

The Role of the Military in Combating Terrorism



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THE INTER-UNIVERSITY CENTER FOR TERRORISM STUDIES

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Preface

General (Ret.) Alfred Gray

*Twenty-Ninth Commandant of the United States Marine Corps; Senior Fellow
and Chairman of the Board of Regents, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies*

Selected Remarks

Part 1*

The role of the military is most germane to the discussion of combating terrorism. But, in my humble opinion, there is no such thing as *only* a military role anywhere in the world, for any reason. It has to be a team effort combining all the elements of national power, influence, and capability – whether it is diplomatic, technological, societal, cultural, or whatever. So, I would ask you to keep that in mind because we are mistaken, in my opinion, when we talk about what can be done exclusively by the military. Clearly, in today's environment, there is a distinct need for what many term "inter-agency"-type processes, cooperation, and working together.

It is important to understand that military type of strategy in action, war, civilian type of strategy in action, national security – or really all the above – are interconnected. This complicated type of operation requires beginning with very clear war or conflict aims and we certainly have to consider how we want this to look when we are done. This is not just from the political, military, economic, or cultural standpoints, but from all of these views and others.

We must also have mechanisms that can translate strategic plans into actions. Today, in this country, we need to do better in this area. We also need to clearly understand that we must be adaptive along the way, because plans and considerations change.

The subject of whether we, in the United States, are liked or not is crucial in many ways. Fundamentally, you want to understand that if the military serves in a non-domestic environment, there are a couple of basic rules we ought to remember. Do not ever do anything that hurts the people you are trying to help. Soldiers and Marines understand this- they do not need too much in the way of legal advice or anything else like that – this is common sense. There are many lawyers involved in operations, and that bothers me.

During the Eisenhower Administration, William Lederer [with Eugene Burdick] wrote a book called *The Ugly American*. He was talking about the way Americans acted and the way we were viewed by other people around the world – for example, in Laos and places like that. And Eisenhower put the word out to the military. He said, "Start learning about cultures and languages, people and how they live, and start looking at the world through their eyes instead of yours." We did that pretty well for a while, but I sense we may have drifted away from that slightly. I think that cultural understanding is very, very important.

* Edited introductory and concluding remarks from event on "The Role of the Military in Combating Terrorism" held on December 5, 2014.

Part 2*

From my personal vantage point, we live in a very challenging world with all of these technologies. But in my experience, over time, there have been counter-measures, counter-counter-measures, and smart people – both civilians and warriors – who figure out ways to operate in these kinds of environments. They figure out how to get to the root cause or challenge of a particular technological advantage or to eliminate, or at least neutralize it. I think that we will maintain that capability because internationally, with our friends and allies, we have the education, the academic background, and the technical expertise. And most of all, any military person operating for the right reasons, in any country, will figure out ways to deal with difficult situations. They have in the past and they will in the future.

What concerns me a little is our propensity to tell everybody – or to lay out ahead of time – our plans. I think we ought to be much more secretive and much smarter about this. There is no need to disclose or advertise what we can or will do. Let them worry about it. Let them think about it. We can really reach out collectively, with our friends and allies, to anywhere in the world, or in space, and pretty much do what we want. We ought to think about this in more of a holistic way and stop revealing so much about doing this and doing that. By the way, I have to tell you that I hate this term "boots on the ground." We should never tell anybody whether or not we are going to put people in there to do what has to be done. Let them worry about it. That is my philosophy on that.

Also, we ought to, geopolitically and through our acts, keep the friends and allies we have. We should talk for a moment about Turkey, for example. Turkey has been a US ally for a long time. Their government has recently undergone some changes – they are moving a little bit away from the secularist position that Ataturk laid out – but Turkey has been a good friend and ally. They have been with us at the 11th hour when they had to be and we ought to cherish those kinds of things. I like people with tough hands – I like people that can fight and they certainly can do that. Having been an artillery forward observer supporting the Turkish brigade in Korea, I have personal knowledge of how they fought. And it is difficult. It is difficult for them with the Kurdish situation and with all of the other things that are going on – and that is just one country. Each country has these types of challenges. Pakistan has good reason to be wary from time to time about certain things that we do and certain ideas that we have.

As an eternal optimist in life, I believe we have to develop an integrative, adaptive strategy that has the buy-in of all our friends and allies. This strategy must be flexible and must be phased over the long haul. Above all, we have to stay with it. There are no silver bullets with terrorism. The “global war on terrorism” is not a good idea because terrorism is a tactic – it is an ideology. You cannot have a war against tactics. So the idea really is, over the long haul, to make terrorism a bad idea for terrorists – so they are not getting anything out of it. Let it wear itself out. There will always be terrorism. There has been terrorism since history was first recorded, and we will have more in the next 50 years. But the idea is to make terrorism worthless.

* Edited introductory and concluding remarks from event on "Combating Terrorism: Strategic Assessments, the Military's Role, and International Cooperation" held on May 14, 2015.

Introduction

Professor Yonah Alexander

Director, Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies

The role of force in the struggle for power within and among nations is a permanent fixture of international life. As James Madison observed during a debate on the adoption of the Constitution in 1787, “There never was a government without force.” Likewise, Sir Winston Churchill in a note to the First Sea Lord on October 15, 1942 remarked: “Superior force is a powerful persuader.”

Clearly, the primary actors capable of resorting to power domestically during periods of peace are the police and other law enforcement agencies. They are mandated to implement the preservation of public order, and thus represent the first layer of protection for civilians, including citizens, permanent residents, and visiting foreigners. These designated governmental bodies seek to encourage “good behavior,” prevent illegal activities, warn-of potential internal threats, and develop strategies to assure an effective national security environment in accordance with the requirements of the administration of justice.

And yet, from time immemorial, military forces in particular have projected power at home and abroad during periods of both war and peace. It is not surprising therefore that there exists a comprehensive literature in this field, from antiquity to the contemporary era. Suffice to mention the infinite theological and secular sources covering the nature, role, and impact of armies on the direction of the statecraft of nations. For example, early religious texts focused on God’s directing military operations (e.g., assurance of victory), organizational structures (e.g., standing armies and mercenaries), arms supplies (e.g., slings, chariots, provisions), strategies and tactics (e.g., intelligence and spoils of war), and the virtues and vices of battles (e.g., magnanimity in victory and treatment of prisoners).

Moreover, political philosophers, policymakers, leaders, soldiers, jurists, scholars, and reporters have continuously introduced into the military lexicon an extensive list of concepts such as aggression, armament, attrition, balance of power, counterinsurgency, Cold War, deception, geopolitics, guerrilla warfare, imperialism, laws of war, limited war, mutiny, national security, neutrality, political-military affairs, preemptive war, propaganda and psychological warfare, rebellion, religious war, resistance, revolution, total war, and war crimes.

This list of terms has been expanded considerably with the emergence of the “age of terrorism” in the post-World War II period. The following is some of the generic and operational phraseology relevant to terrorism challenges and their strategic and tactical responses: asymmetrical warfare, clandestine operations, combating terrorism, cyber terrorism, disruptive terrorism, domestic terrorism, foreign affinity terrorism, the Global War on Terror, hybrid war, high-level conflict, international terrorism, lone wolf terrorism, low intensity conflict, man-made disasters, mass-destruction terrorism, overseas contingency operations, piracy, radicalization and extremism, targeted killings, and unrestricted warfare.

To be sure, the proliferation of the foregoing terms related to contemporary terrorism undoubtedly contributes to an expanded confusion over the conceptual and doctrinal roles of the military in combating current and future challenges on national, regional, and global levels. What further complicates the vision and mission of the armed forces, at least in democracies, is the media corruption of relevant language in its reporting on terrorism. For instance, the electronic and print media interchangeably labels “terrorists” as “militants,” “freedom fighters,” “patriots,” “insurgents,” “guerrillas,” “combatants,” “soldiers,” and “commandos.” Moreover, the media uses paramilitary or pseudo-revolutionary vocabulary such as “act of resistance,” “armed struggle,” and “military operations” to describe common terrorist acts.

In sum, the semantic confusion over the precise universal definition of terrorism, including the subset of the species that can be identified as state-sponsored, has hindered formulation of military policy by democratic nations. Consequently, it has been hard to craft authoritative and systematic doctrinal and policy recommendations on initiatives to prevent, deter, and decrease the effectiveness of terrorist acts, or to punish identified terrorists after the fact.

The purpose of this brief introduction is to provide an academic context for the apparent lingering confusion regarding the nature and implications of the role of the military in combating terrorism in democracies as well as in other governmental systems. It consists of three segments, namely, an outline of the anatomy of terrorism and the military’s role in combating the threats, some perspectives on the mission of the U.S. armed forces, and an acknowledgement of the support of the sponsoring institutions involved in producing this report as well as the academic and professional contributions of the authors who participated in several seminars organized during the 2012-2016 period.¹

Anatomy of Terrorism and Selected Military Responses

Despite the general uncertainty over what constitutes terrorism within the entire spectrum of conflict below the level of what is traditionally perceived as an internationally recognized state of organized “war,” a consensus in the post-9/11 era seems to have emerged on what are some of the basic elements of terrorist threats and what constitutes “success criteria” in combating the challenges with military forces. More specifically, the “fog” over an acceptable global definition of terrorism appears to

¹ This report draws from earlier research as well as numerous publications authored or edited by myself since the 1950s. Recent relevant studies, for example, include *The Islamic State: Combating the Caliphate Without Borders* (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2015), with Dean Alexander; *NATO: From Regional to Global Security Provider* (Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2015), with Richard Prosen; and “Terrorism in North Africa and the Sahel in 2015” (a report published by the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies in March 2016). Other sources are available on *Terrorism: An Electronic Journal and Knowledge Base* (www.terrorismelectronicjournal.org) and the website www.iucts.org.

Mention should also be made of several of my other works such as *Al-Qa’ida: Ten Years After 9/11 and Beyond* (Arlington, VA: Potomac Institute Press, 2012), with Michael S. Swetnam; *Counterterrorism Strategies: Successes and Failures of Six Nations* (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2006); and *Combating Terrorism: Strategies of Ten Countries* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2002).

fade, at least partially, whenever the following selected components are incorporated in framing the nature of this menacing phenomenon:

- Nature of the Act: Terrorism of any kind deliberately embraces violence or threat of violence calculated to induce fear by criminal, unlawful, politically subversive, or anarchic acts; piracy; hijacking of aircraft; taking of hostages; and resort to “high-tech” violence.
- Perpetrators: States, along with individual and private groups, are perpetrators; states sponsoring terrorism are particularly threatening to global security. Sovereign states are entitled to protect themselves and their citizens from perpetrators of this kind.
- Strategic Objectives: Certain states, including one-party dictatorships, sponsor terrorism as part of a campaign of geographic expansion of political control through weakening and destabilizing other existing state structures that are based on political pluralism and representative government.
- Intended Outcomes: Striking fear in populations much broader than the victims themselves; extortion and radical political change are the expected results.
- Targets: Human beings and property are specific targets of terrorist acts, with special focus on heads of state, diplomats, police, armed forces, and other selected and indiscriminate targets.
- Methods: Threats, as well as the actual resort to sabotage, hostage-taking, murder, kidnapping, bombing, and use of other conventional and unconventional weapons, are methods commonly employed to spread fear among target populations.

The other evolutionary emerging consensus relates to the tactical and strategic measures seeking to attain success through military responses. These criteria include:

- Reduction in the number of terrorist incidents;
- Reduction in the number of casualties from these terrorist incidents;
- Reduction in the monetary cost of terrorist incidents;
- Reduction in the size of terrorist groups operating in a country;
- Increasing the number of terrorists killed, captured, and/or convicted;
- Protection of national infrastructures; and
- Preservation of basic national structures and policies such as the rule of law, democracy, and civil liberties.

The Role of the U.S. Military: Some Perspectives

Early guidance on the role of the U.S. military domestically is defined by the 1869 Posse Comitatus Act. It specifically delimits the domestic use of federal military force in a law enforcement role:

The Posse Comitatus Act encompasses legal constraint on the use of military force to combat domestic acts of terrorism. The option to direct a federal military response, however, is available to the President under the provisions of 10 USC 332 and 333 or a proclamation under 10 USC 334 would be necessary to implement such action. If a federal military response were required, coordination between the Departments of

Justice and Defense would clearly be necessary to integrate civilian and military forces.²

That is, while the investigative and operational responsibility for coping with terrorism at home lies with the FBI, and host countries are obligated overseas for planning, coordination, and implementation of precautionary measures, initial protective responses to terrorist actions against U.S. armed forces and bases remain a local U.S. military command responsibility in all locations.

In addition, military force may be required to restore order and preserve lives in such other situations as:

- When the appropriate law enforcement system is unable to deal with political and ideological violence on a wholesale and protracted basis.
- When a cross-border paramilitary terrorist or guerrilla campaign, conceivable at home but more likely against a foreign military base, is prolonged. This situation requires military force for protection duties, hot pursuit, and sanctuary for base destruction.
- And when civil authorities or police are clearly inadequate in terms of personnel, training, or weapons to deal with hostage rescue or after emergency counterterrorist operations.

Clearly, the unique capability of the armed forces to protect the security and liberties of democratic states must be used with great care, and usually only when other remedies have been found inadequate. Notwithstanding, the U.S. military's role is quite likely to be a vital last line of defense for the protection of U.S. personnel overseas and the guaranteeing of security for U.S. foreign bases.

Additionally, the U.S. military response includes *inter alia* broader missions such as clandestine counterterrorist infiltrations of terrorist organizations, covert support for foreign counterterrorist military operations, overt U.S. military preemptive operations, and overt U.S. military operations against identified terrorist bases and forces used against American targets.

In sum, U.S. responsibility in protecting military power is only one recourse within the full range of counterterrorism responses. The key measure is quality intelligence as dramatically demonstrated in the extraordinary successful Navy SEAL raid on the Abbottabad home of Usama bin Laden in Pakistan, finally killing the founder of al-Qa'ida on May 2, 2011. Other "best practices" strategies include cooperation with the allies, security assistance, political and diplomatic pressures, economic sanctions, and active participation in the "war of ideas."

² For details see, for instance, James B. Motley, *U.S. Strategy for Counter Domestic Political Terrorism* (Washington, DC; National Defense University, 1983), p. 46.

The Rationale, Content of the Report, and Acknowledgements

My academic research related to the role of the military in combating terrorism began in the early 1950s at the University of Chicago and continued at Columbia University and elsewhere. Mention should be made of subsequent work conducted and published with the support of numerous institutions in the United States and abroad, including State University of New York's Institute for Studies in International Terrorism, the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University, the George Washington University's Terrorism Studies Program, and the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies (IUCTS), administered by the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies and the International Law Institute.

To be sure, topic selected for study on terrorism were frequently undertaken as a result of strategic and tactical developments around the world. For example, the October 28, 1983, suicide bombing by the Shiite terrorist group Islamic Jihad of the headquarters of the U.S. Marines in Beirut, which killed 241 servicemen and constituted the most devastating attack on American forces since the end of the Vietnam War, triggered the establishment of a governmental Commission of Inquiry of the tragic incident.

Moreover, on August 17, 1984, the U.S. Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans requested CSIS, where I served as a senior staff member, to prepare a study originally titled "Terrorism as Covert Warfare." Subsequently, a follow-up report on "State-Sponsored Terrorism" was published in June 1985 by the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary of the U.S. Senate. Finally, these works, written by myself and Ray S. Cline (a former Deputy Director for Intelligence at the CIA), were updated and published in a book titled *Terrorism as State-Sponsored Covert Warfare: What the Free World Must Do to Protect Itself* in 1986.³

Similarly, over the years, following escalated terrorist operations around the world, including those targeting the military forces of many nations, other scholarly projects have been undertaken in this field. Suffice to mention the efforts of NATO's Centre of Excellence—Defence Against Terrorism (COE-DAT) and the Partnership for Peace Training Center (PfP TC), both based in Ankara and administered by officers of the Turkish General Staff in cooperation with partner countries. For example, the proceedings of the NATO Advanced Training Course on "Capacity Building in the Fight Against Terrorism" held in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan from June 11-15, 2012, were published in the following year.⁴

Also, PfP TC launched a new international journal titled *Partnership for Peace Review* in 2011. This interdisciplinary publication, edited by myself, aimed to provide a forum for the exchange of information and expertise among nations in the area of international security, peace studies, and military cooperation as well as to emphasize

³ This volume, prepared in cooperation with CSIS, was published by HERO Books in Fairfax, Virginia in 1986.

⁴ Uğur Gürbüz, ed. *Capacity Building in the Fight Against Terrorism* (Amsterdam, Berlin, Tokyo, and Washington, DC: IOS Press, 2013). For example, see Yonah Alexander's chapter on "Terrorism Overview," pp.1-8.

the principle that “global problems require global solutions” with effective contributions of all nations. In fact, the first issue of the Review included selected papers presented at the Silk Road Flag Officers Seminar “Towards a New Strategic Concept: The Future of NATO-Partners Relations” held in Çanakkale, Turkey, June 21-22, 2010. Contributors included both civilian and military experts representing NATO, EU, Turkey, the United States, Australia, Finland, Jordan, and Burkina Faso.

It is against this context that the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies (IUCTS) developed in 2012 a research project on “The Role of the Military in Combating Terrorism.” The rationale for this project is as follows: Modern terrorism and the strategies to counter it have created a fairly deep body of literature, especially in the years since September 11, 2001. In reviewing that literature, however, we find little that explains the impact of terrorist organization growth from small, loosely organized violent groups on one hand to capturing a government and becoming a state sponsor of terror on the other. As an organization grows through this continuum, one would expect an evolution of both political objectives for the organization and in the uses of violence it pursues. Further, there is no literature of which we are aware that defines and evaluates different military strategies for countering terror for organizations that exist on the various levels of structural development. This academic project seeks to fill that gap in knowledge. The research may include evaluation of integrating military with political and diplomatic strategies at each level of terrorist organization growth to expand the body of knowledge.

Among the research topics were two major categories: the first was passive defense that includes threat analysis, intelligence gathering, security enhancement, technologies used to defend against terrorism, contingency planning, crisis management, domestic and international anti-terrorist training and war games, and defensive measures to protect complex infrastructures. The second area focused on active defense that consists of special tactical response units, special multinational forces, counter-terrorism technologies, covert/proxy operations, conventional preemptive measures, unconventional retaliatory measures, preemptive unconventional measures, rescue operations, blockade, and search and destroy operations.

The current report on “The Role of the Military in Combating Terrorism” represents a selection of slightly edited presentations made at several seminars organized by the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies, the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, the International Law Institute, and the University of Virginia School of Law’s Center for National Security Law.

More specifically, the panelists participating in these academic efforts include Rear Admiral (Ret.) Terry McKnight, Brigadier General Richard C. Gross, Lieutenant-Colonel Sébastien Chênebeau, Colonel (Ret.) Timothy G. Murphy, Brigadier General (Ret.) David Reist, Dr. Lawrence J. Korb, Brigadier Chaudhary Sarfraz Ali, Colonel (Ret.) Gary Anderson, Lieutenant General Vincent R. Stewart, and General (Ret.) William E. (Kip) Ward. We wish to express our deep appreciation for their participation in our events and for their rich personal and professional insights into the ongoing debate on the role of the military in combating terrorism.

As always, we are grateful to Michael S. Swetnam (CEO and Chairman, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies), General (Ret.) Alfred Gray (Twenty-Ninth Commandant of the United States Marine Corps; Senior Fellow and Chairman of the Board of Regents, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies), and Professor Don Wallace, Jr. (Chairman, International Law Institute) for their continuing support of our academic work. General Gray in particular deserves appreciation for his Preface to this report that includes selected insights that he presented at several meetings on the topic of “The Role of the Military in Combating Terrorism.”

Finally, our summer 2016 intern team, ably managed by Sharon Layani (Research Associate and Coordinator at the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies), provided most useful research and administrative assistance. The team includes Iakovos Balassi (University of Wisconsin), Gabriela Barrera (Georgetown University), Jacob T. Fuller (University of Oklahoma), Madeline Henshaw-Greene (College of William & Mary), Rachel Kreisman (American University), Alisa Laufer (George Washington University), Basanti Mardemootoo (University of California, Davis), Kathryn Schoemer (Purdue University), Jessica Son (University of California, Berkeley), Robert Stephens (Carnegie Mellon University), and Robert Akira Watson (University of St. Andrews).

August 2016

Rear Admiral (Ret.) Terry McKnight*First Commander of Joint Task Force 151**

I am going to talk a little bit about my background in maritime security and international cooperation. But I am going to focus on what I think is one of the great success stories in international cooperation, and it is fighting pirates. I mean it is just as simple as that, but it is the issue of what the international community has formed together to fight piracy.

As most of you know in 2007 and 2008, there was a major problem with piracy off the coast of Somalia. Now, we have had problems with piracy since ships have gone to sea. Julius Caesar was captured by pirates, St. Patrick was captured by pirates, and our Navy was founded to chase pirates not far from the country of Morocco right there on the Barbary Coast. So it is embedded in our history. But it was a major problem, and the problem with terrorism and with piracy is a failed state. Somalia is a failed state. If you rank all the nation-states together, Somalia has been there and I guess, into the future, will be a failed state.

We have seen some success. They have elected a new president, they have elected a congress that was sworn in on the parking lot of the Mogadishu Airport, so there have been little successes, but it is still a failed state.

And the reason why piracy started is because they could not patrol their borders. They did not have a coast guard, a functioning coast guard, so ships – fishing vessels and everything – were coming into their territorial waters and basically they formed piracy and went after ransom.

But the key is that one of the things I need to stress is the piracy in the Gulf of Aden and other areas of the world, like in the Straits of Malacca we had, it restricts the free flow of trade. As long as our Navy and most navies are going to be in existence, we are going to be out there to stop people from preventing the free flow of trade. So that is a key issue.

The cost of piracy has risen dramatically, but because of the success we have seen it fall off. In 2010, it was estimated that piracy cost the world community in the neighborhood of ten billion dollars. That was from ransom payments, that was from security forces out there, militaries which were out there, and ships basically having to avoid the area. The other thing that was a concern to the United States government about piracy was that in the southern part of Somalia was an organization called al-Shabaab and a very big part of what al-Qa'ida was doing in the Somalia bases.

The fear was that the funds that were going from piracy would feed terrorism to al-Shabaab. Now luckily, we never saw a connection between al-Shabaab and piracy. And we are not really sure why, but you know Somalia is a clan based society so we think the pirates stayed in one area and al-Shabaab stayed in another. But I can tell you for a fact that everybody, everybody, from the highest levels of government down to the pirates themselves, was benefiting from the ransoms paid for piracy.

* Contribution at event on “International Cooperation in Combating Terrorism: Review of 2012 and Outlook for 2013” held on February 27, 2013.

So how did we achieve success? Through the international community and international cooperation. If you remember several years ago Admiral Mullen, when he was the Chief of Naval Operations, said, “We need to form a one thousand-ship navy.” Now, the Congress started to have shivers and started to break out into a sweat thinking that the United States was going to fund a one thousand-ship navy. Well that is not what he was talking about. He was talking about the ships, the navies, the maritime forces of the world forming together, and working together to fight piracy, fight terrorism, or fight conflict whatever it’s going to be. The other success story about fighting piracy was under the umbrella of the United Nations. The United Nations gave us all the authorities we needed, there were several UN Security Resolutions that said you can go ashore, you can attack the pirate camps, you can do basically anything you need. So that was very important in fighting piracy. The other success story was that we had the world community out there.

We had task forces from NATO, the European Union, we had China, Russia, and I headed a combined task force, which was called Task Force 151, which was formed by the United States Navy. At various times there were 25 nations out there working together. Now how many times do you see nations working together? Not very often in conflicts. We may see it in the Olympics, but I spent time on Chinese warships, Russian warships, and we were all out there together for one purpose, and that was to fight piracy. The issue that needs to be addressed in piracy and a lot of other things about terrorism, is the legal issue of how you prosecute, and get the pirates or get the terrorists off the street. When I was out there 60-75 percent of the pirates that we captured we had to catch and release. We caught the criminals, we had the evidence, but the legal community was not prepared, whether it’s the international or the nation-states themselves, were not prepared to prosecute pirates. The major issue that we see in shipping industry is that a ship is registered in Panama, it’s flagged in the Marshall Islands, and has a crew of Malaysians, Filipinos, or some different nationality. And this is one of the problems we have today. There are five ships that remain in the pirate camps, and most of them have been abandoned by the world community because there is no responsibility to go after them. So the legal requirements to go after the pirates is a very good thing. In conclusion, I would just like to say that international cooperation is going to be the key whether we are going to fight piracy, conflicts, or terrorism in the future. The world community has to work together with the United Nations, in order to fight these infections across the globe.

Brigadier General Richard C. Gross*Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff**

I do have to state up front, these are my personal views and that I am not here speaking on behalf of the Department of Defense or the Joint Staff or the United States Army. These are my own personal thoughts and views.

As I thought about how would I reflect back on 9/11 and 9/11 lessons learned, it was interesting, as I was coming in this morning, I was driving to work and one of the local radio stations (107.3) was actually playing back their tape of the events of that morning as they were on the air doing their normal pop, music, news, and sports, but they interrupted their broadcast when they started literally watching CNN and talking about what they were seeing. In the background you could hear the CNN reports that we have all have heard so many times, and it really brought back to memory the great loss of that day, the tragic loss of human life as they literally were watching the television and talking about it as the second plane hit.

I think we all remember where we were the day when we first heard about it. I heard about it when the first plane hit while I was on a training exercise with special operations forces in Hungary. And we heard about the first plane and thought maybe it was a small Cessna, maybe it was a tragic accident, and then we heard that the second plane hit the building and we knew it had to be more than that. And our lives have not been the same since; nobody in this room I think can fairly say that their lives are the same as they were before 9/11. I was reflecting on that – I was in Hungary, my wife was in Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and there were soldiers in the street with concertina wire laid across the entrances to the post, and my kids had guards at their schools. My kids – my oldest was seven at the time – none of my three sons remember a world before 9/11. They do not know what it is like to not be in a constant state of war. Now I realize that is probably more akin to military kids who see their fathers and their mothers go off to war and come back multiple times as so many of us have, but I think everybody in the country has kind of dealt with the issue that we have been in a constant state of war since 9/11, and that's tough. And there were on 9/11 so many great examples of the first responders who showed great bravery in going into buildings, many of whom did not return, firefighters, policemen, and the bravery of the NYC mayor and how he helped all of us uplift after that terrible time. Just so many things that I thought of about those days.

Now, Professor Alexander asked me to think about lessons learned since 9/11. I started with the perspective that obviously I am a military officer and a military lawyer on top of that. This is a policy institute – you all think about policy matters; as a military officer, I do not “do policy”, as we say. We provide our best military advice to the policy makers to decide what is the right or wrong thing to do, and on top of that I provide my best military legal advice to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and others on the Joint Staff as we advise the civilian leadership, and they of course participate in the interagency process. So I thought about it from that perspective as a military officer, what would I say were lessons learned that I would want you all to

* Contribution at event on “The Anniversary of 9/11: Lessons Learned” held on September 11, 2013.

think about as you think about policy related to counter terrorism. So I came up with just a few that I would like to throw out to you for your consideration.

The first one I would tell you is that from my experience on multiple deployments to Afghanistan, to Iraq and other places I would tell you that military operations are certainly part of the solution but they are not all of the solution. You know we have a saying amongst the military and you have heard it as well in other settings: "If you only have a hammer you tend to see every problem as a nail." And I would tell you that when it comes to counterterrorism and taking on threats like this you cannot just use the hammer; there have to be other means of addressing terrorism, and I know that this institute with a focus on science and technology and other things recognizes that very much. But in my experience over the years from the tactical to the strategic level of the Department of Defense, what I have seen is that the whole of government approaches are absolutely critical to getting at the problem of terrorism. The military should not be the only ones dealing with it and cannot be the only ones dealing with it. And fortunately we are not the only ones that deal with this problem. You know we have to have diplomatic solutions sometimes, we have to have economic solutions, as Treasury and others, we have to have USAID fully involved, we have to have informational things, we need to have the intelligence community, and all these portions of our government come together in the interagency process and work together to combat terrorism and the other problems, national security problems we are facing, and I have seen tremendous cooperation since 9/11. You know, as you think about the tragedy of that day, some of the things we have done since then that have made us better as a nation, made us stronger and more resilient. One of the things that I would point out to you is the interagency cooperation that we have seen, certainly that I have seen personally, as folks from Justice, from State, from the CIA, from ODNI, from all the other agencies in the federal government, have really tried to come together and work together to solve problems. So that is one of my key lessons learned that I would tell you. Military operations, whether direct action or building partner capacity or others, are certainly a solution but they are not all of the solution, from my experience.

The next thing I would tell you, related to that on a broader level, is that our partners and our allies are absolutely critical as well, and I am so happy to see the Ambassador from Mali here today as part of this because he is facing in his country the kind of terrorist threats that we have seen as well. You have seen other countries come to the aid of Mali, both the French and the United States supporting the French; you have seen other African nations coming together to face those problems head on with terrorism. You know another saying we have in the military is "the only thing worse than fighting in a coalition is fighting by yourself", or fighting without a coalition. That is been my military experience as well. In Afghanistan and Iraq, when other countries came alongside, whether it be through NATO and ISAF, the International Security Assistance Force, when other nations join us in the fight they bring capabilities, they bring perspectives, they bring different view points, and I think it makes us stronger. It adds challenges certainly for the military but I think most of those challenges are well overcome by the benefits of working together as a coalition force. So that is my second lesson learned of things that I have seen over the last 12 years of war.

The next thing I have seen that I would tell you and as a lawyer in particular, is that the adherence to the rule of law is absolutely critical in what we do. You know we have seen incidents in our history of the last 12 years where we did not necessarily adhere to the rule of law, the law of armed conflict in particular. And in particular with detention operations in Abu Ghraib, we have seen instances like that, misbehavior, misconduct by individuals in war zones, where we failed to adhere to the rule of law and we lose some of our legitimacy. We lose some of our creditability and frankly it sets us back strategically and operationally when we have incidents like that, that do violate the law. That just set us back as we try to move forward to meet our goals and accomplish the mission. So to me it is absolutely critical that we continue to follow the rule of law, that we follow the law of armed conflict, that we follow the *jus in bello* and *jus ad bellum* rules of armed conflict, that we follow domestic and international law as we seek to address the threats that we are faced with. Related with that is the protection of civilian populations, and that's a fundamental tenet of the law of armed conflict. To the degree possible, our military operations, our strikes, our targeting must be proportional; we have to as much as possible to avoid collateral damage. And we found that not only does it make sense to follow the law because it is the law of armed conflict, but it also helps us in our operations. Particularly in a counterinsurgency like Afghanistan, the more we protect the civilian population the easier it is for us to meet our goals. So that is another important lesson that I learned, in particular working as the ISAF legal advisor from 2009-2010.

And then the last part I guess that I have learned, and this is a plug for my profession, is the critical role for lawyers, working with policy makers, working with commanders, working with decisions makers. If you are going to adhere to the rule of law you have to know what the law is. We can inform policy makers about the legal boundaries of the decisions facing them and help them guide them through some of the risks of particular forms of decisions in order to get them where they want to be to accomplish their mission. So in my profession, with trained military judge advocates, military attorneys who understand the profession, understand the rules, understand the law, but are also able to have the courage to speak up to senior commanders, and say, "hey sir, this is what the law says, but here's a way to get where you want to go, but do it legally morally and ethically." That is absolutely critical in my profession. You know, Harold Koh made a speech in 2010 to ASIL where he talked about the role of the legal advisor, and he was talking about the State Department of course, but I thought it was really just a fascinating way of looking at the role of the government lawyer. He said a government lawyer had to be a counselor, a general counselor advising on the law; had to be the conscience of the organization, speaking the law to power, speaking truth to power using good judgment to help decisions makers make good decisions; and then third, he said that lawyers had to be the defenders of U.S. interests; and then finally a spokesperson for international law. I would tell you as a military lawyer I see all of those as part of my role as well, although for the last one I might say I am a spokesperson for the law of armed conflict. Often in interagency lawyers meeting I'm the one who has to speak up and say, I think this is what the law says, I think this is what is expected of us as a nation, as a military, and this is what I think we ought to do, and I think that is absolutely critical.

So just to close, you know I thought about how to end this and right before I came over here a friend of mine put a quote on Facebook, that I thought it was a great way

to remember 9/11. I wanted to read it to you because it was much more eloquent than anything I could have come up with:

“12 years ago today, our United States of America was attacked by a group of hate-filled extremists who crashed hijacked planes into the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center, the Pentagon and into a field in Shanksville, PA. On that day when nearly 3,500 citizens, first responders, and military members died, we must also remember that in the hours and days following that September 11, came stories of incredible human courage, generosity and spirit. Stories about ordinary people who showed extraordinary character and gave us reasons to be uplifted somehow while we processed our vulnerability. On this September 11th while we remember the victims who lost their lives without warning, we honor and recognize those who suited up that day, moved forward and knowingly sacrificed their lives in the line of duty.”

Lieutenant-Colonel Sébastien Chênebeau*The French Liaison Officer at Joint Staff J7**

I will talk more about the usage of force than the diplomatic part. I think there are some useful linkages.

As you may know, I was in Mali last winter for only two months, but at the very beginning of the crisis. I have a good knowledge of the terrorist threat in this part of Africa.

So the Operation Serval was a French-led operation but not only, it was shared with different countries, and that may be the first point where diplomacy meets the use of force because we fought alongside the Malian Army at the very beginning by reinforcing it. We also helped to establish capacities of the different African armies to win this battle.

Mali at this time was a disrupted country. But because of the long shared history we have with Africa, and especially with Mali, we could not let this happen. We faced an aggressive enemy and the whole operation was very challenging for France and its allies.

The use of force in this case points out the new expeditionary way of current warfare. The main characteristics of this operation were: a fast response to an unexpected situation; a regional approach--we fought jointly with different African countries; a non-state and terrorist threat; and the use of combined and joint forces. And also a multinational engagement with many European countries and the United States.

I would like to talk a little bit more about the threat itself and the jihadist armed groups in this part of Sahara and Sahel. It is not only an issue for Mali; it is an issue for the whole area. As you can see on the map, all those points are locations where the jihadist are situated, so you can see that it is not only Mali but also Niger, Libya, and Algeria. There are many connections with different countries.

It's not really an army we faced during this operation. The enemy came from different places in Africa with different ways of mind. So it's very difficult to use diplomacy against such an enemy because it hasn't got any official representation that you have to deal with them. And unfortunately to deal with them the only way was the use of force by France. In addition it is not only jihadists, there are also smugglers. The main course of action of this enemy is not to fight the force directly; they avoid fighting us when possible. They prefer to hide within the population, for instance. And they are able to conduct opportunistic alliances. They can change. The friend of today is not the friend of tomorrow. It is very difficult to deal with this threat.

It is a quick focus for your understanding of what the enemy is, really, and how this enemy fights. Because they are not a traditional army, it's not a confrontation of two armies. It's a confrontation of wills. So, as you can see, in the Adrar des Ifoghas,

* Contribution at event on "Diplomacy and Force: Rewards, Costs, and Lessons" held on May 16, 2014.

in the northeast of Mali, they had a safe haven. And this safe haven was well prepared for combat. We observed that the enemy, generally speaking, and especially al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb, leveraged of all the former wars, and especially in Syria, Libya, and Afghanistan. So this enemy is stronger than expected and was very hard to fight.

Now, after the enemy, I would like to point out the French decision-making process and how are the interactions between the military and the political level. Our chief of defense is the military advisor of the government. He can advise it on the situation from the military point of view, as well as the French Department of State from a diplomatic one. The French President can decide by himself regarding the opportunity to intervene in a country. And after that, he gives the Operational Command to the Chief of Defense. So it is a very short loop. What I would like to remind you of as well is that we cannot and we do not want to intervene without an international and legal mandate. So when the French President decided to intervene in Mali, he made sure before that he had a request from the Malian government; that is the first point. And the second point is that he made sure that the United Nations gave him clearance to intervene. This is our decision-making process with a short loop, but we need a legal environment to commit the troops in country.

Now just a reminder, I would like to mention that when you use force, it could be very challenging. The northern part of Mali is roughly the size of France, or the size of Texas for U.S. people. It is a huge country, empty for the most part. But, it is not that empty. Many people live in this area. Mostly, they are Tuareg. In such an area, it is very hard to conduct a campaign. And, given the emergency, we conducted the campaign and at the same time we built the force and planned the future. And the future for us was not the French future but the Malian future and the African future. So most part of the plan was to keep the strength at the lowest level possible while increasing the capacities of our partners, mainly African, and to make sure the Malian armed forces will be able to deal with the threat in the future.

I won't go into the details of the operation; right now I give the lessons we learned and confirmed. This is another touch point with diplomacy but when the government chooses to commit some troops in a war, the troops need a clear initial political end state and a mission statement as clear as possible. We had that at the beginning in Mali and for militaries it was easy to conduct a campaign. As you may know, France has many troops pre-deployed in different countries in Africa. It is very valuable because we have a good knowledge of the environment, and the French armed forces were trained in an expeditionary mentality. We have, as well, a quick reaction force, and this alert system was very helpful. We learned a lot of lessons from our war in Libya in 2011 and in Afghanistan as well with regard to tactics, techniques, and equipment. I think France has good expertise in terms of cooperation with African countries. It allowed us to fight efficiently from the beginning of the operation. And if you want to conduct a war, you must be prepared to use not only high technology but, if you want to fight some terrorists, you need to use old fashioned dismounted warfare. You must go by foot on the ground; there is no other way but to do that.

Now there are some challenges ahead for the force now. You know that France has decreased its troops in the operation, but we need to keep the situation under control in order to make the political dialogue between north and south parts of Mali possible. France now plans and operates with MINUSMA, and France helps to keep off the

jihadist groups and if possible to kill and disband these groups. And I think this is the case now; France, with the Malian new armed forces, is expanding the hunt for the jihadist groups because they do not know the borders.

So as a conclusion, I would say that the keys for success are unity of purpose at all levels, starting from the political level down to the soldier level. The ability to operate on short notice for a country: if you want to be strong you need to have a good backup and a quick backup. High readiness forces are allowed by our permanent stationed force in Africa. And we need as well to have a very high level of interoperability and confidence with multinational partners in Africa and with all European and also American partners. And it is not only a matter of military; it's a matter of negotiations at all levels, including the political levels.

Colonel (Ret.) Timothy G. Murphy

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I would like to talk about how the world has changed and how, in my view, we need to change in the way we approach the problem from the military perspective.

The world is, indeed, a much different place than when I grew up as a young man in the United States Air Force. It seems to me that what distinguishes this century and the latter half of last century from the recent past is the explosion of adversaries and the types of adversaries that we need to deal with from a military and political point of view. Of course, we still have the problem of nation-states that are in conflict with each other. But we also are seeing the need to deal with conflict between a nation-state and a very well-organized sub-national group that might even have legal status within another nation-state or another system. Then, of course, a step down from that you have outlawed but very organized and violent groups that we normally place in the category of terrorist groups. At the bottom you have loosely organized but very violent groups.

All of a sudden from a military and a diplomatic point of view, we are having to deal with this whole range of bad options. You can pick up the newspaper this morning and find examples of all four of these categories. Even today as we speak there is significant tension between Vietnam and China that falls within the traditional nation-state construct that we knew well from the 19th and early 20th century. Ukraine, in my view, is facing a hybrid of the same thing. Ukraine faces violence from a sub-national group that really is, in my view, a thin disguise of the forces of a nation-state next door to Ukraine.

Hizballah on the northern border of Israel is the best example of a sub-national group that actually has a legal status in another country. Yet Israel is having to deal with them, not in the same way that it would deal with Lebanon the nation-state, but the sub-national group itself. It is very well armed, very well organized, and actually holds a position as a legal party within that nation.

At a lower level there is, of course, the many faces of al-Qa'ida. We talked about AQIM (al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb) this morning. AQIM and other al-Qa'ida affiliates are good examples of the third level of group that are quite organized, quite violent, but do not fall within the authority of a nation-state. Normally, with the exception of the Taliban and Afghanistan many years ago, these groups are an outlawed group within the nation-state they operate in.

I see Boko Haram as sort of in a transition from the loosely organized very violent group up a step into a group that actually is becoming more organized and more violent and more dangerous to Nigeria.

I say that this is new and it is really not new. It started in a big way in the latter part of the 20th century as we saw this movement from primarily nation-state on

* Contribution at event on "Diplomacy and Force: Rewards, Costs, and Lessons" held on May 16, 2014.

nation-state to other constructs. We are in that world where this is a growing problem to us.

In dealing violence across this spectrum from a military point of view, there are some gaps in our thinking and certainly in some of the literature. Two of the gaps are particularly important from my point of view, and the first is a gap in understanding and even *how* to understand the political goals of the sub-national groups with which we are dealing. Clausewitz's famous dictum as he said it was, "We see therefore that war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse carried out with other means." Now I agree with Professor Robert Turner that Sun Tzu still applies. I also think Clausewitz still applies, as we're working through different organizations and different ways of doing battle. Clausewitz was talking about 18th and 19th century nation-on-nation war, but I believe that it's quite true even within these sub-national groups. What the casual student of Clausewitz might miss is that in that same paragraph he wrote, "The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it and means can never be considered in isolation from the purpose." So we want to look at both the means and the goal of every group, even when we are facing the forces of sub-national organizations. We see through a glass very darkly about what the political object is for some of these groups and how best to oppose that or prevent that political object. But they do have a political objective.

The best and most efficient ways to counter violence across the spectrum is to begin better to understand these political goals and what is the combination of diplomatic, economic, and military power we can apply against these groups that will meet our goals and prevent them from reaching theirs. This is one of the reasons that I personally am not enamored with overgeneralized descriptions of the enemy. "The War on Terror" or "Islamic Terrorism" are poor characterizations because in every case we're dealing with a particular group that has a particular set of military and political objectives. If we generalize too much in naming the threat that we are facing it becomes far more difficult to understand particularly what the political goal is that they seek. Now that is not simple, I know. Colonel Chênebeau put up that whole list of jihadists that all came together in Mali. What would have been their political objective? But unless we put some careful thought to identifying it, we will simply be in a reactive fighting mode that likely will not get us very far.

The second gap I think is similar to the first and that we need a better understanding of the combination and the efficacy of the true tools of power – diplomatic, economic, and political – all the way through this spectrum from loosely organized, to organized and dangerous, to a highly organized and legal sub-national group, up to the point of a nation-state that might even be a state-sponsor of terrorism. We are fond of saying, "We don't negotiate with terrorists." That is a nice tagline but it is not really a good substitute for strategy. Now don't get me wrong, I am not saying that we should stop all of this and start negotiating with terrorists. What I am saying is if you just follow the tagline to its logical conclusion, the only choice we have is to send forces and start fighting. Our choices really are much broader than that and we should think through them.

Professor Robert Turner mentioned deterrence this morning. I grew up with Thomas Schelling and some of that crowd. Deterrence theory in the nuclear world was very developed – highly sophisticated game theory and decision theory. Well, why can't

we do the same with sub-national groups? How are they deterred, if they can be deterred? What are the best ways to deter them? If we must fight, what is the right combination of military power, alliances, and attacking their alliances and undermining their source of political and military power? We need to do this type of theoretical work.

In closing, I would note that the world is likely to remain very fractured and violent through this part at least of the 21st century, with conflict across this whole range of groups. I agree with the distinguished Ambassadors that we need new thinking about diplomacy and the institutions in this world. And I would add that we need the same fresh thinking on the military side of this equation.

Brigadier General (Ret.) David Reist

Operation Iraqi Freedom, Deputy Commanding General for Governance and Economics in Anbar Province from February 2006 to February 2007, and Vice President, Strategy and Planning Division, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies

Part 1*

First, let us address what the death of Bin Laden meant. I am not sure, but I am sure of this, that the pressure – the military and economic pressure, etc. – has caused al-Qa'ida to adapt, morph, and mutate. Most view Bin Laden's death as a good thing, but we must ask if his death now causes us to deal with a new strain of al-Qa'ida and what does that strain look like? When you have a game plan set, and the other team changes, you need to adjust. War, and life, is about adaptation. Especially in war, he who adapts quickly will have an advantage. If al-Qa'ida under Bin Laden looked the same after his death, there is no adaptation required. Attempting to extrapolate what al-Qa'ida will look like, what al-Qa'ida will do, what al-Qa'ida will become, is uncertain. As Yogi Berra stated, prediction is hard, especially about the future.

Second, where does al-Qa'ida go and where can it go? Assuming that they have not shifted from their original views and methods, we are dealing with people on the fringe. They believe in their cause and we believe in ours. This gets to truth, and truth can be relative, almost digressing to myth, and myth is powerful. Degrees of the fringe vary from country to country; we have some fringe people in our country, and they exist throughout the world. When truth cannot be agreed upon, especially between nations, violence invariably results.

Third, where do we want al-Qa'ida to go? Of course, we want them eliminated because of the damage they are doing. But is there any way we can shape the future of al-Qa'ida? Unfortunately, the nature of the world right now does not offer many alternatives. Global economic woes, expanding population growth, poverty that results in ignorance and want, reliance on oil, and an emerging culture in some arenas that believe you can reason with anyone and everyone complicates matters.

Two examples come to mind in shaping actions. In the book *In the Ruins of Empire* that deals with the Japanese surrender in the battle for postwar Asia, members of the OSS met with Ho Chi Minh in 1945, and received assurances that the Vietminh were ready to cooperate with Americans in fighting the Japanese. Major Allison Thomas parachuted in near Hanoi, and remained with the Vietminh for two months arming and training select forces against the Japanese. In Anbar Province in 2004, Sunni sheiks and U.S. Marines engaged and looked at alternatives to war. These meetings sought an alternative to AQI, and the sheiks saw no goodness in al-Qa'ida's coming to Anbar 6 and Iraq in general. The Marines who made this outreach were civil affairs Marines, reservists, names that no one here would ever know. They were exceptionally creative. They, along with their sheik counterparts, believed that people wanted a lifestyle just a bit better for themselves, and a better future for their children. Fundamentally, all realized that poor men want to get rich, and rich men want to get

* Contribution at event on "Al-Qa'ida: Quo Vadis? Marking the First Anniversary of "Operation Neptune Spear" held on April 30, 2012.

richer, and war in their backyard did not bring about that end state. It was not until 2006 that the U.S. was able to embrace this concept, and it was termed the Awakening. It is important to ask ourselves who were awakened: us or them?

In closing, let us discuss some fundamentals in dealing with AQ. Be blunt, be brutal, be decisive, separate religion from their cause, and take advantage of the opportunities. In being blunt, leave no doubt between what you say and what you will do, and then do it. When you do it, being decisive and brutal – it is the only way. Some today have lost sight of the fact that war is cruelty, there is no use in trying to reform it, and the crueler it is, the sooner it will be over. General Sherman stated this at the close of the U.S. Civil War in 1865 and it remains true today. When the dogs of war are released, do not be surprised at the resulting carnage. In some ways we are pollyannish in our country. Our fight is not with the Muslim faith, but we have muddied this water. When a person is bad, he is bad regardless of his skin color or religious affiliation. Be decisive and brutal at this point. Opportunities will exist, but they must be realized and exploited, and this is exceptionally difficult. Imagine the difference if Ho Chi Minh had been given a different path, or the Awakening had happened in 2004 instead of 2006 in Anbar. I do not want to trivialize the complexity of these matters, but we will have opportunities.

Part 2*

In dealing with this topic, there are all the rules and laws that guide what the military can do, and then there are the perceptions of the American people of what the military should do. Also, let us remember that there are limits to what the military is able to do, both from a capabilities standpoint and from the vantage point of what is required to be accomplished – enthusiasm is not a capability and “want” does not make it so. I will attempt to address the topic from the perspective of a former practitioner and as an American citizen. Although comments will be confined to the U.S. military, leveraging allied/coalition capabilities is likely crucial to attaining a desired end-state for a variety of reasons.

The military does possess a wide array of skill sets and their organizational construct makes it very attractive to be called upon. Simply, when given a mission the military puts a single person in charge and he or she focuses on mission accomplishment – anything short of this is failure. The ability to respond quickly due to resources, training, and readiness coupled with the scale that those capabilities can be applied is unmatched.

The complex issue of declaring war on terrorists, offensive (that is pre-emptive) or defensive operations, CONUS or OCONUS, are all factors that need to be carefully considered. Most feel that the pre-emption of terrorist actions is warranted – get them before they get us. This involves the development of intelligence assets across the interagency and our allies to be effective – and this is expensive and difficult. It also involves the potential use of military capabilities that some call into question as a mission for military forces. If a threat is emerging from country X, is country X then a candidate for nation building or mil-to-mil engagement (FID)? Are military forces

* Contribution at event on “The Role of the Military in Combating Terrorism” held on December 5, 2014.

placed on the ground in an attempt to shape behavior (for U.S. advantage or in our image) and gain insight on actions that could harm the U.S.? Or do we watch country X by engaging with country Y, which just happens to be adjacent to country X? And if we discover terrorist intentions, when do we act (and if actions are conducted too late the average American will ask “You knew about this and you didn’t stop it because of?” Last, does the local populace harbor those terrorists willingly?

There is also the image of the U.S. military in a foreign country as an entity unwanted by that country. Our nation should be aware of perceptions, both by citizens of our country and the country we are deployed to. There is a delicate balance between assisting and the military being perceived as the “Emperor’s force” – and this balance is timeless. There is also the danger of knee-jerk reactions in employing military forces. At times, the military might be the only tool that can be applied quickly, but it may not be the right tool. Allied forces may be a better solution for a host of reasons, but common cause and a willing coalition is difficult to put together at times.

Whether the military is the right or wrong approach, I would like to offer a thought relative to the fiber of the young men and women who are performing these tasks. We have an all-volunteer, all-recruited force. In dealing with terrorists, the high visibility forces gain the attention of the news media with high profile raids – they are superb. There simply are not enough of these forces. When the military deploys in nation building, mil-to-mil engagements, or any other type of mission that projects the face of the United States to another country, it is the basic corporal or lieutenant that is the face of the U.S. in country X. They are superb. They need no training to exude the ideals of the U.S. and demonstrate caring and compassion. This can be articulated by the State Department and generals, but the impact via example and demonstration of righteousness is powerful – and lasting. Our young men and women, when led well, will never let us down in this forum, whether a farm kid from Iowa or a gang member from Chicago. Also, the employment of the total force is critical. The reserve component (and the guard) offer capabilities, approaches, and ideas that are not sometimes found in the active duty force. This likely applies more to non-kinetic solution sets, but the applicability of skills (think cyber for example) is potentially priceless in taking the fight to terrorists and creating the most robust tool set possible.

Dr. Lawrence J. Korb

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To lighten things up, do we have any Redskins fans here? Well, I want to tell you a joke that is making its way around the Pentagon. Given what has happened with Hagel and Carter, a reporter called me the other day and said, “What do you think of this? ‘Chuck Hagel is RGIII and Bruce Allen, who is the General Manager, is Susan Rice – who is the National Security advisor – and guess who is Dan Snyder? Obama.’” Then, of course if you follow it, Ash Carter is Colt McCoy.

Let me put this subject in proper perspective. To do this, we have to be careful with the terms we use. We are talking about the military’s role in combating terrorism. Terrorism is a tactic. What you have to focus on is which groups are you going after. I think this how we got ourselves into trouble after 9/11, when we declared war on terrorism. We are never going to win; I mean, terrorism is a tactic. You know what is interesting, I was talking to someone from the FBI when I was on CNN the other day, and he said, “We still have Neo-Nazis, committing acts of terror, even though Hitler is dead.” I think that is important.

The other issue is that the generals have talked about the fact that we have a lot of challenges, but none of these pose an existential threat. In other words, I hope Iraq turns out well, but if it does not, it is not the end of the world for us. And ISIS or ISIL, could they cause problems? I was in New York on 9/11, I remember seeing it, it was terrible. Three thousand people died. We are a country of almost 300 million.

Now, during the Cold War, we had an existential threat. I came on active duty before the Cuban Missile Crisis. We thought it was over. We were lucky, because we had something like a thousand soldiers and marines in Florida getting ready to go to invade Cuba, and the Soviets had delegated to the on-scene commander the authority to fire nuclear weapons if we invaded. And we came very, very close. Fortunately, you know, we arrived at a negotiated solution. So I think that is important to keep in mind.

It has already been mentioned here that yes the military is important in this struggle, but it is not the only thing. All the tools we have must be there. For years I have argued that we ought to have a unified national security budget. Tell me how much you want to spend on the Pentagon, State, Homeland Security combined; come up with the amount, and then let us see if we can allocate it better in terms of, do we need more soldiers, or do we need more aid workers? Do we want to buy a new weapons system or do we want to provide more aid? I think that is important. Tell me how much is in your budget and I will tell you how I think you can spend it better.

The next issue we have to be careful about is the terms we use. Obama says we are going to degrade and defeat ISIS. You cannot defeat them militarily. You can degrade them; you are not going to defeat them. It is an ideology. As long as people believe in that ideology, it will not be defeated. What you have to do is undermine the ideology. Now, if the military degrades them, undermines their narrative, that helps. But people

* Contribution at event on “The Role of the Military in Combating Terrorism” held on December 5, 2014.

are going to buy into that ideology because their lives are terrible, or they are not getting the opportunities that they want. Look at all the folks going over there to fight with them, some from our country, a lot from European countries.

The other fact is, and it has already been mentioned here, that we cannot do this by ourselves. It is not just the U.S. military and the other government agencies; we need other countries to help us, because of the fact that they give us legitimacy in this fight. We are an exceptional nation, I think we are very good, but we are not perfect. We make mistakes. We think that when we go into a country that we are going to be greeted as liberators. Not necessarily.

I remember the first time I went to Iraq – Rumsfeld brought a group of us together to evaluate the situation in the fall of 2003. I was talking to this professor at Saddam Hussein University, a Shi'ite, and he said, "Do you know who else said, we came as liberators not as occupiers?" I said, General Maude, the British. He said, "Why did you say it again?" Well, I do not know why the President said it; I hope someone told him that. But that is what you have to understand. I remember when I was a young man in Vietnam; one of my last jobs was to coordinate the air tactics with the swift boats in the operation. Which, by the way, when Kerry was running and people started beating up on him, I could not believe it. I have done a lot of things in my life Riding on a swift boat was the scariest thing I have ever done. But anyway, so one day we were over in Cam Ranh Bay to talk to the swift boat crews and when we were coming back, we got lost. We were in a Jeep, we were not even armed. We used to fly planes so we were not used to this. So I saw a sign there – my French was better then, having gone to Catholic schools – that said, "Behave yourself because tonight you might meet your maker" in French. So I said, Commander, let us go there, maybe they can give us directions. We went in, and the monks were really nice, they talked to us, in French. Then we get back in the Jeep, and the Commander said, "You guys talked a lot, what else did you say?" "Sir, I do not know how to tell you this. The priest said, 'Why do you think you are going to make out any better here than the French?'" Now, we are not the French, but we were perceived that way in Vietnam.

I do a lot of TV news shows. I was on in 2004 with Bill O'Reilly, which of course is worse than going to combat, I can tell you that. So, anyway, we were on the subject of Bush's military service, because of claims made by Dan Rather. So he said to me, "What difference do you think it would have made if Bush and Cheney had been in the military and gone to Vietnam?" I said to him the same thing; they would have recognized that you are not going to be greeted as liberators in these countries with a different culture. It is tough on these young kids when they go there, because they really want to do the right thing, and as the General said they are really motivated. But that is not how we are perceived, unfortunately, in many of these countries. There is a lot of foreign media there, you have Al-Jazeera, etc., and you go on listening to them and saying, my god, that is not us. But that is the kind of narrative that you get.

In fighting this war which has been going on in one form or another since 9/11, we talked about the brave young people, and these kids are terrific, but let me tell you something. When we set up the volunteer military, people forget there were three components. Number one, a comparatively small active force, because now you are going to have to pay people. General, do you remember what you and I used to get? \$200 per month. Now you are going to have to pay a living wage, so manpower will be

expensive so you will have a smaller active force. Then, you are going to have a Guard and Reserve that is ready to go. Up until we had a volunteer military, the Guard and Reserve would be where you get away from home on weekends. We were not serious about it. Now you have to be serious and be able to be called up. The third leg of the stool was selective service registration. We still register; people forget that.

One of the things I had to do when I was in government was persuade President Reagan to keep the selective service because, given his libertarian leanings, he had campaigned against it. One of the arguments I made was, you may have a prolonged conflict, and you want to be able to mobilize. Now, we did not do that at the height of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and to me that was a flippant disgrace. Yes, we had great people. But did you know the army and the marines gave 80,000 moral waivers to take people in at the height of that conflict? Yes, we had great people, but look at some of those we took in. Anyone know who Private Steven Green is? Private Steven Green, who is serving life imprisonment now in a jail in Kentucky, had three misdemeanor convictions, was a high school dropout, and had a personality disorder, yet they gave him a waiver and took him into the army. Several people recommended not deploying and they sent him anyway. While he was over there, together with two other people he raped a 14-year-old girl and killed her and her family. Then they decided that he had a personality disorder and they sent him back, not knowing about this incident. Of course it came out when the other two people with him confessed. He is serving life in prison. Why did we take him in? Because we were desperate to meet our goal. Why did we not have conscription? That would have gotten the American people involved. Congress did pass the AUMF in 2002.

Do you know how many Senators read the classified intelligence analysis about the case for war in Iraq before they voted? Only members of Congress could read it, but not many did. The majority of them voted for war in Iraq without reading it. Let me tell you, if they had conscription, they would have gone in and they would have read that thing. I have not read it; obviously, I am not a member. Senator Bob Graham (D-FL), who was the chairman of the intelligence committee at that time told me, "If you read that, you will know the case for going to war in Iraq is somewhat shaky." Let us go and activate the selective service system, to get people, and get, as General Stanley McChrystal said, get American people with skin in the game.

Let me conclude with this. We talked about this fight and the declining defense budget. Let me tell you something, the Defense Department has plenty of money. In real terms, even with sequester, defense is at the level of 2007. I am talking about the base budget. This is not like after Korea or Vietnam or the end of the Cold War. Do you know in the middle of the '70s, where we were in terms of today's dollars in terms of the base budget? \$350 billion! We are at \$500 billion today, so we have plenty of money. The money is plentiful, if you manage it right. Now, we could sit down and tell you about the things we need to do. Are they going to be done, are they hard to do? One of the lobbies, let me tell you in my view, one of the worst lobbies in Washington is MOAA, Military Officers Association of America. Do you know what Admiral Ryan makes, who runs that thing? Anybody have any idea? Close to \$700 thousand. Whenever something comes up to restore compensation to the agreed-upon standard they fight it. For example, the housing allowance, supposed to cover 75% of housing costs, now covers 100%. Chuck Hagel wanted to take it down to 95%, MOAA argued that you are "breaking promises." When Ryan and Murray tried to say COLA minus

one for working age retirees, until you are 62, they were dragging out enlisted people and talking about them, not including the fact that when they enlisted the retirement pay after 20 years of service was supposed to be 40 percent, but that it was increased to 50 percent after they had joined the service. Then they claimed that COLA minus-one was hurting all veterans. How many veterans retire? How many enlisted Marines retire? 4 or 5 percent of the kids that come into the ground forces. Because you guys know the ground forces are like running backs in football, the people in the infantry do not retire at high levels either. So we need to deal with compensation. If we do not, even if the budget goes up a little bit, but it is not going to go up a lot. The military that is going to be fighting this battle against groups like ISIS, they are not going to have the resources.

Finally, of course, we have got to learn to manage. Let me conclude and read you this, I am not going to tell you who said it until after I finish. “Here too we have to acknowledge an inconvenient fact: sequestration has occurred in part because of a growing frustration with a culture of waste and inefficiency at the defense department that went unaddressed for too long. I have witnessed the emergence of a military industrial complex that has corrupted and crippled the defense acquisition process. This system can now be said to be successful in only one respect, turning billions of taxpayer dollars into weapons systems that are consistently delivered late, flawed, and vastly over-budget, if that is the systems are delivered at all.”—John McCain.

Brigadier Chaudhary Sarfraz Ali

*Defence and Army Attaché, Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan**

Let me set parameters of what I am going to talk about. I am not an intellectual but a practitioner with experience of repeatedly fighting in the counterterrorism operations. Because of this my presentation is going to be more anecdotal than philosophical. I am going to recount the experience of Pakistan military's fight against terrorism with primary focus on the FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas), which is the western tribal region of Pakistan. I will touch little upon the rest of the country more briefly because that is not primarily a military focus.

It is important to understand the morphology of terrorism in Pakistan, explaining the parameters and complexities under which our war is being fought. Beginning with the fundamental of geography of the region, the area where the military is involved in fighting terrorism is around 37,000 square kilometers and a population of around 3.5 million. Just drawing comparisons, the area matches that of West Virginia and the population of Oklahoma. The border with Afghanistan is around 2,611 kilometers in length. One can travel from Washington to Denver in the same distance. It is characterized by a very rugged terrain with very high peaks and desolate areas and inaccessible zones. Its inhabitants are the most interesting part of its geography. In places, the border passes through the middle of different tribes and villages. There might be a house with its dining room in Afghanistan and its living room in Pakistan. With divided villages, families, and tribes, the public of the border regions enjoys free rights to move across under the easement rights decided between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Its flip side is an open cross-border trade. To control the smuggling, there are 659 border posts on Pakistan side.

Revisiting history, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the struggle against it were primarily based on creating fighters imbued with religious motivation. There was a greater role given to clergy. These are the same folks that we are fighting now. So the problem has its roots. These fighters who have inherited the culture of fighting are very adaptive, and they keep picking up from the experience of other militants from across the world. If there is a certain new tactic used by the militants in Iraq, the next day it finds its place in Afghanistan and the next day it is in Pakistan. Then we have the cross-border militancy factor, and then we have the dilemmas of what to deal with first: i.e., security and liberty. As if this were not enough, to add to the complexity we have too many passing judgments: "You are not doing this well. You should be doing this first and that later." No one should have any doubt on our intention to deal with this menace as it is about our survival. We just have no options but to win, sooner or later.

By 2007 and 2008, militant had full control of around 32 percent of the area and had contested control of additional 31 percent of the area. You can judge the effectiveness of military operations by the fact that by June 2014, the militants were left with control of three percent of the area with around 10 percent area under contested control. To clear up the area that was probably the core of the militancy, we had to go for a much bigger operation named Operation Zarb-e-Azb. Its objective was

* Contribution at event on "Combating Terrorism: Strategic Assessments, the Military's Role, and International Cooperation" held on May 14, 2015.

to proactively pursue the elimination of terrorism and deny use of own territory as sanctuary for operations within Pakistan or across the Pak-Afghan border through effective articulation of military, social-political, and socio-economic means so as to achieve relative control and peace. So we do not term this classically as an operation but a concept. It is a concept where it is not the military alone but the whole nation fighting the terrorism; not bound to tribal regions alone but spread across length and breadth of the country. While the military primarily focuses on the North Waziristan and other tribal regions with active militancy, other areas were being cleared by law enforcement agencies with support of military and intelligence resources in their respective zones.

There were so many variables to be balanced while in planning. To name a few, we had to go for the people-centric approach as our efforts had to have the public acceptability. It had to have the convergence of physical, military, and political means. And there had to be a regard for the geography, history, and culture of the area. As we were fighting in our own area, the force had to be selective yet effective, something that tremendously paid us off. Then there were temporarily displaced personnel that we had to take care of. In order to bring the realization of effects, they had to be shown the difference of quality of life with and without militancy.

Operation Zarb-e-Azb was launched in June 2014 in North Waziristan covering around 4,700 square kilometers. As we see the trajectory of our effort, we find that employment of Pakistani army has been expanding over the years. At this moment, approximately 186,000 soldiers are fighting along the western borders. Those who are in the military would know that 186,000 means that there is an equal number that is lined up behind them because one set of soldiers cannot continue to fight forever.

As we talk, around 88 percent of the area has already been cleared and around 12 percent of the area remains under the contested control. A parallel operation was launched in adjoining region of Khyber Agency with the area 2,557 kilometers. In other parts the mainland Pakistan, parallel efforts were launched to uproot the militancy and its support through intelligence-led operations. These operations would also take care of militants fleeing from tribal region. So far, more than 8,000 such operations have been conducted and more than 10,000 suspects have been apprehended.

To assess the impact of these operations, we recovered more than 10,000 different weapons, 2.3 million cartridges of ammunition, plenty of explosives, IEDs, IED factories, and rocket factories. Then there were underground hideouts and private jails and detention centers. It is estimated that at least one brigade-size force could be equipped with these small arms. Among the interesting discoveries, we found tunnels with overall length of about four kilometers. The magnitude of impact of these discoveries can be judged by the estimates that we recovered as much material as IEDs that they could continue blasting five IEDs every single day for 15 years.

Now, where are we and where are we heading to? We are currently passing through the timeline between 'clear' and 'hold' stages of counter terrorism operations. This shall continue till 2018 when we shall transit to transfer stage of the counter-terrorism campaign. This stage shall be an onerous challenge because we have relatively weaker civil institutions. The Army has to support them to ensure that they

have stable transition, and resurgence by the militants is not allowed to take place. We believe that defeating the insurgency has to be through the process of public support. The people of the area should be able to find out the difference between life under militants and quality of life in the absence of militants. We are also running a very successful model of de-radicalization albeit at a limited scale. It is a unique model of which we can claim pride. This de-radicalization concept is informed by the academic input to three different affected segments, i.e., juveniles, women, and able males. The success of this programme can be gauged by the mere fact that out of around 2,300 participants only two cases of return to militancy have been reported so far.

Temporarily displaced populace has been another fundamental challenge. After we started operation in North Waziristan and surrounding areas, we had an exodus of around two million people who had to be managed very well. The process was not only very costly, but sensitive where tribal and other social sensitivities had to be catered for. The impact of this painstaking effort can be gauged by the fact that most of affected personnel actually started feeling their life was better in the camps than when they were living under the fear of terrorists. And hopefully they shall have a much better life once they return. To explain the magnitude of developmental works, over 727 kilometers of roads have been planned while the package includes a large number of schools, basic amenities, and communication infrastructure.

Our success in the campaign against terrorism has however come at a very high cost. It is a unique war where the lives lost include a three-star general, three two-star generals and a large number of one-star generals. In total we have suffered over four thousand military lives and over 13 thousand civilian lives, while the injured exceed well over 50 thousand. Financially, Pakistan has suffered a loss of around 70 billion dollars and around 2 billion dollars annual military expenditure.

The noteworthy effects of our counter terrorism campaign include following:

- The ability of terrorists to control the large swathes of area has been denied.
- Terrorists' strongholds, logistic bases, and command and control nodes are eliminated while the remnants are being vigorously pursued.
- The nation stands galvanized with resolve to eliminate terrorism.
- We are building the bridges of trust with Afghanistan, as you must be following in the news. And there is a greater coordination for targeting the sanctuaries across borders.

Every society has its own character. But there are some common threads that everyone can pick from each others' experience. The role of the military will vary according to the development of the institutions in every state. In our socio-political make up where other institutions are evolving, the army has to take a bigger role in the fight against terrorism. It must however be remembered that the military is an instrument of policy; the military opens the avenues for the application of policy options while policy creates the environment for optimal employment of the military.

When it comes to dealing with the cycle of violence, the cycle of terrorism is based on ideology, recruitment, sanctuaries, financial support, logistic support, and leadership, each supporting the other. However, the denial of social space to the

terrorists most profoundly impacts all components of this cycle. In order to achieve this, it is important to target the enabler of public opinion. In this vein, we had to have a people-centric approach where the people stand behind you. To cite the impact, there have been instances where the relatives of militants have been reporting to us to apprehend them. Those who understand our social make up very well understand the meanings of it for a closed family system. It is primarily because the public sees the fruits of peace. This in turn calls for very calibrated operations with minimum use of force for maximum effect. Collateral damage can be disastrous in this fragile ecosystem of success.

Another important take from our fight is that transnational threat, which most of us are facing at this moment, calls for transnational cooperation. No one nation can fight the terrorism all by itself, and similarly, other connected states must believe that if they do not cooperate in each other's struggle against terrorism, it shall one day come to haunt them. The terrorism knows no boundaries.

Another interesting phenomenon is about external support. When there is no external support to the militants the chances of the government's winning are much higher. If there is cross-border terrorist cooperation or involvement of transnational actors the advantages are almost evened out. However, it becomes extremely difficult for a government to defeat the threat of terrorism, if the latter is supported by other states from across the borders. It is therefore important to solicit regional cooperation so that the terrorism remains within the first two categories, not the third.

In the realm of strategy and ways and means, the shortage of means must be matched through superiority of ways. When you cannot take on all of the components of the threat, then you sequence your effort. You cannot go after all threats at one time. There also has to be a fine balance of tactical gain versus strategic disadvantage. U.S. drone strikes have been a case in point: they have been able to successfully take out some high-value targets, but at the same time they have alienated a lot of the public.

In ideologically driven wars, reconciliation is the end state. You cannot eliminate everyone. Reintegration into the society should be the ultimate objective, and every military effort should contribute towards this larger end state. The military should not aim at destruction and elimination but conditioning for reintegration; thus the importance of strategic patience.

I would also like to make mention about the U.S. support in our war against terrorism. I think the U.S. has been a key ally and a great help to Pakistan in our fight. It would be safe to state that whatever we have achieved so far wouldn't have been possible in this timeframe without the U.S. support. U.S. coalition support funds contribute approximately 45 percent financial effects of our counter-terrorism operations while the remaining 55 percent is picked up by the defense budget. Besides, U.S. support has been instrumental in our development projects. I take this forum to thank my U.S. friends.

Colonel (Ret.) Gary Anderson

*Former senior U.S. Military Liaison Advisor to the UN mission in Mogadishu, Somalia, in 1993 and the Chief of Staff for the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab when it conducted the URBAN WARRIOR experiments from 1998-2000; Fellow, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies**

I am going to make my remarks fairly short. I just thought I would give a little bit of context to the subject on the way military operations impact in the area of terrorism.

If you take a look at the requirement for military involvement and the level of terrorist activity, at this lower level on the graphic (slide on page 32), we see your basic traditional terrorist groups, ranging from the Stern Gang in Israel in the 1948 era to the Weather Underground and the Black Panthers back in the 1970s when I was a lieutenant. In that area, it is primarily an intelligence police issue, a law enforcement agency issue (Referring to the right of the slide).

If in fact these people are successful and move their activities into the area of the classic insurgency, which Brigadier Sarfraz Ali was talking about, then you have got a problem that you are going to need a little more military involvement, and you have explained that much more eloquently than I can. Hezbollah in the 1980s in southern Lebanon, when I was a UN peace keeper, was at that stage; they were using terror as one of their tactics, but not their primary tactic. We lost our friend Rich Higgins to a terrorist activity, but they were also pretty good at ambushing the Israelis and doing things on a more military basis, and it took a lot more military involvement.


When you get to the far right of that spectrum (referring to the slide), which is where ISIS is right now, then you really need a lot of military involvement. I have said publically that I thought we should be lending more support from a ground standpoint to Iraq. But at that point in time this is a situation where the terrorists are actually using terror or where the opposition is using terror as a supporting arm, but its primary threat is military. ISIS, the caliphate, or whatever you want to call them, have a very good light infantry organization which is really good at operating, particularly in urban areas on the defensive and so forth. This becomes, finally, really a military problem, it is almost the final stage of an insurgency, and I think that is the primary concern we have right now—to defeat their regular forces, then dealing with their terrorist aspects. The ideal situation is to bring them back here (referring to the left side of the slide). Get them back to a point where they are an annoyance and a law enforcement issue, rather than a military issue. And I think that is kind of the way we have to talk about that, or to look at the problem and solve it. I hope, quite frankly, that we get a little bit more involved in trying to push the terrorists out of Mosul, break up their light infantry formations, and push them back to this area here. And I think at that point in time it becomes a very doable proposition.

When I was in Iraq the last time in 2009 and 2010, we thought we had their predecessor organization on the run. I was in northwest Baghdad, Abu Ghraib, and we thought we were doing a pretty good job at that point in time, but things change. Here you really have a situation where once you get out of this area, you are dealing with a

* Contribution at event on “Combating Terrorism: Strategic Assessments, the Military’s Role, and International Cooperation” held on May 14, 2015.

whole government approach. You have got to deal with the root causes, you have got to deal with the military problems, and you have got to deal with the intelligence and counterterrorism aspects as well. I will leave it at that, I just wanted to try to put it in some kind of context.

Military Utility Against Terror



Lieutenant General Vincent R. Stewart

*Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Commander, Joint Functional Component Command for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance**

Combating terrorism is unmistakably an important topic on everyone's mind. Today's engagement is a significant opportunity for sharing and debating ideas, defining the threat, and identifying opportunities to undermine forces that use terror. I've heard definitions of the threat ranging from all of Islam to parcels within it.

I'd like to highlight the Defense Intelligence Agency's role in understanding and countering this terrorist threat.

Terrorism is not only a grave threat to international security; it is a direct assault on humanity. During our lifetime, we have witnessed individual acts of ideologically, politically motivated terrorism transform into a continuum of sheer barbarism covering vast areas and territory, and shrouded in religious symbolism.

Although terrorism is not new, it is a reality with increasing intensity especially since the time I put on my uniform during the early 1980s.

From HAMAS to Hizballah, to Al-Qa'ida and now the self-proclaimed Islamic State, terror is used as a violent tool to advance criminal and politically intimidating strategies.

The recent Paris, Beirut, San Bernardino, Mali and Jakarta attacks demonstrate that Daesh, ISIL, ISIS, or whatever you'd like to call them – now has become a direct terrorist threat around the world especially in Europe and here in America. More information is coming out about Daesh operatives allegedly already here on U.S. soil. So, these recent attacks may be just the beginning of violence perpetrated by Daesh, by their inspired lone wolf actors and by returning foreign fighter terrorists, or Daesh coordinated and directed attacks.

In Daesh, we see what our analysts call a 'proto-state'. We are simultaneously confronting both a quasi-military force with state-like features and a transnational terrorist organization driven by a religious ideology. Like a state, it claims territories, attempts to control its borders, it has an executive, a command & control structure, a set of laws, a taxation system, it builds an army and supposedly provides services.

While not recognized as a state by modern nation-state standards, it has been recognized by affiliates around the world who have accepted Daesh's goals of a global caliphate.

Daesh has advanced this notion by marrying its technological capabilities with ideological incitement to transform also cyberspace into another dimension of the battlespace – one with immediate effects on non-traditional battlefields marked by terrorist attacks all over the world.

* Contribution at event on "International Cooperation in Combating Terrorism: Review of 2015 and Outlook for 2016" held on February 8, 2016.

The idea that the caliphate exists both in the physical and virtual domain is Daesh's center of gravity.

Last year, Daesh remained entrenched on Iraqi and Syrian battlefields and expanded globally to Libya, the Sinai, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and the Caucasus. It even inspired terrorist attacks in Beirut at approximately the same timeframe as the Paris attack. This year Daesh is growing more dangerous through emergent branches in Mali, Tunisia, Somalia, Bangladesh, and Indonesia. It would not be a surprise to see them expand into Egypt too.

Daesh is likely to increase the pace and lethality of its transnational attacks because it seeks to unleash violent action and to provoke a harsh reaction from the West, thereby feeding its distorted narrative.

We know Daesh does not represent Islam or the 1.5 billion Muslims around the world – and yet Daesh claims to be creating by force a Caliphate – the “true Caliphate” – a notion that is resonating among very select segments of the Sunni community who advocate ‘violent Salafi jihadism’. It is important to note that it takes all three of these words together to describe the current threat environment.

In this setting, Daesh seeks not only to pit the West and Islam but to stroke sectarian conflict between Sunnis and Shias, not so different from the violence of Shia jihadist groups such as Hizballah. These groups seek to create a chaotic environment in which the groups can thrive.

These threats are exacerbated by the security challenges of the Middle East, which is now facing one of the most dangerous and unpredictable periods in the last decade.

Middle East countries face simultaneous internal and external threats including terrorism, subnational armed groups or insurgencies, and conventional military threats. Some nations have even attempted to eliminate their political or sectarian adversaries under the guise of combating terrorists.

While Daesh might be at the forefront of our thoughts today, they are not the only nefarious organization in town. Increased international focus on Daesh allows Al-Qa'ida to recover from its degraded state, and it enables similar groups to flourish. We must not forget Al-Qa'ida and its affiliates still exist, we cannot count them out: Al-Qa'ida along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, Al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula, Al-Qa'ida in the Maghreb, and Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria. While they may not have advanced their goals in the mindset of a caliphate, similar ideology and analogous tools of terror drive them.

Furthermore, the jury is still out on the largest state sponsor of terrorism – Iran and its affiliates. We do not know yet if Iran will behave responsibly, or how it will invest its 50 to 100 billion US dollars resulting from the JCPOA. Let's not forget that since January 19, 1984, Iran has been listed as a state sponsor of terror and until September 11, 2001 – it had killed more Americans than any other terrorist organization.

We will not take our eye off these threats.

We also face uncertainty in South Asia – the Taliban has launched its first-ever winter offensive in order to make a comeback in Afghanistan, and it has increased attacks in Pakistan. Daesh is also attempting to expand their enterprise into South and Central Asia, and Southeast Asia.

Drawing your attention to Africa, I see a volatile security environment due to dysfunctional political systems and conflict – creating permissive environments for transnational terrorism.

In North Africa, years of civil conflict over political control of Libya and an expanding violent Salafi jihadist presence remain the most pressing security concerns. Even there, Daesh has established a stronghold in Surt, Libya causing instability and increasing illicit activities, and increasing activities in Algeria.

West Africa's Sahel and Lake Chad regions are also contending with a number of violent Salafi jihadist groups. The recent terrorist attacks in Burkina Faso and the November 2015 attack on a major hotel in Mali highlight the expanded terrorism threat. In Nigeria and the greater Lake Chad region, terror attacks by Boko Haram, also known as the Islamic State West Africa Province, who are the most violent Daesh affiliate, which is saying a great deal, are likely to continue especially since their alliance with Daesh.

Parts of central and eastern Africa remains at risk of instability over the next year. Al-Shabaab attacks and control of rural areas will persist in Somalia. The risk of episodic violence in the Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan and Sudan will continue despite peace and stability efforts.

The key causes of instability – aging authoritarian leaders, lack of political transparency, corruption, suffocated civil societies, violation of human rights, religious extremism, insufficient economic opportunity, and sparse social mobility are some among many and will continue to serve as drivers for civil conflict, social cleavages, instability spillover, and regional spoilers' involvement. Daesh plays upon all of these issues.

These terrorists threats and the drivers of conflict alone – not taking into account the myriad other global security concerns and state actors, the economy, and technology have profound of the way DIA shapes, sizes, its form, and function of the DIA's mission – *“to provide intelligence on foreign militaries and operating environments that delivers decision advantage to prevent and decisively win wars.”* We are one of three all-source agencies, and the only one, that effectively incorporates operations, analysis, and science and technology to support this mission.

We face a complex security environment marked by a broad spectrum of disparate threats from aggressive nation-states to adaptive non-state actors. Many of these threats bridge more than one of the warfighting domains and span across multiple categories, and global regions. All of these have implications for future joint, interagency, multinational and public partnerships at all levels especially how

military power will be used for example to counter terrorism in “gray zones” – whether we are talking about the mountains of Afghanistan or throughout cyberspace. In addition, while efforts continue in the military realm, military action is not only sufficient because diplomacy through collaboration is also a force multiplier.

Therefore, we must rethink how we do business. We have to take a broader approach to partnerships. Collaboration across the services and the whole-of-government is no longer enough – fully integrated partnerships with our key allied nations is now an imperative.

Our relationships with our allies, our military responses, and the way that we practice intelligence must therefore adapt and posture for the future.

We must be prepared to operate with greater speed, flexibility, jointness, partnership, and accuracy. The way to do that is through integration – not as an end-state but as a means to an end.

To address this challenge, the DIA and our intelligence partners have moved toward Integrated Intelligence Centers – sitting analysts next to collectors, collections managers, engineers, technologists, and mission support experts in close contact with the full array of intelligence capabilities. This operating model reflects the success we experienced on the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan. It best suits our future challenges because it empowers our center leaders to effectively manage the entire intelligence cycle – from end-to-end – maximizing efficiency and effectiveness. This creates a cohesive, collaborative operating model that can truly deliver decision advantage.

One such example is our Defense Combating Terrorism Center (DCTC) – our functionally focused Integrated Intelligence Center. DCTC as it is called works in close unison with the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) and our forward deployed military forces, especially the Special Operations Forces. Our DCTC integrates critical defense analysis, targeting, and collection to enable warning, operational decisions, precise action within the warfighter’s operating environment against terrorists and their networks. We maintain a broad set of capabilities that aid personnel recovery, exploit captured materials and build identity intelligence.

We are also integrating our foreign partners because in today’s complex security environment, we cannot understand the world without them. When it comes to our Five Eyes (FVEY) and other key international partners, it is unlikely we will go to war again without them. We will be in combat as a coalition, so why shouldn’t we fight and be fully integrating them into our intelligence organizations?

Almost two years ago in March 2014, we stood up our FVEY Center tasked with integrating DIA and Commonwealth capabilities to the maximum extent permitted by Department of Defense (DoD) policies and guidance. The FVEY Center advocates improvements to warning, collection, analysis, crisis planning, operations, and information technology.

DIA is on the forefront of international intelligence integration. The more we can expand FVEY opportunities and other key partners integration across organizations,

the more we can advance effective policies and operations. Our goal is to take DIA from FVEY enclave to becoming an agency that works and thinks as a FVEY agency.

We are also taking unprecedented ‘additional steps’ in intelligence sharing beyond the FVEY community. Take for example our collaboration with France, our oldest ally. We have maintained a close relationship with France not just recently as a result of the Paris attacks – but before in countering terrorism around the world whether Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, or North Africa. We also maintain many bilateral intelligence sharing and other relationships with other partners throughout the world. Partnerships with majority Muslim countries are vital to gain a holistic understanding and to foster regional capabilities.

Integration, innovation, and modernization give us an edge given the multitude of challenges we face ahead.

Yet, we have to be able to stay ahead of the news cycle and deliver a compelling case to decision-makers so that they can make sound decisions. If we can’t, then policymakers will choose piecemeal or biased information from outside sources over an informed intelligence picture.

In closing, I’d like to focus on the subject at hand and take a moment to share another view of this current terrorist phenomenon. On December 2nd of this past year, in the British House of Commons, Shadow Foreign Secretary Sir Hilary Benn spoke of his support in action against Daesh.

While he explained that Daesh poses a clear and present threat, his description of the enemy was more striking:

“And we are here faced by fascists. Not just their calculated brutality, but their belief that they are superior to every single one of us in this chamber tonight, and all of the people that we represent. They hold our belief in tolerance and decency in contempt. They hold our democracy... in contempt. And what we know about fascists is that they need to be defeated.”

The Caliphate must be destroyed and Daesh defeated. This is definitely something to think about, debate and come to a better understanding.

General (Ret.) William E. (Kip) Ward

*Former Commander of the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) and Deputy Commander, United States European Command. Currently, President and COO of SENTEL Corp.**

Let me start off by saying good morning and extending a huge load of gratitude and thanks to Professor Alexander and Michael Swetnam for extending an invitation for me to be here this morning to address this group. And always, the Commandant there, thank you Sir for the kind introduction, and no endorsement by Kip Ward because General Al Gray is clearly one of our nation's iconic heroes. And General, sir, let me thank you for your service over years, and all that you continue to do, not just for Marines but all of us that have worn the cloth of our nation. Thank you very much.

When Professor Alexander contacted me about coming here this morning I said, "Well you know, Professor, I am not an academician. I have not published volumes or tomes and in fact, knowing that, how could I contribute to this austere occasion and offer something to this group?" He said, "General, that is exactly why we want you here." General Gray talked about my career and I will briefly highlight a couple of things that might be instructive as I go through the remainder of my comments.

Over 40 years as an infantryman, my first 20 years as a Soldier were spent ready to protect our Nation should the Cold War threaten our national security. If so we were going to defeat it. And I did that, assigned to units in Europe, in Korea, mechanized units, armored units, such as Third Infantry division and Second Infantry division and contingency force units, 82nd Airborne Division, and 6th infantry division in the United States. The last 20 years presented a different paradigm and I will talk about that. Since 9/11, the security challenges that we face have grave and global implications and they have emerged globally--in the Middle East, Africa, Europe, Asia, all regions. Terrorist networks have emerged, particularly al-Qa'ida and its affiliates Daesh but including al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, the most treacherous of these organizations, killing hundreds of people a week that goes unreported there in the Sahel. These groups are expanding daily operations across this arc of instability that exists without borders.

Topic for the day: Combating Terrorism: Lessons Learned in the Middle East, North Africa, the Sahel, and Beyond. This enemy that possesses state-like features—not a state, yet espousing to be one. How do we recognize it? A few weeks ago, the current Director of the DIA presented an extremely accurate, from my perspective, laydown of what this enemy is, so I will not dare to expand upon what he said about Daesh and this force, but that it is an enemy that has permeated our global commons. We indeed live in a complex security environment. We knew our enemy when I was a Lieutenant. We knew who it was, we knew where it was, we knew its intent, we knew how it operated. We devised a plan to defeat it should it dare challenge us.

In 1992, I was a Brigade Commander, 10th Mountain Division. We went to Somalia to help guarantee humanitarian relief in an impoverished and devastated land. And in 1992, I discovered what I trained to do for twenty years as an infantryman just was

* Contribution to event on "Combating Terrorism: Lessons from the Middle East, North Africa, the Sahel, and Beyond" held on March 30, 2016.

not all that was required in this environment. My young sergeants who were out doing what they do in villages and hamlets, working with tribal elders and leaders, would come back to me and say, "Hey Colonel, it is not about fire maneuverer here. This is about other things to help guarantee stability." And we talked about that and we got through that a bit but we knew then that the enemy presented a different face, operated with different tactics, gained its authority through different means, mostly intimidation and terror. Lesson learned--did we pay attention to it? Maybe, maybe not, yes and no to varying degrees

Some years later, I was fortunate enough to be asked to go Egypt to be the U.S. Security Coordinator with the Egyptian Armed Forces. An assignment that I absolutely treasured then and still think it was one of the best assignments I ever held because it exposed me to understanding the importance of knowing those with whom you work, folks that may not be just like you; an important tour, as the General indicated, helped to form this mosaic of things I came to understand as I moved along.

I had the great opportunity to command the 25th Infantry Division, in the U.S. Pacific Command area of responsibility. Traveling all over the South Asia region, again, being exposed to folks who were not like me, not like my Soldiers, but learning the importance of building relationships.

I told the General he probably gave my talk in his summation because it is so true. It is about how you understand people and how you build relationships, and that theme will come forth again.

So from that asymmetrical threat that we faced in 1992, the learning continued. And on September 11, 2001, as I sat in the Pentagon as the Vice Director of Operations on the Joint Staff, that threat became real in no uncertain terms. I spent four days in the Pentagon without leaving, doing things to help determine what our response would be to that devastating attack that changed all of us. To be sure, we were in a new era. Lessons learned—we all got a crash course that day and we continue to receive it. That traditional enemy that we trained to defeat as a military was not the threat and maintaining security and protecting our national interest needed to occur more than at the end of a rifle, by delivering a main gun round out of an Abrams tank, by dropping a bomb from a B-1, or by firing a missile from a frigate. To be sure, those elements remained essential but more was required, more is required.

I go to the Balkans as the NATO Commander of the Stabilization Force in Bosnia Herzegovina in 2002, with a mission to restore stability and help establish what I called a horizon of hope for people. To do that meant more than just being a combat veteran; that I had been exposed to other factors in this type of environment would be the difference.

In 2005, I was appointed as the United States Security Coordinator to Israel and the Palestinian Authority. These lessons continue to reinforce themselves. What is it that we are doing to help bring stability to an environment? The elements to this notion of security that I had been taught as a Lieutenant, Captain, Colonel, as an infantryman, were limited with respect to the total dimension of how we approach addressing this arc of instability.

I was very fortunate to have been selected as the inaugural Commander of United States Africa Command. I had served in four of our nation's geographic commands at that point. So how was this one to be different if it was to address challenges that we currently face? And to be sure in 2006 and 2007, as we were discussing its design, terrorism was well known to us all. We have talked about those incidents that had led to us having it right smack in our faces. Because of what that young sergeant said to me in Somalia in the early part of 1993, I knew stability was more than what we brought to this dynamic scenario. What we brought, an expert combat capability, was absolutely critical and essential, to be sure, but we needed more. And what was the more? What was the lesson? We talk about it today like it has been around forever. In 2007, we were not talking about the importance of development. We were not talking about the importance of understanding the society in which we were operating, knowing what was important to the people who live there, where they were, and doing things in a sustained way to address those requirements such that the impacted population had a stake in its own stability because it had a horizon of hope. We were not talking about it. And you say well why are you as a soldier talking about it? I am talking about it because when it does not happen my soldiers, Marines, and sailors get called into harm's way to help bring security and stability. To be sure, we are prepared to do it. That is what our nation asks us to do, that is what we took on oath to do. In my mind's eye that ought to be our last resort to achieve the stability that we all desire on these global commons.

As these dangers remain present it is imperative that those things associated with stability are present, defense to be sure, but as pointed out by Professor Alexander, it is more than that. It is also advancing development and good governance. It is a political and economic horizon, a horizon that will lead to an environment more likely to repel terrorist tendencies. We were not paying attention to these activities as AQIM (Al-Para) was growing. Therefore the conditions that spawned the creation of terrorist activities still exist.

So how are we to address it? What are the lessons learned?

We have built great systems to deal with the security aspect. Intelligence fusion centers and cells, sustained security engagement, combined and joint operations to address threats, the use of our special operations forces, the use of our conventional forces. I offer that the same level of engagement is important across this arc of instability in other areas as well.

What is our sustained developmental engagement? What is our sustained diplomatic engagement? You will hear other members of the panel talk about the efforts in affected countries and North Africa in addressing stability issues and what they are doing. I offer that some of it will be realized through better fused and integrated intelligence, better sharing of intelligence. Some of it will come in better trained security forces, be they national armed forces, be they police forces. Much of it will come because of the developmental and political issues associated with the living condition of folks in an area takes a turn that will cause those who live there to see for themselves a horizon of hope where they live. Whose responsibility is that? I offer that it is our collective responsibility. Just as we took collective action to address it in a

military perspective, that same collective action ought to be taken to address terrorism from a developmental perspective.

In this, that third D that we talk about today; some call it diplomacy, some call it democracy but it is about good governance. To that end, what is our sustained level of engagement? Just as we have to have sustained security engagement, we must have sustained developmental and diplomatic engagement. We must devote some portion of our national treasure to that effort. We do not bear that burden alone in the United States of America. The global community shares it as a global responsibility because the threat is a global threat.

So what have we built to address the terrorist actions of al-Shabaab, of Boko Haram, of Daesh which has now with Boko Haram caused that affiliation to be seen in ways never before realized? As we move forward, as we look at programs, as we look at processes, this notion of sustained engagement across all elements of power comes home. Our men and women who wear the uniform of our nation are the best. I am who I am and where I am because of them. And I know that they, as we are engaged globally, will do their job side by side fighting with our friends and allies, but we also should be side by side engaging with them across the spectrum of national power, causing a dynamic to occur whereby there is mutual learning going on. Our understanding better, their seeing a different way, and taking advantage of that to bring stability to where they are. We cannot be everywhere but we must be somewhere.

In this modern age of social media and the Internet, this notion of virtual reality is that out there we can do things virtually. You do not build relationships virtually. You build relationships because you are there. One of the best tools we have at our disposal is how we build relationships with our friends to cause our common objectives to be realized. As the inaugural commander of U.S. Africa Command, one of our main focus priorities was to cause a level of sustained security engagement with our partners and friends across North Africa, the Sahel, and sub-Saharan Africa so that they knew that they could depend on us to be there. I offer that is true in Europe, in Asia, in the Middle East, other places where our being part of the dynamic to create stability across a range of activities will make a difference. It does not take a lot, but it takes something and where we dedicate resources and our greatest resource, in my mind's eye our American sons and daughters who willingly don the uniform of our nation to go forward and serve, we ought to take advantage of that. What are the lessons learned? There are many, they are varied, but they are at hand. As we work with partners around the globe, our ability to make a difference to address the arc of instability in ways beyond force of arms ought to be a priority. We can never back away from a world-class fighting force but it ought not be our first resort of action. And as we conduct activities in ways that will make a difference, we will be able to establish a horizon of hope such that neighborhoods, communities, nations, regions, are doing more for themselves because of the support, the cooperation, the collaboration that is being established by the community of nations.

Let me close by saying this, we must be present and cause our friends and allies and all those whose interests are threatened by terrorism to be present across the range of activities--defense, development, diplomacy. A scenario in which those

impacted are able to see a horizon of hope so that they have a stake and take action to address this threat. This is not done virtually, but in reality because virtual presence is actual absence. We cannot afford to create vacuums. And while that is going on, we will continue to take those off the scene who are just bad actors; but that is not all that is required. These other elements are also important, and as we saw in the creation of AFRICOM that in large measure has been adopted by other geographic commands, our engagement, our relationship building, our understanding of what is important for people in those regions, and then addressing it in real ways. Ways that are important to them where they are. That is going to make the difference, and I have seen that around the world, from Europe, to the Middle East, Asia, and Africa. Those are lessons of a Soldier over a 40-year career, the importance of getting to know people, understanding what was important to them, addressing it, in some way, however modest, so that they then took steps to help create stability in their regions because this in our national interest.

Academic Centers

Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies (IUCTS)

Established in 1994, the activities of IUCTS are guided by an International Research Council that offers recommendations for study on different aspects of terrorism, both conventional and unconventional. IUCTS is cooperating academically with universities and think tanks in over 40 countries, as well as with governmental, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental bodies.

International Center for Terrorism Studies (ICTS)

Established in 1998 by the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, in Arlington, VA, ICTS administers IUCTS activities and sponsors an internship program in terrorism studies.

Inter-University Center for Legal Studies (IUCLS)

Established in 1999 and located at the International Law Institute in Washington, D.C., IUCLS conducts seminars and research on legal aspects of terrorism and administers training for law students.

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