to advance our common interests with Europe in the Euro-Atlantic region and around the world – I think the top priority is a political one, and that is to address the U.S. interests that are affected by a fragmenting Europe, a Europe that is increasingly divided among competing visions, sometimes of individual member states and sometimes within member states.

Perhaps it should go without saying but the United States relies on Europe. It is not only our biggest economic and trade relationship, our most interconnected defense relationship through NATO, our intelligence sharing, our political cooperation – if you take almost any area of government activity, we work closely, and often most closely, with our European friends and allies. But now we are in a situation where European unity is under pressure from several different directions. And unless you are an advocate of American unilateralism, which generally does not work out particularly well for the United States, we need to find a way to recognize and to address the way that affects our interests.

Now the European reaction to the centrifugal tendencies has also not been monolithic. You have on the one hand Brexit and on the other you have the European Union producing a global strategy, which is a good document that outlines a number of areas where the European Union plays an important role and can play an even more important role in the future. So you have both tendencies. Which of these will win out, and what Europe is going to look like in several years after these various tendencies have resolved themselves is anybody's guess. But it certainly affects the U.S.'s ability to relate to Europe, to cooperate with Europe not just militarily but politically and economically as well.

So we need to be actively engaged, especially if you think about the possible consequences of a so called "hard Brexit," an abrupt severing of the UK relationship with the European Union, and/or an acrimonious negotiation between the UK and the remaining European Union countries about the terms of that exit. So I think that what this means is that there needs to be an intensified U.S. investment not just in our partnership with the European Union and our partnership with the UK, but also an engagement on, in certain instances, the specific issues that will develop, that will arise, between the UK and the EU, so that we minimize the risks to our shared prosperity as well as our ability to act in a coordinated fashion and an effective fashion around the world. So that is a bit about the internal challenges.

The external challenges: the Euro-Atlantic region, Europe and the United States, face the problem of external malignant influence. I would point anyone who has not read it to at least the opening parts of the Warsaw Summit communique – the thing is actually pretty long – but Joe Manso, if you had a hand in any of the language that appeared in it, I would give you great credit for it because for those of you who deal with these kinds of consensus documents, they often wind up reading like consensus documents. But if you look at the opening paragraphs of the Warsaw communique, which talks about Russia's actions and its role, it is quite stark and well put. It says "Russia has breached the values...broken the trust...and challenged the fundamental principles of the global and Euro-Atlantic security architecture." Now nice words are one thing, but this was backed up by actions. Some of the steps that we have already heard discussed have changed the deterrence equation in conventional terms in Europe.

But that is not the only challenge we face. Russia, for many years, has tried to exert influence on the political direction and developments in NATO itself and in some NATO member states. We are recognizing this more fully in the United States now. If we look to the future, we should expect Russia to attempt to influence other election processes and state actions, regardless of whether there is an election happening in a particular country or not. So if we look at that clear Warsaw statement about how Russia's aggressive actions have changed the security environment and the measures to deal with it, I think the priority should be a shared transatlantic recognition of the attempts by Russia to exert influence on our politics. That means a recognition that this is happening, and that we cannot see it separately from Russia's military pressure on the transatlantic

community and its aggression in Ukraine. It means a clear statement that there will be consequences if that behavior continues. And from that recognition would flow elements of a transatlantic agenda that includes the European Union as well as NATO, because Dan was absolutely right that there are things NATO does well, and there are certain things NATO does less well, and we should not ask it to do the things it not well set up to do.

But I think this will involve several things. It will involve cybersecurity, it will involve economic statecraft, which includes cooperation and harmonization on things such as economic sanctions, it will involve transparency and media freedom issues, and a whole host of steps that will help reinforce the integrity of our democracies, which are the fundamental thing we are protecting, as Kurt laid out. So I will stop there and hand the microphone over, but I think that is where the focus needs to be.

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What is this new security environment? After decades of peace in Europe, we see that Russia has invaded two of its neighbors and brought back interstate war to the continent. As you have heard already, NATO responded to this in 2014 at the Wales summit, and this summer at the Warsaw summit by taking some very important decisions. And while I agree that these steps NATO has taken so far are helpful and good, I also see that these steps have been insufficient, and that they have not restored deterrence to Europe. I see a strategic gap in Europe between the limited steps that NATO has taken so far and the more robust measures that need to be taken to restore security in Europe. The source of this strategic gap for NATO is that too many NATO leaders are failing to understand three key changes that have taken place in the European security environment. To put it simply, NATO's response so far has been too slow and too small. NATO leaders, quite a few of them, want the alliance to act as if this is 1997, and they are very unwilling to let NATO act to face the real threat it is facing in at this time.

These new threats come in three different changes. These are the changes in NATO's geography, the changes in the technology that NATO is facing, and the changes in the nature of the threat that NATO is facing. I believe that if we invest a little bit of time in understanding these threats, we will see why NATO needs to have more robust response to aggression in Europe, and what are some of these additional steps that need to be taken.

The first change is the change in the geography. Many are familiar with the map that we used to call the layered cake. You saw large deployment of NATO troops from the United States and other nations in West Germany. What you saw here is sort of the geographic environment and view that NATO leaders are trying to avoid. They do not want to have large troop deployments, but at the same time they failed to understand that as NATO's borders have moved east, there are certain key geostrategic changes that have happened apart from the troop deployments. During the Cold War, the zone of friction between NATO and its main external threat was based on one of the four largest NATO members, West Germany. And this NATO member was backed up by other NATO members with significant military capabilities – France, Belgium, and Netherlands – and by forward deployments of significant assets from other allies, such as Canada and United States.

The new security environment we see now is very different. As NATO's borders have moved east, now we see a new zone of friction. This includes the provocations that we have seen from the Russians: their military aircraft flying without transponders on, violations of NATO airspace, and of the sea space of some of the nonaligned countries in the region. So we see that there is greater friction and interaction between hostile external forces and the NATO forces in the northeast. But in addition to that, the NATO members that are most vulnerable are not only the most geographically farthest away from the core of NATO, but they are also geographically some of the smallest in the alliance. So it is a very different dynamic than what we had in the Cold War. And while in the Cold War West Germany did lack strategic depth, this problem has been exacerbated and is even greater now with the small geographic territory of the Baltic republics.

When we are dealing with a change in technology, we can look at some of what are called Anti-Access/Area Denial Sites in the West. Most of you have probably seen maps that focus on the capabilities from Kaliningrad and Crimea, perhaps even the new A2/AD zone in the eastern Mediterranean and Syria. But we also have to remember that Russia has very significant capabilities in St. Petersburg that cover the eastern Baltic as well as in Murmansk that cover areas of the Arctic Circle. With these you can see there is quite a bit of range. With this new technology and these weapons, NATO is now facing a situation where if you talk to senior NATO military leaders, they describe NATO airspace now as contested, as well as NATO sea space. This means even now, in a pre-conflict state, the number of NATO military and naval aircraft that go in can easily be pressured, as we have seen by some of the flybys of the Russian military aircraft over US military ships in the Baltic Sea. This changes the dynamic and puts greater emphasis on the need for forward deployed forces.

Also, the capabilities in Kaliningrad, one of the most geographically-invasive parts of Russian military capabilities within NATO airspace. From Kaliningrad, and some other capabilities you saw earlier in Belarus, they cover the area of access between Lithuania and Poland. And with the addition, as we have heard the recent news of Iskander missiles deployed into Kaliningrad, with their range, it is possible to range even as far west as Berlin. Those were just some of the land capabilities of the new Russian military technology. These are some of the maritime capabilities of Russia's new missiles. These are some of the Kalibr missiles that would have been disclosed. Two new ships having these Kalibr missiles have been deployed to the Baltic Sea fleet for Russia now. These were the same type of Kalibr missiles that were launched from the Caspian Sea to hit Russian targets in Syria. Russia had aircraft in Syria at the time. It did not need to use this capability, but it went out of its way to launch missiles from the Caspian Sea to demonstrate the range and precision of this aircraft. In addition to this, Russia has also deployed Russian bombers from the base we saw in Murmansk all across Western Europe, through the Straits of Gibraltar, into the Mediterranean, just to launch cruise missiles into Syria. Again, Russia had capabilities in Syria already, it did not need to do that. Moscow chose to use those capabilities to show it could demonstrate going around Western Europe, and the range of its military options.

And then very briefly, to discuss the change in the nature of the threat NATO is facing. It is true and it is a fact, Russia is a much weaker power militarily than the Soviet Union was, but at the same time, it is also true and a fact that Russia remains and has a quantifiable military superiority over all its neighbors to the west and to the south.

Russia wants its neighbors weak and unstable, so it can coerce them, influence them, and shape their patterns. But we can also look at some of the largest military powers in Europe including Germany, France, and United Kingdom. And we see that even they do not match up directly to Russia. This helps us understand why Putin's strategies and his tactics are consistently to lean on European countries and on even NATO members bilaterally, one-on-one, to separate them from the rest of the continent and from the rest of their alliances, and to apply pressure and threats to them to make them feel intimidated. This has happened not just with Russian threats to Sweden and Finland, from military leaders, from political leaders threatening them not to join NATO or there will be repercussions. Russia's ambassador in Copenhagen threatened Denmark, a NATO member, that its ships would face nuclear targeting from Russian vessels if Denmark contributed to the NATO missile defense system.

Now, Russia is not the only threat that NATO is facing, and the threats that NATO is facing are not just conventional. Another significant part of the conventional threat is the GIUK gap. Russia has deployed a far greater number of submarines in the North Atlantic. And again, with their technology, they are much quieter than we have ever faced before. CNO Admiral Richardson has expressed great concern about the ability of the United States to move through the contested sea space of the North Atlantic. This is one of the reasons why Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work visited Iceland, and the United States is committed to reopening our base in Keflavik and positioning P-3 Orion anti-submarine helicopters there.

In addition to that we have threats from the south. We have migrants, an unprecedented level of human movement from North Africa and Middle East into Europe. In addition to that, we also have terrorism. Now, for many NATO allies the Russian threat is the main threat. There are also key NATO allies, such as France and Belgium that see terrorism as their number one national security priority and the main threat to their countries. While the terrorists that attacked Paris were less than dozen in number, they may be perhaps the most successful pinning force in military history, because those dozen terrorists are holding down 7,000 French troops that are deployed domestically in French cities for counter-terrorism operations rather than being available for other French military or NATO missions.

On top of that, we have a very robust hybrid warfare campaign being waged by Russia, not just in the gray zone against nonaligned countries, but also within NATO capitals. We have seen references to some of the incidents of this, such as DNC hacks against the United States. This is not an isolated incident; we have seen several of these types of attacks in NATO territory. British intelligence stated that in 2015 it foiled a significant cyber attack against British elections. German intelligence talks about the increase in Russian spies and their attempts to influence German public opinion. These are things that the alliance is facing all across, and needs a much stronger response.

So, as you have heard earlier, there have been some key deliverables from summits, some of the major steps. NATO has prepared eight forced integration units. These are command cells of about 40 personnel: 20 from NATO, 20 from the host country. They are good, they are helpful, but again, they are limited. They are to help NATO plan more NATO exercises and to also facilitate the deployment of some of these other forces that were agreed upon at Wales and Warsaw.

So Wales, NATO just had the NATO response force, which was supposed to be the rapid reaction force for alliance, but alliance leaders saw the speed with which Russia acted in Ukraine was much faster than capabilities that the alliance had. So they almost tripled the size of the NATO response force, and increased it so that the NATO response force should now in theory be deployable within 30 days. But even that was not considered to be quick enough, so NATO created VJTF (Very high readiness Joint Task Force), a smaller unit of about 5,000 troops, light infantry, that should be able to be deployed within two to seven

days, the first units of about 1,500 troops in two days and the rest of the 5,000 within seven days.

At Warsaw, we saw some more significant steps taken, the most famous of which have been the EFP, Enhanced Forward Presence, the four battalions deployed in the east, which we will go into a little bit deeper. In addition to that we must also remember that through President Obama's European Reassurance Initiative (ERI), the United States is also putting a third brigade combat team in Europe on a rotational basis. We are also seeing greater deployments in the Black Sea region with the UK, Canada, and Poland pledging to send some fighters for rotational exercises, which the alliance sometimes called Black Sea Air Policing, but they will be there a very limited time.

Some details of the four battalions going into NATO's northeast: These are the ones that Russia is making a big issue of, and even NATO itself I feel is exaggerating the extent to which this military capability can help. As you can see, in each of the Baltic countries and in Poland there will be a battalion. These battalions will be roughly about 1,000 troops. They will be led by one nation, which NATO refers to as a framework nation. In addition to that, other countries will contribute smaller-size units to that. What this means basically is that, except for the United States, which will be mostly close to 1,000 troops, most of the other battalions deployed, even the framework nation, will not deploy close to 1,000, but probably half or a little more, 500 to 700 of the troops, and the rest of the battalion will be provided by some of the other nations. NATO, I think, is very confident and is claiming credit for participation of 20 countries in the Enhanced Forward Presence. I think it is good to have that type of political solidarity militarily, though as a strategist, I am concerned that it takes 20 countries for NATO to scrape together 4,000 troops.

And the reason why I am concerned about the size of it is this: this a response to Russian aggression in Crimea and Ukraine. After Wales, NATO created and expanded the size of the NRF, and created the VJTF, about 5,000. After Warsaw, NATO is deploying east 4,000 troops in these battalions. Before NATO announced this decision at the Warsaw summit in July, as far back as January the Russians announced they were going to add three divisions to their western military district. Since then, they have changed those numbers. They are adding two divisions or about 20,000 troops to the western military district, and the third division has been reassigned to the southern military district, which is the one closest to the Ukrainian border.

So to put it very briefly, I see that NATO has some key challenges, some key vulnerabilities, and these are size, which you saw in the previous charts; speed, which requires two different types of speed; and readiness. In terms of speed, NATO needs to improve its political decision-making speed, because none of these troops are going to move until NATO provides political approval for them. Also, even once that very difficult hurdle that NATO has been wrestling with over two years is overcome, we still have military speed. The actual deployability of these troops, which leads to what I consider NATO's main Achilles heel, is a very serious readiness problem all across the alliance. NATO does not have sufficient military capabilities to face the threat that it is seeing from Russia. But even if it had it, the problem is more severe. Not only does it not have capabilities. Of the capabilities that NATO thinks it has on paper, it has far fewer of them. More significantly, we see this in Germany in the case of the Bundeswehr, where they have far fewer combat planes than they had before. Even of the ones that remain, about half of them are not combat ready. But this is not isolated just to Germany; the readiness problem is all across the alliance. For example, in Great Britain, the Royal Navy with its illustrious career, has more admirals than it has combat ships. The French as we talked about are overstretched, not just with the counter-terrorism movement in Operation Sentinel, but also with their counter-terrorism efforts in the southern Sahel region in Africa, in Mali, in the Central African Republic. And in the United States, because of sequester, the commander of EUCOM had to ground 25 percent of our fighter aircraft because there was not enough funding for them.

Lastly, just a basic comparison of where we are now. The current NATO approach I describe as cheap deterrence; I see a strong aversion among too many political NATO leaders to take political risk or to spend a lot of money to actually deal with the threat that we are facing. As a result of that, every time Russia acts and creates a provocation to the west, we have a very muted response. Too often this means a bilateral response. There is a lack of political deterrence within the alliance. When Russia pushes one of our allies or one of our partners in Europe, I think there needs to be a multinational diplomatic response. This will reinforce our military deterrence. Likewise, I think NATO is taking too long to resolve the decision-making problem. I think it needs to remember that it has already delegated in the past authority to SACEUR during the Cold War and to SACEUR and the Secretary-General during Balkans conflict. NATO needs to return to these things and not think it is reinventing the wheel. Also, I think we need to see a change from basic defense budget planning among alliances. There are too many free riders in Europe, but at the same time I feel that Washington is enabling this because we are undertaking too many unilateral actions. I feel that already after two rounds of ERI, the United States has put money on the table. According to the NATO Secretary-General's report, NATO defense spending grew in the past year by over \$3 billion, over our European and Canadian allies. ERI itself is \$3.4 billion, which is a significantly large number. So they are spending more on their national defense, but not committing more to NATO missions. I feel that before a third ERI is approved or recommended by the next U.S. administration, it needs to be a multilateral ERI, one in which the United States and our allies both put capabilities on the field.

PART 3: "NATO: STRATEGIC LESSONS FROM THE RUSSIAN INVASION OF UKRAINE" [JULY 2022]

This section consists of presentations made by the contributors at the Special Forum: "NATO: Strategic Lessons From the Russian Invasion of Ukraine" that was held on April 28th, 2022 via Zoom conferencing. Some updates and revisions were made by the invited participants.

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UKRAINE'S NORTH STAR – NATO MEMBERSHIP

A Diplomatic Timeline of the post-WWII World Order and Ukraine's Foreign Policy and Relations with NATO

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, I will present a timeline of diplomatic events that contributed to the making of a world order without Ukraine and later a Europe with Ukraine as a state and a member of the international system. Today, Ukraine is fighting an existential war against Russia, and more than 80 percent of Ukrainians are in favor of joining NATO.¹ But, not all NATO Allies are in favor of Ukraine joining NATO. NATO expansionism is Russia's card for justifying its invasion and illegal war of aggression against Ukraine. In sum, Russia annexed Crimea and invaded eastern Ukraine in 2014 and launched a full out war in 2022 due to Russia's deep-seated aspiration to return to empire status, contain Ukraine within its orbit of influence, and control Ukraine's decision and foreign policy making. An independent Ukraine is not in Russia's interests whereas Ukraine's full membership into the Western alliance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is critical and integral to achieve the vision of a Europe, whole, free, and at peace.

EUROPE – EAST AND WEST

Ukraine, as a state, has always been a question, especially during the 20th century. At the end of World War I, Ukraine's international recognition as an independent state failed and after World War II, it's territory and boundaries were drawn as one of 15 republics within the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, USSR. In an effort to bring peace during World War II, the idea of a League of Nations was floated once again among world leaders. During the Yalta conference early 1945, USSR's Former Premier Joseph Stalin agreed to support the idea to create an intergovernmental organization called the United Nations (UN) but only if the USSR would have three seats at the UN, with Ukraine SSR and Byelorussian SSR as the two additional seats. In September 1945, Germany surrendered and in October of 1945, the UN was formed with 51 founding members and Ukraine SSR, as part of the Soviet Union was one of the founding members.

In 1946, Great Britain's Prime Minister Winston Churchill delivered his famous speech, *The Sinews of Peace* where he coined the term "the Iron Curtain" to describe an area within Europe that was governed by the Soviet Union. This term became a common household phrase to describe a line drawn in Europe and initiated a separation and division within Europe. No longer was Europe a continent from the Atlantic to the Urals, but an area depicted on a map that encompassed states that belonged to alliances formed at the conclusion of WWII as part of a world order created to bring peace and stability. An East-West divide became the blueprint for international relations, especially within the international affairs and diplomatic community.

At the conclusion of World War II, all major European powers were destroyed, and the international system was left with only two states standing, the United States and the USSR. Both held ideological differences, democracy and communism, and a competition between the two powers began a Cold War with the unspoken understanding that spheres of influence and a realpolitik vision controlled the international order. In 1947, U.S. President Harry S Truman announced US's foreign policy of containment during the delivery of the Truman Doctrine and pledged support to countries or people threatened by Soviet forces or Communist insurrections.²

In 1949, after the conclusion of World War II, Germany was divided into two states, East Germany, German Democratic Republic, (GDR), and West Germany, (Federal Republic of Germany) further deepening the concept of an East and West divide within Europe. Additionally, twelve founding members from the Western sphere of influence formed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a collective security defense organization established in response to the threat emanating from the Soviet Union. The purpose of NATO was threefold, to deter Soviet expansionism, forbid the revival of nationalist militarism in

Europe, and encourage European political integration.³ This integration of European states was based on the political ideology of democracy, and further enhanced the concept of like-minded membership.

Behind the Iron Curtain, the Crimean Peninsula was “gifted” to Ukraine SSR by the leadership of the Soviet Union in 1954. According to declassified documents about the cession of Crimea it was a “noble act on the part of the Russian people to commemorate the 300th anniversary of the reunification of Ukraine with Russia (a reference to the Treaty of Pereyaslav signed in 1654 representatives of the Ukrainian Cossack Hetmante and Tsar Aleksei I of Muscovy) and to evince the boundless trust and love the Russian people feel toward the Ukrainian people.”⁴ The documents confirm that the transfer of Crimea from the Russian Soviet Federation of Socialist Republics (RSFSR) to Ukraine SSR was approved by the Presidium of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on January 25, 1954.⁵

During the same time, in response to the West’s creation of NATO, the Soviet Union established its own collective defense treaty in Warsaw, Poland in 1955 and its membership included eight Eastern bloc countries, known as the Warsaw Pact. Throughout the Cold War, both NATO and the Warsaw Pact were two ideologically opposed collective security defense alliances. For nearly 50 years, U.S. foreign policy towards Europe centered on containing communism with a clear sense that a functioning international system required a balance of power between the East and West.

This stability within the world order was challenged in 1989 when the Berlin Wall came down and was altered again in 1991, when the Soviet Union collapsed. Both the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union fell apart and the Iron Curtain cracked and cast a shadow on the making of foreign policy to the region, in particular Ukraine. In 1991, the international system and the world witnessed fifteen Newly Independent States (NIS) become members of the international community. But the recognition as an independent state for Ukraine didn’t come easy. In 1991, before the Soviet Union disintegrated, U.S. President George H.W. Bush travelled to Kyiv, Ukraine and delivered a speech written by Condoleezza Rice where Bush regarded Ukraine’s fight for independence as “suicidal nationalism.”⁶ The same month, on August 24, 1991, Ukraine declared independence from the Soviet Union and on December 1, 1991 Ukraine held a referendum in which more than 90% of Ukraine’s population voted for independence, including both Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, voting 54% and 57% respectively.⁷

Ukraine, a country submerged within the Soviet Union during most of the 20th century, now had to identify its place within Europe. Additionally, Ukrainians themselves had to learn about their own history while Europe and the West had to reexamine European history from a historical lens that was no longer fogged by Soviet propaganda of communist ideology. A new security architecture needed to be created for Europe and the U.S. foreign policy of containment was soon to be replaced, with a new vision. In September 1993, U.S. President Bill Clinton’s national security advisor Anthony Lake delivered a speech at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) where he announced the administration’s “Strategy of Enlargement.”⁸ Lake said, “throughout the cold war, we contained a global threat to market democracies. Now we should seek to enlarge their reach, particularly in places of special significance to us. The successor to a doctrine of containment must be a strategy of enlargement, the enlargement of the world’s free community of market economies.”⁹ As historian Mary Sarotte wrote, “expansion itself was a justifiable response to the geopolitics of the 1990s. NATO had already been enlarged a number of times. Given that former Soviet bloc states were now clamoring to join the alliance, it was neither unprecedented nor unreasonable to them in...Put simply, expansion was a reasonable policy; the problem was how it happened.”¹⁰ It was debated in Washington on how to do this. Former Secretary of State Warren Christopher wrote in 1994, “swift expansion of NATO eastward could make a neo-imperialist Russia a self-fulfilling prophecy.”¹¹ The error of Washington was not to enlarge NATO, “but to do so in a way that maximized Moscow’s aggravation and gave fuel to Russian reactionaries...as a necessary response to NATO’s deployments of military infrastructure at our borders.”¹²

NATO could have enlarged with conditions similar to Norway. Norway was one of the original NATO members and shared a border with the Soviet Union, but “decided against either the stationing of foreign bases or the deployment of foreign forces on its territory in peacetime and had ruled out nuclear weapons either on its land or in its ports. All this was done to keep long-term frictions with Moscow manageable.”¹³ By moving NATO military infrastructure eastward onto the territory of new NATO members, Russia viewed this as a provocation and believed it had to respond; eventually President Vladimir Putin did.

UKRAINE AS A STATE – POST COLD WAR

Since 1991, Ukraine became an independent state and regularly was at odds with the Russian Federation regarding its relations with the West. The Government of Ukraine’s choice to align itself more with the West was motivated by a history and fear of Russian expansionism and revisionism¹⁴, which was shared by the countries of the central and East Europe. As soon as the Berlin Wall fell, the fight over Central and Eastern Europe’s future in Western institutions such as the European Community (EC) and NATO began.¹⁵

EU and NATO membership were fundamental goals for European integration, stability, and security against Russia's anticipated aggression. With the fall of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, NATO too had to adapt and change since its core principle, as to deter Soviet expansionism that was no longer relevant. Without the Soviet Union, "for NATO, the question was existential: was there any further need for the Atlantic Alliance?"¹⁶ In December 1991, the Allies established the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), later renamed in 1997 as the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council in 1997.¹⁷ By joining the NACC in December 1991, Ukraine launched its first step toward European integration and formed a relationship with NATO that was wholly independent of Russia.¹⁸ Ukraine became a member of NACC and this decision "marked the first stage in Ukraine's relationship with NATO."¹⁹

When Ukraine became independent, it also became the third largest country in the world with nuclear warheads on its territory. An independent Ukraine "had a significant impact on the formation of the new security architecture in Europe."²⁰ It was U.S. Secretary of State James Baker that told U.S. President George H. W. Bush, "strategically there is no other foreign issue more deserving of your attention or time."²¹ Ukraine didn't want to be a nuclear state, but it wanted to obtain certain guarantees in exchange for giving up its inherited nuclear weapons. The U.S. "had to explain to Ukraine that guarantees were not possible since Article 5 of NATO was the only guarantee provided by Western Allies and since Ukraine was not a member of NATO only assurances could be given to Ukraine."²²

In January 1994, at the NATO summit in Brussels, the allies agreed on the policy of enlargement and declared "we [NATO allies] expect and would welcome NATO expansion that would reach to democratic states to our East, as part of an evolutionary process, taking into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe."²³ The Allies also launched the Partnership for Peace Program (PfP) and Ukraine joined the PfP in February 1994 signaling again its ambition to integrate with Western institutions. In July 1994, Ukraine held its presidential elections and Ukraine's Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma was elected as Ukraine's second president. The PfP served four purposes: "to advance the Western aspirations of most of the member countries; to help promote democracy in former Warsaw Pact states; to foster common military standards and practices, potentially as steps for some of those countries eventually to join NATO; and to forge lasting institutional connections to NATO for countries that would not join it."²⁴ All participating States of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and members of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council were eligible to seek membership into the PfP.

In May 1995, U.S. President Bill Clinton visited Kyiv and met with Ukraine's second President Leonid Kuchma. During Clinton's meeting with Kuchma, Ukraine's President said that he believed that "NATO would be a guarantor of stability in Europe and that the official foreign policy under his administration was that Ukraine favors a gradual enlargement of NATO that does not lead to a new division of Europe."²⁵ Between 1994-2000, under the Kuchma administration, Ukraine implemented a multi-vector foreign policy approach where it carefully balanced its relations with the United States, Russia, and the EU and Ukraine's official foreign policy was membership into both the EU and NATO.²⁶

Ukraine's relations with NATO were strengthened with the signing of the 1997 Charter on a Distinctive Partnership with NATO, "which is the basic foundation underpinning NATO-Ukraine relations and established the NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC) to take cooperation forward."²⁷ Also, in 1997 and 1999 respectively, NATO opened the NATO Information and Documentation Centre (NIDC) and the NATO Liaison Office (NLO) in Kyiv.

PROVOCATION AND THE ONSET OF IMPERIALISTIC TENDENCIES

For the first time in history, Article 5 was invoked for collective defense against al-Qaeda's attacks on New York and Washington, D.C. on 9/11. Ukraine, which now had a decade of bilateral defense ties with the United States and was institutionally partnered with NATO, was swept into a new orientation of a foreign policy. Kyiv now allowed overflight rights to NATO aircraft enroute to and returning from Afghanistan and the Middle East. Ukraine also contributed troops to NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).²⁸ In 2003, as the U.S. expanded its military operations into Iraq, Ukraine also joined Coalition operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003-2011), and deployed a brigade of 1,650 servicemembers to Iraq for combat operations. This resulted 18 Ukrainians killed and 44 wounded in action.²⁹

Moscow's "neo-imperialist mindset first surfaced in 2003 with tension over the ownership of Ukraine's Tuzla Island in the Kerch Strait."³⁰ In 2004, Russian President Putin congratulated Ukraine's Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich for winning the presidential elections even before the results of the elections were announced. This ignited the Orange Revolution, and a run-off election was scheduled, and Viktor Yushchenko was elected as Ukraine's third president. In February 2004, Yushchenko addressed the NATO-Ukraine Commission in Brussels and professed "a course [of] integration in the European and Euro-Atlantic structures...[and Ukraine is] ready to make efforts to achieve this noble goal."³¹ In 2006, NATO ratified a Strategic Airlift Agreement with Kyiv, established a NATO trust fund, and in 2007 "the Ukrainian Navy deployed its first ship beyond the Black Sea for NATO's maritime counterterrorism surveillance and interdiction operations in the Mediterranean for Operations Active Endeavor."³²

NATO enlargement was a concern for Russian President Putin and Russia, especially when “NATO moved its infrastructure-foreign bases, troops, and above all, nuclear weapons-to[ward] Moscow.”³³ The problem began when U.S. President George W. Bush began informal talks with the governments of Poland and the Czech Republic about establishing missile defense facilities on their territories. Both Czechia and Poland joined NATO in 1999 and within a couple of years the Bush Administration began talking about establishing defense facilities in both Poland and Czechia. NATO had bordered the Soviet Union with Turkey’s membership with both NATO and U.S. military bases were built in Turkiye since 1952. But it was the reunification of Germany in 1990 when NATO included East Germany into the Alliance and the inclusion of the Warsaw Pact countries that were formerly under the influence of Moscow that was an irritant for Putin. In March 2004, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and the three Baltic countries, Estonia Latvia, Lithuania joined NATO and once again Russia’s border with NATO increased with now the Baltic countries being the first states from the former Soviet Union to become members of NATO. Putin was witnessing Russia’s influence of former Soviet territory diminishing.

In 2007, the U.S. government requested formal negotiations to begin for the European Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) program which was to be stationed in Poland and Czechia. This action influenced Putin’s decision to participate in the 2007 Munich Security Conference (MSC). For the first time in the history of the MSC, the President of Russia participated and explicitly laid out the need for a new global security architecture. In his MSC speech, Putin asserted that “NATO expansion does not have any relation with the modernization of the Alliance itself or with ensuring security in Europe. On the contrary, it represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust.”³⁴ Putin also said, “plans to expand certain elements of the anti-missile defense system to Europe cannot help but disturb us [Russia].”³⁵ Putin ended his speech by reminding the audience and participants that “Russia is a country with a history that spans more than a thousand years and practically always used the privilege to carry out an independent foreign policy.”³⁶

In January 2008, the Ukrainian government requested NATO to agree to a Membership Action Plan (MAP) for Ukraine during the upcoming Bucharest summit.³⁷ In late March and early April, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and President George W. Bush travelled to Kyiv to meet with Ukraine’s President Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko to personally thank Ukraine for its support in the war in Afghanistan. As a gesture of gratitude for Ukraine’s assistance against the War on Terror, Bush decided to inform Yushchenko and Tymoshenko that the United States agreed to propose at the NATO Summit in Bucharest for all NATO Allies to vote for Ukraine and Georgia to become NATO members. During this meeting, Tymoshenko reportedly expressed reservations to Bush and Rice in Ukraine becoming a NATO member. It was clear that in 2008, Ukraine was not yet ready for membership into the defense alliance.³⁸

On the first day of the Bucharest Summit, April 2, 2008, Bush stated that the United States endorsed MAP for Georgia and Ukraine. But in reality, the Bush Administration did not coax Allies with this ask prior to the summit and both Germany and France voted against Ukraine and Georgia to become NATO members. The official declaration from the Summit reads, “NATO welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO. We [NATO] agree today that these countries will become members of NATO.”³⁹ During the Summit in Bucharest, Putin told Bush, “you have to understand George, that Ukraine is not even a country. Part of its territory is in Eastern Europe and the greater part was given to us.”⁴⁰ After the Bucharest Summit, Bush travelled to Sochi to discuss bilateral relations with Putin, in particular the U.S. plan for a missile defense shield in eastern Europe and NATO expansion. This was the last time Bush and Putin met as presidents as Dmitry Medvedev was elected as Russia’s next president on May 7, 2008, and Barack Obama was elected as the next U.S. president in November 2008.

THE ENDGAME – UKRAINE UNIFIED

In August 2008, Russia invaded Georgia and sent its military troops across the international frontier and attempted to change the borders in Europe by force. This was the first direct military engagement between Russia and a recognized sovereign state. On November 5, 2008, the day after the U.S. elections results were announced, newly elected Russian President Dmitry Medvedev delivered his first speech to the Russian parliament where he said he would “place Iskander missiles in the Kaliningrad region, a Russian enclave surrounded by EU countries [and NATO members].”⁴¹

In 2013, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s interfered with Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich’s decision to not sign the Association Agreement with the EU. Putin offered to buy \$15 billion dollars, worth of Ukrainian bonds and cut gas prices for Ukraine.⁴² This was regarded as a win for Putin, but it actually gave rise to the Euromaidan Revolution. During the Maidan Revolution, President Yanukovich fled Ukraine for Russia and in May 2014 Ukraine elected Petro Poroshenko to be the fifth President of Ukraine. Upon entering the office, Poroshenko was confronted with an empty National Bank and a stripped Ukrainian Army. During his term in office, Poroshenko rebuilt the Ukrainian Army and secured both lethal and non-lethal aid from the West. Poroshenko ensured that the Ukrainian Army was more NATO ready than ever before through intense military exercises and training with NATO. By Russia launching a full out war against Ukraine in February 2022, both Finland and Sweden sought NATO membership. Finland, the second country with the longest border to Russia, 800 miles, became a NATO member in April 2023. In June 2023, it is expected that Turkiye may approve Sweden’s NATO bid for membership as

membership is contingent of all members voting in favor of membership.⁴³ Presently there are 31 member countries.

Ultimately, the annexation of Crimea and Russia's role in the Donbas War in 2014 led to major shifts in Ukrainian public opinion that have contributed to pro-Western sentiments. Polling data shows that public sentiment in Ukraine has become decidedly less pro-Russia and Russian aggression in Ukraine has led to a substantial increase in support for NATO membership. According to a September 2014 poll by two Ukrainian polling agencies, the Democratic Initiatives Foundation and the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, "in a hypothetical referendum on NATO membership 44% would have voted in favor, 35% against, while 22% were undecided. A November 2014 poll by the Rating Group found 52% of respondents supporting NATO membership and 25 % opposing it...Between 2002-2009, on average, less than 25% of Ukrainians supported NATO membership according to the Razumkov Center in 2009."⁴⁴ In a poll conducted by the International Republican Institute (IRI) in December 2021, it was reported that if a referendum was held on joining NATO, 54% of the Ukrainian population would vote to join the military alliance.⁴⁵ In a follow-up survey conducted by IRI in February 2023, 82% of Ukrainians would support joining NATO if a referendum were held today. This was an increase of nearly 30% from 2014. Additionally, 97% of Ukrainians believe they will win the war against Russia and 74% believe Ukraine will maintain all territories from within its internationally recognized borders defined in 1991.⁴⁶

CONCLUSION

How and when the ongoing war in Ukraine will end, no one knows. But what everyone does know is that Ukraine is fighting against one of the largest armies in the world. It is not giving up and for the first time in Ukraine's history, the Western nations and most of the world is supporting Ukraine in its fight for sustaining a Ukrainian identity, statehood, democracy and respect of international law and a global world order. The ongoing war is a war of choice initiated by Russia to expand its territory and project imperialistic power. As Bobo Lo wrote, "the Russian invasion of Ukraine has sharpened the commitment of Western governments to a liberal vision of international order."⁴⁷ Just as WWII was a fight against fascism and Nazism; today, the war in Ukraine is a fight against Russism.⁴⁸

Putin's interference into Ukraine's foreign policy making has backfired. Ukraine's population and leadership is more in favor of joining NATO than ever before. Due to Putin's actions in Ukraine, both Finland and Sweden have sought membership into NATO. In May 2023, Russia gained 800 new miles of border with NATO when Finland was added as a new member. The war against Ukraine has demonstrated clear deficiencies in the Russian Army's tactical and operational capabilities and shown how the West may have overestimated Russia's military might.

As succinctly stated by historians Serhii Plokhyy and Mary Sarotte, "the Soviet Union may have ceased to exist on paper in December 1991, but its influence did not. Empires do not simply vanish. They die long and messy deaths, denying the decline when they can, conceding their dominions when they must, and launching irredentist actions wherever they sense an opening. And nowhere are the consequences of the Soviet collapse clearer than in Ukraine – a country that has wrecked attempt after attempt at establishing a durable order on the Eurasian continent."⁴⁹

During the diplomatic talks in November-December 2021, Russia outlined its conditions to not further invade Ukraine and requested "security guarantees" of which two were a legally binding promise that Ukraine would not join NATO and that Ukraine would recognize Crimea as a part of Russia.⁵⁰ By requesting Ukraine to declare Crimea part of Russia, Russia internationally acknowledged that Crimea is not part of Russia. Also, by justifying NATO expansion as the reason for launching a military operation into Ukraine, Putin further obscured the truth just as he did in 2014 when he publicly said that the "little green men" were not Russian soldiers in Crimea. Moscow has dealt with a NATO border since its creation in 1949. As reported when Montenegro became a member of NATO, "the reason Russians cared so much about blocking NATO membership is that they knew it would reduce their ability to manipulate Montenegro and would remove a chess piece from the board on which they sought to challenge Europe. Indeed, in the months after NATO's invitation, Russia continued its attempts to stymie Montenegro's path by stirring up internal unrest through propaganda, paid protesters, and even an attempted coup. It failed."⁵¹ This is the same for Ukraine.

Just as East and West Germany were unified, so too is Ukraine with Europe. Once again Europe is relearning another perspective of its history. Former Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott wrote in his memoirs, "Russia was a malignancy in remission; the Yeltsin era was at best a fleeting opportunity to be seized before Russia relapsed into authoritarianism at home and expansionism abroad."⁵²

In 2021, Russian President Putin wrote, "Russians and Ukrainians were one people – a single whole."⁵³ Moving forward, Russia needs to acknowledge and comprehend that Russians and Ukrainians are not one people. Yes, they both are Slavic nations, stemming from the same root, but these countries have historically been different. Putin writes, "what Ukraine will be – it is up to its citizens to decide."⁵⁴ For nearly 10 years Ukraine has been struggling with Russia to maintain its independence, territorial integrity, and sovereignty. According to the United Nations Human Rights Office of the High

Commissioner (OHCHR), from February 2022 to March 12, 2023, Ukraine has experienced nearly 22,000 civilian casualties: 8,231 killed and 13,734 injured.⁵⁵ According to new research released from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), “Russian combat deaths in the first year of its war [2022-2023] on neighboring Ukraine have likely now exceeded the combined death toll of all of its wars since WWII.”⁵⁶ As former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger said, “Ukraine should join NATO – for the sake of Europe and Russia...the outcome [of the war] should be one in which Ukraine remains protected by Europe and doesn’t become a solitary state just looking out for itself.”⁵⁷

Ukraine has clearly chosen to align itself with the Western capitals and for Kyiv, NATO Membership is its north star. On September 30, 2022, Ukraine formally applied to join NATO, following Russia’s annexation of Southern and Eastern Ukraine. NATO Allies need to collectively stand up to Russia’s revisionist actions, vote unanimously for Ukraine to become a NATO member and ensure peace in Europe. Ukraine needs an ironclad agreement from NATO and NATO needs to implement its mission and purpose as a collective defense and security alliance. As NATO Chief Jens Stoltenberg declared in April 2023, “Ukraine deserves to join the military alliance.”⁵⁸ Just as Brzezinski’s wrote, “it cannot be stressed enough that without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be an empire, but with Ukraine suborned and then subordinated, Russia automatically becomes an empire.”⁵⁹ Until Ukraine joins NATO, Russia will continuously attempt to weaken the international world order and the attempt to bring back the power it once held as the Russian empire.

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AMBASSADOR ROBERT HUNTER

Former U.S. Ambassador to NATO

It is an honor as always to be with one of your seminars because over the years you have been a leader on discussion of some of the most critical issues facing this nation and the West, and today is no exception. It comes at a critical moment. I am not going to cover the same grounds as my distinguished former colleague, General Wesley Clark. We served together part of the time when I was the NATO ambassador and part of the time when he was the Supreme Allied Commander Europe. We would sit around the NATO table in the old headquarters – the good ole headquarters across the street from the current one – dealing with some of the more difficult problems, beginning of course with the implementation of the Stabilization Force (SFOR) for Bosnia and leading up to Kosovo (at that point, I had left NATO.)

I will not track over what he said about the dilemmas involved with nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence. I will address the situation short of getting into those questions which, God-forbid, we never have to. I will say one thing that in my long experience – fortunately I was too young for the only nuclear war we had in 1945 – I have been involved in these issues since 1962. Even when I was a mid-level officer at the White House Staff in 1964-5, basically working on education, I also worked on IAEA issues and on the issue of the NATO deterrent, including the mixed-man Multilateral Force (MLF). I did think I played a role in seeing that that did not go to fruition and indeed it didn't – the allies didn't want it. We created instead a NATO nuclear organization, the Nuclear Planning Group, which helped to deal with a requirement, to put it most starkly: "How did the United States convince the Europeans that we would be prepared to commit suicide for the defense of Europe?" That is what deterrence in Europe essentially was. That is what the various NATO agreements on this were and it took us a long time to get it done, and it continued to be an issue right up until the end of the Cold War. I was involved in the SS-20 question back in the late 1970s, when I was the lead official on NATO on the National Security Council staff. I was involved in the early negotiations, particularly with the Germans, the Dutch, and other allies regarding the U.S. deployment of American Pershing II and cruise missiles. Fortunately, that had a happy ending.

We are now in the post-Cold War era, and we may be in the process of leaving it because, let me use an emotive term which is also descriptive: "A naked Russian aggression" against a key part of Central Europe. Ukraine is not a formal member of NATO. We all know that, but it is on the high road, the classical high road for conventional war in both directions, going way back certainly to 1914, between Western Europe and Russia, then the Soviet Union, and now Russia again. As a result, what happens in this corridor stretching from the Russian frontier all the way into the heart of Western Europe is a critical power decision. I think we sent some very poor signals as to what we would do and what the strategic importance was and is of what happens in Ukraine. We are at a moment today as you can tell by watching television, if you saw President Biden earlier today and also the Secretary of Defense, Lloyd Austin, who essentially declared war on Russia. It was nothing short of that when he said our objective is to weaken Russia's forces. He was backed up by the White House Press Secretary who I guess was probably poorly instructed, but then General Austin at Ramstein over the weekend repeated that our objective is to weaken the Russian capacity to do against other countries in Central Europe what it has been doing in Ukraine. That obviously includes the formal members of NATO, but also Transnistria, which is part of Moldova and is a member of Partnership for Peace and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, but is not a NATO member and has never been given even the hint of a NATO security guarantee.

So, in my judgment, General Austin declared war on Russia. President Biden backed off from that, today. He said, "We are not making war on Russia. We are trying to stop Russian aggression on Ukraine." Fortunately, he backed off rather than ratifying what the Secretary of Defense said, which is I think another lesson, a strategic lesson on communications, which is that Secretaries of Defense ought to keep their mouths shut on matters like this. If there is going to be a communication that has authority on something as great as making war, it needs to come from the President or from the Secretary of State, or in certain circumstances, from the National Security Advisor. I doubt General Austin was so instructed. I think it was an unfortunate use of words, but it took the President of the United States until 11:15 this morning to correct the record and keep us from entering a new and uncertain strategic area, in which the United States for the first time since 1919 could get us into war with Russia. (A side comment: when I was with the National Security Council in the 1970s and dealing with Europe, one of the tiny little issues that I had to deal with was Railroad Retirement Benefits for former U.S. railroad workers who were still alive who had worked on the Trans-Siberian railroad and got as far as Yakutsk in Siberia, as we and others were supporting the White Russians against the Bolsheviks, something almost no Americans know about!)

In my judgment, we need to communicate to Mr. Putin that he has already exceeded the limits beyond which we can tolerate, in terms not just of NATO but also of a strategic and security picture in Europe and more broadly in the world. The credibility of the guarantees from the United States is the bedrock of NATO. It is also a bedrock of what we do elsewhere in the world and, if we do not regain what I believe has been a diminishing of American credibility over the last two months, then we are going to have problems in a lot of places. The President is talking about another \$33 billion today in military and other aid for

Ukraine, and when we refer to the meeting in Ramstein (Germany) the other day with 40 countries, including all the NATO allies and, prior to that, the provision of some weaponry to Ukrainian forces, I will argue that that is “a day late and a dollar short.” We should have been providing a lot more weaponry so we would not be talking today about how fast we can get things to Ukraine. We should have done that right from the start and certainly as soon as Ukrainian forces demonstrated that they were not going to lie down and be walked over. We have seen the courage of every Ukrainian, remembering the Holodomor of the starvation of the 1930s and the way in which they had been treated by the Soviet Union and now by Russia. We have also seen the amazing courage of Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and then the defense of Kyiv. It succeeded, not really because of what was provided from outside – which was instrumental – but the courage and determination of Ukraine to stand up. That’s the point at which we should have been rushing the kinds of weapons and other equipment we are now saying we are rushing. Well, “better late than never,” but there is a lesson to be learned, and I fear that this particular administration, like its three predecessors, did not respond as was necessary, not just for Ukraine but for European security overall.

Let me go back to 1989. George H. W. Bush declared an objective in Mainz, Germany, in May 1989, trying to create a “Europe whole and free,” to which the words “and at peace” were later added. That is a grand strategy. It had a number of components, and I had the privilege of being one of the key architects of implementing that grand strategy when I was NATO ambassador for four-and-a-half years, during the time in which we put all the pieces in place and on which my team at NATO played an instrumental role. General Clark was involved in part of that later on after his predecessor, George Joulwan, had left and, before him, John Shalikashvili, who was one of the truly outstanding individuals that we have ever seen as SACEUR.

A key element of the reform and restructuring of NATO – and this is a central point for today’s discussion – was to reflect on what happened to Germany after the Great War, World War I. A key objective at NATO was to avoid what happened in Germany, and with Hitler, following the War Guilt Clause (231) of the Treaty of Versailles, which required that Germany take full responsibility for starting the war, in order to have a legal basis for reparations, particularly demanded by the French. Hitler went to town on that and it helped produce World War II. (Incidentally, one of the two authors of that clause was a young lawyer named John Foster Dulles.)

George H.W. Bush was determined not to make that mistake again and isolate Russia and treat it like a pariah. His objective was instead to include Russia in arrangements for Europe and its future, not to exclude it. Democrats agreed, and the Clinton administration picked up where Bush left off. One of the great things about NATO is that it has always been bipartisan. I do not think I can think of another element of today’s U.S. foreign policy that has always been bipartisan. It is a great strength for our country and a great strength for NATO and a great deterrent in itself.

There was an understanding that at some point Russia would rise again like the phoenix from the ashes and would become a major power in Europe that we would need to deal with, one way or another, and if at all possible without having a repeat of what happened with Germany after 1919.

So, what were the elements of NATO’s restructuring? Number one, the United States would remain as a European power. We would not leave like we did in 1919 or in part beginning in late 1945 and then coming back again militarily beginning in 1950 with Allied Command Europe. Number two, we decided to preserve NATO’s Integrated Military Command Structure. It is unprecedented in history. I do not need to review that for this group. Third, the “German problem,” – how to deal with a powerful Germany on the European Continent – which started about 1866, was in effect brought to an end. The Russians accepted, under the so-called Two- Plus-Four Agreement, that unified Germany would be within NATO. All of it. Why? So it would be in the NATO alliance and so the United States could keep watch on Germany. Who was a great champion of that? German Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl.

We then, fourth, had to take Central Europe off the geopolitical chessboard. It had been a proximate cause of the First and Second World Wars and the Cold War. We started with Partnership for Peace, of which I was among a handful of “inventors,” which could well have been sufficient to help countries in Central Europe transform into Western-oriented democracies. But several of them said: “Wait a second, with what we went through in the Second World War and in the Cold War under Soviet domination, we need more than that to feel secure enough to get on with national transformation.” So, we undertook the first NATO enlargement in 1997, for three countries: Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. The Russians didn’t like it, but they sat still for it for a simple reason: Poland and the Czech Republic surrounded Germany with NATO and hence also the United States, and that gave added assurance to everybody. So, I used to say, that this generation of Germans would make it impossible for a future generation of Germans, to do what the previous generations of Germans did. Russia has accepted that.

Where the problems began was with further enlargement, to begin with were the Baltic states as special cases. That went all the back to 1918 and then to 1939, with the Nazi-Soviet Pact. We in the West never recognized that they had been incorporated into the Soviet Union. And except for some Russian minorities, they are not Slavic countries. So, there is really no history of internalizing these states, as Putin is trying to do with Ukraine, by representing it as an inherent part of historic Russia and, he claims, thus never having been independent. So, even if Russia could tolerate the Baltic States in NATO, it could not tolerate other countries joining, in what Putin has called the “surrounding” of Russia with NATO. We can object to that characterization, arguing that NATO is not an aggressive alliance, but Putin has still been able to use NATO enlargement at home as a propaganda point.

Given this background, if Putin succeeds in Ukraine, he could well turn his attention elsewhere, by posing either direct kinetic security threats or newer threats like cyber and energy, which he is already doing to some degree. Thus, we have to help Ukraine in this war, in part to keep Putin from getting away with it – a first step in deterrence, if you will.

In restructuring NATO after the Cold War, the big issue was about Russia. So, before NATO enlargement came along there was negotiation of the NATO-Russia Founding Act, signed at the Élysée Palace on May 27th, 1997. Go back and read it. It's got a bunch of principles and 19 areas of specific cooperation, plus a NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, but which had NATO allies all sitting on one side and the Russians sitting on the other. That was transformed at a summit in Rome in 2003, when the NATO-Russia Council was inaugurated. In the NRC, Russia would sit at the table with veto power equal to that of any of the NATO allies. That council is now in abeyance. In moving beyond the current crisis and war, if that is possible, the NATO-Russia Council needs to be revived.

What about Ukraine? It was understood in 1997 by everybody, including the Ukrainians at the time, that Ukraine could never become part of NATO and thus bring the alliance right up against the Russian frontier. So, what does that leave them? Well, one thing was that we were trying to get beyond spheres of influence and balance of power – though in fact Ukraine was to be neutral as between NATO and Russia, everyone understood that. So we negotiated a NATO-Russia Charter, which gives Ukraine all kinds of rights plus cooperation/consultations with NATO, short of full membership. (As the lead negotiator for NATO, I was in Kyiv in 2017 for the 20th anniversary and spoke in the Verkhovna Rada.)

Now, some things went wrong on the Western side. First, beginning in 1998, the people who had understood that you could not drive Russia into a corner - because someday it's going to come back at you - left the government and we were left with people who said, “Okay, Russia lost the Cold War so we can do whatever we want.” They started by attacking Serbia over Kosovo without a UN Security Council Resolution (unlike Bosnia, when Russia had accepted NATO military action and even joined the post-conflict Implementation Force.) The United States abrogated the ABM Treaty of 1972, abrogated the IMF treaty, got rid of Open Skies, and deployed ABM systems in Central Europe. The last were directed not against Russia but against North Korea and Iran. Russia knew that that did nothing to its own deterrent, but it was operating in its own backyard. Go back and look at what Putin said at the Munich Security Conference in 2007. Read that speech. We did not pick up on anything. I was there when it happened, and I was surprised that people just ridiculed Russia as “just Guatemala with nuclear weapons.” (For its part, Russia left the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty.)

We come to 2008, and we have to review this because it is very important. The George W. Bush administration said, “Well why don't we bring Ukraine and Georgia into NATO?” The allies were horrified. Most of them were simply not going to agree to go to war for either country if it were attacked. But to give President Bush something to take home, politically, the allies agreed that the two countries “will become members” of NATO. In plain English, that was the moment of commitment. That is what the words meant, and they had no other interpretation despite the fact that some people say, “No, it was not really a promise.” But it was. It soon got tested by Georgia's President, Mikheil Saakashvili, who sent troops to try recovering the break-away province of South Ossetia, even though a US Assistant Secretary of State pleaded with him not to do so. When Russia responded militarily, not a single NATO ally did anything other than provide some weapons and ancillary support. It showed that the commitment to bring Georgia into NATO and, by extension, Ukraine, was nugatory. Yet NATO, over and over, restated that Ukraine and Georgia “will become members” of the alliance. (Further, it could never happen, anyway, since NATO decisions are taken by consensus, and no consensus would ever be produced to admit either of these two countries. That continues to be true, even today.)

I will not try to comprehend why Putin decided to seize Crimea in 2014 and then sent “little green men” to seize the Donbas. Some US/NATO missteps, discussed above, certainly did not help. It was naked aggression, however. NATO at that point did not do enough, clearly not enough, to counter what Russia did. This was a big mistake.

One of the U.S. errors, and you can go look it up on the internet, is that an Assistant Secretary of State tried to run a coup in Kyiv to put the preferred US candidate in as prime minister. The conversation was put on the internet by the Russians. Everybody got upset because this person said something unpleasant about the European Union, but you have to listen to the rest of it which is, “We're going to get our guy in power.”

We get to now, when in this last year Putin felt strong enough to invade Ukraine. One incredible thing is that we committed to make Ukraine a member of NATO, but then did not act on the strategic/political pledge, on the ground that it was not a “legal” agreement.

So, we get to the problem after the war starts. The big strategic problem for NATO was how to get across to Putin that he cannot succeed in Ukraine, in part because we did give it a commitment, but then did not formalize it. That’s number one. Number two, as Wesley Clark and others have asked: “Will Putin stop there?” And we are now in a position where we have to demonstrate to Putin that he cannot succeed in Ukraine because, if he does, then NATO’s credibility for honoring Article 5 for allies will also be in deep trouble, along with the credibility of the United States. That is why I deeply regret we did not do more early on. The president of the United States, probably correctly, said in the beginning – and we will debate this for years – “No American troops.” He was worried about escalation, potentially even to the use of nuclear weapons by Russia, which Putin has discussed. President Biden is obviously worried about the United States getting into another war anywhere, just after we have gotten out of Afghanistan, and given that the American people do not want war anywhere else unless we are being attacked.

Step number one is we have to prevent Russia from succeeding militarily and we are now a day late and a dollar short. We also, in my judgment, should be keeping our mouths shut about things, like trying to weaken Russia. Of course, we would like to weaken Russia. Of course, we would like to make it more difficult or maybe even impossible for it to do to other countries what it is doing to Ukraine, but you keep your mouth shut about that. You do not force Putin to dig in his heels even more and also for the people in Russia most of whom, like it or not, will support Putin if only on patriotic grounds. Putin is still 70% popular. It is not just that they are not being told what is going on. It is because they do not want to see their country attacked. That is one reason why we have not countenanced attacks in Russia. A couple of Ukrainians may have done that, but we have not countenanced it. I also regret that two days ago the British Foreign Secretary said, “We have to drive Russia out of Ukraine.” Well, if you are going to do it, do it, but keep your mouth shut about it. Further, it is not good policy if one means all of Ukraine, including Crimea, because if you realize that some form of negotiations are going to be needed to end this war, you certainly don’t want to start off by signaling a lasting war with Russia. You have to be very careful what you say.

So, we need to put in whatever we have and whatever we can in order to keep Russia from prevailing militarily in its Phase One around Kyiv. We have to make sure it is denied Phase Two, which to start with is to create a landlocked Ukraine. We need to enable Ukraine to prevent Russia from having that land bridge. Third, we have to help Ukraine to make sure that, if the Russians are determined to try consolidating their position in the Donbas, they will pay a heavy, conventional military price.

So, NATO has to be in this with full-on support for Ukraine, but with the United States in the lead, because as we all know going back to its inception, that NATO has been nothing without the United States. And one little sidebar to make the point: People remember that on September 12, 2001, the day after 9/11, NATO declared Article 5. We did not ask for it. The Canadians proposed it. The allies asked, “Can we do it?” and they came to the United States and asked: “Do you mind if we declare Article 5?” We said “OK, if you want to do it, it is fine with us.” Why did they do it? Not because they thought that there were going to be major terrorist attacks in Europe, even though there were some terrorist attacks but nothing of the quality and drama and lasting threat as we saw on 9/11. They got NATO to declare Article 5 on our behalf for one simple reason: they were worried we would become so distracted that we would not focus on the number-one European requirement, which was the defense of Europe against any possible Russian threat and preserving the credibility of the commitment to deal with Russia. Nobody but the US can deal effectively with Russia. The same with 2003, going into Iraq to support the US invasion (where Germany and France turned out to be right), and then getting involved in Iraq afterwards, and then later, of course, the allies sending troops to Afghanistan. They did it again in both circumstances for one reason: because only the United States can deal with Russia.

That is my bottom line right now. For the credibility of the alliance and the credibility of the United States, Russia has to “not succeed” in Ukraine, which means it is going to have to fail in Ukraine. That means getting the Donbas free of Russian forces. I think at the end of the day, frankly, nobody is really going to care if Russia ends up with Crimea. Nobody is really going to care as long as the principle of sanctity of international borders is clear, and Ukraine is in charge of the rest of its country, and it is Russia-free in terms of troops and fighting. So that, in my judgment, is the fundamental strategic posture problem for NATO. Without succeeding, NATO is going to be in deep trouble.

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I would like to express my gratitude to be invited to this important reunion, with such distinguished and knowledgeable speakers, to discuss a topic crucial for future decisions in the field of war and peace, in the transatlantic community, and practically in the world. To respond appropriately to this difficult topic, let me define from the very beginning the following points of my attempt.

Firstly, I will concentrate on the political-strategic part of the matter and not on the military strategic (operational) level. In Madrid, in June 2022, a few weeks from now, the NATO Summit will give necessary guidance for at least another decade regarding the essential principles of evolution of this community of 30 nations. It will formulate the common vision regarding the changing global political-military environment and establish strategic-military posture in order to respond to the massive challenges of today and in the future. Secondly, on this conceptual basis, we must address the idea of consolidating NATO in the next decade, on the horizon of the 2030s, taking into account the unambiguous background:

- a common global vision
- ways to strengthen the transatlantic link
- construction of an adequate military strategy and forces
- distribution of the transatlantic burden
- the democratic resilience of our societies

On a personal note, our topic today will be researched and debated by academics, the military, and politicians for years and decades to come, using declassified documents on both sides of the hill, and there will certainly be much controversy, many diametrically opposed interpretations, and varied views. We are now, without any hint about the 'rule of the epilogue,' at the beginning of this process of gradually knowing the truth about these events, and trying to identify, even during their unfolding, what is essential or peripheral. I also add that I am solely responsible for what I say.

QUESTIONS [OF THE TOPIC] TO BE ANSWERED

In this context, both of the crisis leading up to the Russian invasion of February 24 and the evolution of this military confrontation in Ukraine, Allied experts and analysts have been called upon to extract preliminary conclusions, to answer a broad package of questions, and to build the vision of a *grand strategy* capable of delivering NATO relevance in the medium and long term.

Here are just a few such questions that I consider very important within this framework:

1. Did the Russian invasion of Ukraine aim to change only the strategic situation in Europe or, more than that, to change the entire global order?
2. Is this the first "proxy" geopolitical war in Europe, and does it set a model for the medium-term of future geopolitical clashes between the major nuclear powers in the global system?
3. What is the useful, economically, and militarily favorable relationship between strategic deterrence and strategic defense in this future geopolitical environment?
4. What 'exits'/solutions observed historically from similar strategic difficulties and geopolitical clashes of the great powers are to be considered now and in the future: Yalta -1945, Helsinki -1975, Finlandization -1990, or Ukraine -2022?
5. Is there any resemblance of the current crisis in Eastern Europe to other historically registered crises after the Second World War ('Cuban missile crisis of 1962'; 'missile crisis of 1983')?
6. Is it conceivable that a development of events, imposed today on the United States, would eventually lead it to wage a war on two continental fronts, concomitantly, against Russia and China?

7. What is the solution for a US victory in such a confrontation on two fronts: unilateral preparation or readying NATO's robust European component capable, with American support, to maintain its own continental security?
8. Is the Russian-Ukrainian war a kind of prolonged "frozen war" produced by Moscow's strategy to keep for the years to come, or is Europe unstable and insecure, dividing allies and destroying transatlantic links?
9. What changes need to be made to NATO's war-fighting concept and included in the New Strategic Concept as a result of the lessons learned from this Russian-Ukrainian war?
10. Is a Third World War, undoubtedly a nuclear one, unavoidable, or can diplomatic ways to prevent it be identified? If so, what are they and what suggestions does the current war in Ukraine offer?

And so on.

ABOUT THE RUSSIAN GOAL: EUROPE OR THE WORLD?

What have the five weeks of political-military developments of the Ukrainian war shown us, and what lessons can we draw for the future according to the guidelines outlined above?

Before anything else: does the Russian invasion in Ukraine only aim to change the balance of power in Europe or to transform the entire global system? The answer is extremely important because it engages the entire planning of NATO's grand strategy, but also the military and operational strategy and the entire future activity of the North Atlantic Alliance.

Here, in this perimeter, we identify today – namely, to be precise, before the end of the war, two opinions of the experts clearly expressed. The first, because it is the most widespread, is that the Russian invasion of Ukraine is the first phase of a conscious military effort by Russia to position itself against NATO and the European Union, the main continental institutions of Euro-Atlantic security. As one expert recently noted: *"Russia's explicit goal is the disintegration of NATO, the EU and any other structure in the international architecture that gets in its way. Thus, it makes no sense to say that 'NATO is not at enmity with anyone'."*¹ Such a completely new situation in Europe since the invasion began on February 24 has made the old position of the Euro-Atlantic alliance no longer possible.

This old position was, in the formulation of a group of experts² in charge of elaborating a draft of a new strategic concept, dating from February 3, 2022: *"The Alliance will continue to seek dialogue with Russia and honor the NATO-Russia Founding Act, even though Russia continues to breach the values, principles, trust, and commitments outlined in that and other agreed documents that underpin the NATO-Russia relationship."*³ But the same document has an paramount conclusion which has to be strengthened in the New Strategic Concept: *"The upholding of the rules-based order will be further assured by reinforcing the transatlantic pact between North America and Europe in which Europeans become ever more central to European defense."*⁴

So, if the biggest war in Europe after the second global conflagration of 1939-1945 signifies that Russia's position is the recovery of its former sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, then NATO must decide in Madrid, in the New Strategic Concept, that a completely new strategic orientation is needed. And this is to define Russia not as a competitor or possible partner, but as a self-declared enemy.

The second opinion, more recently expressed publicly, including by high-ranking allied politicians and experts, is that Russia's so-called special military operation in Ukraine is the beginning of a violent challenge to the current global order. Thus, a professor from the University of Turku (Finland) recently wrote on her twitter account: *"I've been asked in many discussions if I think the European and even global rules-based security order is dead due to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. My short answer: it depends on the outcome of the war/ Ukraine's defeat would encourage authoritarian great powers Russia and China to keep pushing for a revised security order based on spheres of influence and rejecting the values of democracy and human rights. One might argue that Russia and China would establish a different, but still rules-based order, with different rules, but fundamentally it would mean force prevailing over norms."*⁵ She concludes her analysis by showing that in Ukraine with the help of the West: *"we can save the rules-based order and give a decisive blow to Russian imperialist ambitions and the spread of authoritarianism."*⁶ *The Bulletin for the Atomic Scientists* recently published an editorial on the war in Ukraine, in which it stated that: *"The war in Ukraine is not only about the future of Ukraine. Both Russian and US leaders are making it increasingly clear that the brutal fight for territorial control inside the former Soviet republic is but part of a larger superpower struggle that will determine a new balance of power around the world."*⁷

BUT IS RUSSIA ALONE IN THIS EFFORT TO CHANGE THE BALANCE OF POWER IN EUROPE AND DEMOLISH THE GLOBAL ORDER?

More and more space in the comments of experts, as well as in those of allied politicians or their positions, is devoted to the thesis of an alliance, formal or informal, between China and Russia. It should not be ignored that Russia, during this Ukrainian war, will be not only declaratively but directly supported by China in its effort to demolish the global order. This is clear from the joint statement signed on February 4, 2022, by the presidents of the two major nuclear powers [China and Russia] that expressly states: *"The sides believe that certain States, military and political alliances and coalitions seek to obtain, directly or indirectly, unilateral military advantages to the detriment of the security of others/.../intensify geopolitical rivalry/.../. The sides oppose further enlargement of NATO and call on the North Atlantic Alliance to abandon its ideologized cold war approaches/.../. The sides stand against the formation of closed bloc structures and opposing camps in the Asia-Pacific region and remain highly vigilant about the negative impact of the United States' Indo-Pacific strategy on peace and stability in the region."*⁸

The opposition of the signatories, Presidents V. Putin (Russia) and Xi Jinping (China), to NATO enlargement considered as a way to obtain *"military advantages to the detriment of the security of others"* and to US strategy in the Indo-Pacific region, is clear proof of a joint Russian-Chinese program of destruction of today's international order. Here is possible strategic coordination between the two powers shown by a recent statement on the content of the conversation of April 18, 2022 between the Deputy Foreign Minister of China Le Yucheng and Russian Ambassador to China Andrey Ivanovich Denisov: *"Le Yucheng said that under the guidance of President Xi Jinping and President Vladimir Putin, China and Russia maintain high-level development of the comprehensive strategic partnership/.../No matter how the international landscape may change, China will continue to strengthen strategic coordination with Russia for win-win cooperation, jointly safeguard the common interests of the two countries and promote the building of a new type of international relations/.../The two sides also exchanged views on deepening China-Russia cooperation within the framework of the BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as well as the situation in Ukraine and other international and regional issues of common concern."*⁹ Along this line of finding, an analyst wrote on April 24 in an overview dedicated to the close relations between Russia and China: *"There is a growing trend in the West of treating Russia and China as an increasingly close political tandem, dubbed 'Dragonbear', referring to the two countries' national animals."*¹⁰ To complete the picture, US Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman said after talks with senior EU officials about China, NATO and the Indo-Pacific in Brussels (April 22) that *"Chinese state media has parroted the Kremlin's lies and conspiracy theories, including absurd claims that Ukraine and NATO and the EU pose a security threat to Russia."*¹¹

For NATO, the above-mentioned positions are not just points of academic debate, but rather elements of a huge challenge to the very future of the alliance. In the previous two months of the conflict, in the face of Russian aggression, members of the North Atlantic alliance have shown extraordinary and even unexpected unity in supporting the Ukrainian military effort. At the same time, millions of refugees in Ukraine have received necessary support from the NATO states on the eastern flank, all members of the EU showing an unprecedented opening of cooperation between the two organizations.

At the Madrid Summit, NATO must responsibly take the necessary steps to secure its own medium and long- term future in the face of an existential threat. Below is an incomplete summary, not in any order of priority, of some of the challenges highlighted by the Ukraine conflict which the Summit must confront in accordance with the 'lessons learned' up to now: strengthening the transatlantic link; consolidating the defense of some regions on NATO's eastern flank of exceptional strategic significance in order to block the spread of Russian aggression; expanding the NATO alliance; building a compelling deterrent to Russia's aggression against Europe; and responding to the Russian-Chinese comprehensive partnership/alliance in the future.

ABOUT A 'PROTRACTED' WAR IN UKRAINE

Could the Ukrainian war be considered a 'frozen war' within Moscow and Beijing's strategy? The concept of the 'frozen war' has been mentioned, in today's circumstances, as a possible alternative for Russia to the military invasion of Ukraine. According to this concept, Russia would have rotated its troops on the border of Ukraine, so as to permanently maintain the pressure on this country and the West. As well-known strategist Lindley- French has written prior to the Russian invasion: *"The cleverest strategy Putin might adopt is to not quite invade Ukraine allowing coercion and the threat of invasion to keep Europe politically off-balance and the wider transatlantic alliance divided."*¹²

The invasion occurred, and in Lindley French's analysis we are in the third phase of the war between Russia and Ukraine (the first in 1914, the second, the invasion of February 24, and the third, launched with the focus of the Russian army on the Donbass and offensive actions already triggered). On the basis of the 'cleverest strategy' already mentioned, Putin could now consider encircling the bulk of the Ukrainian army in the Donbas, prolonging this operation; or, launching another operation also in Ukraine, so as to force the West to multiply aid to Kyiv significantly. This would keep the West busy asking itself 'what's

next?' in Eastern Europe and caring all the time about deterring Russia. The West would be dispersing and consuming its own military forces and neglecting the other important global region, India-Pacific, where China could act. Here is the danger of the Ukrainian war for the possible big confrontation on two fronts which the US and its Allies could be pushed to wage: focusing on eastern Europe and losing the global overview of the Russian-Chinese challenge. In such a way, the Russian strategy of keeping Europe off-balance and dividing the transatlantic link could be unfolded up to the desired goal. A recent fascinating report on the war has "*the foremost conclusion*" that "Russia is now preparing, diplomatically, militarily and economically, for a protracted conflict."¹³

I note that in Western Europe, there is a growing dissatisfaction with the attitude of some allies (the case of Germany, which continues to import energy from Russia and thus financially subsidizes the Kremlin's war effort, while refusing to support Ukraine with heavy weapons, which has divided the domestic political scene; it is also worth mentioning France, whose military support does not rise to the expected level, and Bulgaria or Hungary). We must not forget in this narrative the common Russian-Chinese propaganda offensive in support of the actions launched by Russia to challenge the current global order, which is developing in Africa, India, Europe or elsewhere.

At the same time, along with the above, we must take into account the 'war fatigue' that could occur on this trend of incongruity in action across the EU, and even the possible negative impact of the waves of refugees from the war zone intentionally weaponized by Russia. Here is Lindley French's description of this scenario: "*Frozen war would also force risk-averse European leaders with their outmoded Bonsai armed forces, COVID economies and fin de siècle populations to choose between expensive and dangerous confrontation and appeasement. It would reignite the German Question as Germans were once again forced to face possible trauma in the future and the deep, dark traumas of the past. There is no guarantee that German angst would automatically lead to greater resolve to strengthen NATO. Frozen war would also create a new information war designed to stoke a new culture war similar to the public fear which greeted the 1983 deployment of Cruise and Pershing 2 missiles and the mass demonstrations in Western Europe it provoked. Putin is no Gorbachev and the former would like nothing more than to weaken the already frayed political bonds between the US and its Allies, humiliate NATO, and if possible 'decouple' the Americans from the defense of Europe.*"

It is important to consider how much is needed, especially concerning the prolongation of the Ukrainian war. There is a careful correlation between forces, means, and political or military risks. If for Russia, a prolongation of the war without a swift victory will appear to be a strategy to reach the final goal, then a protracted war in Ukraine will put the West in a limited situation. Therefore, a quick successful end of the Ukraine war (or even a suitable settlement) is needed, and the increase of Western support in this regard (while avoiding the nuclear threshold), is decisive.

STRENGTHENING THE TRANSATLANTIC LINK

The Washington Treaty states that the alliance between the two shores of the Atlantic Ocean is "*founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law,*", fundamental values that unite the 30 members. The current global order is an expression of their common political will. In the run-up to the Alliance's New Strategic Concept Summit, an indisputable truth has been stated: "*NATO will remain the unique, essential, and indispensable transatlantic forum for consultations and joint action on all matters related to the individual and collective security of the allies, as set out in Article 4 of the Washington Treaty.*"¹⁴

The war in Ukraine hastened what was already assumed in principle, namely the establishment of a framework for debating the issue of transatlantic security in a NATO-EU context, which was already in the process of implementation. In this context, the EU adopted the '*strategic compass*' last month, practically a security strategy for the organization. Overall, the document is seen as being "*a quantum leap forward*" in the direction of building a "*stronger and more capable EU in security and defense*" and towards increasing its contribution to global and transatlantic security. This dimension of the EU will be definitively complementary to NATO. Among other things, the document provides: training of a strong EU Rapid Deployment Capacity of up to 5000 troops, for crisis interventions; the carrying out of regular training exercises on land and sea; optimizing military mobility, etc.¹⁵ The executive summary of the EU document contains a crucial paragraph for its entire orientation: "*The transatlantic relationship and EU-NATO cooperation, in full respect of the principles set out in the Treaties and those agreed by the European Council, including the principles of inclusiveness, reciprocity and decision-making autonomy of the EU, are key to our overall security. The EU reaffirms its intention to intensify support for the global rules-based order, with the United Nations at its core. It will also reinforce its strategic partnership with NATO and increase its cooperation with regional partners, including the OSCE, AU and ASEAN.*"¹⁶ I mention that in the late 1990s, when the UK was part of the EU, a decision was made to form a 60,000-military Rapid Reaction Force for military intervention as needed. Unfortunately, it was unfulfilled for various reasons. We realize that this level of ambition can be much higher in the perspective of transatlantic cooperation for the defense of the current global order. At the same time, NATO's announcement that the New Strategic Concept will have to debate the world role for NATO shows that this transatlantic cooperation has to become a fundamental pillar to global stability. The NATO Secretary General's participation in the G-7 meeting in Brussels on March 24, 2024, is a proof of that orientation,

taking place in a period of effervescent mobilization of NATO, EU and G-7 to assess the global security situation and take action accordingly.

A COMPELLING DETERRENT IN EASTERN EUROPE

During the Russian invasion of Ukraine and in close connection with its evolution, various escalation scenarios were circulated. Among them, on the basis of the imposition of a nuclear alert by the Kremlin (February 27), the dangerous scenario of a nuclear confrontation began to be considered, especially since the Russian leader's medium and long-term intentions were unknown. Then, when Russian troops carried out military operations in both the Chernobyl (closed) and the Zaporozhe (operational) plants, these fears of escalating beyond the nuclear threshold multiplied (use of tactical nuclear strikes by Russia). In addition, the massive Western support sent to Ukrainian defenders in convoys arriving at Ukraine's borders could finally lead the Kremlin to invoke this as NATO participation in the war. This, coupled with the plight of Russian forces on the ground in Ukraine operations, has once again raised fears that tactical nuclear strikes could be used by Russia to force the West to suspend or reduce aid.

The hypothetical escalation and the possibility of a nuclear accident in Ukraine were also arguments - in addition to the possibility of Russia attacking the territory of an alliance member - often imagined when considering the probability of the outbreak of a Third World War. The hybrid war between the two camps has increased the perception of this probability, with some Russian commentators insisting that such a war, while not immediate, is an inevitable one. In the West, this scenario, which encourages growing fears of a global war, has been used by some political leaders to prevent the deployment of high-performance weapons for defense in Ukraine. Germany, after announcing the abandonment of the Ostpolitik assumed in the 1960s and at the same time the allocation of important financial funds for the country's military preparation, hitherto neglected for several weeks, despite international and domestic pressure, to deliver heavy weapons (howitzers, tanks) to Ukraine as aid.¹⁷ After the concentration of Russia's offensive military actions in the Donbas, where World War II-type confrontations are specific to the vast steppes here, and the countering of Russian military means requires such heavy weapons, on April 25, Berlin announced that it will deliver heavy howitzers and tanks. The same thing happened in France, where for electoral reasons it was only after the second round of voting that heavy armor was sent to Ukraine (the Caesar howitzer).

As experts noted, in the first eight weeks of fighting weapons were delivered to Ukraine as a symbol of support by the West; especially small arms and Javelin anti-tank armor, which were useful, for example, to stave off the enemy in the Kyiv region. In the last two weeks, the US-Biden administration has sent heavy howitzers and artillery rounds, armored vehicles, counter-battery radars and deadly experimental drones, the type of armaments desperately asked for by Ukrainian field commanders.¹⁸ On the other hand, in order to avoid escalation towards WW3, the request by Kyiv to install a no-fly zone in Ukraine was rejected. But, what was noticed from the beginning of the war in Ukraine was that the NATO forces on the eastern flank were insufficient to be a credible deterrent to the aggressive Russian actions. A more robust NATO military deterrent had begun to be set up after March 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea, but its consolidation had been delayed in recent years. Today, the situation is considered to be dangerous, and during last March the first measures to consolidate it were taken, especially in the southern part. Basically, in March it was decided to double the number of multinational battle groups deployed on the Eastern flank (from 4 to 8), but it is not enough. As mentioned in congressional hearings some weeks ago by the U.S. military chief, General Mark Milley, in congressional hearings, after 2005 the number of American soldiers deployed in Europe decreased rapidly, reaching about 30,000, and only recently through new deployments did this number rise to 100,000. According to the Pentagon, a credible deterrent would be the deployment of permanent military bases on the eastern flank in Poland, Lithuania, and Romania, and these changes might be under study at both the Pentagon and NATO headquarters.

As I underlined above, an EU-USA forum for debating security and defense issues has existed since 2021, as an expression of the will to fight together [against] security threats according to mutual ties, values, and common interests. The focus of discussions in this forum include cooperation in various fields: cyber defense, climate change, disruptive technologies, etc.¹⁹ The issue of "strategic autonomy" by the EU is expected to be one of the hot topics in this forum, especially since the war in Ukraine has demonstrated the imminent danger of Russian aggression. Furthermore, a common European military force to oppose it is not available, and its construction will take time. The importance of this issue is also mentioned by J. Lindley French, who argues the most comprehensive and efficient deterrent against Russia is related to having an operational and robust European military force, which would be available, in cooperation with American forces, to defend NATO territory on the Eastern flank. Here is Lindley French's opinion on such a force: *"reinforcing the Eastern Flank of the Alliance. That means the strengthening of the Enhanced Forward Presence; the acceleration and expansion of the NATO Readiness Initiative; and by moving HQ Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (HQ ARRC), NATO's most capable non-American deployable corps headquarters from England to near Warsaw reinforced by American, British, German, and Polish forces and in support of the EFP forces, HQ Multinational Corps (Northeast) and supported by the Joint Support and Enabling Command (JSEC). HQ ARRC must now be designated as the command and development driver for a new European-led first responder, high end multi-domain Allied*

Mobile Heavy Force (AMHF) heavy enough to fill the 1500 km gap between MNC (NE) the Black Sea and the Baltic States, maneuverable enough to both deter a high-end aggressor such as Russia, heavy enough to also support front-line states facing terrorism, as well as capable enough of holding the European theatre across the hybrid, cyber, hyper war spectrum in an emergency if US forces are simultaneously engaged in Europe, the Indo-Pacific and elsewhere.”²⁰

In such an era of uncertainty and a lack of international communication between the conflicting camps, such strategies must be adopted quickly and implemented urgently.

NATO ENLARGEMENT

Russia's aggression in Ukraine has condensed decades of historical developments into weeks. Ironically, given the arguments invoked within the proposed Russian draft treaty with NATO in December 2021 (which calls for the abandonment of NATO's enlargement), after the launch of the Ukraine invasion on February 24, Finland and Sweden, neutral countries, have expressed their intent to join the North Atlantic Alliance.

NATO enlargement by including these two Nordic countries expands NATO's eastern flank, but at the same time adds value to both the building of a compelling deterrent and the successful defense of the territory between the Arctic and Black Seas in the event of Russian aggression. The strategic space of defense becomes much wider and more compact, hindering the strategic maneuvers of the enemy, and the military and political impact of the alliance with these two countries cannot be underestimated. In an article published in *Foreign Affairs*, the former Prime Minister of Sweden, Carl Bildt, argues that the accession of these two countries to NATO at the Madrid Summit changes the security architecture in Northern Europe: *“Integrated control of the entire area will make defense of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania easier [...] it will strengthen deterrence and make a conflict there less likely [...] increase the alliance’s political strength as the pillar of the defense of Europe and the transatlantic area [...] underlining that “neither Finland nor Sweden is likely to seek any permanent basing of major NATO units in their territory, and both are likely to have the same reservations about housing nuclear weapons.”²¹*

PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS

As the Ukrainian war intensifies, both long expected and totally unexpected events are happening. In the first category: the Bundestag motion today to send heavy weapons to Ukraine; for so long this has been refused by the government in spite of domestic and international pressure. In the second: yesterday, statements of some officials in the UK and the US concerning the West's goal in Ukraine have been summarized as the “weakening of Russia.” Accordingly, the current analysis has to be refined, and even revised in some details. That is the risk I had in mind when I referred to ‘the rule of the epilogue’.

The Ukrainian war, as an unfolding ‘proxy geopolitical war,’ might be usefully studied according to the theory of the systemic hegemonic war. NATO's NSC in Madrid should be tailored accordingly, preparing the alliance for the future.

Installing a compelling deterrent against Russian aggression against the NATO countries in Eastern Europe should be implemented fast alongside the unfolding Ukrainian war.

ENDNOTES

¹ Mason, “Ukraine, NATO and a Zeitenwende.” Social Europe, April 11, 2022

² The Alphen Group (TAG) is an informal network of leading strategic thinkers who to considers the future of the transatlantic relationship and European security and defence. The members are:

Ambassador Alexander Vershbow; Lieutenant General (Ret.) ; Arne Bard Dalhaug; Dr. Alexandra Schwarzkopf; Professor Andrew Michta; Anna Wieslander; Professor Beatrice Heuser; Lt. Gen. (ret.) Ben Hodges; Dr. Claudia Major ; Colin Robertson; Edward Lucas; Assoc. Prof. Dr. Franco Algieri ; Professor Emeritus Georges-Henri Soutou ; Admiral (ret.) Giampaolo Di Paola; Dr Hans Binnendijk; Lt. Gen. (ret.) Heiner Brauss; Professor Holger Mey; Professor Jaap de Hoop Scheffer; General (ret.) Sir James Everard; Jim Townsend; Judy Dempsey ; Professor Julian Lindley-French (Chair); Kate Hansen Bundt; Marta Dassu; Professor Neil MacFarlane; Professor Paul Cornish; Professor Paul Schulte; Lord Richards of Herstmonceux; Dr. Colonel (ret.) Richard D. Hooker, Jr.; General (Retd.) Richard Shirreff; Professor Rob de Wijk; General (Ret.) Sir Rupert Smith; Dr. Sarah Kirchberger; Stan Sloan; Ambassador Stefano Stefanini; Professor Sten Rynning; Thomas Kleine- Brockhoff; Trygve Refvem; Professor Yves Boyer Professor Žaneta Ozoliņa- <https://thealphengroup.home.blog/>

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PROFESSOR HERMAN MATTHIJS

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I live in the Northeast side of Belgium about 100 kilometers from the Capital, Brussels, where NATO political headquarters is located. The SHAPE HQ is located approximately 75 kilometers from here. My slides concern the defense spending of NATO members and over the past years I have written a few articles concerning the defense spending of countries in NATO as well as those outside NATO. My source for this contribution is the yearly report of the NATO 2021 of the Secretary General. For my presentation, I want to show you something that happened over the last years with the Wales agreement in 2014 when they decided in NATO, with the persuasion of President Obama, that all the NATO members should have a defense spending of 2% GDP. Also, 20% of the national defense budget should be spent on investments.

The targets of Wales are what we see in the 2021 annual report, which was presented a few weeks ago here in Brussels. In 2021 we saw that 8/30 members in NATO are at the 2% GDP norm. The number one on the "hit list" is Greece, who is always a big spender, then the US, Poland, the UK, the three Baltic states, and Croatia which, makes 8 at the national defense budget spending of 2% like was decided in the Wales-Cardiff Summit of 2014. We do find 3 countries, Romania, Norway, and France, who are at 1.75%, and then quite a few members between 1.5% and 1.75%, which is 11 that is 1/3 of the total group under the norm. What is seen from the figures over the last decade is that the lowest points of defense spending were in the year 2017. From 2017 to 2021 there was certainly an improvement in the European members concerning defense budget spending. I have to underline that over the last days and weeks, several European leaders decided that they should upgrade and increase the defense budget. Also, you see from the great European states that only the UK and Poland are over the 2% norm. France in 2021 was 1.93%, so I suppose within the next year, the Macron government will reach 2%. Germany was at 1.49% GDP in 2021, but the German Chancellor has already declared that the federal republic will reach the 2% over the next few years. The German GDP is the greatest in Europe and the second highest in NATO, behind the US. This means that Germany, in a few years' time, will have the most important defense budget in Europe. Then, look at the other greater states in Europe: Italy at 1.54% and Spain at 1.03%. So, still, a lot of necessary improvement to look for more defense means in Spain. Let's say, in the next years, France and the Federal Republic of Germany will reach the NATO 2% guideline.

There was a second guideline in 2014 that NATO members should reach 20% spending on defense investments. In 2016, we see that only 9 members reached this norm. Now, in 2021 the yearly report of the NATO secretary-general, shows that 21 of members of NATO have reached this second target from the 2014 summit. In other words, it is easier to reach the second target of the summit than the first. Here, we see that in a few years, the number of countries will be 25, 26, or 27 that will be at the target. When you also view the yearly report, it is also interesting to see the amount of military personnel. I have taken here the year 2016, which was when most countries were at the lowest point; in other words, the year they had the lowest amount of military personnel manpower and compared to 2021. You will see the US was always more than 1.3 million, so if you compare for 5 years, they have increased by 50,000. In the UK, also, you see an enormous upgrade in military manpower over 5 years, from 139,000 to 156,000. Then you see Turkey always had enormous manpower in their army for tradition. The cycle is always the tension between Greece and the geographic location of Turkey. You see, in 2016, Turkey's army did have manpower of 359,000, and in 2021 it had 439,000- so an upgrade of 80,000. Then take the rest of Europe, which is the EU, Baltic states, and Norway, there is an increase in military manpower. It was 1,218,700 (2017) to 1,263,700 (2021) so a 45,000 increase in manpower from EU states. The conclusion is that it is not a guideline of the Wales summit, but you see that over the last 5 years, except in Canada, there was an increase in investment in manpower.

Over the last few years, there has been a lot of discussion concerning a European Army. There was already a discussion in the 1950's and 60's but let us be honest if you take the 27 EU states, including Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Poland, and Belgium, we had in 2021 1.3 million troops and a defense budget of \$230 billion with all the states together. So compared with the last slide compared to the US, there is not much of a difference between EU armies and the US. But there is a large difference between the financial and budget means if you take the US government defense budget and all the 27 member states of the EU. Of course, I have to underline the fact that most of the EU states are located with a budget lower than the 2% NATO GDP spending.

The most important European army is the UK. I already said 156,000 troops and in USD, a military budget in 2021 of \$66 billion. There is always a difference between the #1 in NATO, which is the US with \$811 billion from 2021. Turkey has an enormous army, but in the budget, it is \$7.2 billion, which is not the greatest budget. One of the main reasons they are so low is the devaluation of the Turkish currency. Take the 3 Balkan states – Kosovo, Montenegro, and Albania – with Iceland and Norway. These 5 countries have 38,000 troops and a budget of \$8.3 billion. The most important is Norway, of course, with \$7.4 billion. Then you have Canada, but the conclusion is that you can't say Europe hasn't invested troops, with 1.3 million, which may be enough to create a European army but does not have the budget. Also, over the last decades, between the creation of NATO, European security was and is paid for by US taxpayers. That is, I suppose, one of the reasons that the Obama administration said in 2014 that there must be more European money on the table in the Wales Summit.

Moving to my conclusions, let us be realistic. NATO, for the moment, is the only possibility to protect Europe. The budgets in Europe are too small; there was maybe more coordination in the past with European armies, but the main question in the next years will be the political questions and if the German government will increase the German military budget to more than 2% of GDP. Then, the German budget will be a lot higher and more important than the French. That would be a problem for the Macron administration. They asked Macron, who was just re-elected, about a European army if he would agree to transfer French nuclear power to Europe, and he said no. He always says the same thing: France is one of the 5 countries on the UN Security Council with a permanent seat and veto power, and he has said that the security veto seat should stay in Paris. We also have economic, financial, and cultural relationships with North America and Western Europe. Certainly, on the European side, the budgets were and are focused on budget savings. If you compare the lowest point, 2017, and today based on the last figures in the NATO report from 2021. The point is also "what are the declarations of government leaders in Europe from the Ukraine War?" We will see what they will do based on the reality of this war in increasing the military budget. Also, for Europe the fact that in the period of the creation of NATO in 1949 last century to now 75 years later is a very long period of historic peace in Western Europe. Would we have the same peace situation without NATO - I doubt it, really. If you go back in history, the war between France and Germany and WWI was 40 years. Then in 1940, there was only 22 years difference from the first World War. We have now, for European historical norms, a very long period of peace in Western Europe. Then, I want to conclude with a topic from the news. What would happen if Finland and Sweden joined NATO? Don't forget Finland has a long border, 1,300 kilometers, a direct border with Russia. Also, Finland has increased their military budget over the last few years. It is already at 2% GDP in accordance with Wales Summit guidelines. In Sweden, the government has declared that they will upgrade their military budget from 6 billion euros to 10 billion Euros. In that case, this Scandinavian country will reach 2% GDP. I will also underline that Sweden has a very important military industry. Finland, who may be the next member of NATO, has bought the American F-35A jet fighter. Also, Switzerland has decided to buy the F-35A as well. To conclude with that, a lot of European neutral states today - what is the value of a neutral state like Finland and Sweden – who may want to join NATO. They can say bye to neutral state status. There is a demand from the Swiss capital for NATO to make more coordination with NATO, which is very historically for a very neutral state. The conclusion is that with the Ukraine War, we will certainly see an increase in military budgets for the next years.

PROFESSOR NATIVIDAD CARPINTERO SANTAMARIA

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THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN WAR AND THE ENERGY EMERGENCY FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION

Energy supply is one of the biggest issues for the security of the European Union and the Russian invasion of Ukraine has made this issue a major concern.

Energy prices are currently higher than ever before and continue to be volatile. One of the main reasons for the price increase is the global demand for economies recovering from COVID-19. The other main reason for the energy crisis is derived from the Russian invasion of Ukraine which has aggravated the context of primary energy supply to the EU. Gas prices have risen sharply in the last weeks with today being 40% in US dollars per million Btu more expensive than in 2016 and continue to be alarmingly high for citizens.¹

The uncertainty of supply from Russia, as a main supplier of gas to Europe, is increasing as is the instability of the market in the medium term. In case of a disruption in Russian supplies, the EU would be most vulnerable in terms of diesel, naphtha and fuel oil. According to Eurostat, EU countries imported 58% of their energy consumption in 2020 with Russia being the main supplier of natural gas (46%), oil (26%) and coal (53%).²

However, within the European Union, there are big differences between countries with respect to energy import considerations. One example includes the case of Germany and Spain. Germany is presently in the process of phasing out its nuclear power program which provides almost 12% of its energy generation. In 2021, Germany had six nuclear power reactors in operation that will be permanently shut down by the end of 2022. The country is the biggest consumer of Russian natural gas which accounted for 55% of German gas imports in 2021.³ With respect to coal imports, the situation is the same, Germany imported 45% of this mineral from Russia in 2019.⁴ In contrast, Spain has the largest number of regasification plants in the whole European Union. The latter of which will provide a relief in gas imports for the EU since it will be able to become an alternative instead of importing liquefied natural gas (LNG) from countries such as the United States and others, and distribute it to the rest of the EU.

Last February, after long debates in the EU Parliament, it was decided to sanction Russia by halting the opening of the Russian Nord Stream 2- an offshore natural gas pipeline under the Baltic Sea that would supply gas from northwestern Russia to Germany. Both the Nord Stream 1 and the North Stream 2 offshore natural pipelines were built to alternate the impact of the passing of Russian gas through Ukraine- the main transit country since the Soviet Union period and with a big and powerful gas pipelines infrastructure which presently supplies a quarter of Russian gas import to Europe.

EU POLICY FOR NON-DEPENDENCE OF RUSSIAN FUELS

The abovementioned situation has led EU countries to draw a new line in energy transition that contemplates an energy diversification with a policy for non-dependence of Russian fossil fuels before 2030. The plan is known as REpowerEU and it focus is twofold: 1) to increase the resilience of the EU's energy system. 2) to import greater amounts of gas and LNG from countries such as the United States, Azerbaijan, Qatar, Japan, South Korea among others. This policy will exponentially reduce the EU's dependence on Russia as a primary source of energy.

NATO PIPELINE NETWORK IN EUROPE

NATO pipelines cover 5,200 kms through 10 different networks. They provide fuel for transport, ground vehicles, tanks and aircrafts. The Central Europe Pipeline System (CEPS) is the largest system of NATO and meets operational necessities in Central Europe in cases of conflict, peace and crisis situations. CEPS pumps fuel 24 hours during 365 days with a volume of 13 million cubic meters of fuel per year. NATO also supplies fuel for civil airports in Brussels, Frankfurt, Luxembourg, Schiphol and Zurich. Brussels civil airport has had a NATO pipeline as a fuel supplier since 1993.

UKRAINIAN ENERGY SITUATION

“Current crisis in Ukraine is a serious conflict due to its international implications. Political instability in the country grew after the so-called Orange Revolution in 2004 and removal of President Viktor Yanukovich in February 2014 has given rise to severe civil confrontations [...] One key factor in this conflict is gas supply.” (NATO. From Regional to Global Security Supplier, 2015). Indeed, deep structural changes and an overall decline in economic activity caused total gas consumption to fall from 50.4 bcm in 2013 to 29.8 bcm in 2019. Since 2008, constant disputes with Russian Gazprom on the price of gas and tariff borders through Ukrainian territory led the Ukrainian government to source its imports from European suppliers instead. Coal production and transportation have also been severely disrupted in the Donbas region and in conflict areas. Due to the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014, Ukraine stopped gas imports from Russia and started gas import supplies from European countries. However, most of Ukraine's imported gas is still of Russian origin and reaches Ukraine through reverse flows.

CYBER ATTACKS

Until the present conflict ends, it is difficult to have a complete picture of the cyber-attacks aspect of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Although increasing efforts are being done to protect Ukrainian cyberspace, cyber installations are still rather poorly protected. Since 2015, Ukraine has been the target of several attacks which have been attributed to Russia. Cyberattacks targeting critical infrastructure are of particular concern for the survival of the civilian population. They imply terror and uncertainty for people and governments. According to the Council of Foreign Relations, Russia has been launching distributed denial of service attacks (DDoS), wiper malware, and phishing attacks against Ukrainian websites with some being more successful than others.

In consonance with this situation and under proper debate and considerations, the following statement should be taken into mindful account: “Conflict in Ukraine presents perhaps the most acute cyber risk the U.S. and western corporations have ever faced. The invasion by Russia has led to the most comprehensive and dramatic sanctions ever imposed on Russia, which views such measures as economic warfare. Russia will not stand by, but will instead respond asymmetrically using its considerable cyber capability.”⁵

NATO AND COLLECTIVE CYBER DEFENSE

Cyber defense is part of NATO’s core task of collective defense. NATO Cyber Rapid Reaction teams with 200 people are on standby 24 hours a day/365 days to assist allies, if requested and approved, and share real time information working by means of a special malware information platform. Allies are committed to protecting their critical infrastructure and IT Infrastructure which covers over 60 different locations (political headquarters in Brussels and military commands to the places of NATO operations). The NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) is based at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe in Mons, Belgium and is in charge of registering suspicious events or increasingly sophisticated attacks. Last 24th of April, NATO incorporated a sophisticated Network Intrusion Protection System and Full Packet Capture System to strengthen cyber technology, so as to face the present challenging security situation.

Main NATO cyber defense structures include: the Communications and Information Agency and the Cooperative Cyber Defense of Excellence (Tallin, Estonia). It is important to remark that on April 27th, 2007, a group of hackers directed numerous DDoS attacks toward Estonia’s essential infrastructure, telecommunications, e-mails, etc. that practically paralyzed the country.

Other NATO cyber defense infrastructure includes the School Oberammergau (Germany), the Communications and Information Academy (Oeiras, Portugal), and the Defense College (Rome, Italy). All NATO agencies are devoted to strengthening and protecting cyber domains; the development of strategic thinking on cyber defense issues; and the education and training capabilities and technological development to defend the alliance’s IT and communications systems in land, air and sea operational scenarios.

ENDNOTES

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PROFESSOR SHIMON SHETREET

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Certainly, the evidence that came from Ukraine gave strong evidence about war crimes and the international bodies in charge of criminal investigations on war crimes are working quite hard to accumulate evidence. It is not clear what the procedure will be. Certainly, it is doubtful whether President Putin himself would be directly addressed as the defendant in these proceedings, but certainly the field commanders and the medium-level people who were on the ground will be exposed to the possibility of being charged with violations of crimes against humanity and serious violations of war crimes. As we have seen in the news, eyewitnesses have reported all these atrocities.

I want to make a few comments about a number of points that were made. I would like to say that we have seen changing aims of NATO and the West. In the beginning, the wording was, “just to provide Ukraine with defensive weapons.” I quoted at the previous discussion on Ukraine “qualified military assistance.” In addition to humanitarian and economic measures. The weeks after, Ukraine has shown courage and the ability to withstand Russian forces, the West decided to upgrade Ukraine support and today we heard about the package of \$33 billion by President Biden for Ukraine which I would say is dramatic, in the context of the Ukrainian war. I think that it is legitimate to expect more coordinated statements from the West about what the aims are. We heard from Ambassador Hunter about the statements that were made by Defense Secretary Lloyd, “to weaken Russia” and then there's some reservation on the part of President Biden. So, I think what is important is that we should see coordinated statements in communications on this point.

My last point is that I see a direct link between the issue of “deterrence” which was justifiably emphasized by General Clark and then Ambassador Hunter. I see a direct link between their statements in the analysis of professor Matthijs about the defense budget. Europe has been “sleeping” for many, many decades because they were under the shelter or the umbrella of the U.S. protection. Therefore, my hope for the benefit of the democratic and liberty values that the European countries will wake up. It seems that they are aiming at increasing their defense budget to 2% GDP, but I think that this is very important if they want to be ready for the future challenges which are faced by the democratic countries, vis a vis the autocratic countries.

PROFESSOR BRUCE WEINROD

Former Secretary of Defense Representative for Europe and former Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and NATO Policy

This has been a very illuminating discussion and it's great to have a conversation that goes into real depth rather than, unfortunately, a lot of the other short-term forums such as Twitter, where people just speak with only a sentence or a paragraph. So, to be able to go into depth is really, really good.

Let me start out, and I'll try to just hit some high points based on what's been discussed already, first of all to note that NATO obviously is alive and well despite the predictions of a number of commentators and scholars over the years. I recently had the opportunity to look back and found that in 2002, a Council on Foreign Relations fellow Charles Kupchan predicted that NATO would have pretty much disappeared by 2010. Richard Hass, the President of the Council of Foreign Relations, wrote an op-ed for the New York Times in 2014, I think it was, asking if NATO disappeared, would anybody miss it? Would anyone feel the need to establish it again? He also said the unfortunate answer to these questions was no. He was wrong and I wrote something at the time in *The American Interest* disagreeing and explaining why NATO was still very much needed. Now Finland and Sweden along with many other nations certainly appreciate that NATO is around. And then you have professors, the self-styled realists, such as Professor Walt at Harvard who had constantly predicted that NATO just could not possibly continue because it violates his theories of what should happen. He also has been proved wrong. As someone once pointed out, since the beginning of NATO, there's always been an opportunity for a conference entitled “Whether NATO”, or “NATO: Problems and Prospects,” and we're clearly going to have a continuation of those types of meetings and for good reason.

So, let me now move more into the substance, although I should first say something about my own experience, because I think it's relevant. By whatever chance, appointed by President George H W Bush, I was the senior Defense Department official dealing with Europe and NATO when the Berlin Wall came down, from then through the end of the first Bush administration. So everything that happened, the transitions, the Cold War, the first Gulf War, the breakup of Yugoslavia, all these things I had what I like to call a second-row seat in history. I may not have been at the meeting table – although sometimes I was - but always at least behind the table, and I was at every meeting that Secretary of Defense Cheney had with a European official at the Pentagon or in Europe, for all those years. I was also on every visit by Secretary of State Baker to Europe as the Defense Department representative, so I was at the two plus four talks, and when he tried to mediate in Belgrade, to prevent the breakup of Yugoslavia. This was a fascinating history to be a part of. Years later I was asked, when I came back into the government as the dual-hatted Defense Advisor of the US mission to NATO and the Secretary of Defense Representative for Europe, which is the Defense Department's equivalent of an ambassador. I also served as acting US Ambassador to NATO. And so I was there under Secretary Gates, Bob Gates, and I was there, for example, when the Bucharest NATO summit took place. And I was involved, which I'll come back to, in all the issues that came up during that period, the Soviet incursion in Georgia, et cetera.

So let me go to a few big points, which I can talk about for a long time, and certainly have written about. First, with respect to NATO enlargement, is there any lesson to be learned for NATO's future? Well, some people have been writing and arguing, and some of them have argued in the past, that NATO should never have been enlarged, and it was a big mistake, and that it provoked Russia and Putin. And I just reject that fundamentally and so do many others, and I don't think the case has been made very well. I wrote a rebuttal to Professor Michael Mandelbaum of John Hopkins who wrote recently in the *American Purpose* saying that the enlargement of NATO was the biggest blunder in US foreign policy history. Hopefully just a bit of hyperbole, but basically, most every argument he makes does not stand up under scrutiny. But I will say, the key point is with respect to Ukraine, Putin would have done what he did regardless of what NATO did or did not do. And, if NATO did not enlarge, including the first round in 1999 with Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, then that whole central European region would have been a zone of instability and what's going on in Ukraine would most likely at some points have gone on in central and eastern Europe.

I would just also say that the Putin leadership has a fundamentally different conception of European security and what it means than does the West. I also would just quote Professor Michael McFaul, who was the US Ambassador to Russia, and wrote recently that Putin's underlying goals all along have been "normalizing annexation, denying sovereignty to neighbors, and dissolving NATO." With respect to Ukraine, I will just provide a little bit of context. I was the US Defense Advisor to NATO when the 2008 NATO Summit Communique was being prepared ahead of the meeting. Bob Hunter knows better than I do about how these things work. But, in general, NATO communiqués are all agreed to ahead of time, and then the heads of State and Government come to meet and affirm the communique and go to their social events. Well this was different. We negotiated—we tried—I say we; I mean the American Ambassador at the time and myself negotiated the communique and there was just one section that was not agreed to prior to the Summit, and that was respect to how NATO would interact with Georgia and Ukraine. At the insistence of the White House, this item was designated as something to discuss at the Summit itself. This is rare, very unusual as all issues are almost always agreed to ahead of a Summit meeting. So the question was regarding Ukraine and Georgia—President Bush was the person who pushed this from the top. So when he got to Bucharest in the early evening, normally they have a meeting in the evening, and then they went off to a social event, the heads of state and government. And in this case, President Bush basically said, I think we need to talk about this issue. So, they sat around while the rest of us went to the Bucharest concert hall for a wonderful concert, and they were still there at their dinner talking, and finally the leaders showed up. I think they wanted to go to the social event and get out of there, so what they agreed at that point was let their advisors work out something overnight, and that's what happened. I think Steve Hadley was the key person for the U.S. in this regard, and they were up most of the night, eventually they came up with the language which some people don't agree with, others didn't go far enough, which said that these two nations, Georgia and Ukraine, will become members of NATO someday. So, for better or worse, that's where things ended up. Nobody thought at the time that Ukraine, or Georgia was going to become a member in the near term or even the medium term. But there was also a feeling, I think, even among some of those who were opposed to the membership at the time, saying that as a bottom line, Russia should not have a veto on who becomes a member of NATO. My view—and not everybody's view—is that Russia and Putin would have done what they were doing anyway, and they would have done it even further to the West if NATO had not brought in the initial group of new members.

I would just note, as a footnote to history, that the origins of enlargement, the concept, really started in the first Bush administration. A question we faced when the Soviet empire dissolved and the Warsaw pact dissolved, what was going to happen? How, if at all, should the US and NATO have any security-related interaction with these newly independent countries, particularly in eastern and central Europe? On this issue within the Bush administration, there were differing views. There were those who thought we have to be very careful, and we can't disturb or provoke Moscow at this point, and we shouldn't give any signal at all that these countries, central European and eastern European in particular, could have any kind of security connection to NATO or the US. I disagreed strongly, some others did as well. And I also visited those countries in central and eastern Europe as the first Defense Department official to go there after the collapse of the Warsaw pact, and everybody I talked to said "we want to get into NATO. When can we get into NATO?" and I actually had to say, "slow down, you may become a member of NATO, but it's not going to come for a long time, and you need to get involved with NATO to show them that you're going to be democratic and resolve your territorial disputes, et cetera." In this regard, an historical footnote. One thing that happened within the Bush Administration at that time was that Secretary Cheney was going to make a speech at NATO to the Defense ministers and some of us thought it would be a great opportunity to push for some types of security interaction between NATO and these newly independent nations. So I asked the Joint Chief of Staff, can you provide some modest examples of things that the US or NATO can do with these newly independent countries, particularly Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia in the security area. And they provided very modest ideas, like search and rescue mission training, et cetera. These were not pure military, but they would be done by the militaries. So I drafted a speech for Cheney, and included these proposed NATO initiatives into Cheney's speech draft. So the day we left, we circulated the draft for review by the NSC. So as I was getting onto the plane, I was handed a message that the National Security Advisor Scowcroft would like that language about proposed new initiatives taken out from the speech draft. So I showed this request to Secretary Cheney, I said this is what Scowcroft wants, he wants it out, and Cheney looked at it and he said quickly to keep it in. And I still remember that.

So he gave that speech, and he said the US supports NATO doing these things, and as everybody knows, if the US suggested these initiatives, NATO was going to agree. So that was the real origin of security connections with the newly independent nations. Then you have the first meeting of the group of Defense Ministers in April 1991, which I'll never forget, because you had in the same room the Defense Ministers of all the countries that were part of the two security blocks, and their goal was to try to figure out to defeat each other and now they were all in the same room, including the Russian Defense Minister,. So this is now quite a while ago, but it was an extraordinary story. Then NATO moved to the North Atlantic Cooperation Council and then NATO moved on to be the Partnership for Peace and to NATO membership, which did occur in the Clinton administration, and I think was the right thing to do by far.

Regarding what happens with NATO when issues come up regarding the Ukraine situation there are a number of different issues that are up in the air or uncertain and could have a real effect on NATO. For example, aside from the defense spending and defense capabilities, what the US does now in terms of changing its posture in Europe, you have the question of what about Hungary? How are they going to fit into the coalition against Russia, if you will? How about Turkey? Turkey's been playing a sort of double-triple game for many years, and wants to see where they're going to end up. Germany is crucial. Sweden and Finland are likely to request to join NATO which is historic. I remember going to Finland in 1992 with Secretary Cheney, and even at that time there were op-eds and opinion pieces saying Finland should join NATO and I thought this was extraordinary, because obviously Finland had been a neutral nation for so long. And we visited military facilities in Sweden with Secretary Cheney, which had been set up in coordination with NATO under the radar screen to be ready to be used, in case of a crisis or conflict with the Soviet Union. So Sweden was neutral, but it also has a long-standing cooperation with NATO. And in recent years both Sweden and Finland have had officials in place at NATO, including when I was there. I always made sure to brief these officials after the NATO meetings about what had happened. They are both very engaged with NATO, and it would just be very significant historically, but in terms of day-to-day, it wouldn't necessarily be that different if and when they join, which I think will happen.

The other big issue is with China and how does NATO deal with China? Before the Russian attack on Ukraine happened, there was definitely a movement in NATO to take on some role and responsibility with respect to China. That should continue. It may be challenging, but NATO can walk and chew gum at the same time. It can continue what it has been doing, which is connect with its own partners in the Asian region—Japan, Australia, New Zealand, et cetera—and it can also work with the so-called Quadrilateral Dialogue members. NATO should continue to maintain its role in China. It will be challenging but it is doable.

The next question is, what deters, if we are looking at Ukraine and trying to draw lessons that may be helpful in terms of ensuring NATO deterrence capabilities. On the plus side, Germany has now decided to acquire the F35 in its dual-capable (for nuclear weapons) configuration. Whether Germany would do this was a big issue for a long time, even when I was in NATO a few years ago, so that's significant. But the gap between NATO and Russia in terms of tactical nuclear capabilities is really, really extraordinary and applies to the US and Europe as well with respect to China. The US gap there has been large - as General Clark pointed out, the U.S. has few very small nuclear weapons, known as tactical nukes. So that has to be—it should be addressed. And the whole question of what deters—what could we, meaning the US primarily, and or NATO, have done prior to Russia's attack on Ukraine to deter? We didn't do all that much. We did some things, but basically the US, the administration announced intelligence that Russia was going to attack. Okay, but then the US didn't do an awful lot in response. So we can never know for sure, but certainly we can question whether stronger actions prior to the actual invasion might have deterred Russia. So I think that's something to be looked at very carefully.

My last point is that I think a lot of the differing perspectives that have come out regarding what's going on with respect to Russia and Ukraine reflect the differences between those who focus more on values, and those who focus more on realpolitik. I happen to be more of the belief that both can be pursued together, but at the end of the day, values are an essential part of, not only the US psyche and DNA, but also as well as for NATO as articulated on the NATO charter itself. Everything that NATO has been doing to encourage democratic values throughout Europe, including in terms of integration and security. The Russian attack is a fundamental attack on the most rules-based international order that's been established at least since the end of World War II. If, for the first time, a nation such as Russia can aggressively use major military force to annex territories of sovereign nations this undermines that international order. This is a values issue as well as a matter of geopolitics and power rivalries.

GENERAL (RET.) ALFRED GRAY, USMC

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I think that was certainly a great session. I want to thank all of the speakers for a very informative, and of course, very current seminar. It occurred to me throughout the presentations that we very clearly need to have a comprehensive international strategy on this whole affair, not just Ukraine. What happens after, what the options are, and so on. Above all, we must not focus only on military strategy. More importantly, it must be a comprehensive, all elements, and national powers strategy so that economic, societal, and all fields are included because it has to be very adaptive. One cannot simply come up with a single solution to resolve all of these intricate challenges, but we have to work together. It has to be a continuous and current international, NATO strategic thought process.

V. APPENDICES OF KEY NATO DOCUMENTS

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL STATEMENT ON THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS [MARCH 5, 2020]

Fifty years ago today, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) entered into force. We, as NATO Allies, celebrate this visionary Treaty and its remarkable achievements. The NPT remains the essential bulwark against the spread of nuclear weapons, the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation and disarmament architecture, and the framework for international cooperation in sharing the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, science, and technology. Allies remain strongly committed to full implementation of the NPT in all its aspects.

The NPT has limited the spread of nuclear weapons across the world. Since the Treaty entered into force, great progress has been made on nuclear disarmament, evidenced by the elimination of tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, and further work to implement all provisions of the Treaty remains necessary. Ongoing proliferation challenges underline the need for upholding and strengthening the Treaty, and we call on all States to enhance efforts to achieve universal adherence and universalisation, and effectively combat nuclear proliferation through full implementation of the NPT. There is no credible alternative to this Treaty.

Arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation have made, and should continue to make, an essential contribution to achieving NATO's security objectives and for ensuring strategic stability and our collective security. NATO Allies have a long track record of doing their part on disarmament and non-proliferation. We reaffirm our resolve to seek a safer world for all, and to take further practical steps and effective measures to foster nuclear disarmament. As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance. The fundamental purpose of NATO's nuclear capability has always been to preserve peace, prevent coercion, and deter aggression. Allies have always adhered to their obligations under the NPT and continue to do so. NATO's nuclear arrangements have always been fully consistent with the NPT.

NATO Allies support the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons in full accordance with all provisions of the NPT, including Article VI, in an ever more effective and verifiable way that promotes international stability, and is based on the principle of undiminished security for all. Despite its achievements, the enduring success of the NPT cannot be taken for granted and requires sustained effort. In this spirit, we call on all NPT States Parties to work together towards a successful Review Conference later this year.

STATEMENT BY THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL CONCERNING MALICIOUS CYBER ACTIVITIES [JUNE 3, 2020]

1. We stand united as we face this unprecedented coronavirus pandemic. We condemn destabilising and malicious cyber activities directed against those whose work is critical to the response against the pandemic, including healthcare services, hospitals and research institutes. These deplorable activities and attacks endanger the lives of our citizens at a time when these critical sectors are needed most, and jeopardise our ability to overcome the pandemic as quickly as possible.
2. NATO continues to play its part in responding to the pandemic. Allies as well as partners are supporting each other, including through providing and transporting medical supplies, deploying medical personnel and helping to deliver innovative responses.
3. We stand in solidarity with those who have been affected by malicious cyber activities and remain ready to assist Allies, including by continuing to share information, as they respond to cyber incidents that affect essential services.
4. In line with their national responsibilities and competences, Allies are committed to protecting their critical infrastructure, building resilience and bolstering cyber defences, including through full implementation of NATO's Cyber Defence Pledge.
5. As stated at the 2018 NATO Summit in Brussels, cyber defence is part of NATO's core task of collective defence. Reaffirming NATO's defensive mandate, we are determined to employ the full range of capabilities, including cyber, to deter, defend against and
6. counter the full spectrum of cyber threats. NATO will continue to adapt to the evolving cyber threat landscape, which is affected by both state and non-state actors, including state-sponsored.

7. We all stand to benefit from a rules-based, predictable, open, free, and secure cyberspace. NATO reiterates that international law applies in cyberspace and must be respected. All states have an important role to play in promoting and upholding voluntary norms of responsible state behaviour and in countering destabilising and malicious cyber activities.

STATEMENT BY NATO FOREIGN MINISTERS ON AFGHANISTAN [AUGUST 20, 2021]

1. We, the Foreign Ministers of NATO, met today to discuss the difficult situation in Afghanistan.
2. We are united in our deep concern about the grave events in Afghanistan and call for an immediate end to the violence. We also express deep concerns about reports of serious human rights violations and abuses across Afghanistan. We affirm our commitment to the statement by the UN Security Council on 16 August, and we call for adherence to international norms and standards on human rights and international humanitarian law in all circumstances.
3. Our immediate task now is to meet our commitments to continue the safe evacuation of our citizens, partner country nationals, and at-risk Afghans, in particular those who have assisted our efforts. We call on those in positions of authority in Afghanistan to respect and facilitate their safe and orderly departure, including through Hamid Karzai International Airport in Kabul. As long as evacuation operations continue, we will maintain our close operational coordination through Allied military means at Hamid Karzai International Airport.
4. The Afghan people deserve to live in safety, security and dignity, and to build on the important political, economic and social achievements they have made over the last twenty years. We stand by civil society actors who must be able to continue to safely play their meaningful role in Afghan society. We call on all parties in Afghanistan to work in good faith to establish an inclusive and representative government, including with the meaningful participation of women and minority groups. Under the current circumstances, NATO has suspended all support to the Afghan authorities. Any future Afghan government must adhere to Afghanistan's international obligations; safeguard the human rights of all Afghans, particularly women, children, and minorities; uphold the rule of law; allow unhindered humanitarian access; and ensure that Afghanistan never again serves as a safe haven for terrorists.
5. For the last twenty years, we have successfully denied terrorists a safe haven in Afghanistan from which to instigate attacks. We will not allow any terrorists to threaten us. We remain committed to fighting terrorism with determination, resolve, and in solidarity.
6. We honour the service and sacrifice of all who have worked tirelessly over the last twenty years to realise a better future for Afghanistan. Together, we will fully reflect on our engagement in Afghanistan and draw the necessary lessons. We will continue to promote the stable, prosperous Afghanistan that the Afghan people deserve and address the critical questions facing Afghanistan and the region, in the immediate future and beyond, including through our cooperation with regional and international partners, such as the European Union and United Nations.

SUMMARY OF THE NATO ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE STRATEGY [October 22, 2021]

1. Artificial Intelligence (AI) is changing the global defence and security environment. It offers an unprecedented opportunity to strengthen our technological edge but will also escalate the speed of the threats we face. This foundational technology will likely affect the full spectrum of activities undertaken by the Alliance in support of its three core tasks; collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security.
2. In order to maintain NATO's technological edge, we commit to collaboration and cooperation among Allies on any matters relating to AI for transatlantic defence and security. NATO and Allies can help accelerate these efforts by building on the existing adoption efforts of several NATO and Allied bodies.
3. The aim of this Strategy is fourfold:
 - a. To provide a foundation for NATO and Allies to lead by example and encourage the development and use of AI in a responsible manner for Allied defence and security purposes;
 - b. To accelerate and mainstream AI adoption in capability development and delivery, enhancing interoperability within the Alliance, including through proposals for AI Use Cases, new structures, and new programmes;

- c. To protect and monitor our AI technologies and ability to innovate, addressing security policy considerations such as the operationalisation of our Principles of Responsible Use; and
 - d. To identify and safeguard against the threats from malicious use of AI by state and non-state actors.
4. In the future, the NATO Alliance aims to integrate AI in an interoperable way to support its three core tasks. Such use will be conducted in a recognised, responsible fashion across the enterprise, mission support and operational levels in accordance with international law. Recognising the leading role of the civil private sector and academia in AI development, this Strategy will be underpinned by: significant cooperation between NATO, the private sector¹ and academia; a capable workforce of NATO technical and policy-based AI talent; a robust, relevant, secure data infrastructure; and appropriate cyber defences.
 5. Under the forthcoming Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA), national AI test centres could support NATO's AI ambition. NATO and Allies will also conduct regular high-level dialogues, engaging technology companies at a strategic political level to be informed and help shape the development of AI-fielded technologies, creating a common understanding of the opportunities and risks arising from AI.
 6. Furthermore, NATO will remain the transatlantic forum for AI in defence and security, leveraging the potential of AI while safeguarding against its (AI) malicious use by state and non-state actors.

PRINCIPLES OF RESPONSIBLE USE

7. At the forefront of this Strategy lie the NATO Principles of Responsible Use for AI in Defence, which will help steer our transatlantic efforts in accordance with our values, norms, and international law. The NATO Principles of Responsible Use (the Principles) are based on existing and widely accepted ethical, legal, and policy commitments under which NATO has historically operated and will continue to operate under. These Principles do not affect or supersede existing obligations and commitments, both national and international.
8. The Principles below were developed based on Allied approaches and relevant work in applicable international fora. These Principles apply across all types of AI applications. They are aimed at providing coherence for both NATO and Allies to enable interoperability. The Principles will be foundational to the discussion and adoption of more detailed AI best practices and should be considered a baseline for Allies as they use AI in the context of defence and security, noting that some Allies already have national principles of responsible use.

NATO PRINCIPLES OF RESPONSIBLE USE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN DEFENCE

9. Allies and NATO commit to ensuring that the AI applications they develop and consider for deployment will be – at the various stages of their lifecycles – in accordance with the following six principles:
 - a. **LAWFULNESS:** AI applications will be developed and used in accordance with national and international law, including international humanitarian law and human rights law, as applicable.
 - b. **RESPONSIBILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY:** AI applications will be developed and used with appropriate levels of judgment and care; clear human responsibility shall apply in order to ensure accountability.
 - c. **EXPLAINABILITY AND TRACEABILITY:** AI applications will be appropriately understandable and transparent, including through the use of review methodologies, sources, and procedures. This includes verification, assessment and validation mechanisms at either a NATO and/or national level.
 - d. **RELIABILITY:** AI applications will have explicit, well-defined use cases. The safety, security, and robustness of such capabilities will be subject to testing and assurance within those use cases across their entire life cycle, including through established NATO and/or national certification procedures.
 - e. **GOVERNABILITY:** AI applications will be developed and used according to their intended functions and will allow for: appropriate human-machine interaction; the ability to detect and avoid unintended consequences; and the ability to take steps, such as disengagement or deactivation of systems, when such systems demonstrate unintended behaviour.
 - f. **BIAS MITIGATION:** Proactive steps will be taken to minimise any unintended bias in the development and use of AI applications and in data sets.

ENSURING THE SAFE AND RESPONSIBLE USE OF ALLIED AI

10. To ensure the safe and responsible use of Allied AI, NATO will operationalise its Principles of Responsible Use. These Principles will apply across the lifecycle of an AI capability. Allies and NATO will therefore operationalise these principles across all lines of development.
11. To further inform this work, the NATO AI Test Centre(s) will develop best practices for Allies, which will include assisting overall interoperability and information security efforts.
12. Underpinning the safe and responsible use of AI, NATO and Allies will consciously put Bias Mitigation efforts into practice. This will seek to minimise those biases against individual traits, such as gender, ethnicity or personal attributes.
13. NATO will conduct appropriate risk and/or impact assessments prior to deploying AI capabilities.

MINIMISING INTERFERENCE IN ALLIED AI

14. Some state and non-state actors will likely seek to exploit defects or limitations within our AI technologies. Allies and NATO must strive to protect the use of AI from such interference, manipulation, or sabotage, in line with the Reliability Principle of Responsible Use, also leveraging AI-enabled Cyber Defence applications.
15. Allies and NATO should develop adequate security certification requirements for AI, such as specific threat analysis frameworks and tailored security audits for purposes of ‘stress-testing’.
16. AI can impact critical infrastructure, capabilities and civil preparedness—including those covered by NATO’s seven resilience Baseline Requirements—creating potential vulnerabilities, such as cyberspace, that could be exploited by certain state and non-state actors.
17. Some state and non-state actors may also leverage disinformation opportunities within Allied societies by creating public distrust of the military use of AI. Allies will seek to prevent and counter any such efforts within the context of the Principles of Responsible Use and utilise strategic communications, where appropriate. NATO will support Allies as required.

STANDARDS

18. NATO will further work with relevant international AI standards setting bodies to help foster military-civil standards coherence with regards to AI standards.

¹For purposes of the Strategy ‘private sector’ includes Big Tech, start-ups, entrepreneurs and SMEs as well as risk capital (such as venture and private equity funds).

NATO’S OVERARCHING SPACE POLICY [JANUARY 17, 2022]

INTRODUCTION

1. Space is increasingly important for the Alliance’s and Allies’ security and prosperity. Space brings benefits in multiple areas from weather monitoring, environment and agriculture, to transport, science, communications and banking. The use of space has greatly enhanced Allies’ and NATO’s ability to anticipate threats and respond to crises with greater speed, effectiveness and precision. The evolution in the uses of space and rapid advances in space technology have created new opportunities, but also new risks, vulnerabilities, and potentially threats for the Alliance’s and Allies’ security and defence. Today, access to, and use of, space is no longer the prerogative of a few nations that are technically capable of launching and operating a spacecraft. Space technology and services have become more readily accessible, cheaper and more capable. Most space capabilities are dual use, serving civilian/commercial as well as military purposes, often at the same time, further adding to the complexity of the space domain¹. In security and defence terms, space is increasingly contested, congested and competitive and

requires the Alliance to be able to operate in a disrupted, denied and degraded environment. Allies' space capabilities could become a high priority target given the advantages that space systems provide in conflict and given Allies' dependence on these systems to enable operations.

SPACE-RELATED THREAT ENVIRONMENT

2. Space is a unique physical domain which is challenging Allies' traditional perceptions of time, distance and geography. Potential adversaries are developing, testing and operationalising sophisticated counter-space technologies that could threaten Allies' access to, and freedom to operate in space. These technologies comprise a diverse range of counter-space capabilities to disrupt, degrade, deceive, deny, or destroy capabilities and services on which Allies – and the Alliance – might critically depend. Potential adversaries are increasing their own use of space, thereby extending their ability to project power over greater distances, with increased precision, speed and effectiveness. They are also using space capabilities to track NATO and Allies' forces, exercises, and other activities. Satellite navigation and commercial services are also used for planning and targeting by potential adversaries, including by non-state actors. The capabilities being developed by potential adversaries could be used against the Alliance in order to, inter alia:
 - a. Hold space assets at risk, thereby complicating NATO's ability to take decisive action in a crisis or conflict;
 - b. Deny or degrade Allies' and NATO space-based capabilities critical to battlespace management and situational awareness and the ability to operate effectively in a crisis or conflict;
 - c. Create impacts on Allies' space systems that are damaging or disruptive to economic or public life and violate the principle of free use of space, yet fall below the thresholds of threat of force, use of force, armed attack or aggression.
3. Space-related threats and risks can vary in form and intensity, ranging from low-end, non-kinetic systems which create reversible effects (such as jamming of communications or GPS signals), to non-kinetic and high-end kinetic capabilities that produce irreversible effects and which may result in significant and adverse long-term impacts to the space environment. In particular, the latter can produce space debris, leading to reduced accessibility and usability of orbits and collateral damage. It is worth noting that both space-based (satellites) and ground-based (ground stations and launchers) segments, as well as the links between them, can be the targets of such capabilities. In addition to man-made risks, space systems are also vulnerable to natural hazards and accidents.
4. A number of nations are developing counter-space and anti-satellite systems². Potential adversaries in particular are pursuing the development of a wide range of capabilities from non-kinetic (such as dazzling, blinding and jamming of space assets) to kinetic destructive systems (such as direct-ascent anti-satellite missiles, on orbit anti-satellite systems, and laser and electro-magnetic capabilities). Such space destruction, disruption, degradation and denial capabilities are further exacerbated by the susceptibility of space to hybrid approaches and the associated difficulty of attributing harmful effects to space systems. Some threats, such as signal jamming and cyber-attacks, can potentially be caused also by non-state actors, including terrorist organisations. Many threats to Allies' space systems originate in the cyber domain and are likely to increase.

PRINCIPLES AND TENETS

5. This overarching NATO space policy is based on a number of principles and tenets which are consistent with those of the Alliance's overall posture:
 - a. Space is essential to coherent Alliance deterrence and defence;
 - b. Space is an inherently global environment and any conflict that extends into space has the potential to affect all users of space. Even in cases where NATO is not involved in conflict, Allies' space systems could be affected;
 - c. The free access, exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes is in the common interest of all nations. NATO and Allies will continue to carry out all activities in outer space in accordance with international law, including the UN Charter, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international cooperation and understanding³;
 - d. Space is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty⁴;

- e. Allies will retain jurisdiction and control over their objects in space⁵ as well as full authority and sovereignty over their space capabilities and resources;
- f. Considering that the Alliance is not aiming to develop space capabilities of its own⁶, Allies will undertake to provide, on a voluntary basis and in accordance with national laws, regulations and policies, the space data, products, services or effects that could be required for the Alliance's operations, missions, and other activities;
- g. NATO is not aiming to become an autonomous space actor. NATO will seek to complement and add value to the work of Allies and to engage with other relevant international organisations, as appropriate, avoiding unnecessary duplication of effort.

NATO'S APPROACH TO SPACE

6. **KEY ROLES:** Consistent with the principles outlined above, NATO's overall approach to space will focus on the following key roles:
 - a. Integrating space and space-related considerations into the delivery of NATO's core tasks: collective defence, crisis management and, where appropriate, cooperative security;
 - b. Serving as a forum for political-military consultations and information sharing on relevant deterrence and defence-related space developments, with a view to informing the Alliance's situational awareness, decision-making, readiness and posture management across the spectrum of conflict. Such consultations could cover threats, challenges, vulnerabilities and opportunities, and take into account the development of legal and behavioural norms in other fora;
 - c. Ensuring effective provision of space support and effects to the Alliance's operations, missions and other activities;
 - d. Facilitating the development of compatibility and interoperability between Allies' space services, products and capabilities. In support of these key roles, NATO will pursue a number of lines of effort, as outlined below.
7. **SPACE SUPPORT IN OPERATIONS, MISSIONS AND OTHER ACTIVITIES:** Continuous and secure access to space services, products and capabilities is essential for the credibility of the Alliance's posture, management of that posture, and the conduct of the Alliance's operations, missions and other activities. NATO requires space systems in the following functional areas:
 - a. Space situational awareness is required to understand the operational environment, which enhances the Alliance's strategic anticipation and resilience. It is a prerequisite to identify risks and threats in space, from space, and to space, and to propose mitigation measures;
 - b. Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance requires space capabilities for strategic, operational and tactical assessment, situational awareness and to support decision-making and planning;
 - c. Space-based monitoring of the atmospheric, oceanic and space environments is important for planning and execution of NATO missions and operations;
 - d. Satellite communications are essential in all NATO missions. NATO operations require the availability of satellite communications to efficiently and effectively support consultation, command and control;
 - e. Positioning, navigation and timing is essential in all NATO missions. It enables precise positioning and allows for the synchronisation of effort across the full spectrum of military operations;
 - f. Shared early warning is a capability that contributes to deterrence and defence by providing persistent monitoring and warning of missile events and other services.
8. NATO will identify and, if necessary, develop appropriate mechanisms, based on voluntary participation, to fulfil and sustain requirements for space support in NATO operations, missions and other activities in the above functional areas. Allies' capabilities, and, if necessary, trusted commercial service providers should be leveraged to meet these requirements in the most secure, efficient, effective and transparent manner.

9. In November 2019, NATO declared space as an operational domain, which will help to ensure a coherent approach to the integration of space into NATO's overall deterrence and defence posture. In October 2020, NATO established a NATO Space Centre⁷ at Allied Air Command in Ramstein, Germany. A NATO Space Centre of Excellence is also being established in Toulouse, France.
10. **SPACE DOMAIN AWARENESS:** NATO is developing space domain awareness through a number of actions:
 - a. Raising general political and military awareness across the Alliance about NATO's reliance on space and the importance of the Alliance's continuous and secure access to the space services, capabilities and effects it requires;
 - b. Building a shared understanding of the evolving space-related threats and vulnerabilities, including through continued information and intelligence sharing among Allies, as well as fusion and assessment of this material at NATO level;
 - c. Continuing voluntary sharing of information and data on relevant national space activities.
11. **DETERRENCE, DEFENCE AND RESILIENCE:** Space must be seen as an integral part of the Alliance's broad approach to deterrence and defence, drawing upon all of the tools at NATO's disposal, to provide the Alliance with a broad range of options to be able to respond to any threats from wherever they arise. To this end:
 - a. Considering that Allies have recognised that space is essential to the Alliance's deterrence and defence, and to a coherent Alliance posture, the Alliance will consider a range of potential options, for Council approval, across the conflict spectrum to deter and defend against threats to or attacks on Allies' space systems, as appropriate and in line with the principles and tenets outlined in this policy;
 - b. The Alliance should develop a common understanding of concepts such as the role of space in crisis or conflict;
 - c. As part of the effort to increase the readiness and ability of the Alliance to operate decisively across all operational domains (land, maritime, air and cyber), due consideration will need to be given to the role of space as a key enabler for operational domains, as well as for NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence, and, for Allies concerned, nuclear deterrence;
 - d. While resilience and survivability of Allies' space systems is a national responsibility, NATO will consider ways to improve space resilience Alliance-wide, including through sharing of best practices, and by exploiting force-multiplying redundancies in space capabilities owned by Allies;
 - e. Guidelines will need to be developed on how to secure and ensure NATO's access to space data, products, services and capabilities.
12. At the 2021 Brussels Summit, Allies agreed that attacks to, from, or within space present a clear challenge to the security of the Alliance, the impact of which could threaten national and Euro-Atlantic prosperity, security, and stability, and could be as harmful to modern societies as a conventional attack. Such attacks could lead to the invocation of Article 5. A decision as to when such attacks would lead to the invocation of Article 5 would be taken by the North Atlantic Council on a case-by-case basis.⁸
13. **CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT AND INTEROPERABILITY:** NATO will pursue a number of work strands related to capability development and interoperability, pertaining to space:
 - a. Allies have previously agreed on the need to be cognisant of the enabling role of space capabilities and the growing importance of space for NATO operations, missions and other activities, while at the same time recognising that Allies retain full authority and sovereignty over their space capabilities and resources;
 - b. NATO will encourage cooperation between Allies to enhance the compatibility and interoperability of their space capabilities, including through information sharing (e.g. Space Situational Awareness) and coordination, joint development and production, standardization and related doctrinal, legal and procedural work;
 - c. The space domain should be appropriately reflected in the context of the relevant NATO capability development programmes.

14. **TRAINING AND EXERCISES:** NATO also has an important role to play in the area of Education, Training, Exercises and Evaluation with a view to advancing Alliance-wide understanding of the space domain, taking into account the extensive network of NATO's educational and training facilities, multinational education and training institutions, entities and programmes. Space should continue to feature more consistently and prominently in NATO exercises, to include partial or complete loss of access to space services provided by Allies' capabilities. NATO forces should be prepared to operate when space support in operations is degraded, denied or disrupted.
15. **STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS AND RESPONSIBLE SPACE BEHAVIOURS:** NATO will continue to communicate on NATO's approach to space based on concrete decisions and developments. NATO and Allies support international efforts to develop norms, rules and principles of responsible space behaviours.
16. **SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION:** NATO will consider ways to better exploit scientific, research and technological capacity that exists across the Alliance (e.g. the NATO Communication and Information Agency, the Science and Technology Organisation, relevant NATO educational and training facilities and NATO-accredited Centres of Excellence), as well as the work in innovation and experimentation which is being led by Allied Command Transformation, with a view to contributing to space awareness and effective application of space capabilities and services to meet the Alliance's political and military objectives.
17. **INDUSTRY:** Allies should also explore opportunities to foster cooperation with space-related industry and the commercial sector through readily available frameworks (e.g. the NATO Industrial Advisory Group and the NATO-Industry Forum).
18. **PARTNERSHIPS:** NATO will engage with selected partners and relevant international organisations, such as the UN and the EU, on space and space-related aspects, as appropriate, and where it adds value to NATO's core tasks.

NATO SPACE TERMINOLOGY

In the context of NATO's overarching space policy, the following terminology is used:

SPACE: Space is the 'volume' beyond the upper limits of airspace⁹.

SPACE SYSTEM: A space system can include: (1) the space segment (all elements in orbit); 2) the ground segment (ground station and command and control centre); 3) the data links (uplink, downlink and cross-link); and 4) the user segment (decision-makers and deployed forces).

SPACE CAPABILITY: The capability using space systems, which supports, among others, military commanders, staffs and forces in all operational domains.

SPACE SERVICES: The services provided by space systems to users in order to enable them to conduct operations (e.g. SATCOM and PNT).

SPACE DATA: The information acquired, produced and provided by space systems or relayed to or through space systems necessary for the provision of space-based products and services.

SPACE PRODUCTS: Space products are synthesised and processed data used for operations (e.g., satellite images, weather forecasts and satellite reconnaissance advanced notice).

SPACE SUPPORT: Space support is the ability to support operations through the provision of data, products and services, provided or procured by space-capable nations, governmental and commercial organisations.

SPACE DOMAIN AWARENESS: Shared understanding of the operational space-related environment, threats and vulnerabilities that encompasses the functional areas: Space Situational Awareness (SSA), Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), Positioning, Navigation and Timing (PNT), Satellite Communications (SATCOM), Meteorological Services (METOC), Shared Early Warning (SEW), with regard to the implications for NATO's ability to conduct operations, missions and activities in other domains.

1. For the purposes of this policy, the term 'space domain' is used in a generic manner to denominate the totality of all space and space-related activities that are relevant in terms of security and defence.
2. While China and Russia both have advanced programmes, Iran and North Korea and some other nations also have some indigenous counter-space capabilities.

3. As per the Outer Space Treaty.
4. As per the Outer Space Treaty.
5. As per Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty.
6. Owning devices or parts of ground segments enables the Alliance to benefit from Allies' space capabilities.
7. The NATO Space Centre is the hub of operational space information and expertise in Allied Command Operations, and is responsible for ensuring coordination and interoperability of space-related activities across all domains by liaising with national space entities and relevant NATO stakeholders.
8. 2021 Brussels Summit Communiqué, paragraph 33.
9. Recognising that currently there is no universally agreed definition of space.

STATEMENT BY NATO DEFENSE MINISTERS ON THE SITUATION IN AND AROUND UKRAINE
[FEBRUARY 16, 2022]

We are gravely concerned by the very large scale, unprovoked and unjustified Russian military build-up in and around Ukraine and in Belarus. We urge Russia, in the strongest possible terms, to choose the path of diplomacy, and to immediately reverse its build-up and withdraw its forces from Ukraine in accordance with its international obligations and commitments. We remain committed to our dual-track approach to Russia: strong deterrence and defence, combined with openness to dialogue.

Russia's actions pose a serious threat to Euro-Atlantic security. As a consequence and to ensure the defence of all Allies, we are deploying additional land forces in the eastern part of the Alliance, as well as additional maritime and air assets, as announced by Allies, and have increased the readiness of our forces. Our measures are and remain preventive, proportionate and non-escalatory. We are prepared to further strengthen our defensive and deterrent posture to respond to all contingencies.

Our commitment to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty is iron-clad. We stand united to defend each other.

NATO remains committed to the foundational principles underpinning European security, including that each nation has the right to choose its own security arrangements. We reaffirm our support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders. As stated previously, any further Russian aggression against Ukraine will have massive consequences and carry a high price. NATO will continue to closely coordinate with relevant stakeholders and other international organisations including the EU.

NATO and Allies continue to pursue diplomacy and dialogue with Russia on Euro-Atlantic security issues, including at the highest levels. We support all these efforts, and efforts in the Normandy Format to implement the Minsk agreements. We have expressed our readiness to engage in a Renewed European Security Dialogue initiated by Poland as the current OSCE Chair. We have made substantive proposals to Russia to enhance the security of all nations in the Euro-Atlantic region and await a response. We have repeatedly offered, and continue to offer, further dialogue through the NATO-Russia Council, and stand ready to engage. We strongly encourage Russia to reciprocate and to choose diplomacy and de-escalation.

STATEMENT BY NATO HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT ON RUSSIA'S ATTACK ON UKRAINE
[FEBRUARY 25, 2022]

We have met today to discuss the gravest threat to Euro-Atlantic security in decades. We condemn in the strongest possible terms Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, enabled by Belarus. We call on Russia to immediately cease its military assault, to withdraw all its forces from Ukraine and to turn back from the path of aggression it has chosen. This long-planned attack on Ukraine, an independent, peaceful and democratic country, is brutal and wholly unprovoked and unjustified. We deplore the tragic loss of life, enormous human suffering and destruction caused by Russia's actions. Peace on the European continent has been fundamentally shattered. The world will hold Russia, as well as Belarus, accountable for their actions. We call on all states to condemn this unconscionable attack unreservedly. No one should be fooled by the Russian government's barrage of lies.

Russia bears full responsibility for this conflict. It has rejected the path of diplomacy and dialogue repeatedly offered to it by NATO and Allies. It has fundamentally violated international law, including the UN Charter. Russia's actions are also a flagrant rejection of the principles enshrined in the NATO-Russia Founding Act: it is Russia that has walked away from its commitments under the Act. President Putin's decision to attack Ukraine is a terrible strategic mistake, for which Russia will pay a severe price, both economically and politically, for years to come. Massive and unprecedented sanctions have already been imposed on Russia. NATO will continue to coordinate closely with relevant stakeholders and other international organisations including the EU. At the invitation of the Secretary General, we were joined today by Finland, Sweden and the European Union.

We stand in full solidarity with the democratically elected president, parliament and government of Ukraine and with the brave people of Ukraine who are now defending their homeland. Our thoughts are with all those killed, injured and displaced by Russia's aggression, and with their families. NATO remains committed to all the foundational principles underpinning European security, including that each nation has the right to choose its own security arrangements. We will continue to provide political and practical support to Ukraine as it continues to defend itself and call on others to do the same. We reaffirm our unwavering support for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders, including its territorial waters. This principled position will never change.

In light of Russia's actions, we will draw all the necessary consequences for NATO's deterrence and defence posture. Allies have held consultations under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty. We will continue to take all measures and decisions required to ensure the security and defence of all Allies. We have deployed defensive land and air forces in the eastern part of the Alliance, and maritime assets across the NATO area. We have activated NATO's defence plans to prepare ourselves to respond to a range of contingencies and secure Alliance territory, including by drawing on our response forces. We are now making significant additional defensive deployments of forces to the eastern part of the Alliance. We will make all deployments necessary to ensure strong and credible deterrence and defence across the Alliance, now and in the future. Our measures are and remain preventive, proportionate and non-escalatory.

Our commitment to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty is iron-clad. We stand united to protect and defend all Allies. Freedom will always win over oppression.

STATEMENT BY NATO HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT [ON UKRAINE] [MARCH 24, 2022]

We, the Heads of State and Government of the 30 NATO Allies, have met today to address Russia's aggression against Ukraine, the gravest threat to Euro-Atlantic security in decades. Russia's war against Ukraine has shattered peace in Europe and is causing enormous human suffering and destruction.

We condemn Russia's invasion of Ukraine in the strongest possible terms. We call on President Putin to immediately stop this war and withdraw military forces from Ukraine, and call on Belarus to end its complicity, in line with the Aggression Against Ukraine Resolution adopted at the UN General Assembly of 2 March 2022. Russia should comply with the 16 March ruling by the UN International Court of Justice and immediately suspend military operations. Russia's attack on Ukraine threatens global security. Its assault on international norms makes the world less safe. President Putin's escalatory rhetoric is irresponsible and destabilizing.

Ukrainians have inspired the world with heroic resistance to Russia's brutal war of conquest. We strongly condemn Russia's devastating attacks on civilians, including women, children, and persons in vulnerable situations. We will work with the rest of the international community to hold accountable those responsible for violations of humanitarian and international law, including war crimes. We are deeply concerned about the increased risk of sexual violence and human trafficking. We urge Russia to allow rapid, safe, and unhindered humanitarian access and safe passage for civilians, and to allow for humanitarian aid to be delivered to Mariupol and other besieged cities. We also condemn attacks against civilian infrastructure, including those endangering nuclear power plants. We will continue to counter Russia's lies about its attack on Ukraine and expose fabricated narratives or manufactured "false flag" operations to prepare the ground for further escalation, including against the civilian population of Ukraine. Any use by Russia of a chemical or biological weapon would be unacceptable and result in severe consequences.

Russia needs to show it is serious about negotiations by immediately implementing a ceasefire. We call on Russia to engage constructively in credible negotiations with Ukraine to achieve concrete results, starting with a sustainable ceasefire and moving towards a complete withdrawal of its troops from Ukrainian territory. Russia's continuing aggression while discussions are taking place is deplorable. We support Ukraine's efforts to achieve peace, and those undertaken diplomatically by Allies to weigh in on Russia to end the war and relieve human suffering.

We stand in full solidarity with President Zelenskyy, the government of Ukraine, and with the brave Ukrainian citizens who are defending their homeland. We honour all those killed, injured, and displaced by Russia's aggression, as well as their families. We reaffirm our unwavering support for the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders extending to its territorial waters.

Ukraine has a fundamental right to self-defence under the United Nations Charter. Since 2014, we have provided extensive support to Ukraine's ability to exercise that right. We have trained Ukraine's armed forces, strengthening their military capabilities and capacities and enhancing their resilience. NATO Allies have stepped up their support and will continue to provide further political and practical support to Ukraine as it continues to defend itself. NATO Allies will also continue to provide assistance in such areas as cybersecurity and protection against threats of a chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear nature. NATO Allies also provide extensive humanitarian support and are hosting millions of refugees. Foreign Ministers will discuss further our support to Ukraine when they meet in April.

We are united in our resolve to counter Russia's attempts to destroy the foundations of international security and stability. We are holding Russia and Belarus to account. Massive sanctions and heavy political costs have been imposed on Russia in order to bring an end to this war. We remain determined to maintain coordinated international pressure on Russia. We will continue to coordinate closely with relevant stakeholders and other international organizations, including the European Union. Transatlantic coordination remains crucial for an effective response to the current crisis.

We call on all states, including the People's Republic of China (PRC), to uphold the international order including the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, as enshrined in the UN Charter, to abstain from supporting Russia's war effort in any way, and to refrain from any action that helps Russia circumvent sanctions. We are concerned by recent public comments by PRC officials and call on China to cease amplifying the Kremlin's false narratives, in particular on the war and on NATO, and to promote a peaceful resolution to the conflict.

We remain committed to the foundational principles underpinning European and global security, including that each nation has the right to choose its own security arrangements free from outside interference. We reaffirm our commitment to NATO's Open Door Policy under Article 10 of the Washington Treaty.

We are providing tailored support to partners affected by Russian threats and interference and will step up our assistance to help them resist Russian malign influence and strengthen their resilience, based on our partners' requests and our long-standing partnership programmes. In April, Foreign Ministers will consider concrete proposals for enhancing our support to these partners.

We will continue to take all necessary steps to protect and defend the security of our Allied populations and every inch of Allied territory. Our commitment to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty is iron-clad. In response to Russia's actions, we have activated NATO's defence plans, deployed elements of the NATO Response Force, and placed 40,000 troops on our eastern flank, along with significant air and naval assets, under direct NATO command supported by Allies' national deployments. We are also establishing four additional multinational battlegroups in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia. We are taking all measures and decisions to ensure the security and defence of all Allies across all domains and with a 360-degree approach. Our measures remain preventive, proportionate, and non-escalatory. We will now accelerate NATO's transformation for a more dangerous strategic reality, including through the adoption of the next Strategic Concept in Madrid. In light of the gravest threat to Euro-Atlantic security in decades, we will also significantly strengthen our longer-term deterrence and defence posture and will further develop the full range of ready forces and capabilities necessary to maintain credible deterrence and defence. These steps will be supported by enhanced exercises with an increased focus on collective defence and interoperability.

We are increasing the resilience of our societies and our infrastructure to counter Russia's malign influence. We are enhancing our cyber capabilities and defences, providing support to each other in the event of cyber-attacks. We are ready to impose costs on those who harm us in cyberspace, and are increasing information exchange and situational awareness, enhancing civil preparedness, and strengthening our ability to respond to disinformation. We will also enhance our preparedness and readiness for chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats. We will take further decisions when we meet in Madrid.

The steps we are taking to ensure the security of our Alliance and of the Euro-Atlantic area will require adequate resourcing. Allies are substantially increasing their defence expenditures. Today, we have decided to accelerate our efforts to fulfil our commitment to the Defence Investment Pledge in its entirety. In line with our commitment in Article 3 of the Washington Treaty, we will further strengthen our individual and collective capacity to resist all forms of attack. At our meeting in Madrid, we will submit additional plans on how to meet the Pledge.

Russia's unprovoked war against Ukraine represents a fundamental challenge to the values and norms that have brought security and prosperity to all on the European continent. President Putin's choice to attack Ukraine is a strategic mistake, with grave consequences also for Russia and the Russian people. We remain united and resolute in our determination to oppose Russia's aggression, aid the government and the people of Ukraine, and defend the security of all Allies.

NATO's CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR (CBRN) DEFENCE POLICY [JUNE 14, 2022]

INTRODUCTION

1. NATO's security environment has grown more complex and challenging since 2009, when Allies agreed NATO's *Comprehensive, Strategic-Level Policy for Preventing the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and Defending against Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Threats*. That Policy has served as a cornerstone of Allied security and stability for thirteen years. Today, we face a world in which the potential use of CBRN materials or WMD by state and non-state actors remains a central and evolving threat to Allied security. It is a world in which NATO increasingly cannot assume that the international norms and institutions related to the proliferation or use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) will ensure our security, and in which scientific and technological innovation and other emerging trends have accentuated CBRN risks to the Alliance.
2. We will continue to meet these challenges through the use of military and non-military tools in a coherent and sustained manner. NATO remains clear-eyed about the CBRN challenge: Allies will have all the appropriate tools to ensure that potential adversaries do not perceive that they can gain a clear advantage against NATO by using, or threatening to use, CBRN materials. NATO's 2022 Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Defence Policy establishes the framework upon which we will understand, plan, posture, exercise, train, equip, and assess our capabilities, in order to counter WMD proliferation and ensure that we deter and defend our Alliance against CBRN threats.

VISION

3. NATO's populations, territories and forces will be defended and secure against the threat or use of chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear materials and weapons of mass destruction. We will enhance the resilience of our nations and societies against the full spectrum of CBRN threats, and encourage cooperation between Allies to enhance international norms. The proliferation, threat or use of WMD and their delivery systems will not undermine NATO's deterrence and defence. NATO forces will be able to operate effectively, fight and prevail in any environment.

SCOPE AND CONTEXT

4. NATO's CBRN Defence Policy sets the overall level of ambition for NATO's CBRN defence, including our complementary commitments to providing necessary military capabilities and enabling national resilience, thereby enhancing NATO's resilience against CBRN threats. This policy is guided by our shared and lasting commitment to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, protect the Alliance against CBRN incidents or attack, and support recovery from the consequences of any such use. For the purposes of this policy, "weapon of mass destruction" refers to any weapon or weapons system employing CBRN materials that is able to cause widespread devastation and loss of life. "CBRN materials" refers to any chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear substance that may pose a hazard to NATO populations, territories and forces, regardless of origin or whether the material was originally conceived as a weapon.
5. This policy supports the goals enshrined in the new Strategic Concept, and contributes to the fulfilment of its Core Tasks. The policy is consistent with and supports the implementation of NATO's Military Strategy, including the Concept for the Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area and the NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept. It further complements the Alliance's ongoing work, including the Strengthened Resilience Commitment, the Comprehensive Cyber Defence Policy, the Strategy on NATO's Role in Countering Hybrid Warfare, and the Coherent Implementation Strategy on Emerging and Disruptive Technologies.
6. In response to Russia's illegal, unprovoked full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, NATO has taken steps to significantly strengthen its deterrence and defence posture, and will further develop the full range of capabilities, including CBRN defence capabilities, necessary to maintain credible deterrence and defence. We are increasing the resilience of our societies and our infrastructure to counter Russian and other malign influence efforts and behaviour, and we will enhance our preparedness and readiness for CBRN threats.
7. We remain fully committed to NATO's enhanced role in the international community's fight against terrorism. We will continue our work to defend against CBRN threats related to terrorism.

8. NATO Allies remain committed to preventing the proliferation of WMD, in part by implementing and supporting arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation (ADN). Arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation have made and should continue to make an essential contribution to achieving the Alliance's security objectives and for ensuring strategic stability and our collective security, taking into account the prevailing security environment. NATO has a long track record of doing its part on disarmament and non-proliferation. Allies remain collectively determined to uphold, and support existing arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation agreements and commitments, which are an important element of our efforts to defend the Alliance against CBRN threats.
9. In line with the NATO / Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council Women, Peace and Security Policy and Action Plan, NATO will ensure that gender perspectives are appropriately mainstreamed into CBRN defence. This will make an important contribution to increasing military readiness and supporting national resilience against WMD and CBRN threats. This will include recognizing and addressing, as appropriate, gender-based differences in requirements for equipment, medical management, and protection, as well as training and capacity-building.
10. Consistent with the NATO Climate Change and Security Action Plan, the Alliance will incorporate climate change considerations into its work to enhance our CBRN defence capabilities and resilience. Allies will increase awareness of potential impacts of climate change on our CBRN security environment, including how extreme and unusual conditions may exacerbate the consequences of CBRN threats, and the possible acceleration or spread of emerging and infectious disease. Allies will take appropriate steps to adapt to these impacts, and to incorporate these elements into outreach activities.

THE EVOLVING CBRN THREAT

11. The global CBRN security environment has changed dramatically over the past decade.
12. **Russia:** Russia poses NATO's most pressing CBRN security challenge. Russia's illegal, unprovoked full-scale invasion of Ukraine has starkly illustrated the Putin regime's contempt for international law and global norms. This has amplified the concerns posed by Russia's demonstrated capability, rooted in Soviet programmes, to produce chemical and biological weapons, its large, diverse and expanding nuclear capabilities, as well as its continued assault on international non-proliferation tools and regimes.
13. Russia has led efforts to undermine global norms against the proliferation and use of WMD, including by trying to shield the Syrian government from accountability for chemical weapons use. Russia, along with China, has deliberately attacked the legitimacy and authority of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and its attribution and investigative mechanisms. Russia has dangerously increased the spread of disinformation about biological and chemical weapons, including during the war in Ukraine. It has consistently refused to address legitimate questions about the assassination attempts using nerve agents from the so-called Novichok family against Sergei and Yulia Skripal on Allied territory in 2018, which cost the life of a UK citizen, and against Alexei Navalny in 2020. The Alliance also has grave concerns that Russia is considering the use of chemical or biological weapons in the future.
14. Russia's actions have also eroded the international treaty regime limiting the proliferation of delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction, notably by violating the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, leading to that Treaty's demise. Russia has refused to comply with almost all of its ADN obligations, including commitments related to the proliferation and use of WMD. These issues, combined with Russia's irresponsible and escalatory rhetoric related to CBRN materials and weapons of mass destruction, have dramatically increased international concern over their possible use, or threatened use, particularly in Ukraine.
15. **Non-State Actors:** Hostile non-state actors including terrorist organizations continue to seek to acquire WMD, CBRN materials, and means of delivery, and to use them against NATO populations, territories and forces. Terrorists believe that a WMD attack or deliberate use of CBRN materials has the potential, inter alia, to sow panic and strain national emergency response capabilities. Non-state actors have already used chemical weapons in Syria and Iraq, and they are known to both seek access to more sophisticated CBRN materials and WMD, as well as to attempt to weaponise toxic industrial chemicals and other materials that may be easier to acquire. Moreover, scientific and technological innovation continues to reduce the barriers to acquiring or developing advanced and diverse CBRN materials and means of delivery. Consequently, the risk of CBRN use or proliferation by non-state actors is likely to continue to grow.

16. In addition to Russia and terrorist organizations, NATO must continue to address security challenges posed by other actors. Syria's government has repeatedly demonstrated the willingness to use chemical weapons in violation of its international obligations, as the OPCW has confirmed. Having refused to fulfil its disarmament commitments and verifiably eliminate all stocks of chemical weapons, Syria continues to present a serious risk of using or proliferating chemical weapons and their means of delivery. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) continues the reckless expansion of its nuclear arsenal and missile capabilities in violation of relevant UN Security Council Resolutions. The assassination of Kim Jong-Nam with a nerve agent in Malaysia in 2017, demonstrates that the DPRK is willing and able to use prohibited weapons outside its borders. The expansion of Iran's missile capabilities, combined with the continued development of its nuclear program poses an ongoing challenge to regional and NATO security. Moreover, Iran's ongoing, active missile proliferation demands continued NATO vigilance.
17. Finally, China's stated ambitions and assertive behaviour pose systemic challenges to the rules-based international order and to areas relevant to Alliance security. China is rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenal with more warheads and a large number of sophisticated delivery systems. China's rapid and ambitious military modernization is an issue of particular concern, accentuated by China's lack of transparency and limited engagement with international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, including with regards to WMD. There have been many instances when China has repeated and amplified Russian disinformation regarding chemical and biological weapons.
18. NATO faces a widening spectrum of chemical threats, ranging from traditionally understood chemical materials, to so-called Novichok nerve agents and pharmaceutical-based agents (PBAs) that challenge detection, response and protection measures. Concerns persist regarding research on PBAs with potential dual-use applications, which may have utility for chemical weapons applications.
19. The risk of naturally-occurring or accidental biological threats can likewise add to the complexity of the security environment. The COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated the extraordinary capacity of biological threats, regardless of origin, to disrupt our societies and strain our response capacity across domains. Biological agents, including both existing and modified pathogens, also pose unique and enduring challenges to NATO operations, with deployed forces facing the prospect of deliberate use of biological agents by hostile actors, accidental release, and contact with endemic and imported diseases. Climate change and associated trends are also expected to accelerate the emergence of zoonotic illnesses, including potential pandemic threats. These risks intersect with WMD proliferation, as new, naturally-occurring pathogens and toxins may be employed, enhanced or weaponized by malicious actors.
20. Taken together, these trends make clear the need to strengthen relevant capabilities, including medical diagnostics, research and countermeasures, and bio-detection and analysis, and to better understand how CBRN defence and deployed medical capabilities can contribute to responding to biological threats of any origin.
21. Emerging and Disruptive Technologies (EDTs) and dual-use challenges shape NATO's security environment in increasingly diverse ways. For currently known chemical, biological and radiological materials, EDTs can potentially help proliferators to identify new manufacturing processes and bypass internationally controlled materials and equipment. Dual-use concerns may arise regarding advanced biological research and related activities. New technologies, including nanotechnology, synthetic biology and additive manufacturing, also threaten to enable the development of even more effective or more lethal CBRN materials, such as those that can overcome protective measures and resist detection, decontamination, or medical countermeasures. They may also increase the availability of low-cost dispersal systems, as well as dual-use devices for bio-manufacturing, which could further enable the use of biological or chemical weapons.
22. Innovation may also facilitate threats from the convergence of technologies, such as unmanned systems and other novel delivery systems coupled with CBRN materials. EDTs therefore pose new challenges to international ADN that must be addressed, including by strengthening relevant international agreements, national implementation of those agreements, and global norms.
23. At the same time, innovation offers promising new and enhanced capabilities that can support our CBRN defence, including enhanced approaches to detection, identification, protection, decontamination, medical management, consequence assessment and management, and knowledge management. In addressing the challenges posed by the overlap between CBRN threats and new technologies, NATO will not neglect to take full advantage of EDTs to strengthen our security.
24. **Cyber:** NATO's defence against CBRN threats must also address their nexus with cyber threats. The internet is a key channel for the proliferation of WMD-related technical knowledge and expertise. Malicious cyber actors may attempt to undermine NATO's capacity to prevent and effectively respond to a CBRN incident by targeting NATO or Allied communications and information systems. Cyberattacks against critical infrastructure highlight the risk that cyber capabilities could be used to compromise industrial or scientific infrastructure with the intent to cause the release

of toxic industrial chemicals, or another CBRN incident. Moreover, recent crises with a chemical or biological dimension have featured malicious cyber elements, including attempts to hack the OPCW, as well as destabilizing and malicious cyber activities against healthcare services and medical research facilities during the COVID-19 pandemic.

25. **Hybrid:** CBRN materials can be employed by potential adversaries to challenge the thresholds of detection and identification with the intention to create ambiguity, delay or prevent attribution, and impair decision-making, which are hallmarks of hybrid threats. Russian efforts at disinformation and malicious cyber activity following the Salisbury assassination attempt and Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, intended to disrupt a coherent Allied response, illustrated the nexus of hybrid and CBRN threats. The development of new CBRN materials, including those that are more difficult to detect, trace, or investigate, and novel means of targeting and delivery, may generate new opportunities for CBRN use alongside hybrid techniques.
26. In sum, NATO faces a security environment in which CBRN threats have grown more numerous and more diverse, in which state and non-state actors pose a greater threat of WMD use and proliferation, and where technological trends are rapidly amplifying these risks. Allies will continue working to strengthen and reinforce the international ADN framework together with their efforts to protect NATO populations, territories and forces from CBRN threats. We recognize the scope of this changing threat, and the steps necessary to ensure our security in this challenging new context.

CORE PRINCIPLES AND COMMITMENTS

27. Consequently, NATO’s CBRN Defence policy rests upon two complementary, mutually reinforcing principles and commitments: (1) the Alliance will develop and maintain the necessary CBRN defence capabilities, including intelligence, personnel, equipment, policies, plans, exercises and training, and these will be effectively integrated into NATO’s deterrence and defence posture; and (2) our societies will have the necessary resilience against CBRN threats. Together, these aim to ensure that NATO can prevent, protect against, and recover from any use of CBRN materials against our populations, territories and forces. Figure 1, below, reflects NATO’s core principles and commitments for CBRN Defence, as well as the accompanying Strategic Enablers outlined in this policy.



Figure 1: NATO’s Principles and Commitments for CBRN Defence

CORE PRINCIPLE AND COMMITMENT 1: ENHANCED AND INTEGRATED CBRN MILITARY CAPABILITIES

28. NATO’s credible deterrence and defence is essential as a means to prevent conflict and war. NATO’s deterrence and defence will not be undermined by the proliferation, threat or use of WMD.
29. We will have the national and multinational military capabilities, including intelligence, personnel, equipment, policies, plans, exercises and training, required to address any CBRN threat, and to fight and prevail in any environment. We are investing in our military capabilities, including CBRN defence, in order to meet new and enduring challenges across all operational domains. We will continue to improve and adapt the sustainability, deployability, and interoperability of our capabilities for the evolving and demanding strategic environment. The Alliance supports the development of mobile and interoperable CBRN defence capabilities through its Joint CBRN Defence Capability Development Group. Our national capability development plans will support the full and timely implementation of CBRN defence capabilities, in particular those required by the Alliance in line with the NATO Defence Planning Process.

30. The implementation of CBRN defence capabilities is a fundamentally national responsibility. Although Allies have made progress in addressing capability gaps for CBRN defence, some shortfalls remain, and can only be addressed with the investment of necessary national resources.
31. **PREVENT:** Fully-resourced CBRN defence capabilities contribute to Allied security across the full spectrum from peacetime to crisis to conflict. NATO's CBRN defence capabilities contribute to prevent the conceptualization, development, possession, proliferation and use of WMD and related expertise, materials, technologies and means of delivery. NATO forces will be ready to deny access to CBRN materials and their means of delivery, disable and dispose of WMD and CBRN materials in operational contexts, respond against the source of any WMD attack, mitigate the effects of CBRN use, and eliminate an aggressor's WMD capabilities. The ability to conduct countering WMD and interdiction operations, including by sea, plays a central role in preventing the proliferation of WMD and CBRN materials, their means of delivery, and related materials and technologies.
32. Moreover, comprehensive and credible CBRN defence capabilities have a profound deterrent effect, by reducing the advantage that any adversary might hope to gain by acquiring WMD and by employing WMD against Allies. NATO will further protect against WMD use by maintaining a posture sufficient to deter attack. In the event of WMD attack, NATO is prepared to use its military capabilities to disrupt, deny and defeat WMD use, to protect Alliance populations, territories and forces, and to assist partners.
33. In that context, the fundamental purpose of NATO's nuclear capability is to preserve peace, prevent coercion, and deter aggression. Given the deteriorating security environment in Europe, a credible and united nuclear Alliance is essential. Nuclear weapons are unique. The circumstances in which NATO might have to use nuclear weapons are extremely remote. NATO reiterates that any employment of nuclear weapons against NATO would fundamentally alter the nature of a conflict. If the fundamental security of any of its members were to be threatened, however, NATO has the capabilities and resolve to impose costs on an adversary that would be unacceptable and far outweigh the benefits that any adversary could hope to achieve.
34. **PROTECT:** In order to fulfil NATO's core tasks, Allied forces must be enabled with integrated basic, enhanced and specialized CBRN defence capabilities. NATO's deployable forces in all services must be capable of protecting themselves against a wide range of CBRN threats in an operational context. Specialized CBRN defence units provide supplementary capabilities that can be tailored to enable operational success in specific mission types, including countering WMD, and to support combined operations in CBRN environments. NATO, as appropriate, supports these national capabilities, including through the Combined Joint CBRN Defence Task Force (CJ-CBRND-TF), a deployable strategic military asset designed to perform the full range of CBRN defence missions in support of deployed NATO forces, and the technical and scientific support provided by the NATO CBRN Reachback Element (CBRN RBE).
35. **RECOVER:** Military CBRN defence capabilities enable NATO forces to more quickly recover from the consequences of a CBRN incident, to sustain effective operations and to further support the recovery of affected populations, territories and forces. We will ensure that these capabilities are underpinned by appropriate resources, personnel, equipment and training. CBRN military medical capabilities are an essential element of recovery from CBRN use, and will be appropriately incorporated into NATO's doctrines, policies, concepts and capability development processes. Military medical personnel will be educated, trained and prepared to recognise and provide effective CBRN medical support or operational bio-response within an all-hazards framework.
36. **CAPABILITIES DELIVERY:** NATO will continue to support and facilitate national CBRN defence capabilities, including those of Allies and partners, through information exchange, to be in line with established practices, procedures and policies, planning, training, exercises, and technical and scientific support. Specific NATO assets, platforms and processes play a key role in supplementing national capability development efforts, including the NATO-wide network of Centres of Excellence (COEs), particularly the Joint CBRN Defence Centre of Excellence (JCBRN Defence COE) in the Czech Republic.
37. NATO is developing innovative means to deliver needed CBRN defence capabilities and close any capability gaps. To that end, we welcome multinational initiatives that enable the common development of new capabilities for participating Allies, including the High Visibility Projects for CBRN Defence launched by numerous Allies in October 2021, the Framework Nations Concept Cluster CBRN Protection, and the Smart Defence project in Pooling CBRN Capabilities. Building in part on these projects, NATO will continue to seek new means to facilitate Allied CBRN defence capabilities, without prejudice to fundamentally national responsibilities.
38. **DOCTRINES AND STRUCTURES:** To enable a timely, coordinated and effective response to any kind of CBRN threats, NATO will ensure an appropriate level of CBRN expertise and staffing throughout the NATO Command and Forces Structure. In particular, the timely implementation of CBRN Command and Control systems as a functional service across NATO is a priority. NATO, with the support of nations, will ensure a functioning and tested CBRN warning and

reporting network. These are essential to enable NATO to respond to CBRN incidents, and to proactively prevent CBRN proliferation and use. NATO will ensure that CBRN related intelligence, information and analysis can be effectively incorporated into all levels of Alliance civil and military decision-making.

39. NATO, led by the Joint CBRN Defence Capability Development Group, will further develop and refine the common doctrines, standards and policies that underpin our CBRN defence capabilities and forces and support the interoperability of our CBRN defence forces. The military medical community will support these efforts, with a view towards developing appropriate frameworks for military medical contributions to CBRN defence.

CORE PRINCIPLE AND COMMITMENT 2: IMPROVED RESILIENCE AGAINST CBRN THREATS

40. National and collective resilience are an essential basis for credible deterrence and defence and the effective fulfilment of the Alliance's core tasks. They are vital to our efforts to safeguard our societies, our populations and our shared values. The 2021 Strengthened Resilience Commitment reiterated that resilience is a national responsibility and a collective commitment. NATO's seven Baseline Requirements for national resilience provide a comprehensive framework to support the effective enablement of our armed forces and of NATO's core tasks. The Baseline Requirements include measures for CBRN preparedness, in particular those related to continuity of government and dealing with mass casualties or disruptive health crises.
41. An attack with CBRN materials or a large-scale CBRN incident could have devastating consequences for our societies and the critical infrastructure upon which they depend. This could have potential impacts on almost all seven baseline areas, and affect our society's ability to support military operations. Even a comparatively limited employment of CBRN substances may have a severe impact on the population, require significant attention by public authorities, demand considerable resources to mitigate impacts, and complicate the Alliance's readiness and responsiveness.
42. Allies have committed to enhance their national and collective resilience, addressing threats and challenges from both state and non-state actors, which take diverse forms and involve the use of a variety of tactics and tools. Recognising this, we will not permit CBRN threats to compromise our broader commitment to national resilience. Allied governments and first responders should possess the full range of capabilities required to respond effectively to a CBRN incident on their territory. Noting that resilience against CBRN threats remains a national responsibility, Allies are collectively committed to work together to reduce vulnerabilities.
43. **PREVENT:** Just as with military CBRN defence capabilities, national resilience against CBRN threats contributes to our security at all points of the spectrum from peacetime to crisis to conflict. It has an essential preventive and deterrent effect, by reducing the advantage that any adversary could hope to gain by the employment of CBRN. Pre-crisis coordination, arrangements and planning at a national level could be necessary to support a whole-of-government approach to CBRN preparedness and prevention. NATO could, as appropriate and upon request, support Allies in bolstering national capabilities to prevent theft and illicit trafficking of CBRN materials.
44. **PROTECT:** One of the three core functions of NATO Civil Preparedness, to provide essential services to the population, includes the provision of assistance to national authorities in protecting Alliance populations and critical infrastructure from the consequences of natural and technological disasters, including CBRN incidents. Allies have committed to ensuring that they have the civilian capabilities, including medical capabilities, needed to address large-scale crises. While nations have the primary responsibility for their domestic security and their own resilience, NATO can consider supporting national authorities in protecting against large-scale CBRN incidents or attacks, upon request. As such, NATO could further assist Allied national authorities in protecting relevant critical infrastructure. On request, NATO assets, including deployable forces and enabling capabilities, may support national authorities in strengthening their CBRN preparedness and consequence management.
45. At the same time, NATO's military forces require effective, secure civilian services and infrastructure, particularly in transportation, telecommunications, IT services, energy, food and water supply, law enforcement, and in the medical field. Consequently, ensuring national resilience against CBRN threats serves to protect our military forces, preventing CBRN threats against our nations from compromising our deterrence and defence posture.
46. **RECOVER:** We must be fully prepared to recover from the impact of a CBRN incident affecting NATO populations, territories and forces, whatever its origins, and to assist our partners, if necessary. In the event of a CBRN incident, national authorities have primary responsibility for leading the recovery and for ensuring effective civil-military coordination at the national level. NATO supports such efforts, as appropriate, through deployable assets, training, exercises, and policy guidance. Drawing on national and international best practices, NATO has issued non-binding guidelines for enhanced civil-military cooperation to deal with the consequences of large-scale CBRN events, and for

civil-military medical cooperation in response to CBRN mass casualty incidents. These guidelines are an example of the added value that NATO brings to supporting national resilience against, and recovery from, CBRN incidents.

47. As the COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted, effective whole-of-government and civil-military cooperation has been essential to address shortages of essential materials and equipment, managing movement restrictions for essential personnel, and ensuring the continuity of essential services. NATO Allies' support to each other and to partners during the pandemic included logistical support, including airlift, often coordinated through the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC), rather than primarily public health, medical, or direct CBRN assistance. Recognizing that in a CBRN crisis, NATO may be asked to provide support from across the full spectrum of Alliance capabilities, we will endeavour to ensure that our CBRN defence support and other forms of aid are well coordinated and jointly exercised. The EADRCC would be responsible, in the event of a CBRN incident afflicting a NATO Ally or partner, for coordinating bilateral requests for and offers of civil assistance.
48. Our resilience against CBRN threats also demands resilience against techniques and methods that may be deployed against NATO in order to weaken our ability to respond to CBRN incidents. These include cyberattack, hybrid techniques, and disinformation, all of which are likely to continue to be elements of future CBRN incidents. All efforts to strengthen resilience against CBRN threats, at the NATO and national levels, should incorporate these threat multipliers from the planning stage to implementation.
49. **CIVIL-MILITARY INTERACTION:** While military CBRN defence capabilities and civil preparedness should support and reinforce each other, they are not interchangeable and neither can replace the other. Ensuring both military readiness and national resilience demands effective, two-way civil-military interaction that is appropriately planned, exercised, and resourced. The COVID-19 pandemic has reinforced the importance of civil-military cooperation in a crisis and the potential contributing role of CBRN defence capabilities. It has highlighted that Allied military forces can be called upon to provide significant support to national civil authorities as a key instrument of national resilience, in cooperation with other relevant actors. Inversely, effective civilian support to military forces is indispensable to accomplishing military objectives. NATO will continue to take the necessary steps to strengthen civil-military interaction in support of CBRN defence.

STRATEGIC ENABLERS

50. Strategic enablers are crosscutting capabilities that enable the Alliance to fulfil the full range of its commitments. They anchor NATO's two core CBRN defence principles and commitments described above, in support of NATO's core tasks. The following strategic enablers facilitate NATO's efforts to defend against CBRN threats and WMD: capacity-building for military and civilian personnel; intelligence- and information-sharing; partnerships and outreach; strategic communications and public diplomacy; scientific and technical collaboration; and medical support.
51. **SHARED UNDERSTANDING:** Shared awareness and intelligence- and information-sharing are critical enablers for all aspects of NATO's CBRN defence mission, directly supporting strategy, planning, and decision-making, informing risk management, and facilitating improvements to the Alliance's operational capabilities through exercises, procurement, and other functions.
52. Reliable CBRN warning and reporting generates a shared understanding of our threat environment, and enables decision-makers to assess the impact and implications of planned or perpetrated CBRN incidents. Timely, accurate and evaluated intelligence is critical to enable early warning, to permit a rapid and effective response to potential threats, enable appropriate counter-proliferation measures, identify appropriate capability targets, support attribution, and to activate protection measures and response forces. It further permits us to use effective strategic communication, counter disinformation and misinformation, and reassure our publics in the face of CBRN risks, as we did following the 2018 Salisbury attack, the 2020 poisoning of Alexei Navalny and during Russia's 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. While always important, this is particularly relevant where an adversary uses a hybrid strategy to create ambiguity and attempt to impair Alliance decision-making.
53. Intelligence-sharing with partners also supports our response to CBRN threats. Allies are working to enhance their contributions of CBRN-related national intelligence and expertise, and will continue to seek to make our intelligence sharing ever more effective, timely and comprehensive.
54. **CAPACITY-BUILDING FOR MILITARY AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL** NATO is fully committed to building the capacities and expertise of all personnel, military and civilian, involved in CBRN defence in a prioritized and effective manner. Education, Training, Exercises and Evaluation (ETEE) are essential to enabling the Alliance to confront today's CBRN threats. Allies have primary responsibility for the education and training of national personnel and forces allocated to NATO, while the Alliance offers substantial support to ensure that personnel have the necessary capabilities to

succeed in this mission. NATO provides and coordinates an extensive portfolio of CBRN defence education and training for NATO forces, participating Allied national forces and civilian personnel, and authorized partners.

55. NATO forces must regularly exercise their CBRN defence capabilities, including the ability to operate in CBRN environments and to support CBRN emergency response. Major strategic exercises also often include CBRN defence elements, according to their training objectives. Exercise activities include both NATO-organized exercises, and national exercises in which Allies and Partners may participate as appropriate. Exercises and scenario-based discussions among NATO's civilian committees also serve to build our understanding of the CBRN threat and NATO's role in addressing it. NATO will include relevant CBRN defence aspects in major joint exercises, and incorporate CBRN and NATO Crisis Response System related CBRN aspects, in relevant events in the NATO HQ High Level Exercise Programme.
56. NATO Centres of Excellence are a key source of expertise for the Alliance. The JCBRN Defence COE in the Czech Republic, in particular, serves as a critical focal point for CBRN defence-related analysis, insight, and innovation. The JCBRN Defence COE provides training, capacity-building, and support to NATO analysis and programming for CBRN defence, as well as training for partners, without duplicating or competing with already existing NATO capabilities. Other NATO COEs and education and training facilities make important contributions to our CBRN defence, including the Defence against Terrorism COE, Military Medicine COE, Maritime Security COE, Explosive Ordnance Disposal COE, Strategic Communications COE, and the NATO Maritime Interdiction Operational Training Centre.
57. NATO's CBRN reachback capability provides an on-demand source of authoritative technical analysis and expert guidance that facilitates efforts to strengthen deterrence and defence, support operations, conduct exercises and respond to CBRN incidents through a dedicated network. NATO's CBRN Reachback Element, housed at the JCBRN Defence COE, is the focal point of CBRN reachback for the Alliance, together with Allies' national military and civilian CBRN defence capabilities, when needed and volunteered. The NATO CBRN reachback network provides actionable, full spectrum CBRN defence expertise and analysis to support operations and specified organisations.
58. **PARTNERSHIPS AND OUTREACH:** Partnerships and outreach activities bolster NATO's efforts to address CBRN threats, through two distinct and complementary lines of work, with international organizations and with NATO's bilateral partners. We will continue to strengthen each of these, with a view to enhancing our understanding of regional and global CBRN risks and threats and areas of associated responsibility and activity, and identifying practical cooperation opportunities that enhance mutual security, including information-sharing, exchanges on policy and standards, and joint training and exercises, in accordance with existing rules and procedures.
59. **UNITED NATIONS (UN) AND REGIONAL MULTILATERAL ORGANIZATIONS:** In an interlinked world with globally shared security challenges, effective outreach to and cooperation with international organizations is necessary to counter the threat posed by WMD. The UN is an indispensable actor with global reach, and is often the first international organization to come to the aid of a nation responding to a crisis. We will continue to enhance NATO-UN cooperation for addressing CBRN threats, including supporting the effective implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 and other non-proliferation resolutions. As appropriate, Allies will work together in their national capacities at the UN in support of effective multilateral non-proliferation efforts. NATO Allies will also continue to work together to support and strengthen the operationalization of the UN Secretary-General's Mechanism for the Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical or Biological Weapons. Allies also support the invaluable work of the World Health Organization, in particular, in responding to CBRN threats. NATO will continue to strengthen its engagement with regional multilateral organizations, including the African Union and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
60. **EUROPEAN UNION (EU):** The EU remains a unique and essential partner for NATO. This has been demonstrated by our strong and coordinated response to Russia's 2022 illegal and unprovoked full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Through mutual and effective coordination, NATO and the EU can mobilize a broad range of tools to respond to CBRN challenges, and better provide security in Europe, including through building the capacities of partners. As appropriate, NATO and the EU should seek to coordinate and de-conflict relevant CBRN-related civil preparedness and crisis management activities.
61. **ADN REGIMES:** While not a party to any international treaty, NATO serves as a platform for technical and political consultation between Allies and partners, to strengthen international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation regimes, and their contributions to our security. We will engage with relevant organizations, as appropriate, in support of efforts to counter WMD threats and reinforce the prohibitions on chemical and biological weapons, while avoiding unnecessary duplication. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons remains the essential bulwark against the spread of nuclear weapons. Allies will continue to support the critical work of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty Organization, and the International Atomic Energy Agency, and to strengthen the

implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. As appropriate, Allies will support international investigation and identification mechanisms within appropriate regimes in order to verify and enforce compliance, and support credible attribution in the event of a CBRN incident.

62. **BILATERAL PARTNERSHIPS:** NATO's bilateral partnerships also contribute to Allied security and that of NATO's large network of partners. NATO partners participate in joint exercises addressing WMD threats, and share CBRN defence-related expertise and information. They make valuable contributions to the work of the Joint CBRN Defence Capability Development Group, the Joint CBRN Defence COE and the Framework Nations Concept Cluster CBRN Protection. NATO has multiple partnerships mechanisms for which CBRN defence and resilience are focus areas, including the Science for Peace and Security Programme, and the Defence and Related Security Capacity-Building Initiative. CBRN defence is a regular focus of engagement with regional partnership groupings including the Partnership for Peace, Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. Considering the transnational nature of CBRN threats, NATO recognizes that strengthening the CBRN defence of its partners helps to sustain the overall security of the Alliance.
63. With a view to taking full advantage of available resources and minimizing duplication, NATO will continue to take steps to make partnerships more strategic, more coherent, and more effective in strengthening our CBRN defence. We will prioritize efforts that enhance the security of both NATO Allies and partners, including strengthening interoperability, building CBRN defence capabilities, conducting joint exercises and training, supporting defence- and security-related reforms, and enhancing civil preparedness and crisis management. As appropriate, we will work with partners to coordinate our efforts to strengthen the international arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation regime, as we have done, *inter alia*, in pursuing accountability for Syria's use of chemical weapons. The Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (GP), a primary international WMD threat reduction mechanism, offers a good example for working with civil authorities around the world for capacity-building to prevent, detect and respond to CBRN threats.
64. **STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY:** Strategic communications is an essential enabler of NATO's response to CBRN threats. It is critical to building awareness and support, reinforcing deterrence, enabling recovery and reassuring our publics. NATO will continue to employ coherent and calibrated strategic communications to convey that we are taking all appropriate steps to prevent WMD proliferation and protect our populations, forces and territories against CBRN threats.
65. Hostile information activities increasingly aim to undermine the Alliance. During the 2018 Salisbury attack, hostile information activities intended to hinder attribution and generate discord among NATO publics. In 2022, Russia dramatically heightened its disinformation campaign to justify its illegal, unprovoked full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and potentially to provide a pretext for further escalation, including its own possible use of chemical or biological weapons. Addressing hostile information activities, including propaganda and disinformation, is an integral element of CBRN defence and incident response.
66. Attribution, supported by an understanding of the information environment, is important to the strategic communications response to any CBRN incident. While attribution remains a national prerogative, NATO will continue to support effective attribution through our longstanding role as a forum for information-sharing and political consultation. As this policy is implemented, the NATO HQ Strategic Communications Framework on WMD Non-Proliferation and CBRN Defence will be updated as required.
67. **SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL COLLABORATION:** Scientific and technical collaboration is essential to understand and counter CBRN threats, and to ensure Alliance security in a rapidly-changing environment. Innovation is driving the evolution of the CBRN threat, including by enabling new chemical and biological materials, lowering the barriers to proliferation, and introducing destabilizing new delivery systems for WMD. At the same time, new capabilities in detection, forensics, decontamination, personal and collective protection, knowledge management, medical countermeasures and more offers new avenues for countering CBRN threats. Armed with the best available scientific guidance, NATO will effectively identify and navigate the interlinked risks and potential that innovation and EDTs presents for CBRN defence.
68. Spearheaded by the NATO Science and Technology Organization (STO), NATO will maintain a world-leading network of collaborative scientific expertise related to CBRN threats, defences, and countermeasures. NATO will continue to strengthen collaboration between its scientific, policy and planning communities, ensuring that our assessments of CBRN threats and our development of needed capabilities are both informed by cutting-edge science. We will also seek to expand our collaboration with relevant industry groups, focusing on understanding, and responding to, the intersection of innovation and CBRN risks.

69. **MEDICAL SUPPORT:** Medical capabilities support the two core CBRN defence principles and commitments through medical support to CBRN defence and countering WMD missions, health surveillance, protective and therapeutic medical countermeasures, and CBRN casualty care. They contribute to efforts to prevent, protect against, and recover from any use of CBRN materials against NATO. Recent CBRN incidents have highlighted the importance of healthcare systems in detecting and identifying the use of CBRN materials. In the event of a biological incident in particular, medical capabilities have a central role in biological detection and identification and in mitigating biological risk.
70. CBRN medical capabilities will be able to support and advise military and civilian authorities, within appropriate medical, legal and ethical frameworks, in accordance with national legal and regulatory considerations. NATO will take appropriate steps to guide the development of operational and strategic capabilities in this area, and future research.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

71. Our security environment with regards to CBRN threats has grown more complex and more challenging. The potential use of CBRN materials or WMD by state and non-state actors is a fundamental threat to our security. The norms and institutions related to the proliferation or use of WMD have been challenged by the use of CBRN materials in conflict and as tools of assassination, which we have condemned in the strongest possible terms. Moreover, emerging and disruptive technologies pose critical new challenges to our shared security in the CBRN realm, even as they open up new opportunities to maintain NATO's technological edge.
72. Since our founding, NATO has always adapted to changes in our security environment. We will continue to do so in order to address the significantly changed CBRN threat from Russia, non-state actors, and other states, the challenges to arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation regimes, and the risks and opportunities posed by emerging and disruptive technologies. Our approach to CBRN threats and risks will be integrated with our deterrence and defence posture, notably the Concept for the Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area, and the NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept, as well as our Strengthened Resilience Commitment, and policies to address cyber and hybrid threats.
73. We will have the military capabilities necessary to counter WMD proliferation and to operate effectively and to fight and prevail in any environment, and we will enhance our national and collective defence and resilience against CBRN threats of all types.
 - a. The Baseline Requirements are: 1) Assured continuity of government and critical government services; 2) resilient energy supplies; 3) ability to deal effectively with uncontrolled movement of people; 4) resilient food and water resources; 5) ability to deal with mass casualties; 6) resilient civil communications systems; 7) resilient transport systems.

STATEMENT BY THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL ON THE NEW START TREATY [FEBRUARY 3, 2023]

The NATO Invitees associate themselves with this Statement.

1. NATO Allies agree the New START Treaty contributes to international stability by constraining Russian and U.S. strategic nuclear forces. Therefore, we note with concern that Russia has failed to comply with legally-binding obligations under the New START Treaty.
2. Russia's refusal to convene a session of the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC) within the treaty-established timeframe, and to facilitate U.S. inspection activities on its territory since August 2022 prevents the United States from exercising important rights under the Treaty, and undermines the United States' ability to adequately verify Russian compliance with the Treaty's central limits. The United States is in compliance with the New START Treaty.
3. NATO Allies continue to view effective arms control as an essential contribution to our security objectives. The New START Treaty remains in the national security interest of all states, including NATO Allies. NATO Allies welcomed the February 2021 agreement between the United States and the Russian Federation to extend the New START Treaty for five years. However, Russia's noncompliance undermines the viability of the New START Treaty.
4. We call on Russia to fulfil its obligations under the Treaty by facilitating New START inspections on Russian territory, and by returning to participation in the Treaty's implementation body, the BCC.



NATO 2022

STRATEGIC CONCEPT

Adopted by Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Madrid

29 June 2022

PREFACE

We, the Heads of State and Government of the NATO Allies, have come together in Madrid at a critical time for our security and for international peace and stability. Today, we endorse a new Strategic Concept to ensure our Alliance remains fit and resourced for the future.

For more than seventy years, NATO has ensured the freedom and security of Allies. Our success is the result of the service and sacrifice of the women and men of our armed services. We owe them and their families a great debt of gratitude.

We remain steadfast in our resolve to protect our one billion citizens, defend our territory and safeguard our freedom and democracy. We will reinforce our unity, cohesion and solidarity, building on the enduring transatlantic bond between our nations and the strength of our shared democratic values. We reiterate our steadfast commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty and to defending each other from all threats, no matter where they stem from.

We will continue to work towards just, inclusive and lasting peace and remain a bulwark of the rules-based international order. We will retain a global perspective and work closely with our partners, other countries and international organisations, such as the European Union and the United Nations, to contribute to international peace and security.

Our world is contested and unpredictable. The Russian Federation's war of aggression against Ukraine has shattered peace and gravely altered our security environment. Its brutal and unlawful invasion, repeated violations of international humanitarian law and heinous attacks and atrocities have caused unspeakable suffering and destruction. A strong, independent Ukraine is vital for the stability of the Euro-Atlantic area. Moscow's behaviour reflects a pattern of Russian aggressive actions against its neighbours and the wider transatlantic community. We also face the persistent threat of terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations. Pervasive instability, rising strategic competition and advancing authoritarianism challenge the Alliance's interests and values.

Our new Strategic Concept reaffirms that NATO's key purpose is to ensure our collective defence, based on a 360-degree approach. It defines the Alliance's three core tasks: deterrence and defence; crisis prevention and management; and cooperative security. We underscore the need to significantly strengthen our deterrence and defence as the backbone of our Article 5 commitment to defend each other.

The fundamental purpose of NATO's nuclear capability is to preserve peace, prevent coercion and deter aggression. As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance. NATO's goal is a safer world for all; we seek to create the security environment for a world without nuclear weapons.

The Strategic Concept emphasises that ensuring our national and collective resilience is critical to all our core tasks and underpins our efforts to safeguard our nations, societies and shared values. It also emphasises the cross-cutting importance of investing in technological innovation and integrating climate change, human security and the Women, Peace and Security agenda across all our core tasks.

Our vision is clear: we want to live in a world where sovereignty, territorial integrity, human rights and international law are respected and where each country can choose its own path, free from aggression, coercion or subversion. We work with all who share these goals. We stand together, as Allies, to defend our freedom and contribute to a more peaceful world.

PURPOSE AND PRINCIPLES

1. NATO is determined to safeguard the freedom and security of Allies. Its key purpose and greatest responsibility is to ensure our collective defence, against all threats, from all directions. We are a defensive Alliance.
2. The transatlantic bond between our nations is indispensable to our security. We are bound together by common values: individual liberty, human rights, democracy and the rule of law. We remain firmly committed to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty.
3. NATO is the unique, essential and indispensable transatlantic forum to consult, coordinate and act on all matters related to our individual and collective security. We will strengthen our Alliance based on our indivisible security, solidarity, and ironclad commitment to defend each other, as enshrined in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Our ability to deter and defend is the backbone of that commitment.
4. NATO will continue to fulfil three core tasks: deterrence and defence; crisis prevention and management; and cooperative security. These are complementary to ensure the collective defence and security of all Allies.

5. We will enhance our individual and collective resilience and technological edge. These efforts are critical to fulfil the Alliance's core tasks. We will promote good governance and integrate climate change, human security and the Women, Peace and Security agenda across all our tasks. We will continue to advance gender equality as a reflection of our values.

STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

6. The Euro-Atlantic area is not at peace. The Russian Federation has violated the norms and principles that contributed to a stable and predictable European security order. We cannot discount the possibility of an attack against Allies' sovereignty and territorial integrity. Strategic competition, pervasive instability and recurrent shocks define our broader security environment. The threats we face are global and interconnected.
7. Authoritarian actors challenge our interests, values and democratic way of life. They are investing in sophisticated conventional, nuclear and missile capabilities, with little transparency or regard for international norms and commitments. Strategic competitors test our resilience and seek to exploit the openness, interconnectedness and digitalisation of our nations. They interfere in our democratic processes and institutions and target the security of our citizens through hybrid tactics, both directly and through proxies. They conduct malicious activities in cyberspace and space, promote disinformation campaigns, instrumentalise migration, manipulate energy supplies and employ economic coercion. These actors are also at the forefront of a deliberate effort to undermine multilateral norms and institutions and promote authoritarian models of governance.
8. The Russian Federation is the most significant and direct threat to Allies' security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. It seeks to establish spheres of influence and direct control through coercion, subversion, aggression and annexation. It uses conventional, cyber and hybrid means against us and our partners. Its coercive military posture, rhetoric and proven willingness to use force to pursue its political goals undermine the rules-based international order. The Russian Federation is modernising its nuclear forces and expanding its novel and disruptive dual-capable delivery systems, while employing coercive nuclear signalling. It aims to destabilise countries to our East and South. In the High North, its capability to disrupt Allied reinforcements and freedom of navigation across the North Atlantic is a strategic challenge to the Alliance. Moscow's military build-up, including in the Baltic, Black and Mediterranean Sea regions, along with its military integration with Belarus, challenge our security and interests.
9. NATO does not seek confrontation and poses no threat to the Russian Federation. We will continue to respond to Russian threats and hostile actions in a united and responsible way. We will significantly strengthen deterrence and defence for all Allies, enhance our resilience against Russian coercion and support our partners to counter malign interference and aggression. In light of its hostile policies and actions, we cannot consider the Russian Federation to be our partner. However, we remain willing to keep open channels of communication with Moscow to manage and mitigate risks, prevent escalation and increase transparency. We seek stability and predictability in the Euro-Atlantic area and between NATO and the Russian Federation. Any change in our relationship depends on the Russian Federation halting its aggressive behaviour and fully complying with international law.
10. Terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations, is the most direct asymmetric threat to the security of our citizens and to international peace and prosperity. Terrorist organisations seek to attack or inspire attacks against Allies. They have expanded their networks, enhanced their capabilities and invested in new technologies to improve their reach and lethality. Non-state armed groups, including transnational terrorist networks and state supported actors, continue to exploit conflict and weak governance to recruit, mobilise and expand their foothold.
11. Conflict, fragility and instability in Africa and the Middle East directly affect our security and the security of our partners. NATO's southern neighbourhood, particularly the Middle East, North Africa and Sahel regions, faces interconnected security, demographic, economic and political challenges. These are aggravated by the impact of climate change, fragile institutions, health emergencies and food insecurity. This situation provides fertile ground for the proliferation of non-state armed groups, including terrorist organisations. It also enables destabilising and coercive interference by strategic competitors.
12. Pervasive instability results in violence against civilians, including conflict-related sexual violence, as well as attacks against cultural property and environmental damage. It contributes to forced displacement, fuelling human trafficking and irregular migration. These trends pose serious transnational and humanitarian challenges. They undermine human and state security and have a disproportionate impact on women, children and minority groups.

13. The People's Republic of China's (PRC) stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests, security and values. The PRC employs a broad range of political, economic and military tools to increase its global footprint and project power, while remaining opaque about its strategy, intentions and military build-up. The PRC's malicious hybrid and cyber operations and its confrontational rhetoric and disinformation target Allies and harm Alliance security. The PRC seeks to control key technological and industrial sectors, critical infrastructure, and strategic materials and supply chains. It uses its economic leverage to create strategic dependencies and enhance its influence. It strives to subvert the rules-based international order, including in the space, cyber and maritime domains. The deepening strategic partnership between the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation and their mutually reinforcing attempts to undercut the rules-based international order run counter to our values and interests.
14. We remain open to constructive engagement with the PRC, including to build reciprocal transparency, with a view to safeguarding the Alliance's security interests. We will work together responsibly, as Allies, to address the systemic challenges posed by the PRC to Euro-Atlantic security and ensure NATO's enduring ability to guarantee the defence and security of Allies. We will boost our shared awareness, enhance our resilience and preparedness, and protect against the PRC's coercive tactics and efforts to divide the Alliance. We will stand up for our shared values and the rules-based international order, including freedom of navigation.
15. Cyberspace is contested at all times. Malign actors seek to degrade our critical infrastructure, interfere with our government services, extract intelligence, steal intellectual property and impede our military activities.
16. Strategic competitors and potential adversaries are investing in technologies that could restrict our access and freedom to operate in space, degrade our space capabilities, target our civilian and military infrastructure, impair our defence and harm our security.
17. Emerging and disruptive technologies bring both opportunities and risks. They are altering the character of conflict, acquiring greater strategic importance and becoming key arenas of global competition. Technological primacy increasingly influences success on the battlefield.
18. The erosion of the arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation architecture has negatively impacted strategic stability. The Russian Federation's violations and selective implementation of its arms control obligations and commitments have contributed to the deterioration of the broader security landscape. The potential use of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear materials or weapons against NATO by hostile state and non-state actors remains a threat to our security. Iran and North Korea continue to develop their nuclear and missile programmes. Syria, North Korea and the Russian Federation, along with non-state actors, have resorted to the use of chemical weapons. The PRC is rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenal and is developing increasingly sophisticated delivery systems, without increasing transparency or engaging in good faith in arms control or risk reduction.
19. Climate change is a defining challenge of our time, with a profound impact on Allied security. It is a crisis and threat multiplier. It can exacerbate conflict, fragility and geopolitical competition. Increasing temperatures cause rising sea levels, wildfires and more frequent and extreme weather events, disrupting our societies, undermining our security and threatening the lives and livelihoods of our citizens. Climate change also affects the way our armed forces operate. Our infrastructure, assets and bases are vulnerable to its effects. Our forces need to operate in more extreme climate conditions and our militaries are more frequently called upon to assist in disaster relief.

NATO'S CORE TASKS

20. **DETERRENCE AND DEFENCE:** While NATO is a defensive Alliance, no one should doubt our strength and resolve to defend every inch of Allied territory, preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all Allies and prevail against any aggressor. In an environment of strategic competition, we will enhance our global awareness and reach to deter, defend, contest and deny across all domains and directions, in line with our 360-degree approach. NATO's deterrence and defence posture is based on an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional and missile defence capabilities, complemented by space and cyber capabilities. It is defensive, proportionate and fully in line with our international commitments. We will employ military and non-military tools in a proportionate, coherent and integrated way to respond to all threats to our security in the manner, timing and in the domain of our choosing.
21. We will significantly strengthen our deterrence and defence posture to deny any potential adversary any possible opportunities for aggression. To that end, we will ensure a substantial and persistent presence on land, at sea, and in the air, including through strengthened integrated air and missile defence. We will deter and defend forward with robust in-place, multi-domain, combat-ready forces, enhanced command and control arrangements, prepositioned ammunition and equipment and improved capacity and infrastructure to rapidly reinforce any Ally, including at short or no notice. We will adjust the balance between in-place forces and reinforcement to strengthen deterrence and the

Alliance's ability to defend. Commensurate with the threats we face, we will ensure our deterrence and defence posture remains credible, flexible, tailored and sustainable.

22. We will continue to enhance the collective readiness, responsiveness, deployability, integration and interoperability of our forces. We will individually and collectively deliver the full range of forces, capabilities, plans, resources, assets and infrastructure needed for deterrence and defence, including for high-intensity, multi-domain warfighting against nuclear-armed peer-competitors. We will ensure a robust, resilient and integrated command structure, increase the alignment of national and NATO defence plans and strengthen and modernise the NATO force structure. We will strengthen training and exercising, adapt and streamline our decision-making processes, enhance our planning and improve the effectiveness of our crisis response system.
23. Maritime security is key to our peace and prosperity. We will strengthen our posture and situational awareness to deter and defend against all threats in the maritime domain, uphold freedom of navigation, secure maritime trade routes and protect our main lines of communications.
24. We will expedite our digital transformation, adapt the NATO Command Structure for the information age and enhance our cyber defences, networks and infrastructure. We will promote innovation and increase our investments in emerging and disruptive technologies to retain our interoperability and military edge. We will work together to adopt and integrate new technologies, cooperate with the private sector, protect our innovation ecosystems, shape standards and commit to principles of responsible use that reflect our democratic values and human rights.
25. Maintaining secure use of and unfettered access to space and cyberspace are key to effective deterrence and defence. We will enhance our ability to operate effectively in space and cyberspace to prevent, detect, counter and respond to the full spectrum of threats, using all available tools. A single or cumulative set of malicious cyber activities; or hostile operations to, from, or within space; could reach the level of armed attack and could lead the North Atlantic Council to invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. We recognise the applicability of international law and will promote responsible behaviour in cyberspace and space. We will also boost the resilience of the space and cyber capabilities upon which we depend for our collective defence and security.
26. We will pursue a more robust, integrated and coherent approach to building national and Alliance-wide resilience against military and non-military threats and challenges to our security, as a national responsibility and a collective commitment rooted in Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty. We will work towards identifying and mitigating strategic vulnerabilities and dependencies, including with respect to our critical infrastructure, supply chains and health systems. We will enhance our energy security and invest in a stable and reliable energy supply, suppliers and sources. We will ensure civil preparedness to provide for continuity of government, the delivery of essential services to our populations and civil support to our armed forces. We will boost our capacity to prepare for, resist, respond to, and quickly recover from strategic shocks and disruptions, and ensure the continuity of the Alliance's activities.
27. We will invest in our ability to prepare for, deter, and defend against the coercive use of political, economic, energy, information and other hybrid tactics by states and non-state actors. Hybrid operations against Allies could reach the level of armed attack and could lead the North Atlantic Council to invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. We will continue to support our partners to counter hybrid challenges and seek to maximise synergies with other relevant actors, such as the European Union.
28. The fundamental purpose of NATO's nuclear capability is to preserve peace, prevent coercion and deter aggression. Nuclear weapons are unique. The circumstances in which NATO might have to use nuclear weapons are extremely remote. Any employment of nuclear weapons against NATO would fundamentally alter the nature of a conflict. The Alliance has the capabilities and resolve to impose costs on an adversary that would be unacceptable and far outweigh the benefits that any adversary could hope to achieve.
29. The strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States, are the supreme guarantee of the security of the Alliance. The independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France have a deterrent role of their own and contribute significantly to the overall security of the Alliance. These Allies' separate centres of decision-making contribute to deterrence by complicating the calculations of potential adversaries. NATO's nuclear deterrence posture also relies on the United States' nuclear weapons forward-deployed in Europe and the contributions of Allies concerned. National contributions of dual-capable aircraft to NATO's nuclear deterrence mission remain central to this effort.
30. NATO will take all necessary steps to ensure the credibility, effectiveness, safety and security of the nuclear deterrent mission. The Alliance is committed to ensuring greater integration and coherence of capabilities and activities across all domains and the spectrum of conflict, while reaffirming the unique and distinct role of nuclear deterrence. NATO will continue to maintain credible deterrence, strengthen its strategic communications, enhance the effectiveness of its exercises and reduce strategic risks.

31. We will continue to invest in our defence against Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear threats. We will enhance our policies, plans, training and exercises and assess our capabilities to ensure that these requirements are integrated into our deterrence and defence posture.
32. Strategic stability, delivered through effective deterrence and defence, arms control and disarmament, and meaningful and reciprocal political dialogue, remains essential to our security. Arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation strongly contribute to the Alliance's objectives. Allies' efforts on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation aim to reduce risk and enhance security, transparency, verification, and compliance. We will pursue all elements of strategic risk reduction, including promoting confidence building and predictability through dialogue, increasing understanding, and establishing effective crisis management and prevention tools. These efforts will take the prevailing security environment and the security of all Allies into account and complement the Alliance's deterrence and defence posture. We will make use of NATO as a platform for in-depth discussion and close consultations on arms control efforts.
33. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is the essential bulwark against the spread of nuclear weapons and we remain strongly committed to its full implementation, including Article VI. NATO's goal is to create the security environment for a world without nuclear weapons, consistent with the goals of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
34. Countering terrorism is essential to our collective defence. NATO's role in the fight against terrorism contributes to all three core tasks and is integral to the Alliance's 360-degree approach to deterrence and defence. Terrorist organisations threaten the security of our populations, forces and territory. We will continue to counter, deter, defend and respond to threats and challenges posed by terrorist groups, based on a combination of prevention, protection and denial measures. We will enhance cooperation with the international community, including the United Nations and the European Union, to tackle the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism.
35. **CRISIS PREVENTION AND MANAGEMENT:** NATO Allies have a shared interest in contributing to stability and managing conflicts together through NATO. We will continue to work to prevent and respond to crises when these have the potential to affect Allied security. We will build on the unique capabilities and expertise we have acquired in crisis management. To that end, we will invest in crisis response, preparedness and management, through regular exercises and leverage our ability to coordinate, conduct sustain and support multinational crisis response operations.
36. We will ensure the resources, capabilities, training and command and control arrangements to deploy and sustain military and civilian crisis management, stabilisation and counter-terrorism operations, including at strategic distance. Building on the lessons learned over the past three decades, including through our operations in Afghanistan, we will continue to improve our readiness, our military and civilian capabilities and civil-military planning and coordination. We will further develop the Alliance's ability to support civilian crisis management and relief operations and to prepare for the effects of climate change, food insecurity and health emergencies on Allied security. This will allow us to respond to any contingency at short notice.
37. Partners make an important contribution to NATO-led crisis management. We will continue to ensure sustained political engagement and military interoperability with partners who express an interest in contributing to our missions and operations.
38. We will increase our efforts to anticipate and prevent crises and conflicts. Prevention is a sustainable way to contribute to stability and Allied security. We will enhance support for our partners, including to help build their capacity to counter terrorism and address shared security challenges. We will scale up the size and scope of our security and capacity-building assistance to vulnerable partners in our neighbourhood and beyond, to strengthen their preparedness and resilience and boost their capabilities to counter malign interference, prevent destabilisation and counter aggression.
39. Human security, including the protection of civilians and civilian harm mitigation, is central to our approach to crisis prevention and management. We will work with other international actors to address the broader conditions fuelling crises and pervasive instability and contribute to stabilisation and reconstruction. We will reinforce our coordination and cooperation with the United Nations and the European Union, as well as with other regional organisations such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the African Union.
40. **COOPERATIVE SECURITY:** NATO's enlargement has been a historic success. It has strengthened our Alliance, ensured the security of millions of European citizens and contributed to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. We reaffirm our Open Door policy, consistent with Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, as an expression of our fundamental values and our strategic interest in Euro-Atlantic peace and stability. Our door remains open to all European democracies that share the values of our Alliance, which are willing and able to assume the responsibilities and obligations of membership, and whose membership contributes to our common security. Decisions on membership are taken by NATO Allies and no third party has a say in this process.

41. The security of countries aspiring to become members of the Alliance is intertwined with our own. We strongly support their independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. We will strengthen political dialogue and cooperation with those who aim to join the Alliance, help strengthen their resilience against malign interference, build their capabilities, and enhance our practical support to advance their Euro- Atlantic aspirations. We will continue to develop our partnerships with Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia and Ukraine to advance our common interest in Euro-Atlantic peace, stability and security. We reaffirm the decision we took at the 2008 Bucharest Summit and all subsequent decisions with respect to Georgia and Ukraine.
42. Political dialogue and practical cooperation with partners, based on mutual respect and benefit, contribute to stability beyond our borders, enhance our security at home and support NATO's core tasks. Partnerships are crucial to protect the global commons, enhance our resilience and uphold the rules-based international order.
43. The European Union is a unique and essential partner for NATO. NATO Allies and EU members share the same values. NATO and the EU play complementary, coherent and mutually reinforcing roles in supporting international peace and security. On the basis of our longstanding cooperation, we will enhance the NATO-EU strategic partnership, strengthen political consultations and increase cooperation on issues of common interest, such as military mobility, resilience, the impact of climate change on security, emerging and disruptive technologies, human security, the Women, Peace and Security agenda, as well as countering cyber and hybrid threats and addressing the systemic challenges posed by the PRC to Euro-Atlantic security. For the development of the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU, non- EU Allies' fullest involvement in EU defence efforts is essential. NATO recognises the value of a stronger and more capable European defence that contributes positively to transatlantic and global security and is complementary to, and interoperable with NATO. Initiatives to increase defence spending and develop coherent, mutually reinforcing capabilities, while avoiding unnecessary duplications, are key to our joint efforts to make the Euro-Atlantic area safer.
44. We will strengthen our ties with partners that share the Alliance's values and interest in upholding the rules-based international order. We will enhance dialogue and cooperation to defend that order, uphold our values and protect the systems, standards and technologies on which they depend. We will increase outreach to countries in our broader neighbourhood and across the globe and remain open to engagement with any country or organisation, when doing so could bolster our mutual security. Our approach will remain interest-driven, flexible, focused on addressing shared threats and challenges, and able to adapt to changing geopolitical realities.
45. The Western Balkans and the Black Sea region are of strategic importance for the Alliance. We will continue to support the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of interested countries in these regions. We will enhance efforts to bolster their capabilities to address the distinct threats and challenges they face and boost their resilience against malign third-party interference and coercion. We will work with partners to tackle shared security threats and challenges in regions of strategic interest to the Alliance, including the Middle East and North Africa and the Sahel regions. The Indo-Pacific is important for NATO, given that developments in that region can directly affect Euro- Atlantic security. We will strengthen dialogue and cooperation with new and existing partners in the Indo-Pacific to tackle cross-regional challenges and shared security interests.
46. NATO should become the leading international organisation when it comes to understanding and adapting to the impact of climate change on security. The Alliance will lead efforts to assess the impact of climate change on defence and security and address those challenges. We will contribute to combatting climate change by reducing greenhouse gas emissions, improving energy efficiency, investing in the transition to clean energy sources and leveraging green technologies, while ensuring military effectiveness and a credible deterrence and defence posture.

ENSURING THE ALLIANCE'S CONTINUED SUCCESS

1. Investing in NATO is the best way to ensure the enduring bond between European and North American Allies, while contributing to global peace and stability. We will continue to reinforce our political unity and solidarity and to broaden and deepen our consultations to address all matters that affect our security. We commit to reinforce consultations when the security and stability of an Ally is threatened or when our fundamental values and principles are at risk.
2. We will share equitably responsibilities and risks for our defence and security. We will provide all the necessary resources, infrastructure, capabilities and forces to deliver fully on our core tasks and implement our decisions. We will ensure our nations meet the commitments under the Defence Investment Pledge, in its entirety, to provide the full range of required capabilities. We will build on the progress made to ensure that increased national defence expenditures and NATO common funding will be commensurate with the challenges of a more contested security order. NATO is indispensable to Euro-Atlantic security. It guarantees our peace, freedom and prosperity. As Allies, we will continue to stand together to defend our security, values, and democratic way of life.

NATO 2023 VILNIUS SUMMIT COMMUNIQUÉ – ISSUED BY NATO HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT PARTICIPATING IN THE MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL IN VILNIUS [JULY 11, 2023]

The NATO Invitee associates itself with this Communiqué.

1. We, the Heads of State and Government of the North Atlantic Alliance, bound by shared values of individual liberty, human rights, democracy, and the rule of law, have gathered in Vilnius as war continues on the European continent, to reaffirm our enduring transatlantic bond, unity, cohesion, and solidarity at a critical time for our security and international peace and stability. NATO is a defensive Alliance. It is the unique, essential and indispensable transatlantic forum to consult, coordinate and act on all matters related to our individual and collective security. We reaffirm our iron-clad commitment to defend each other and every inch of Allied territory at all times, protect our one billion citizens, and safeguard our freedom and democracy, in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. We will continue to ensure our collective defence from all threats, no matter where they stem from, based on a 360-degree approach, to fulfil NATO's three core tasks of deterrence and defence, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security. We adhere to international law and to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and are committed to upholding the rules-based international order. This Summit marks a milestone in strengthening our Alliance.
2. We warmly welcome President Zelenskyy to the inaugural meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Council. We look forward to our valuable exchanges with the Heads of State and Government of Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and the Republic of Korea, as well as the President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission at this Summit. We also welcome the engagements with the Foreign Ministers of Georgia and the Republic of Moldova, and with the Deputy Foreign Minister of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as we continue to consult closely on the implementation of NATO's tailored support measures.
3. We welcome Finland as the newest member of our Alliance. This is an historic step for Finland and for NATO. For many years, we worked closely as partners; we now stand together as Allies. NATO membership makes Finland safer, and NATO stronger.
4. We reaffirm our commitment to NATO's Open Door policy and to Article 10 of the Washington Treaty. Every nation has the right to choose its own security arrangements. We look forward to welcoming Sweden as a full member of the Alliance and, in this regard, welcome the agreement reached between the NATO Secretary General, the President of Türkiye, and the Prime Minister of Sweden.
5. Peace in the Euro-Atlantic area has been shattered. The Russian Federation has violated the norms and principles that contributed to a stable and predictable European security order. The Russian Federation is the most significant and direct threat to Allies' security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. Terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations, is the most direct asymmetric threat to the security of our citizens and to international peace and prosperity. The threats we face are global and interconnected.
6. Strategic competition, pervasive instability and recurrent shocks define our broader security environment. Conflict, fragility and instability in Africa and the Middle East directly affect our security and the security of our partners. The People's Republic of China's (PRC) stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests, security and values. We remain open to constructive engagement with the PRC, including to build reciprocal transparency, with a view to safeguarding the Alliance's security interests. We continue to be confronted by cyber, space, hybrid and other asymmetric threats, and by the malicious use of emerging and disruptive technologies.
7. Russia bears full responsibility for its illegal, unjustifiable, and unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine, which has gravely undermined Euro-Atlantic and global security and for which it must be held fully accountable. We continue to condemn in the strongest terms Russia's blatant violations of international law, the Charter of the United Nations, and OSCE commitments and principles. We do not and will never recognise Russia's illegal and illegitimate annexations, including Crimea. There can be no impunity for Russian war crimes and other atrocities, such as attacks against civilians and the destruction of civilian infrastructure that deprives millions of Ukrainians of basic human services. All those responsible must be held accountable for violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law, particularly against Ukraine's civilian population, including the forced deportation of children and conflict-related sexual violence. The destruction of the Kakhovka dam highlights the brutal consequences of the war started by Russia. Russia's war has had a profound impact on the environment, nuclear safety, energy and food security, the global economy, and the welfare of billions of people around the world. Allies are working to enable exports of Ukrainian grain and actively support international efforts to alleviate the global food crisis.

8. Russia must immediately stop this illegal war of aggression, cease its use of force against Ukraine, and completely and unconditionally withdraw all of its forces and equipment from the territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders, extending to its territorial waters. We urge all countries not to provide any kind of assistance to Russia's aggression and condemn all those who are actively facilitating Russia's war. Belarus' support has been instrumental as it continues to provide its territory and infrastructure to allow Russian forces to attack Ukraine and sustain Russia's aggression. In particular Belarus, but also Iran, must end their complicity with Russia and return to compliance with international law.
9. We welcome the strong support in the UN General Assembly for efforts to promote a comprehensive, just, and lasting peace in Ukraine. We welcome and support President Zelenskyy's commitment in setting out the principles for such a peace through his Peace Formula. We are committed to achieving a just and lasting peace that upholds the principles of the UN Charter, in particular sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence. We underline that this cannot be realised without Russia's complete and unconditional withdrawal. While we have called on Russia to engage constructively in credible negotiations with Ukraine, Russia has not shown any genuine openness to a just and lasting peace.
10. We reaffirm our unwavering solidarity with the government and people of Ukraine in the heroic defence of their nation, their land, and our shared values. We fully support Ukraine's inherent right to self-defence as enshrined in Article 51 of the UN Charter. We remain steadfast in our commitment to further step up political and practical support to Ukraine as it continues to defend its independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders, and will continue our support for as long as it takes. We welcome efforts of all Allies and partners engaged in providing support to Ukraine.
11. We fully support Ukraine's right to choose its own security arrangements. Ukraine's future is in NATO. We reaffirm the commitment we made at the 2008 Summit in Bucharest that Ukraine will become a member of NATO, and today we recognise that Ukraine's path to full Euro-Atlantic integration has moved beyond the need for the Membership Action Plan. Ukraine has become increasingly interoperable and politically integrated with the Alliance, and has made substantial progress on its reform path. In line with the 1997 Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and Ukraine and the 2009 Complement, Allies will continue to support and review Ukraine's progress on interoperability as well as additional democratic and security sector reforms that are required. NATO Foreign Ministers will regularly assess progress through the adapted Annual National Programme. The Alliance will support Ukraine in making these reforms on its path towards future membership. We will be in a position to extend an invitation to Ukraine to join the Alliance when Allies agree and conditions are met.
12. The security of Ukraine is of great importance to Allies and the Alliance. To support Ukraine's further integration with NATO, today we have agreed a substantial package of expanded political and practical support. We have decided to establish the NATO-Ukraine Council, a new joint body where Allies and Ukraine sit as equal members to advance political dialogue, engagement, cooperation, and Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic aspirations for membership in NATO. It will provide for joint consultations, decision-making, and activities, and will also serve as a crisis consultation mechanism between NATO and Ukraine.
13. The continued delivery of urgently needed non-lethal assistance to Ukraine by NATO through the Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP) remains a priority. Since the Madrid Summit, Allies and partners have committed over 500 million Euros to the CAP. To support Ukraine's deterrence and defence in the short, medium, and long term, we have agreed today to further develop the CAP into a multi-year programme for Ukraine. The assistance provided will help rebuild the Ukrainian security and defence sector and transition Ukraine towards full interoperability with NATO. Allies will continue to fund the CAP in a sustained and predictable way. We highly welcome and encourage partner contributions.
14. Russia has increased its multi-domain military build-up and presence in the Baltic, Black, and Mediterranean Sea regions, and maintains significant military capabilities in the Arctic. Russia's more assertive posture, novel military capabilities, and provocative activities, including near NATO borders, as well as its large-scale no-notice and snap exercises, continue to threaten the security of the Euro-Atlantic area. In the High North, its capability to disrupt Allied reinforcements and freedom of navigation across the North Atlantic is a strategic challenge to the Alliance. NATO and Allies will continue to undertake necessary, calibrated, and coordinated activities, including by exercising relevant plans.
15. Russia's deepening military integration with Belarus, including the deployment of advanced Russian military capabilities and military personnel in Belarus, has implications for regional stability and the defence of the Alliance. NATO will remain vigilant and further monitor developments closely, in particular the potential deployment of so-called private military companies to Belarus. We call on Belarus to stop its malign activities against its neighbours, to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, and to abide by international law.

16. Russia is modernising its nuclear forces, including its large stockpile of theatre-range weapons, and expanding its novel and disruptive dual-capable delivery systems. It is unacceptable that Russia uses such dual-capable systems to attack civilians and critical civilian infrastructure in Ukraine. We condemn Russia's announced intention to deploy nuclear weapons and nuclear-capable systems on Belarusian territory, which further demonstrates how Russia's repeated actions undermine strategic stability and overall security in the Euro-Atlantic area. We condemn Russia's irresponsible nuclear rhetoric and coercive nuclear signalling. We recall the Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear Weapons States issued on 3 January 2022 on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races. We call on Russia to recommit – in words and deeds – to the principles enshrined in that Statement.
17. Russia's actions demonstrate a posture of strategic intimidation and underline the continued need for NATO to monitor all of these developments and adapt its posture as necessary. Allies will continue to work closely together to address the threats and challenges posed by Russia and reiterate that any use of Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear weapons by Russia would be met with severe consequences.
18. Russia has intensified its hybrid actions against NATO Allies and partners, including through proxies. This includes interference in democratic processes, political and economic coercion, widespread disinformation campaigns, malicious cyber activities, and illegal and disruptive activities of Russian intelligence services. We are enhancing the tools at our disposal to counter Russian hybrid actions and will ensure that the Alliance and Allies are prepared to deter and defend against hybrid attacks.
19. We seek stability and predictability in the Euro-Atlantic area and between NATO and Russia. NATO does not seek confrontation and poses no threat to Russia. In light of its hostile policies and actions, we cannot consider Russia to be our partner. Any change in our relationship depends on Russia halting its aggressive behaviour and fully complying with international law. We remain willing to keep open channels of communication with Moscow to manage and mitigate risks, prevent escalation, and increase transparency. At the same time, we will continue to consult on and assess the implications of Russia's policies and actions for our security, and respond to Russian threats and hostile actions in a united and responsible way.
20. We categorically reject and condemn terrorism in the strongest possible terms. Countering terrorism in all its forms and manifestations is essential to our collective defence. NATO's role in the fight against terrorism contributes to all three core tasks of the Alliance and is integral to the Alliance's 360-degree approach to deterrence and defence. Allies will continue to fight this threat with determination, resolve, and in solidarity. As part of a broader effort to better respond collectively to this threat, we will further develop Allies' capabilities, and continue to engage with the Global Coalition to Defeat Da'esh and with partner countries in order to support their efforts and to help them build their capacity to counter terrorism. NATO will also continue to engage, as appropriate, with other international actors to ensure added value and complementarity.
21. Terrorist organisations threaten the security of our populations, forces and territory. They have expanded their networks, enhanced their capabilities and invested in new technologies to improve their reach and lethality. We will continue to deter, defend and respond to threats and challenges posed by terrorist groups, based on a combination of prevention, protection and denial measures. We have today tasked the Council in permanent session to update NATO's Policy Guidelines and Action Plan on Counter-Terrorism, and reassess, in consultation with our regional partners, the areas where NATO can provide civil-military assistance to partners in this field. Our approach to terrorism, and its causes, is in accordance with international law and the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, and upholds all relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions on the fight against terrorism.
22. NATO's southern neighbourhood, particularly the Middle East, North Africa and Sahel regions, faces interconnected security, demographic, economic, and political challenges. These are aggravated by the impact of climate change, fragile institutions, health emergencies, and food insecurity. This situation provides fertile ground for the proliferation of non-state armed groups, including terrorist organisations. It also enables destabilising and coercive interference by strategic competitors. Russia is fuelling tensions and instability across these regions. Pervasive instability results in violence against civilians, including conflict-related sexual violence, as well as attacks against cultural property and environmental damage. It contributes to forced displacement, fuelling human trafficking and irregular migration. These trends pose serious transnational and humanitarian challenges and have a disproportionate impact on women, children, and minorities. In response to the profound implications of these threats and challenges within and in the vicinity of the Euro-Atlantic area, we have today tasked the North Atlantic Council in permanent session to launch a comprehensive and deep reflection on existing and emerging threats and challenges, and opportunities for engagements with our partner nations, international organisations, and other relevant actors in the region, to be presented by our next Summit in 2024.
23. The People's Republic of China's stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests, security and values. The PRC employs a broad range of political, economic, and military tools to increase its global footprint and project power, while remaining opaque about its strategy, intentions and military build-up. The PRC's malicious

hybrid and cyber operations and its confrontational rhetoric and disinformation target Allies and harm Alliance security. The PRC seeks to control key technological and industrial sectors, critical infrastructure, and strategic materials and supply chains. It uses its economic leverage to create strategic dependencies and enhance its influence. It strives to subvert the rules-based international order, including in the space, cyber and maritime domains.

24. We remain open to constructive engagement with the PRC, including to build reciprocal transparency, with a view to safeguarding the Alliance's security interests. We are working together responsibly, as Allies, to address the systemic challenges posed by the PRC to Euro-Atlantic security and ensure NATO's enduring ability to guarantee the defence and security of Allies. We are boosting our shared awareness, enhancing our resilience and preparedness, and protecting against the PRC's coercive tactics and efforts to divide the Alliance. We will stand up for our shared values and the rules-based international order, including freedom of navigation.
25. The deepening strategic partnership between the PRC and Russia and their mutually reinforcing attempts to undercut the rules-based international order run counter to our values and interests. We call on the PRC to play a constructive role as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, to condemn Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, to abstain from supporting Russia's war effort in any way, to cease amplifying Russia's false narrative blaming Ukraine and NATO for Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, and to adhere to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter. We particularly call on the PRC to act responsibly and refrain from providing any lethal aid to Russia.
26. In 2014, at the Wales Summit Allied Heads of State and Government agreed the Defence Investment Pledge. Since then Allies have made remarkable progress and all have increased their defence spending, developed further their forces and capabilities, and have contributed to Allied operations, missions and activities. However, as the Strategic Concept sets out, our nations are now facing more profound security threats and challenges than at any time since the end of the Cold War.
27. Consistent with our obligations under Article 3 of the Washington Treaty, we make an enduring commitment to invest at least 2% of our Gross Domestic Product (GDP) annually on defence. We do so recognising more is needed urgently to sustainably meet our commitments as NATO Allies, including to fulfil longstanding major equipment requirements and the NATO Capability Targets, to resource NATO's new defence plans and force model, as well as to contribute to NATO operations, missions and activities. We affirm that in many cases, expenditure beyond 2% of GDP will be needed in order to remedy existing shortfalls and meet the requirements across all domains arising from a more contested security order.
28. We commit to invest at least 20% of our defence budgets on major equipment, including related Research and Development. We recognise this should be met in conjunction with a minimum of 2% of GDP annual defence expenditure. We need to maintain our technological edge, and continue to modernise and reform our forces and capabilities, including through the integration of innovative technologies.
29. We commit to contribute the necessary forces, capabilities and resources to the full range of NATO operations, missions and activities. This includes meeting requirements for deterrence and defence, providing the forces needed to implement NATO's defence plans and contribute to NATO crisis management operations. Allies will ensure that our forces are ready and have the necessary personnel, equipment, training, spares, logistics, infrastructure, and stockpiles. We commit to improve the interoperability of our national forces, including through transparent compliance with, and further development of, NATO standards and doctrines.
30. To have the necessary capabilities, the Alliance requires a strong and capable defence industry, with resilient supply chains. A strong defence industry across the Alliance, including a stronger defence industry in Europe and greater defence industrial cooperation within Europe and across the Atlantic, remains essential for delivering the required capabilities. Furthermore, consistent with our commitments, obligations and processes, we will reduce and eliminate, as appropriate, obstacles to defence trade and investment among Allies.
31. NATO is the foundation of our collective defence. NATO's key purpose and greatest responsibility is to ensure our collective defence, against all threats, from all directions. NATO will continue to fulfil three core tasks: deterrence and defence; crisis prevention and management; and cooperative security. These are complementary to ensure the collective defence and security of all Allies.
32. Deterrence and defence are at the heart of the Alliance, underpinned by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and an enduring transatlantic bond. We are modernising NATO for a new era of collective defence. We are united in our commitment and resolve to prevail against any aggressor and defend every inch of Allied territory.

33. Guided by our sovereign decisions, and in response to the threats we face, we remain vigilant and stand together in solidarity ensuring a substantial and persistent presence of our military forces across the Alliance on land, in the air and at sea, in line with our 360-degree approach. NATO's deterrence and defence posture is based on an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional and missile defence capabilities, complemented by space and cyber capabilities. It is defensive, proportionate and fully in line with our international commitments. We will employ military and non-military tools in a proportionate, coherent and integrated way to respond to all threats to our security in the manner, timing and in the domain of our choosing.
34. In response to a radically changed security environment, we are strengthening NATO's collective defence, against all threats, from all directions. We cannot discount the possibility of an attack against Allies' sovereignty and territorial integrity. Since 2014, and in particular at the 2022 Madrid Summit, we have taken decisions to strengthen our posture and set a clear trajectory for accelerated military adaptation. Today, we have agreed significant measures to further enhance NATO's deterrence and defence posture in all domains, including strengthening forward defences and the Alliance's ability to rapidly reinforce any Ally that comes under threat. We will fully implement these measures and deny any potential adversary any possible opportunities for aggression.

We have:

- a. Put in place a new generation of regional defence plans, building on our existing strategic and domain-specific plans. Together this family of plans will significantly improve our ability and readiness to deter and defend against any threats, including on short or no notice, and ensure timely reinforcement of all Allies, in line with our 360-degree approach. To a greater extent than at any time since the end of the Cold War, the planning for our collective defence will be fully coherent with the planning for our forces, posture management, capabilities, and command and control. We have committed to fully resource and regularly exercise these plans to be prepared for high-intensity and multi-domain collective defence.
 - b. Agreed that our defence plans are the main driver for the organisation of our forces and the specific military requirements NATO asks of them, allowing us to respond faster and at a greater scale. With the new NATO Force Model, agreed at the Madrid Summit, Allies are delivering a larger pool of dedicated combat-capable forces, including forces at high readiness, improving our military responsiveness, and harnessing regional expertise and geographic proximity. We are also establishing a new multinational and multi-domain Allied Reaction Force, which will provide more options to respond swiftly to threats and crises in all directions. We are committed to provide the necessary forces and capabilities in full.
 - c. Agreed to strengthen NATO's command and control, to ensure that it is sufficiently agile, resilient and staffed to execute our plans. This will improve our ability to conduct exercises, to manage NATO's posture in peacetime and in the transition to crisis and conflict, and to undertake command and control for the full spectrum of missions, including large-scale multi-domain operations for collective defence, conducted by SHAPE and its subordinate commands, including the three equally capable Joint Force Commands.
 - d. Reaffirmed our decisions at the Madrid Summit to put in place additional robust in-place combat-ready forces on NATO's Eastern Flank, to be scaled up from the existing battlegroups to brigade-size units where and when required, underpinned by credible rapidly available reinforcements, prepositioned equipment, and enhanced command and control. The eight multinational battlegroups are now in place. We will continue our efforts to implement these decisions, including by demonstrating the ability to scale up our military presence through robust live exercises across the Eastern Flank of the Alliance. We welcome ongoing efforts by Allies to increase their presence on NATO's Eastern Flank, which further adds to credible deterrence and defence. All these forces demonstrate our resolve and readiness to defend every inch of Allied territory.
 - e. Agreed to further improve the readiness, preparedness, and interoperability of NATO's Integrated Air and Missile Defence, in particular through regular training and rotational presence of modern air defence systems and capabilities across SACEUR's Area of Responsibility, with an initial focus on the Eastern Flank, thereby strengthening our deterrence.
 - f. Agreed to continue our work on multi-domain operations, enabled by NATO's Digital Transformation, which further drives our military and technological advantage, strengthening the Alliance's ability to operate decisively across the land, air, maritime, cyberspace and space domains.
35. We welcome the rapid progress towards the full integration of Finland into NATO's deterrence and defence, and have agreed to complete this process as soon as possible.

36. We need a robust and resilient defence industry able to sustainably meet the need of significantly strengthened collective defence. We have endorsed a Defence Production Action Plan, and its action items. This Plan will ensure long-term NATO engagement across the Alliance based on the principles of transparency, equitable treatment and inclusive participation. With this Plan, and in support of Allies' own priorities, we are committed to leveraging the Alliance's role as a convener, standard-setter, requirement setter and aggregator, and delivery enabler to promote sustainable defence industrial capacity. This will be underpinned by a renewed and urgent focus on interoperability and improving materiel standardization to ensure that our forces can operate seamlessly together, with an initial focus on land munitions. The Plan will ensure our understanding of defence industry across the Alliance, including small and medium size enterprises, help aggregate demand to meet NATO's capability targets, encourage multinational cooperation and more agile procurement, and enhance transparency with industry.
37. Our robust military capabilities are critical for NATO's deterrence and defence. We continue to invest more in advanced and interoperable capabilities across all domains, placing particular emphasis on combat capable, predominantly heavy, high-end forces and capabilities. These will reflect the requirements of NATO's defence plans and other tasks. We will ensure that these capabilities are resourced to maintain the required high levels of readiness. We continue to improve the deployability, interoperability, standardisation, responsiveness, force integration and support of our forces in order to conduct and sustain high intensity operations, including crisis response operations, in demanding environments. The NATO Defence Planning Process plays a key role in the sharing of risks and responsibilities, and we reaffirm our commitment to providing our respective shares of the capabilities required by the Alliance to fulfil our three core tasks. Our capability development plans will ensure that we maintain our technological edge, recognising the challenges and opportunities presented by emerging and disruptive technologies, while ensuring their timely integration. We have also decided to significantly increase our stockpiles of certain battle-decisive munitions.
38. We will continue to strengthen and regularly exercise the Alliance's ability to rapidly reinforce any Ally that comes under threat. Exercises are a key way of demonstrating the Alliance's resolve and capability. We are adapting and streamlining our decision-making processes and improving the effectiveness of our alert and response system.
39. We will individually and collectively deliver the full range of forces, capabilities, plans, resources, assets and infrastructure needed for deterrence and defence, including for high-intensity, multi-domain warfighting against nuclear-armed peer-competitors. Accordingly, we will strengthen training and exercises that simulate conventional and, for Allies concerned, a nuclear dimension of a crisis or conflict, facilitating greater coherence between conventional and nuclear components of NATO's deterrence and defence posture across all domains and the entire spectrum of conflict.
40. We have accelerated our efforts, both nationally and in NATO, to ensure the enablement of SACEUR's Area of Responsibility, including logistics, and to improve our ability to support the reinforcement and sustainment of Allied forces into, across, and from the entire Alliance territory, including through prepositioning of ammunition and equipment. As part of the enablement of SACEUR's Area of Responsibility, we are taking forward our work on fuel supply distribution arrangements, as the timely provision of fuel to NATO's military forces where required in Europe underpins the Alliance's readiness and responsiveness. We recognise that the changed security environment represents a more demanding challenge to the Alliance's collective logistics and we will make political and military efforts to address this challenge, recognising that credible deterrence and defence relies on adequate logistics capability. Effective military mobility is essential for enablement and further progress is required. Efforts to ensure a coherent approach and synergies between NATO and the EU in the area of military mobility should be pursued.
41. NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence (IAMD) remains key for credible deterrence and defence, and the indivisible security and freedom of action of the Alliance, including NATO's capability to reinforce, and to provide a strategic response. NATO IAMD is an essential and continuous mission in peacetime, crisis, and times of conflict. NATO IAMD incorporates all measures to contribute to deter any air and missile threat or to nullify or reduce their effectiveness. This mission is conducted in a 360-degree approach, and tailored to address all air and missile threats emanating from all strategic directions from state and non-state actors.
42. Allied IAMD deployments, including those on the Eastern flank in response to the Russian aggression against Ukraine, as well as exercises and training demonstrate Allied solidarity and resolve. Based on the Strategic Concept, the new baseline for deterrence and defence posture agreed in Madrid in 2022, and the new generation of defence plans, NATO continues to strengthen its IAMD by improving IAMD readiness, responsiveness, effectiveness, and interoperability, as well as availability of airspace. NATO and Allies continue to improve IAMD capabilities, such as surveillance, interceptors, and command and control. We will continue to take into account the increasingly diverse and challenging air and missile threats ranging from simple Uncrewed Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) to sophisticated hypersonic missiles.

43. The fundamental purpose of NATO's nuclear capability is to preserve peace, prevent coercion and deter aggression. Nuclear weapons are unique. As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance. NATO's goal is a safer world for all; we seek to create the security environment for a world without nuclear weapons. The circumstances in which NATO might have to use nuclear weapons are extremely remote. Any employment of nuclear weapons against NATO would fundamentally alter the nature of a conflict. The Alliance has the capabilities and resolve to impose costs on an adversary that would be unacceptable and far outweigh the benefits that any adversary could hope to achieve.
44. The strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States, are the supreme guarantee of the security of the Alliance. The independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France have a deterrent role of their own and contribute significantly to the overall security of the Alliance. These Allies' separate centres of decision-making contribute to deterrence by complicating the calculations of potential adversaries. NATO's nuclear deterrence posture also relies on the United States' nuclear weapons forward-deployed in Europe. National contributions, by Allies concerned, of dual-capable aircraft, as well as the provision of conventional forces and military capabilities in support of NATO's nuclear deterrence mission, remain central to this effort.
45. NATO will take all necessary steps to ensure the credibility, effectiveness, safety and security of the nuclear deterrent mission. This includes continuing to modernise NATO's nuclear capability and updating planning to increase flexibility and adaptability of the Alliance's nuclear forces, while exercising strong political control at all times. The Alliance reaffirms the imperative to ensure the broadest possible participation by Allies concerned in NATO's nuclear burden-sharing arrangements to demonstrate Alliance unity and resolve.
46. The Alliance is committed to ensuring greater integration and coherence of capabilities and activities across all domains and the spectrum of conflict, while reaffirming the unique and distinct role of nuclear deterrence. NATO will continue to maintain credible deterrence, strengthen its strategic communications, enhance the effectiveness of its exercises and reduce strategic risks. NATO is ready and able to deter aggression and manage escalation risks in a crisis that has a nuclear dimension.
47. Missile defence can complement the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence; it cannot substitute them. The aim and political principles of NATO Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) remain unchanged from the 2010 Lisbon Summit. NATO BMD is purely defensive and is aimed at countering ballistic missile threats emanating from outside of the Euro-Atlantic area. Allies remain committed to the full development of NATO BMD, to pursue the Alliance's collective defence and to provide full coverage and protection for all NATO European populations, territory, and forces against the increasing threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles.
48. NATO BMD is based on voluntary national contributions, including the US European Phased Adaptive Approach assets in Romania, Türkiye, Spain, and Poland, as well as the NATO BMD command and control, the only component eligible for common funding. Additional voluntary national contributions will provide robustness. We are committed to completing additional essential components of NATO BMD command and control, which is necessary for achieving the next major milestone before reaching the Full Operational Capability.
49. Strategic stability, delivered through effective deterrence and defence, arms control and disarmament, and meaningful and reciprocal political dialogue remains essential to our security. Arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation strongly contribute to the Alliance's objectives. Allies' efforts on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation aim to reduce risk and enhance security, transparency, verification, and compliance. We will pursue all elements of strategic risk reduction, including promoting confidence building and predictability through dialogue, increasing understanding, and establishing effective crisis management and prevention tools. These efforts will take the prevailing security environment and the security of all Allies into account and complement the Alliance's deterrence and defence posture. We will make use of NATO as a platform for in-depth discussion and close consultations on arms control efforts.
50. Arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation have made and should continue to make an essential contribution to achieving the Alliance's security objectives and for ensuring strategic stability and our collective security. NATO has a long track record of doing its part on disarmament and non-proliferation. After the end of the Cold War, NATO dramatically reduced the number of nuclear weapons stationed in Europe and its reliance on nuclear weapons in NATO strategy. Allies remain collectively determined to uphold and support existing disarmament, arms control, and non-proliferation agreements and commitments. We will further strengthen arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation, as a key element of Euro-Atlantic security, taking into account the prevailing security environment and the security of all Allies.
51. Russia's violations and selective implementation of its arms control obligations and commitments have contributed to the deterioration of the broader security landscape. We condemn Russia's purported suspension of the New

START treaty and failure to comply with its legally-binding obligations under the Treaty. We call on Russia to return to full implementation of the Treaty as well as to act responsibly and engage constructively to reduce strategic and nuclear risks. We also condemn Russia's decision to withdraw from the landmark Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, which further demonstrates Russia's continued disregard for arms control, and is the latest in a series of actions to undermine Euro-Atlantic security. Allies urge Russia to implement its commitments and obligations, and to use the remaining time before its withdrawal to reconsider its decision. Allies will continue to consult on the implications of Russia's withdrawal from the CFE Treaty and its impact on the security of the Alliance.

52. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) remains the essential bulwark against the spread of nuclear weapons. It is the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime and disarmament architecture, the only credible path to nuclear disarmament, and the framework for international cooperation in sharing the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, science and technology. Allies remain strongly committed to the full implementation of the NPT across its three pillars, including Article VI. Russia blocking consensus at the Tenth NPT Review Conference was irresponsible. We call on all NPT States Parties to work together to implement and strengthen the NPT in the current NPT Review Cycle. We underline the urgent need to bring the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty into force. We call for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other explosive devices in accordance with Conference on Disarmament report CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein. We call on all states that have not yet done so to declare and maintain voluntary moratoria on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
53. NATO Allies support the ultimate goal of a world without nuclear weapons, in full accordance with all provisions of the NPT, achieved in an effective and verifiable way that promotes international stability and which is based on the principle of undiminished security for all. NATO's nuclear burden-sharing arrangements have always been fully consistent with the NPT.
54. We reiterate that the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) stands in opposition to and is inconsistent and incompatible with the Alliance's nuclear deterrence policy, is at odds with the existing non-proliferation and disarmament architecture, risks undermining the NPT, and does not take into account the current security environment. The TPNW does not change the legal obligations on our countries with respect to nuclear weapons. We do not accept any argument that the TPNW reflects or in any way contributes to the development of customary international law. We call on our partners and all other countries to reflect realistically on the ban treaty's impact on international peace and security, including on the NPT, and join us in working to improve collective security through tangible and verifiable measures that can reduce strategic risks and enable lasting progress on nuclear disarmament.
55. The PRC is rapidly expanding and diversifying its nuclear arsenal with more warheads and a larger number of sophisticated delivery systems to establish a nuclear triad, while failing to engage in meaningful transparency or good faith efforts to achieve nuclear arms control or risk reduction. We oppose any attempt to produce or support the production of plutonium for military programmes under the guise of civilian programmes, which undermines the objectives of the NPT. We urge the PRC to engage in strategic risk reduction discussions and to promote stability through greater transparency with regard to its nuclear weapon policies, plans and capabilities.
56. We reiterate our clear determination that Iran must never develop a nuclear weapon. We remain deeply concerned about Iran's escalation of its nuclear programme. We call on Iran to fulfil its legal obligations under its Non-Proliferation Treaty-required safeguards agreement and political commitments regarding nuclear non-proliferation without further delay. The fulfilment by Iran of these obligations and commitments is crucial to allow the IAEA to provide credible assurances of the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme. We also call on Iran to stop all ballistic missile activities inconsistent with UNSCR 2231.
57. We condemn in the strongest terms the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's (DPRK) WMD and ballistic missile programmes which violate multiple UN Security Council Resolutions. We reiterate that the DPRK must abandon its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes, and any other weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes, in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner. We urge the DPRK to return to, and fully comply with, the NPT and IAEA safeguards. We call on the DPRK to accept the repeated offers of dialogue put forward by all parties concerned, including Japan, the United States, and the Republic of Korea.
58. The potential use of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) materials or weapons against NATO by hostile state and non-state actors remains a central and evolving threat to our security. We are implementing NATO's new CBRN defence policy, as agreed at the Madrid Summit, and are investing in the military capabilities required to effectively operate, fight and prevail in any environment, and to ensure our national and collective resilience against CBRN risks and threats.

59. NATO safeguards the freedom and security of all its members using both political and military means. The evolving security environment increasingly requires that NATO will take a structured and tailored approach that uses non-military and military tools in a deliberate, coherent, and sustained manner, throughout the full spectrum of peace, crisis and conflict. NATO uses a variety of non-military tools which support the Alliance's three core tasks. It also continues to serve as a platform for enhancing the coherent use of these tools by Allies, under their own authority and control, and alongside other international actors. We will continue to strengthen effective, clear, and convincing strategic communication.
60. As the war in Europe has fundamentally shifted the nature of the Euro-Atlantic security environment, the emphasis on intelligence has become even more prominent and essential to Alliance decision-making and strategic planning. The value of the NATO intelligence enterprise comes first and foremost from the Allied intelligence and security services working closely together to share intelligence and continue to ensure that the Alliance has a comprehensive understanding of the global strategic picture. To that end, Allies' intelligence capabilities will contribute to improving NATO's understanding of the threats, risks and challenges, and to optimising our significant and diverse analysis capabilities. We will strengthen our intelligence cooperation within the Alliance and with partners as appropriate. NATO and Allies will enhance their security and counter-intelligence measures to respond effectively to hostile intelligence activity.
61. National and collective resilience are an essential basis for credible deterrence and defence and the effective fulfilment of the Alliance's core tasks, and vital in our efforts to safeguard our societies, our populations and our shared values. Resilience is a national responsibility and a collective commitment rooted in Article 3 of the Washington Treaty. Today we have agreed the 2023 Alliance Resilience Objectives. We build on the 2021 Strengthened Resilience Commitment. The Resilience Objectives will strengthen NATO and Allied preparedness against strategic shocks and disruptions. They will boost our national and collective ability to ensure continuity of government and of essential services to our populations, and enable civil support to military operations, in peace, crisis and conflict. Allies will use these objectives to guide the development of their national goals and implementation plans, consistent with their respective national risk profile. We will also work towards identifying and mitigating strategic vulnerabilities and dependencies, including with respect to our critical infrastructure, supply chains and health systems. Allies should also promote societal resilience. As we strengthen our efforts to build resilience, we will continue to work with our partners engaged in similar efforts, in particular the European Union, in order to make the Euro-Atlantic area and our broader neighbourhood more secure. The actions, commitments and legal obligations of individual Allies in other international bodies also contribute to enhancing our resilience.
62. The Alliance's ability to fulfil its core tasks increasingly relies on the adoption of digital technologies. Recognising the urgency of a digitally-transformed Alliance, we have endorsed a Digital Transformation Implementation Strategy to underpin our ability to conduct Multi-Domain Operations, drive interoperability across all domains, enhance situational awareness, political consultation, and employ data-driven decision-making.
63. Emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) bring both opportunities and risks. They are altering the character of conflict, acquiring greater strategic importance and becoming key arenas of global competition. The operational importance of EDTs as well as of access to and adaptation of commercial technologies in current operations have been highlighted in the context of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine. NATO's strategic competitors and potential adversaries are investing heavily in technologies that can be highly effective, particularly in malign hybrid activities, and decisive in conflict. We are accelerating our own efforts to ensure that the Alliance maintains its technological edge in emerging and disruptive technologies to retain our interoperability and military edge, including through dual-use solutions. We are working together to adopt and integrate new technologies, cooperate with the private sector, protect our innovation ecosystems, shape standards, and commit to principles of responsible use that reflect our democratic values and human rights. We will ensure that we act in accordance with international law and seek to build public trust. NATO's Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) has now launched its first challenges to start-ups in NATO countries. To further develop our transatlantic innovation ecosystem, the NATO Innovation Fund, the world's first multi-sovereign venture capital fund, will begin to invest in deep-tech in the coming months. Complementing the recently agreed strategies on Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy, NATO will develop further strategies for key emerging and disruptive technologies, including on Quantum Technologies and on Biotechnology and Human Enhancement to address the opportunities and risks they present.
64. We continue to face growing hybrid threats and challenges from state and non-state actors, who use hybrid activities, including through interference and the harmful use of technologies, to target our political institutions, our critical infrastructure, our societies, our democratic systems, our economies, and the security of our citizens. We remain united in defending our open and democratic societies against these malign activities. We reiterate that hybrid operations against Allies could reach the level of an armed attack and could lead the Council to invoke Article

5 of the Washington Treaty. We will continue to prepare for, deter, defend against and counter hybrid threats, including by potentially deploying Counter Hybrid Support Teams. We continue to develop comprehensive preventive and response options and stand ready to apply them to enhance resilience and deter malign actors from engaging in hybrid operations. Individual Allies may consider, when appropriate, attributing hybrid activities and responding in a coordinated manner, recognising attribution is a sovereign national prerogative. We will continue to address disinformation and misinformation, including through positive and effective strategic communications. We will also continue to support our partners as they strengthen their resilience in the face of hybrid challenges.

65. The threat to critical undersea infrastructure is real and it is developing. We are committed to identifying and mitigating strategic vulnerabilities and dependencies with respect to our critical infrastructure, and to prepare for, deter and defend against the coercive use of energy and other hybrid tactics by state and non-state actors. Any deliberate attack against Allies' critical infrastructure will be met with a united and determined response; this applies also to critical undersea infrastructure. The protection of critical undersea infrastructure on Allies' territory remains a national responsibility, as well as a collective commitment. NATO stands ready to support Allies if and when requested. We have agreed to establish NATO's Maritime Centre for the Security of Critical Undersea Infrastructure within NATO's Maritime Command (MARCOM). We also agreed to set up a network that brings together NATO, Allies, private sector, and other relevant actors to improve information sharing and exchange best practice.
66. Cyberspace is contested at all times as threat actors increasingly seek to destabilise the Alliance by employing malicious cyber activities and campaigns. Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine has highlighted the extent to which cyber is a feature of modern conflict. We are countering the substantial, continuous, and increasing cyber threats, including to our democratic systems and our critical infrastructure, as well as where they are part of hybrid campaigns. We are determined to employ the full range of capabilities in order to deter, defend against and counter the full spectrum of cyber threats, including by considering collective responses. A single or cumulative set of malicious cyber activities could reach the level of armed attack and could lead the North Atlantic Council to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, on a case-by-case basis. We remain committed to act in accordance with international law, including the UN Charter, international humanitarian law, and international human rights law as applicable. We continue to promote a free, open, peaceful, and secure cyberspace, and further pursue efforts to enhance stability and reduce the risk of conflict, by ensuring that international law is respected and by supporting voluntary norms of responsible state behaviour in cyberspace. Today, we endorse a new concept to enhance the contribution of cyber defence to our overall deterrence and defence posture. It will further integrate NATO's three cyber defence levels - political, military, and technical - ensuring civil-military cooperation at all times through peacetime, crisis, and conflict, as well as engagement with the private sector, as appropriate. Doing so will enhance our shared situational awareness. Strengthening our cyber resilience is key to making our Alliance more secure and better able to mitigate the potential for significant harm from cyber threats. Today we restate and enhance our Cyber Defence Pledge and have committed to ambitious new national goals to further strengthen our national cyber defences as a matter of priority, including critical infrastructures. We have launched NATO's new Virtual Cyber Incident Support Capability (VCISC) to support national mitigation efforts in response to significant malicious cyber activities. This provides Allies with an additional tool for assistance. We will further seek to develop mutually beneficial and effective partnerships as appropriate, including with partner countries, international organisations, industry, and academia, furthering our efforts to enhance international stability in cyberspace. Complementing our existing exchanges, we will hold the first comprehensive NATO Cyber Defence Conference in Berlin this November, bringing together decision-makers across the political, military, and technical levels.
67. Space plays a critical role for the security and prosperity of our nations. Space is also an increasingly contested domain, marked by irresponsible behaviour, malicious activities, and the growth of counterspace capabilities by NATO's potential adversaries and strategic competitors. Maintaining secure use and unfettered access to space is key to effective deterrence and defence. As part of our work on space as an operational domain, we are accelerating the integration of space into planning, exercising and executing joint and multi-domain operations in peacetime, crisis, and conflict in order to ensure space effects are coordinated across all domains. We have committed to enhancing the sharing of our space data, products and services within NATO in support of the Alliance's requirements and defence plans. We welcome the ongoing efforts on the Alliance Persistent Surveillance from Space (APSS) multinational programme, which will improve NATO's intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capacity. We welcome the establishment of the NATO Space Centre of Excellence in France. Allies are committed to upholding international law and we will continue to support international efforts to reduce space threats by promoting norms, rules, and principles of responsible space behaviours. We reaffirm that hostile operations to, from, or within space could reach the level of armed attack and could lead the North Atlantic Council to invoke Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.

68. Energy security plays an important role in our common security. The energy crisis intentionally exacerbated by Russia has underlined the importance of a stable and reliable energy supply and the diversification of routes, suppliers, and sources. We will continue to develop NATO's capacity to support national authorities in protecting critical energy infrastructure. We are committed to ensuring secure, resilient, and sustainable energy supplies to our military forces. As we adapt our Alliance to the ongoing energy transition, we will ensure military capability, effectiveness and interoperability. Allies are seeking and will continue to seek diversification of their energy supplies, in line with their needs and conditions.
69. Climate change is a defining challenge with a profound impact on Allied security facing present and future generations. It remains a threat multiplier. NATO is committed to becoming the leading international organisation when it comes to understanding and adapting to the impact of climate change on security. We will continue to address the impact of climate change on defence and security, including through the development of innovative strategic analysis tools. We will integrate climate change considerations into all of NATO's core tasks, adapt our infrastructure, military capabilities and technologies ensuring resilience to future operating environments. To contribute to the mitigation of climate change, we are committed to significantly cutting greenhouse gas emissions by the NATO political and military structures and facilities; we will also contribute to combatting climate change by improving energy efficiency, transitioning to clean energy sources, and leveraging innovative next-generation clean technologies, while ensuring military effectiveness and a credible deterrence and defence posture. We will continue to strengthen our exchanges with partner countries, the scientific community, as well as other international and regional organisations that are active on climate change and security. We welcome the establishment of a NATO Centre of Excellence for Climate Change and Security in Montreal.
70. We are committed to integrating the Human Security and the Women, Peace and Security agendas across all our core tasks. We will continue to work towards fully operationalising this objective, through robust policies and clear operational guidelines, in order to enhance our operational effectiveness and ensure synergies between the civilian and military structures. In doing so, we are working with partners, international organisations, and civil society. We reaffirm our commitment to an ambitious human security agenda. Our Human Security Approach and Guiding Principles allows us to develop a more comprehensive view of the human environment, contributing to lasting peace and security. Today, we endorse a NATO Policy on Children and Armed Conflict, and an updated Policy on Combatting Trafficking in Human Beings. Our ongoing work on human security also includes cultural property protection.
71. We recognise the critical importance of women's full, equal, and meaningful participation in all aspects of peace and stability, noting the disproportionate impact that conflict has on women and girls, including through conflict-related sexual violence. We will consistently continue to implement our Policy on Women, Peace and Security, and, in this context, we will advance gender equality and integrate gender perspectives and foster the principles of the Women, Peace and Security agenda set out by the UN Security Council in all that we do, including in NATO operations, missions, activities, and our work on emerging challenges. We will assess and update NATO's Policy on Women, Peace and Security.
72. NATO's partnerships are, and will continue to be, essential to the way NATO works. They play an important role in supporting NATO's three core tasks and our 360-degree security approach. We are grateful to our partners for their significant contributions to NATO's situational awareness, operations, missions, and activities, including Trust Fund projects. The current security environment highlights the significance of partnerships. They are crucial to protect the global commons and enhance our resilience. We will strengthen our ties with partners that share the Alliance's values and interest in upholding the rules-based international order. We will continue to strengthen political dialogue and practical cooperation with partners, based on mutual respect, benefit and interest of both Allies and partners. This contributes to stability beyond our borders and enhances our security at home. We will increase outreach to countries in our broader neighbourhood and across the globe and remain open to engagement with any country or organisation, when doing so could bolster our mutual security. We remain committed to the principles underpinning our relations with our partners, and have taken steps to make our partnerships more strategic, more coherent and more effective. We will discuss common approaches to global security challenges where NATO's interests are affected, share perspectives through deeper political engagement, and seek concrete areas for cooperation to address shared security concerns. In line with our Comprehensive Approach Action Plan, we will continue to pursue coherence within NATO's own tools and strands of work, concerted approaches with partner nations and organisations such as the UN, the EU, and the OSCE, as well as further dialogue with non-governmental organisations.
73. The European Union remains a unique and essential partner for NATO. Our strategic partnership is essential for the security and prosperity of our nations and of the Euro-Atlantic area. It is built on our shared values, our determination to tackle common challenges and our unequivocal commitment to promote and safeguard peace,

freedom and prosperity. NATO recognises the value of a stronger and more capable European defence that contributes positively to transatlantic and global security and is complementary to, and interoperable with NATO. The development of coherent, complementary and interoperable defence capabilities, avoiding unnecessary duplication, is key in our joint efforts to make the Euro-Atlantic area safer. Such efforts, including recent developments, will lead to a stronger NATO, help enhance our common security, contribute to transatlantic burden sharing, help deliver needed capabilities, and support an overall increase in defence spending. Non-EU Allies continue to make significant contributions to the EU's efforts to strengthen its capacities to address common security challenges. For the strategic partnership between NATO and the EU, non-EU Allies' fullest involvement in EU defence efforts is essential. We look forward to mutual steps, representing tangible progress, in this area to support a strengthened strategic partnership. We reaffirm in their entirety all the decisions, principles, and commitments with regard to NATO and EU cooperation. We will continue to further strengthen this partnership in a spirit of full mutual openness, transparency, complementarity, and respect for the organisations' different mandates, decision-making autonomy and institutional integrity, and as agreed by the two organisations.

74. In the context of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, NATO-EU cooperation has become more significant. We have unequivocally demonstrated unity of purpose and common resolve in leveraging our complementary, coherent and mutually reinforcing roles. NATO and EU will continue to support Ukraine. In this respect, we welcome the establishment of the dedicated NATO-EU Staff Coordination on Ukraine. We have also achieved tangible results in strategic communications, including the fight against disinformation, countering hybrid and cyber threats, exercises, operational cooperation, defence capabilities, defence industry and research, counter-terrorism, and defence and security capacity building. We are further expanding our cooperation on resilience, protection of critical infrastructure, emerging and disruptive technologies, space, security implications of climate change, and geostrategic competition. We will also continue to address the systemic challenges posed by the PRC to Euro-Atlantic security. Political dialogue between NATO and the EU remains essential to advance NATO-EU cooperation.
75. The Western Balkans is a region of strategic importance for NATO as highlighted by our long history of cooperation and operations. We remain strongly committed to the security and stability of the Western Balkans by supporting reforms that advance the respective NATO and EU aspirations of the countries in the region. We will continue to enhance our political dialogue and practical cooperation in order to support reforms, regional peace and security, and counter malign influence, including disinformation, hybrid, and cyber threats, posed by both state and non-state actors. The region requires continued attention and commitment from the Alliance and the international community to counter these challenges. Democratic values, the rule of law, domestic reforms, and good neighbourly relations are vital for regional cooperation and Euro-Atlantic integration, and we look to continued progress in this regard.
76. NATO strongly supports the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a stable and secure Bosnia and Herzegovina, in accordance with the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and other relevant international agreements. We encourage domestic reconciliation, and urge political leaders to refrain from divisive and secessionist rhetoric and actions. We remain committed to the country's Euro-Atlantic aspirations. We continue to support reform efforts, including through the newly agreed Defence Capacity Building package, NATO HQ Sarajevo, and wide-ranging cooperative security and partnership tools, and through the country's Reform Programme with NATO. We encourage Bosnia and Herzegovina to take advantage of NATO's support and intensify efforts to make progress on reforms in key areas, including the much-needed political, electoral, rule of law, economic, and defence reforms, without prejudice to a final decision on NATO membership.
77. Strengthening NATO-Serbia relations would be of benefit to the Alliance, to Serbia, and to the whole region. We look to Serbia to engage with NATO and its neighbours in a constructive manner, including in its public communications on the mutual benefits of NATO-Serbia cooperation. We support the EU-facilitated Dialogue and other efforts aimed at the normalisation of relations between Belgrade and Pristina, and urge the sides to seize the moment and engage in good faith towards reaching a lasting political solution. We call on both sides to immediately de-escalate, return to dialogue, and engage constructively in implementing the agreement on the path to normalisation between Belgrade and Pristina reached recently in Brussels and Ohrid.
78. We remain committed to NATO's continued engagement in Kosovo, including through the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR). KFOR will continue to provide a safe and secure environment and freedom of movement in Kosovo in line with UNSC Resolution 1244. The recent escalatory actions are unacceptable and we condemn the violence in northern Kosovo as well as the unprovoked attacks that caused serious injuries to NATO soldiers. We have increased KFOR's troop presence to respond to the recurrent tensions. Any changes to our force posture in KFOR will remain conditions-based and not calendar driven.

79. The Black Sea region is of strategic importance for the Alliance. This is further highlighted by Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine. We underline our continued support to Allied regional efforts aimed at upholding security, safety, stability and freedom of navigation in the Black Sea region including, as appropriate, through the 1936 Montreux Convention. We will further monitor and assess developments in the region and enhance our situational awareness, with a particular focus on the threats to our security and potential opportunities for closer cooperation with our partners in the region, as appropriate.
80. We reiterate our support to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Georgia within its internationally recognised borders. We stand firm in our support for Georgia's right to decide its own future and foreign policy course free from outside interference. We call on Russia to withdraw the forces it has stationed in Georgia without its consent. We further call on Russia to reverse its recognition of the Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions of Georgia; to end the militarisation of these regions and continued attempts to forcibly separate them from the rest of Georgia through the construction of border-like obstacles; and to cease the human rights violations and abuses, including arbitrary detentions, and harassments of Georgian citizens. We highly appreciate Georgia's substantial contributions to NATO operations, which demonstrate its commitment and capability to contribute to Euro-Atlantic security. We remain committed to making full use of the NATO-Georgia Commission and the Annual National Programme (ANP) in deepening political dialogue and practical cooperation with Georgia. We reiterate the decision made at the 2008 Bucharest Summit that Georgia will become a member of the Alliance with the Membership Action Plan (MAP) as an integral part of the process; we reaffirm all elements of that decision, as well as subsequent decisions. We welcome the progress made in implementing the enhanced Substantial NATO-Georgia Package, including Crisis Management, Cyber Security, Military Engineering, and Secure Communications, as well as new initiatives in the areas of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Defence and Training Facilities. To advance its Euro-Atlantic aspirations, Georgia must make progress on reforms, including key democratic reforms, and make best use of the ANP.
81. We reiterate our support for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Moldova within its internationally recognised borders and call on Russia to withdraw all of its forces stationed in the Transnistrian region without Moldova's consent. We stand firm in our support for Moldova's right to decide its own future and foreign policy course free from outside interference, and fully respect Moldova's constitutional neutrality. NATO is stepping up political and practical support to strengthen its resilience and uphold its political independence in light of the deteriorating security environment. Allies welcome Moldova's efforts to promote democratic reforms and are committed to supporting Moldova as it advances its European integration. NATO will continue to provide practical assistance through the enhanced Defence Capacity Building Package, as Moldova works to strengthen its security and defence capabilities and modernise its Armed Forces.
82. The Middle East and Africa are regions of strategic interest. We will deepen our political engagements and public diplomacy outreach to our long-standing partners in the Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. We will also increase our outreach to relevant regional organisations, including the African Union and the Gulf Cooperation Council. We are implementing the Defence Capacity Building packages for Iraq, Jordan, Mauritania, and Tunisia. We will also explore with the Jordanian authorities the possibility of establishing a NATO Liaison Office in Amman.
83. NATO and Allies remain committed in our support to Iraq and its ability to stabilise the country. We recognise the continued efforts and progress of the Government of Iraq and the Iraqi Security Forces to combat ISIS/Da'esh. We encourage further progress in Iraq's fight against terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. Our NATO Mission Iraq continues to deliver non-combat advisory and capacity building support to the Iraqi security institutions in the greater Baghdad area, and has deepened collaboration with Iraq's Ministry of Defence. Based on the request from the Iraqi government, we are considering broadening NATO Mission Iraq, by evolving it to provide advice to the Iraqi Ministry of Interior on its Federal Police. NATO Mission Iraq will continue to be demand-driven, and will be carried out with the full consent of the Iraqi authorities, in full respect of Iraq's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and in close coordination with relevant partners and international actors.
84. Iran's support to the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine has an impact on Euro-Atlantic security. We call upon Iran to cease its military support to Russia, in particular its transfer of Uncrewed Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) which have been used to attack critical infrastructure, causing widespread civilian casualties. We express our serious concern over Iran's malicious activities within Allied territory. We also call upon Iran to refrain from destabilising actions, including seizures of maritime vessels, and to play a constructive role in fostering regional stability and peace.
85. The Indo-Pacific is important for NATO, given that developments in that region can directly affect Euro-Atlantic security. We welcome the contribution of our partners in the Asia-Pacific region – Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and the Republic of Korea – to security in the Euro-Atlantic, including their commitment to supporting Ukraine. We

will further strengthen our dialogue and cooperation to tackle our shared security challenges, including on cyber defence, technology and hybrid, underpinned by our shared commitment to upholding international law and the rules-based international order.

86. NATO's engagement with other international and regional organisations, including the United Nations, the OSCE, and the African Union, contributes to international security. We will strengthen these interactions to advance our shared interests. We are exploring the possibility of establishing a Liaison Office in Geneva to further strengthen our engagement with the United Nations and other relevant international organisations.
87. We will ensure that our political decisions are adequately resourced. We will build on the progress made to ensure that increased national defence expenditures and NATO common funding will be commensurate with the challenges of a more contested security order.
88. We pay tribute to all women and men who work tirelessly for our collective security, honour all those who have paid the ultimate price or have been wounded to keep us safe, and their families.
89. NATO remains the strongest Alliance in history. As in the past, we will stand the test of time in safeguarding the freedom and security of our Allies and contributing to peace and security.
90. We express our appreciation for the generous hospitality extended to us by the Republic of Lithuania. We look forward to meeting again for the Alliance's 75th anniversary in Washington, D.C. in 2024, followed by a meeting in the Netherlands in 2025.

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DR. RAFFI GREGORIAN brings to the United Nations over 33 years of academic, diplomatic and military experience in counter-terrorism and international peace and security. Until September 2019, when he was appointed Deputy to the Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT), he was Director of Multilateral Affairs in the Bureau of Counterterrorism of the United States Department of State. Dr. Gregorian initiated the first new U.S. peacekeeping policy in 25 years, led a number of important peacekeeping reforms, and helped secure full funding for the UN peacekeeping budget. Dr. Gregorian's field experience includes leading two multinational missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) as well as military service in both BiH and in Kosovo. Dr. Gregorian holds a Doctorate in International Relations and Strategic Studies from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, a Masters of Arts in War Studies from King's College London, and a Bachelor of Arts with Honors in History from the University of Pennsylvania. He is the author of several academic publications.

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PROFESSOR SHIMON SHETREET is a Professor of Law at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel. He holds the Greenblatt chair of public and international law and is the head of the Sacher Institute of Legislative Research and Comparative Law. He has in recent years been Visiting Scholar at the New York University Global Law Program, Visiting Prof. at Case Western Reserve University School of Law, Senior Visiting Fellow at the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies at the University of London. He has also been Visiting Prof of law at Tulane University and University of San Diego. He completed his education in Israel and in the US, earning an LL.B., 1968, and an LL.M., 1970, from the Hebrew University, and a Masters, 1971, and a Doctor's degree in 1973 from the University of Chicago School of Law. He served as Visiting Professor at a number of Universities

including NYU School of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, University of Manitoba, Wuerzburg University, Germany and the University of San Diego and New York Law School of Law. He has appeared before the Supreme Court of Israel in a number of landmark cases; was Member of the Chief Justice Landau Commission on the Israeli Court System, 1980; was a Founder Secretary General of the Public Law Association (1987 – 1992); and a Judge on the Standard Contract Court (1981-88). He is President of the Israeli Chapter of the International Association of Constitutional Law. Prof. Shetreet published extensively all the years including when he was serving in high public offices. Between 1988 and 1996 he served as Member of the Knesset the Israeli Parliament. His Past Government Positions include a Cabinet Minister in the Rabin Government where he served as Minister of Economy and Planning, Minister of Science and Technology, Minister in charge of the Second Television and Radio Authority and Minister of Religious Affairs. In addition to his distinguished academic career and his public offices he also held high business positions including member of the board of Bank Leumi and Chairman of the Board of Mishaan.

HONORABLE KENNETH L. WAINSTEIN was confirmed as the Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis at the Department of Homeland Security by the United States Senate on June 7, 2022. Wainstein serves as the Chief Intelligence Officer for DHS and reports directly to the DHS Secretary and Director of National Intelligence. Prior to his confirmation, Wainstein was a litigation partner in the Washington, D.C. office of Davis Polk & Wardwell. During his time in private practice, Wainstein also served as a law school adjunct professor teaching national security law for twelve years, as a commissioner on the Bipartisan Commission on Biodefense, as a member of the Public Interest Declassification Board, and in a number of other national security organizations. Wainstein previously spent over 20 years in law enforcement and national security positions in the federal government. Between 1989 and 2001, Wainstein served as a federal prosecutor in both the Southern District of New York and the District of Columbia, where he handled criminal prosecutions ranging from public corruption to violent gang cases and held a variety of supervisory positions, including Acting United States Attorney. In 2001, he was appointed Director of the Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, where he provided oversight and support to the 94 U.S. Attorneys' Offices. Between 2002 and 2004, Wainstein served as General Counsel of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and then as Chief of Staff to Director Robert S. Mueller, III. Wainstein was then nominated and confirmed as United States Attorney for the District of Columbia, where he led the largest U.S. Attorney's Office in the country, and in 2006 he was again confirmed as the first Assistant Attorney General for National Security at the Department of Justice. In that position, Wainstein established and led the new National Security Division, which consolidated the Justice Department's law enforcement and intelligence operations on all national security matters. In 2008, Wainstein was named Homeland Security Advisor by President George W. Bush. In that capacity, he advised the President, convened and chaired meetings of the Cabinet Officers on the Homeland Security Council, and oversaw the inter-agency process coordinating the nation's counterterrorism, homeland security, infrastructure protection, and disaster response and recovery efforts. Wainstein graduated from the University of Virginia and received his law degree from the University of California, Berkeley, School of Law.

PROFESSOR BRUCE WEINROD has taught and lectured on US foreign and national security policy, and he has extensive senior-level US government foreign and national security policy experience. As a senior Department of Defense official, he served as a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense and at a later point as the (dual-hatted) Defense Advisor to the US Mission at NATO and the Secretary of Defense Representative for Europe. On Capitol Hill, Mr. Weinrod served as a Legislative Director and foreign policy/defense advisor for a US Senator. Mr. Weinrod has also been a Public Policy Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, a Distinguished Research Fellow at the US National Defense University and a Leadership Fellow (based in Japan) of the Japan Society. He has been a US Senate-confirmed member of the Board of the US Institute of Peace and chaired its Research and Studies Committee; and he has published and lectured on US foreign and defense policy issues. In the private sector, Mr. Weinrod is an international business advisor focusing on US national security laws and regulations. A US Army veteran, Mr. Weinrod has a J.D. from the Georgetown University School of Law and an M.A. in International Relations from the University of Pennsylvania. He is a member of the DC Bar and the Council on Foreign Relations.

