CReST SEMINAR

CONVERGENCE OF CRIME AND TERRORISM?

Featured Speakers

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CReST</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGENDA</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXECUTIVE SUMMARY</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPENING REMARKS</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEMINAR TRANSCRIPT</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QUESTION &amp; ANSWER</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPEAKER BIOGRAPHIES</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POTOMAC INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Center for Revolutionary Scientific Thought (CReST) at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies brings together individuals from a variety of backgrounds to enable a comprehensive outlook of science and technology (S&T) futures from academic and policy perspectives. CReST intends to: 1) develop new ideas, 2) formulate strategies on how to achieve revolutionary gains in S&T, 3) provide a discussion forum to address political, ethical, legal and social issues related to S&T, and 4) inform the public and policymakers about the most pressing issues and concerns regarding the future of S&T.

The CReST mission of solving vital societal problems is enacted through research studies, products, seminars, and conferences designed to address the most trying challenges facing our society.
AGENDA

CReST Seminar
Convergence of Crime and Terrorism?

MODERATOR

MICHAEL S. SWETNAM
CEO and Chairman, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies

PANELISTS

THE CONVERGENCE OF CRIME AND TERRORISM
ANTHONY PLACIDO
Principal, Booz Allen Hamilton; Former Assistant Administrator for Intelligence, Drug Enforcement Administration

THE PURPOSE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT IS TO MAKE GOOD CRIMINALS? HOW TO EFFECTIVELY RESPOND TO THE CRIME-TERRORISM NEXUS
VANDA FELBAB-BROWN
Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence, Brookings Institution

UNDERSTANDING DIASPORA COMMUNITIES: CRIME, GANGS AND TERRORISM
MARK STAINBROOK
Assistant Chief, San Diego Harbor Police
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The “Convergence of Crime and Terrorism?” seminar was held at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies on November 21, 2013. The seminar centered on the concept that criminal activity and international security are related. Drawing from personal experiences in law enforcement, federal government, and academia, the three panelists evidenced the ways in which crime and terrorism are linked and how law enforcement can stem this issue.

Anthony Placido touched on how transnational organized crime groups mimic terror tactics. He started the presentation with graphic visuals of the violence in Mexico. According to Mr. Placido, transnational organized crime groups are using terror tactics to further their criminal organization. Drug trafficking also generates revenue for terrorist activity. Today the global drug trade generates $400 billion in revenue, and this revenue has been used by terrorist members, such as those behind the Madrid bombings, to further develop terrorist training and materials for activity. Environmental damage, government destabilization, and an orphan population were also mentioned as examples of the damages inflicted by transnational organized crime.

Additionally, Mr. Placido highlighted the convergence in our understanding of crime and terrorism. He noted that transnational crime groups and terrorist groups both need transportation infrastructure, document forgeries, and money launderers. Therefore, the way you fight these organizations is similar, if not the same. However, statistically, many more people are affected by transnational crime than are by terrorism. Focusing on his specialty, drug trafficking, Mr. Placido stated that 7% of Americans are admitted drug users, millions are addicted, and tens of millions are affected. Thus, many more people are adversely affected by transnational criminal activity on a daily basis than have been affected by terrorism over the history of the country.
The next speaker, Dr. Vanda Felbab-Brown, explained to the audience the function of illicit economies, and argued that on the one hand illicit economies pose a threat to the rule of law, and on the other, are often legitimized by the civilian population. In her discussion, illicit economies such as the drug trade undermine legal economic activity and can also influence the political realm by controlling money on the street. Dr. Felbab-Brown brought up examples of police being assaulted in Colombia in the 1980s, the current situation in Mexico where judges and prosecutors are being killed, and the fact that in these areas institutions are being systematically corrupted or assaulted. Moreover, in some cases illicit economies also serve as the foundation for a nation’s financial system, such as in Afghanistan where opium poppy cultivation and human security function jointly. In Afghanistan opium poppy is often the only access to lease land and landowners will not lease land unless payment is tendered in opium poppy. Thus, there are a whole set of structural reasons where security becomes a function of participating in illegal economic activity and as a result, though the drug trade is illegal, it is not illegitimate.

The final speaker, Mark Stainbrook, took a more personal approach to the topic and addressed how his experience with Pakistani diaspora communities in the UK led to specific conclusions about mitigating the threat of transnational organized crime. Mr. Stainbrook highlighted his experience as a law enforcement official in the Middle East, and how the affects of diaspora communities enhanced globalization and cultural ties. According to Mr. Stainbrook, diaspora communities maintain a strong ethnic framework, they are transnational, and have strong ties to their homeland. Transnational gangs operate in a similar fashion, for they also have an international reach and gangs often have conglomerates in multiple regions throughout the globe. To exemplify this Mr. Stainbrook provided a picture of the graffiti he saw from the Hare Hills Mujahedeen soldiers, which contained images of handcuffs, a rolled joint, and the Islamic crescent set on fire. This graffiti reminded him of graffiti found in South-central Los Angeles, and no doubt had an interesting cosmology that was international in context. Thus, if the
composition of diaspora communities reflects that of transnational criminal groups, a balance between covert and overt action should exist; and local law enforcement agencies should understand that when dealing with transnational crime groups, they are walking a global beat.

In sum, it is not accurate to describe transnational organized crime and terrorism as monolithic; yet it is known that they are inextricably linked. All three panelists provided various methods for dealing with this pressing issue. Mr. Placido argued that there is not a one size fits all approach, but that targeting the infrastructure of transnational organized crime can be effective. Dr. Felbab-Brown believes that the goal is to import the image of a “good” criminal, a criminal that does not collaborate with terrorists, is not very violent, is removed from society, and is without the capacity to corrupt institutions. Concluding the seminar, Mark Stainbrook stated that the goal of law enforcement is long-term prevention rather than detection, and that there exists a need to implement community-based police strategies.
Ladies and gentleman. Welcome once again to the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies. Its always great to look out across the room where most of the faces are people we know, and have been here many times joining us not just in seminars, but in scholarly discussion of the issues of our time. I would like to welcome all of you back as well as those that are here for the first time.

The Potomac Institute is a non-profit science and technology policy think tank that concentrates on how science and technology is changing our society and, our security around the world. As many of you know, the Institute has also been involved in the study of terrorism, specifically the use of technology by terrorists for almost two decades. We are very happy to have here at the Potomac Institute the International Center for the Study of Terrorism chaired by Professor Yonah Alexander, and this Center produces a dozen books and periodicals every year on almost every aspect of Terrorism. The Center is really an international center, and is affiliated with dozens of universities and think tanks around the world. Today, Professor Alexander is in Turkey speaking at a NATO conference on the issues of terrorism and international cooperation to address terrorism. He will however be here next Monday when we have our next ICTS Seminar on Lone Wolf Challenges in Terrorism, Past Experiences and Future Outlook to deal with one of the most challenging aspects of application of terrorism by those that we call Lone Wolfs. That will be held here Monday afternoon at noon and you are all invited.

Again thank you for being here today, and helping us to discuss another aspect of terrorism, one that I find particularly interesting, and one that has been misaddressed or miscommunicated by a lot
of people and a lot of leaders around the world. And that is the question of whether terrorism is a crime, a local criminal action, or whether terrorism is an international threat, whether it is a national security threat, whether things like drug abuse, and drug running, and drug sales are local crimes or international security matters. Today we are going to try and make the point that they are connected in such as way that it is impossible in the modern world to talk about something like crime, gangs, and drugs, as something that’s not connected to things such as international terrorism. People don’t realize when they drive down the street and see a drug deal going down that that drug deal actually affects international terrorism and their security, but it does.

We have brought together some of the world’s experts to describe how law enforcement and national security has recognized this connection, what it means, and what we can do about it. I think you will find this a very fascinating session, one full of great information and communicated to you in an exciting way. The speakers are all wonderful people with great backgrounds, and I would like to start this with a more, what Mark called, a strategic look to start. We will start with Anthony Placido who has served as the Assistant Administrator and Chief Intelligence Officer of the DEA and in that regard, has served as a senior officer in places like Mexico, and Central America, where drug smuggling and drug running takes on a very international and particularly dangerous character. Tony didn’t just serve in those places as part of the DEA, he also served as the intelligence official in the DEA. Read that as, he wasn’t just DEA, but he was connected and always affiliated with the intelligence community. In that role he served as the founding director of the Organized Crime and Enforcement Task Force of the Intelligence Fusion Center in the community. So Tony has lived and worked almost every part of how drugs are generated, smuggled, and more importantly, how they have impacted our national security at an important level. It is with great honor that I introduce to you Tony Placido who will kick this off with some comments on drug enforcement, intelligence, and how those things really are connected.
Thank you very much for the gracious invitation to speak and the kind introduction. It is a real pleasure for me to be here and to connect with some old friends and to meet some new ones. This is a subject near and dear to my heart, and I am delighted to have the opportunity to chat with you for a little bit. My plan of attack here is to talk for 15 or 20 minutes and then leave it open so that we can have a good dialogue and answer your questions at the end.

Let me just warn you as we are going forward for anybody that is faint; I subscribe to the theory that a picture is worth 1,000 words and I have a few pictures in here that are graphic. There is no gratuitous violence shown, but the pictures shown here are to make a point. I apologize for anybody who is a little squeamish.

So let’s start with the convergence of crime and terrorism. I think the first thing we have to do is baseline it, and acknowledge the fact that there is no internationally recognized definition for terrorism. If you go to the United Nations and ask them what their definition of terrorism is, you will not get one. In fact, there are ten criminal acts that constitute things they would call terrorism. But it’s a politically charged question. What happens in the international community is that people don’t want specific activities to be labeled as terrorism. That becomes important, and we will talk about it later on. Think about it in the context of “one man’s freedom fighter is...all crimes may not rise to the level of seriousness that we associate with terrorism, but all acts of terrorism are criminal offenses.”
another man’s terrorist.” If you are sitting in the Security Council of the United Nations, or even in the General Assembly, and you are representing Palestinian interests, you don’t want that to be labeled as terrorists. So it’s a very politically charged issue but for our purposes, much like the definition of pornography, I know it when I see it. I think these ten activities do a reasonably good job of capturing what we are talking about: hijacking, acts of violence against airports, the taking of nuclear materials, bombings, etc. So we intuitively understand what terrorism is even though there is not a universally accepted definition. I think Mike really put his finger on the pulse of this issue when he talks about the convergence of crime and terrorism. I would just make the point, and I’ve heard it made many times before, all crimes may not rise to the level of seriousness that we associate with terrorism, but all acts of terrorism are criminal offenses. I think the importance of that becomes critical when you start talking about what kinds of (legal) authorities you will use to deal with this problem.

So, I said there were going to be a couple of graphic shots and here is one of them. What you see on the screen is the image of the head of a Mexican police officer impaled on a pike much like you might think you would see in medieval times. One of the elements we associate with terrorism is that it is intended to kill one and frighten ten-thousand. It’s also intended to influence the government to take certain actions or not to take certain actions. So I put this slide up to make the point that even in the United States, where we have less of the political context of international organizations like the UN, we still can’t agree on what constitutes terrorism. I would make the argument that if Mexico had to mobilize 40,000 soldiers to control its country, and the drug criminals in that country are assassinating police and public officials as well as deliberately using acts of violence in order to intimidate and coerce action (in this case not the overthrow of the Mexican government but to get the Fox and the Calderon administrations to back off), that you have some of the elements I think that might be construed as terrorism. Certainty this isn’t something that is isolated to Mexico; it occurs in many other parts of the world such as Colombia with the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC). A colleague and I were just talking about the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) and the Shining Path in Peru when we were there in the late 80s and in Burma the United Wa State Army, the Taliban in Afghanistan, and other organizations. It’s a phenomenon that is happening all across the world. Now, if I was called, and I was called to discuss this previously, I would have said that the primary difference between major international or transnational organized crime and terrorism is about motive and largely, that it is a distinction without a difference. I’ve come to change my view on that. If I was drawing on the white board here and I had a Venn diagram I would say some of us in this room and around the world may view crime over here and terrorism over there, and that the two do not overlap because they are completely different things. Others may say that there is an overlap among those two. The notion that there’s a distinction without a difference really came from the fact that there were people, processes, and infrastructure that supported both of those entities (transnational crime and terrorism) in common. So whether you were a transnational criminal, or a terrorist, you needed transportation infrastructure, you needed document forgeries, you needed money launderers, etc. So there was this common infrastructure and the way you had to fight those organizations was very similar. Of course there is a whole list of transnational crimes, and I’ll certainly talk about many of them, but my real expertise is in the field of drug trafficking so that is where my focus will be today.

“...The notion that there’s a distinction without a difference really came from the fact that there were people, processes, and infrastructure that supported both of those entities (transnational crime and terrorism) in common.”
As I said, my previous view was that it was a distinction that largely didn’t make an important difference. I think that has changed because of the some of the special authorizations, tools, and ways that we now approach these two crimes in different ways.

A U.S. led coalition after 9/11 declared a global war on terrorism, and part of that was the authorized use of military force. We went from Afghanistan to Iraq, and now that authorization for the use of military force is being used in Yemen, in Syria, in Somalia, and other parts of the world. I’m not taking a position one way or another on that, but what I am saying is that the connectivity between the global war on terrorism has led to the extensive use, the most extensive use in history, of extra-judicial process. This enables the expanded use of intelligence authorities to gather information, extraordinary renditions (where people are captured and removed from countries without the normal judicial process), unilateral action (where were not coordinating with the countries), and in some cases for those deserving folks that make the JPEL (Joint Prioritized Effects List) list, targeting killings (where we forgo a trial and they are dispatched with a hell-fire missile somewhere). So the distinction without a difference has really changed because of the new and extraordinary authorities that attach themselves to things that we label as terrorism. That makes it really important, and words are always important, when we start talking about what is a terrorist, what is a terrorist organization, what is a terrorist act, and are they all the same. I would offer the personal observation that many things that can be considered terrorism are not alike. So if you try in your own mind to connect attacks conducted on a massive scale like 9/11 with the Boston Marathon bombing, they were both clearly intended to inflict damage, to frighten people, there are political motives behind them, they’re both horrible and need to be dealt with. Yet I would argue that a one-size fits all approach does not work. These are two clear examples but I think there are many others that go well beyond these. It’s a dangerous and slippery slope when we start labeling things as terrorism, especially if that designation results in the application of a different set of rules for how we manage the problem.
I started the presentation with a rather graphic photo of some of the violence in Mexico, and I think you can actually make the argument that criminal organizations down there are using terror tactics to try and dissuade the government of Mexico from being forceful. However, we did not designate the Sinaloa Cartel or other organizations as terrorist organizations. I think as a nation part of the reason for that is this connotation that goes with terrorism. Where I want to go next on this is to really talk about the whole notion of victimless crimes.

Part of what was described here was talking about gangs, and in some sense, our perceptions are affected by local life. We hear about legislation to legalize marijuana in certain states in the United States, and we talk about drug problems and that we can manage them and that they don’t really rise to the level of terrorism. I have a different view on that. By the numbers, 7% of the American public are admitted drug users, millions are addicted, and tens of millions are adversely affected. And I would say in context, if you want to compare the two, that many more people are adversely affected by these kinds of transnational criminal activities on a daily basis than have been affected by terrorism over the history of the country. So this results in a significant cost to all, including my former agency (the Drug Enforcement Administration), and lots of other entities that are funded to deal with this problem. The last number I have represents that you are all paying about $2,500 a piece – in the form of taxes – to deal with the drug issue, but there’s another number that I think bears discussion when we talk about confluence between crime and terrorism. The global drug trade is probably the largest in terms of revenue generation of transnational crime; drugs alone, according to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, generates nearly $400 billion per year in revenue. When you try to get your arms around that, it sounds like a bigger number before we had stimulus packages. But that amount of money in the wrong hands can do a lot of damage. When you look at what it costs to actually train and equip and run a terror cell, it is relatively easy for many of these now autonomous terrorist sympathizer groups who are not directly connected with al-Qa’ida or with a bigger organi-
zation, but share their ideology to generate the revenue that they need to run operations. The points I’ll make here again are when we are talking about crime versus terrorism, transnational crime, at least on the scale that I’m going to talk about, is a cancer. It corrupts public officials and institutions, it undermines respect for the rule of law, and you can read the rest on the slide. Many people in this room have worked and lived in foreign countries, and in an increasingly globalized society where we need partnerships, the corruptive influence and the undermining of governance in many parts of this world is a real problem. This corruption actually creates safe havens that allow organizations which are committed to doing these kinds of things to operate with impunity.

To give you an idea of the scale, this is just one case with $56 million of seizures in it. Here’s one location with $207 million in one place. This, incidentally, was not even the drug dealer; this was a chemical broker from China importing pseudoephedrine into Mexico to support the illicit methamphetamine trade; this resulted in the largest cash seizure in history.

When we talk about marijuana dispensaries and drug legalization, this is what (marijuana cultivation) it looks like in Mexico. I can tell you for those people, and I’m not taking a view here, that say we are going to legalize marijuana and it’s all going to go away, the folks that make their living doing this are not working on their resumes because Colorado and Washington state have legalized marijuana. They’re not donning a Brooks Brother suit and trying to get a job in legitimate industry. Instead what they will be doing is going to the cocaine trade (or some other form of illegal activity). This photo depicts the destruction of cocaine seized in the Port of Manzanillo, Mexico in a single month with nearly 24 metric tons of cocaine. How much money does that generate? How much violence does it cause? In the case of methamphetamine, there are industrial pharmaceutical companies around that don’t have production capacity like these clandestine criminal organizations.
So it’s a little bit of a misnomer in my view to do this comparison of gangs to terrorism. In some ways when we talk about gangs, at least in my mind, we are talking about the street corner gang or maybe the prison gang, and they’re a nuisance, and they’re trouble, but they’re contained. Alternatively, these transnational corporations that operate outside the law, outside the construct of any kind of rule of law, and have the capacity to inflict great harm both directly and indirectly, are not. To be a little cute about it, when we talk about terrorism, we talk about the ABC’s – atomic, biological, and chemical – and I would say the 4th one, D, is drugs. It comes down to the corruptive influence and the amount of money that can be siphoned off to do bad things. It moves beyond hypothetical and into the actual world as we will talk in a second. So you can take the position that people want to self-medicate, and that if people make bad decisions there will be environmental Darwinism, and society has no need to look out for folks who make bad decisions. Okay, fine. But what about the environmental impacts on people who
didn’t make those decisions, when public places of accommodation like hotels are converted into methamphetamine labs and are contaminated. What about the environmental damage when that goes off and when fires and explosions result? What about the innocent kids who live in these environments? There is a whole new term in Appalachia now where they talk about “meth orphans” where both parents have been carted off to jail and now the social services we pay for are taking care of their children. Is that another form of a problem we have to deal with?

Certainly we have all said there is trafficker on trafficker violence and this has always been understood. I think a lot of us have come to accept that as long as it’s them, as long as it’s the criminals fighting among themselves, and they don’t bother us, that’s okay. But what about when we see what happens in Mexico, what’s happened in other places, where they’re taking on the government? They are murdering police, prosecutors, and judges, and they’re doing it in horrific ways intended to instill fear. There are ways to
kill somebody without having to butcher them, and behead them, and leave signs, but when they take 74 innocent people off a bus and bludgeon them to death with a sledgehammer, and then leave a sign that says “if you keep bothering us this is going to continue,” I think you are rapidly approaching the point where this is terrorism.

The money that is generated from this trade goes to creating armies. They may not represent nation states or countries, but I guarantee you that there are organizations all around the world from Mexico to Burma to the Taliban in Afghanistan and places in the Sahel of Africa where the drug trade is standing up insurgencies; well-trained, well-funded, well-armed insurgencies, that are creating all kinds of problems for us. It’s very difficult to separate them, transnational crime and terrorism, and so when you get beyond that, criminal on criminal violence, we are all worried (or should be).
I think the worst-case scenario when we talk about terrorism is a madman with a nuclear bomb. Nobody wants a madman with massive capabilities to do damage. Well, the transnational crime groups have already developed much of the infrastructure. What you see from the photos here, is they have their own air forces, they’ve had their own navies for years, but now they’ve got fully submersible and semi-submersible vessels, and the U.S. Navy is having a great deal of difficulty tracking them.

Today’s vessel that is used to move seven to ten metric tons of cocaine into the country, could be tomorrow’s transportation vessel that brings in a dirty bomb or foreign fighters? I think the answer is that we don’t have the luxury of saying it will never happen. Many people say drug traffickers have a financial motive, terrorists are ideologically motivated, and so why would drug traffickers allow terrorists to cut into their profits? Well, they might not do it willingly, they might be fooled, and that has been known to happen. But beyond that, once this technology exists it’s hard to put the genie back in the bottle. If you have to mobilize 40,000 military troops to deal with what is a crime problem, it’s not an ordinary crime problem. Now we may not need or want to put predator drones overhead and start blasting these folks out of the sky, particularly in a place like Mexico, but all crimes are not the same, just as all terrorism is not the same. The case can be made that this convergence is occurring, it has occurred, it’s ongoing, and that in some respects this is the old story that if you put a frog in the water and gently raise the heat, it will stay in there until he dies versus plopping one in already hot water and he immediately jumps out. I think in some sense we have become desensitized to a lot of this, and it’s dangerous. It’s happening all over the world and we now have special forces on the same authorized use of military force working in Africa. I can tell you the cocaine pipeline from South America through West Africa across the Sahara and into Europe is functioning effectively, and al Qaeda and in the land of the Islamic Maghreb is already taxing it.
In an increasingly globalized world with Internet and transportation and the like, do we have the luxury of saying we don’t care about certain places? We did that with Afghanistan, and it cost us dearly. I would say that we cannot. Just to bring it home, and I’m going to wrap it up here and move from the hypothetical to the real, this is actually a receipt that was seized in Afghanistan from the Taliban. What it says is that the bearer of this note is in possession of a quantity of heroin and has already paid his tax and shouldn’t be bothered further. So these foreign fighters, whether it is the Taliban or others, are already in the business of financing their activities through the drug trade and through others forms of transnational crime. Another great example of this is the Madrid train bombing, or the so-called March 4th explosions. This was an al Qaeda affiliate, not hard core main al Qaeda, but sympathizers who generated enough money through the sale of hashish and MDMA to do the training, acquire the materials, and run a terrorist operation in Madrid, Spain. I think there are a number of valuable lessons that we learn from our engagements with transnational criminals. I think they are applicable to the counter-terrorism world and we as a nation need to be careful. My personal view is not to take a one-size fits all approach. Yes, there are existential threats out there and they need to be dealt with severely, and under certain circumstances the use of extra-judicial process may be warranted. But that’s not true, I think, of the garden-variety criminal offense, and not every criminal offense and not every terrorism event rises to the same level. My final word on this before turning it over is that my Dad was a carpenter who provided exceptionally good advice; “measure twice, cut once.” Once we start down that slope and fail to distinguish the subtle but important differences among criminal enterprises we can get ourselves into big trouble. Thank you.

Michael Swetnam: I knew we could count on Tony to kick off the seminar with the right spirit today. Tremendous presentation. Let’s turn to Dr. Vanda Felbab-Brown who is here from Brookings Institution, and it is a great pleasure to have you here with us.
You are a true academic who has studied these issues across the board for some time. She is a senior fellow with the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence and Foreign Policy program at Brookings. She is an expert in international internal conflict, non-traditional security threats, including insurgency, organized crime, urban violence, and illicit economies. She’s done fieldwork across the globe from Asia, to Burma, to Mexico, to Morocco and Somalia, and Dr. Felbab-Brown has written and published more books and articles than I have time to list, given the time that we have here to discuss this issue. As I said it’s a real honor to have with us such an established and recognized scholar, and it is my privilege to introduce you and we all look forward to your comments.

VANDA FELBAB-BROWN

THE PURPOSE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT IS TO MAKE GOOD CRIMINALS? HOW TO EFFECTIVELY RESPOND TO THE CRIME-TERRORISM NEXUS

Thank you very much. What I think connects Tony’s fascinating presentation and my talk is a plea, a call for nuance, and for distinction in a phenomenon, or a set of phenomena, that are no doubt interacting in ways that are perhaps unique, and that we have perhaps not seen at least in scope and design. Nonetheless, effective policy will be highly dependent on specificity, and I think there is very much a need to avoid falling into gross generalizations and assumptions that can produce policies that may not be effective or under some circumstances, even be counterproductive. So it is very much in the spirit of calling for nuance and distinction, and careful, specific analysis, that I will then violate the premise, and start with some more general comments.

We have increasingly come to focus our attention to the fact there is a lot of organized crime and many illicit economies around the world, which partially is just a function of the fact that the global international polity is becoming one where there are many more
restrictions, rules, and legal norms. Tony had worked for many years in counter-narcotics enforcement, and the drug regime has been around for a long time. But increasingly today there are illicit economies such as illegal logging and blood diamonds, and there are more and more notions and understandings that commodities that might be legal are only legal if the production or transportation follow a certain set of rules or restrictions. And increasingly there is a tendency to arbitrate and in fact, make legal decisions at the global level about normative procedures and normative concepts that then generate legal concepts, and their violation produces illegality. To put it very bluntly, a part of the reason why there is far more organized crime and illicit economy is because there are so many more laws and norms. Until recent decades, or in some cases years, many forms of behaviors, even if highly undesirable and socially problematic, would be considered legal, simply because there would have been no procedures, laws, or arbitrations about them.

These normative and legal developments also influence how malignant groups interact with social and economic domains. Indeed they might have interacted with particular illegal economies, or engaged in activity now seen as illegal or normatively undesirable for a long time, but we are only all of a sudden paying attention because now we perceive that there are two sets of illegalities, or two sets of violations of norms. We have a sense that this phenomenon of the crime-militancy nexus is new and acutely threatening. But let me suggest that many aspects of the so-called crime-terror nexus that seem new and acute are perhaps not so new. That does not mean that we should not be concerned about them, but the question is, in what ways does the nexus of organized crime, illicit economies, militant activity and terrorism pose dangers to societies and states?

Illicit economies, such as the drug trade, pose obvious threats to rule of law and to law enforcement, whether it is police being assaulted at the level of Colombia in the 1980s or Mexico today, with judges and prosecutors being killed, or institutions being systematically corrupted or assaulted to the point of the deterrence capacity of law enforcement collapsing.
Other threats, such as the environmental threats that Tony brought up, are the destruction of forest ecosystems from illegal logging, grazing, mining and hunting. In the Sahel for example, such environmental crimes as well as legal environmental exploitation result in desertification, thereby creating some of the underlying conditions for militant activities by Boko Haram in northern Nigeria.

Illicit economies also pose great economic threats. They often generate difficult macroeconomic distortions that can prevent, or at least undermine, legal economic activity and systematically and increasingly privilege illegal economic activity.

“In hundreds of millions of people around the world participate in and support illicit economies and consider them legitimate.”

In some cases, particularly when militant groups which seek to take over the state or some part of its territory manage to tap into these illicit economies – like the diamond trade in West Africa, logging in Cambodia, or the drug trade in Colombia or Afghanistan – the nexus of militancy and illicit economies can in fact come to pose a fundamental threat to the very survival of the state and the existing political order.

But with all of these threats that illicit economies generate, it is still a fact that hundreds of millions of people around the world participate in and support illicit economies and consider them legitimate. So on the one hand there are these big threats posed by illicit economies; on the other, while they are illegal, many do not consider them to be illegitimate. And in fact this paradox can make devising effective policies that address the threats but also, take into account the political and sustainability realities, excruciatingly challenging.

And the reason why these illicit economies, with all the threats and all the problems they generate, are still very much legitimate for
hundreds of millions of people around the world is because these hundreds of millions of people are often fundamentally dependent on the illicit economy for satisfying their human security needs. So the paradox, the difficulty, the core policy dilemma of the 20th and 21st century to resolve is one of the security of states and institutions being fundamentally inconsistent with, if not altogether antagonistic to, the human security of peoples for which the states and global international system are nominally meant to provide.

To stick with the Afghanistan example I brought up a few minutes ago: There is a reason why there is so much poppy in Afghanistan and why it has been there for the past 20 years. The reason is that much of the economic activity of the country is dependent on opium poppy production. Fundamentally, much of the rural population needs still to cultivate opium poppy not simply to generate an income, but also to get access to microcredit, without which people cannot access medicines, food, essential nondurables and durables, without which they cannot make it through the winter since they often don’t have enough land to generate enough economic income without having to borrow. Often opium poppy also provides the only means to rent land, as landowners will not rent land unless the borrower pays them back in opium. In other words, there is a whole set of structural reasons which condition human security of many people to be a function of participating in illegal economic activity.

This reality also means that militant groups or criminal groups that participate in and sponsor these illegal economies, if they are clever enough, can obtain a lot of what I call political capital. By that, I essentially mean acceptance and enough legitimacy from the population to ensure that the population is willing to tolerate them, if not outright, prefer them to the government, and even refuse to cooperate with the state in fighting the militants. This political capital flowing from militants’ sponsorship of illegal economies is particularly large if the state is deeply deficient in addressing the socio-economic aspects of human security and economic survival, as well as a whole variety of other public goods that a state should provide – at least in the way we conceptualize state formation and
purpose and institutional development in the West. So whether it is the Taliban or the FARC, militant groups that come to participate in illicit economies, or mafia groups like the Sicilian Mafia, the clever ones learn that by sponsoring the illicit economy, regulating the illicit economy, and using profits from the illicit economy to provide some socio-economic handouts and some public regulation, as well as other public goods and services, they get a lot of political support. They can entrench their survival in a way that would be completely elusive to them otherwise. Some criminal groups, like the PCC in São Paulo or Comando Vermelho in Rio de Janeiro, even come to regulate the level of violence that is perpetrated on the street. Now you can say that is another paradox: these criminals are the source of violence in the first place, often intense violence as they fight over turf with rival groups. True no doubt; but at the same time, they also often regulate other forms of criminality and violence that take place on the street. Sometimes they act against rapes, even unauthorized murders, arbitrate domestic disputes or disputes amongst neighbors, and set and enforce rules that the state should be setting and enforcing, were it not deficient in its presence. Indeed, both criminal and militant groups will sometimes also set up courts – Hezbollah or the Taliban, as well as Brazil’s criminal groups mentioned before, immediately come to mind. In such settings, the population has no motivation or capacity to go to formal courts for dispute resolution.

In short, by sponsoring illicit economies and by taking on these various public security, regulatory, and dispensation functions in a way

“From the perspective of the state, there would ideally emerge an alignment between legality and legitimacy, so that what is illegal is also broadly perceived as illegitimate, and what is legal is legitimate.”
that could be quite elusive for belligerents and criminals otherwise, the militant and criminal groups can in fact take on the trappings of a proto-state. They become a government entity; a governing entity with a degree of legitimacy and political capital.

And that fundamentally changes the way in which the state needs to tackle the crime-militancy nexus. Instead of merely suppressing an aberrant social activity, as one would perhaps conceptualize many predatory crimes such as extortion or kidnapping, the state needs to conceptualize its policy response as a competition in state-making between the state and the criminals and the belligerents over the allegiance of the population. From the perspective of the state, there would ideally emerge an alignment between legality and legitimacy, so that what is illegal is also broadly perceived as illegitimate, and what is legal is legitimate.

Different illicit economies have different structural factors that influence just how much political capital belligerents can obtain from their sponsorship of the illicit economy. I will not go into them, but let me posit however, that if you accept my claim that in many settings an appropriate policy response is not simply about policing and law enforcement in the classic sense, but that policy response moves into a far more delicate and complex strategic game over the allegiance of the population, then there is a whole other set of factors that need to become part of the tool kit for policy makers. Policing or, in some cases, a military response against insurgencies and terrorist groups, is indispensable. It is a crucial component. However, it often might need to be supplemented by other policies, such as socioeconomic approaches, so that one breaks the economic dependence of populations on illegal economies. That is often very complex, very difficult to do, and socio-economic approaches, such as alternative livelihoods, have often turned out to be more prone to failure than success. We can talk about that in the Q and A. Other important government policies might also involve mobilizing other non-state actors, providing other forms of access to public goods, or justice with the goal that people transfer their allegiance to the state, where bonds between the state and citizens become
strengthened, and bonds between the population and non-state violent actors, criminal groups or belligerent groups, weakened.

In the 1990s academic concepts emerged that were promptly adopted by many governments and policy-making bodies, that militant groups have essentially become criminals. We would often hear that the FARC is no longer an insurgent group or a political entity, but now a criminal group because it participates in the drug trade. People would make similar comments about the Taliban in the late 1990s when the Taliban was full force engaging in opium poppy cultivation. Yet in many ways this view was an oversimplification and overstatement of what was happening. Certainly many militant groups who came to participate in illicit economies would nonetheless retain ideologies and very clear political agendas. Similarly, centuries before the 1990s, many militant groups past would have members who were in the fight simply for the money – whether they were outright mercenaries or professed ideological commitment. The fad in both academia and policy circles came to be to say that many militant groups became mere criminals, lost their political ideology, and stopped being political actors.

Here was the second misdiagnosis of this kind of “greed-versus grievance” analysis: the assumption that if the primary motivation is money that does not carry political implications. I would argue the opposite: What is a more political act than controlling bullets and money on the street? If you are the Sinaloa Cartel and you determine how much violence takes place within a territory, and you – directly or indirectly, through illegal economies and their spillovers into the legal economy – provide income for 20% of the population, are you not a political actor? You might not have an ideology, your goal

“Criminals and militants might be exploiting the same tactics, they might be learning from each other, there might be modus operandi contagion effects.”
might not be to topple the state, but you certainly want to shape how the population relates to you, whether it provides intelligence to the police or not, and you also want to shape how the police, politicians, and judges act toward you. All such strategic engagement by nonstate actors affects the legitimacy and fundamental purpose of the state and carries political implications. Indeed, it might well be that policymakers and scholars not so much overestimated the extent of political grievances of insurgent groups, but rather that they underestimated the political effects of organized crime groups.

Now that said, I want to make clear that I do not believe that criminals and insurgents have merged into one monolith and that today there is no distinction between the two, and that Somalia’s pirates are no different from Boko Haram in Nigeria, or that the Taliban is equivalent to the Zetas in Mexico. Yes, both militant actors and criminal actors might engage in brutality and use media to communicate signals, they all engage in political signaling as well as other signaling, and they have political effects and might develop political capital. But I will still argue that there are fundamental differences between the two types of actors. In fact, policies that treat them as identical and that seek to target both through the same means will bring about worse outcomes. They will only inadvertently, and highly undesirably, push these groups together, whereas they might have actually been natural enemies. Criminals and militants might be exploiting the same tactics, they might be learning from each other, there might be modus operandi contagion effects taking place. Sometimes, even some cooperation between the two types of actors might emerge, but this tactical cooperation will often be far from lasting. In fact, these marriages of convenience, to the extent that they emerge at all, might very easily unravel, and the divorces might be far more common than the marriages staying together.

We thus need to design policies to actively encourage the separation, the distance, and the infighting between the militants and the criminals, rather than push them together as a result of our
policies. In some cases, a policy response might involve thinking geographically. To go back to the Somalia example: the Shabaab for many years did not participate in piracy, but in fact opposed piracy. Piracy was not something Shabaab as an organization was interested in engaging in. But increasingly, the defeat of Shabaab in Kismayo and the weakening of Shabaab between Kismayo and Mogadishu have pushed Shabaab into Puntland. At the same time, various international actors have created and sponsored (semi-)official militias that operate on land in Puntland to attack the pirates’ safe havens on land. The outcome of these two pressures has been that for the first time really over the past two years, some of the pirate groups and Shabaab operate in the same territory and face not dissimilar external enemies. The inadvertent outcomes of the policies is in fact to set up the possibility of greater cooperation between the pirate groups and the clans from which they hail and the Shabaab than was the case five years ago. Such cooperation is still not inevitable, and in fact, policies should be consciously designed to pit them against each other. To repeat, there is still a fundamental difference between the pirates and Shabaab, but it was the policies that pushed them together at least in the same physical territory, and might inadvertently be creating conditions for cooperation among the two separate actors.

On the opposite side, we have many examples where careful targeting patterns, careful signaling, and in some cases devil’s deals between the state and criminal groups resulted in suppression of militant groups. So I would very much urge against treating them as a monolith and believing that, under all circumstances, we have to target all of them equally. Instead, policy needs to consider what are the organized crime groups which are most likely to fall in bed with the most dangerous terrorists, how to keep them apart physically, how to encourage friction and discourage cooperation, how to eliminate one perhaps in order to eliminate access for the other, and how to pit them against each other?

That also means thinking about law enforcement as a signaling mechanism to organized crime groups. It is often alleged that since
organized crime groups are interested in making profit, they will engage in any kind of behavior. I don’t think that’s the case at all. In fact, much of what law enforcement does domestically is shaping the behavior of organized crime groups and there are vast differences in how violent, for example, organized crime groups are. There is as much drug trafficking in East and Southeast Asia as there is in the Americas, yet the murder rates in Southeast Asia are akin to murder rates in Western Europe, somewhere between Western European and U.S. rates, which are very low. There is a lot of drug trafficking, and it’s a lot of very nonviolent drug trafficking – in a striking difference to the increasing brutality and violence prevalence we see in Latin America. We can debate why we have different outcomes and patterns of behavior and violence in Latin America and Asia, but I would posit that one of the important differences is that organized crime groups in Southeast Asia have different perceptions of the role of the state and their power vis-à-vis the state and law enforcement institutions. This deterrence effect and assessment of the balance of power might not last forever. But in some ways, the management of organized crime groups by political actors in Southeast Asia has been far more effective than the political management of criminality in Latin America. And the optimal structuring of the criminal market would be one where authority clearly lies with law enforcement and police and the judicial system, such as is present in Western Europe or the United States. That does not mean that all organized crime, such as all drug trafficking, can be suppressed – rather, the objective should be to reduce the most significant harms associated with transactional crime. For example, if a group peddles drugs, it will be targeted by law enforcement. The goal should be to push drug trafficking behind closed doors, to minimize the violence associated with it. And if that fails, if groups do not alter their behavior, and if they do engage in great violence, then those groups in particular will they face the preponderance of law enforcement action. Similarly, policy design needs to signal to organized crime groups that if they engage in organized crime, they will be targeted; but if they also engage with and cooperate with al Qaeda, all holds are off and they will really face the preponderance of the crackdown. In fact, such signaling and sometimes ex-
licit messaging takes place in many settings as to the rules of what tolerable criminal behavior is and what absolutely intolerable criminal behavior is. The criminal groups that don’t learn, they need to be the target first, and be made an example of as well as incapacitated.

So with that, let me provocatively close with suggesting that in the case of many transactional crimes, like drug trafficking, as opposed to predatory crimes, such as murder, suppression by law enforcement will often merely lead to displacement and a balloon effect. Thus, perhaps an important goal of law enforcement should be to make “good criminals.” Now what do I mean by making good criminals? Well, I mean essentially four characteristics: First, criminals who don’t play with terrorists, who actively avoid such engagements and cooperate with law enforcement against terrorist groups. And indeed, if they do engage with terrorist groups, such as al Qaeda, they cross a red line that pushes them into a different level of enforcement priority and focus. In other words, through its signaling and targeting patterns, law enforcement should seek to shape the incentives of criminals so that when they learn that Boko Haram, for example, is trying to use their smuggling routes for financing, the criminal group will cooperate with law enforcement in targeting Boko Haram.

The second characteristic of “a good criminal” is limited violence. There are always some violent aspects of criminal activity, some extortion that is underpinned by the threat of violence, and murders take place. But policy should seek to minimize the violence associated with criminal activity – the goal, for example, should be to make drug trafficking in Mexico look like drug trafficking in the United States: behind closed doors, over the Internet, not very visible to society, and as nonviolent as possible. Yes, there will always be some violence associated with criminal markets, including drug trafficking, such as between dealers and pushers on the street, but it does not have to look anything like the killing fields in Ciudad Juarez in 2009 and 2010.
In addition, criminals need to believe that authority and power lies with law enforcement and the justice institutions, with the outcome being that if a police officer arrests them, they will extend their hands and have the handcuffs snapped on, and end up in jail for a long time, as opposed to responding by blowing up the police station or assassinating the prosecutors and judges. In other words, law enforcement institutions should seek to shape the behavior of criminals so that the absence of or minimal violence – vis-à-vis each other, law enforcement officials and institutions, and society broadly – characterizes transactional crimes as much as possible.

The third characteristic of a “good criminal” is his or her distance from society. That means essentially that large segments of the population are not dependent on going to the local crime don to be able to borrow money or get employment, or to achieve social mobility or secure economic or physical survival itself. Instead, they can go to the formal justice system or legal private sector or perhaps nonprofits if they have a dispute with their neighbor. They do not seek out the mafia don to have him adjudicate or disburse socioeconomic or public goods and services. The way the state “creates” this kind of criminal is by providing socioeconomic services and public goods via legal means to the population. With respect to this characteristic, it is not about how the state signals and shapes the criminal, but rather how it interacts with broader society.

The final characteristic of a “good criminal” – i.e., and by good criminal, I of course mean the least dangerous and harmful one – is one who doesn’t have the capacity to corrupt institutions. There will always be individuals in the government, in law enforcement

“Perhaps an important goal of law enforcement should be to make ‘good criminals’.”
or justice institutions, who can be corrupted, but we don’t want to be in a situation where entire political elected bodies as well as the entire judicial and law enforcement institutions, or institutions of economic arbitrage, are beholden to either criminals or to political actors who control criminality in the area. In this case, the way policy shapes “good criminals” is not about signaling, or socioeconomic policies, but about what kind of vetting, resilience, redundancy, and transparency mechanisms are built into the formal institutions, what kind of accountability is built into the system.

Shaping the criminal market and criminal groups and their behavior in this way, maximizing the key policy objectives of the least criminal violence, least propensity of criminal groups’ interaction with militant groups, least corruption capacity on the part of criminal groups, and greatest separation of crime and society – a set of objectives I have facetiously called making “good criminals” – is differently possible in different settings. Different criminal market structures and preexisting patterns of behavior and different institutional settings may enable these policies to materialize more quickly in some settings than others. If the baseline is one where the state is essentially a “mafia bazaar,” where political competition and power is about issuing exceptions from law enforcement to one’s patronage group and client clique, where crime surrounded sorghum long before it became about drugs, then achieving those desired outcomes will take longer, will be far more challenging, and require much more robust policies. In such settings, social and political changes might also be necessary far more so than in settings where the baseline already is a basic alignment between legality and legitimacy and where the state is already the principal provider of public goods, perhaps not throughout the entire territory, but at least in the core areas from which it can expand.

I hope that the talk was provocative enough and I look forward to your tough questions.
Michael Swetnam: Thank you very much. Now to our keynote speaker and a good friend of the Potomac Institute. One of our Senior Fellows and Board of Regents members, Jeffrey “Skunk” Baxter, introduced me to Mark a while back with the words that, we study terrorism at the Potomac Institute and we have been involved with lots of national security issues, but we need to meet and talk to a guy who has actually had his hands in trying to deal with those things on the front line from Los Angeles, to the Middle East, and South America. Mark is somebody that has dealt with national security, terrorism, drugs, and policing, on the front lines of California and the third world and will compare the two together.

When we met with Mark a few months ago and had a long ranging discussion about gangs, drugs, terrorism, and international affairs, it was clear that we needed a forum like this. We needed a forum where we could bring together people who have dealt with this issue at a strategic level, as Tony talked about, and all of the insidious national security impact. We need to know how this affects policy and how we are academically thinking about it, which Vanda did a fantastic job of framing those issues (including the concepts of “good criminals”), and the fact that criminal networks even if they don’t have political motivations have political impacts and effects. Thank you very much Vanda.

Mark is the Assistant Chief of the San Diego Harbor police and has been in law enforcement for decades. He is a 16-year veteran of the Los Angeles police department, and along with that long career in policing, he has been a reservist in the United States Marine Corp. Mark is a Lieutenant Coronel who has seen duty in Thailand, Kosovo, Bolivia, and Iraq. And in all of those places his job was helping to create order, maintain order, or bring order to situations that involved insurgencies, crime, and in ways that are often hard for Americans to imagine. Yet he is also an academic, he has a master’s degree in public administration from a California State University. He has also been a Fulbright scholar and a Fulbright Police Fellow in Great Britain where he had the opportunity to work with the Pakistani communities that actually produced the 7/7 bombings.
not too long ago. So he brings to the table an experience in the military, in national security, in law enforcement internationally and law enforcement locally, along with direct experience working to harness gangs and drug trafficking in California. So it is a great pleasure to introduce our good friend, Mark Stainbrook.

MARK STAINBROOK
UNDERSTANDING DIASPORA COMMUNITIES: CRIME, GANGS AND TERRORISM

Thank you sir. I want to thank Mike and Patrick for flying me out here. My mother really appreciated them getting me out here, and when she asked me what I was doing, I told her I was speaking at the Potomac Institute. She asked me what that was, and I told her it was a think tank. She said, “My lord Mark, when you were growing up, I never thought your name and think tank would be used in the same sentence.”

I know General Gray is associated closely with this organization. He actually commissioned me into the Marine Corps 22 years ago. What I will always remember and take away from his leadership was telling me to challenge conventional thinking, and maybe I will do some of that today. As Mike mentioned, I did spend six months living, working, and studying in the Pakistani community in West Yorkshire, where the 7/7 bomber lived. So that is going to be the context for the first 15 minutes of my presentation.

Now on that day, 52 British were killed, and 700 were wounded. It has been described as their 9/11, and it had a big impact on the folks in the United Kingdom, both emotionally and mentally, and mainly because it was conducted by some of their own. These were not people flown in to conduct these attacks, but three young British guys – normal soccer playing, rugby playing, cricket playing young men. Three of them were from the Pakistani community, from the diaspora, and one, Germaine Lindsay, was a convert of Jamaican
descent, from the Afro-Caribbean diaspora. So in 15 minutes or less, I am going to make everyone in here experts in diaspora.

The context of me going there, and this was about 18 months after the bombings, was the relationship between the community and the police after the bombings. That was my main thrust. So I studied in the religion and theology department at Leeds, because I wanted to do a complete 180 from what I had learned in the military and law enforcement. I looked at the community in that context, and I learned that there were nine traits of a diaspora. I found it interesting that the more you can marry up the diaspora to the nine traits, the more they could be impacted by terrorism and crime. I am going to try and make that argument.

The first trait is dispersal from the homeland to two or more foreign regions. This is what happened after World War II. Britain was completely depleted, and they needed manpower to get factories back up and running. They went to their commonwealths, and this was a part of India at the time, and told them, “Hey, you can work in England. You can’t stay forever, but you can send money back home.” So people came and moved to England in the 50s and 60s, and a second wave went to East and Central Africa around the same time. Now, because of all of the bad guys in Africa at that time, in the 1970s that wave moved north to join their cousins in England.

So who came? It was young men. They moved to these dense urban areas in the North like Bradford, where the factories were. In 1962 England passed the Immigration Acts, which gave them amnesty, meaning that not only could they stay, but they could also bring their families with them. So, mom, dad, cousins, grandparents, aunts and uncles, this was a great deal for them. So, here they go from a group of young men, living in clustered apartments together, sending money back, to instant communities and families in the heart of Britain.

They maintained a strong ethnic culture and distinctness over a long period of time. The population likely included first to fourth
generation immigrants. They are wearing the salwar kameez, and if you travel down the street, you might think you were in Pakistan. Everything is in the Urdu language, and you can buy clothes and food that are ethnically correct. Sometimes they even say they are more Pakistani than the Pakistanis.

The other thing is that they have a collective memory of the homeland. They sing songs, read poetry and books, and they participate in cultural events, sometimes going back to the homeland to do that. And they have this idealization of their homeland – a collective commitment to it. If you remember the big earthquake in Pakistan, or the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, it affects people in their new country. So when the earthquake happened, the British police had to set up areas to know who died in Pakistan, so they could let the families there know. A police sergeant told me once, “What hap-
pens in Pakistan today, effects Bradford tonight.” This is an important point I want you to think about.

There is also a return movement. This is a key point, for they never planned to stay, they were always supposed to return home. As it is, some 400,000 Pakistanis a year go back and forth between England and Pakistan. So from a law enforcement perspective, how do you track that, how do you monitor it? I have a picture of a funeral from my friend Raj, whose a special constable and Pakistani guy, grew up most of his life in the UK, he took his dad over, who unfortunately died. He took his dad back over to Pakistan and buried him there and I asked him, “Raj, where do you want to be buried?” and he said, “I’m British, but I want to be buried back in Pakistan next to my dad.” So even in death this psychological tie, this emotional tie, of wanting to return to their homeland is there.

However, there is also a troubled relationship with host societies and, trying to gain acceptance. Ironically on the same date four years earlier, on July 7, 2001, the Bradford Riots happened. You could classify them as race riots. Young Pakistani youths, who thought that the National Front was coming into their town, got upset and reacted violently. The police had to be called in, and the violence lasted for 3 days. Now we don’t know for sure if the 7/7 bombers were at these riots, but it is likely that they were in the area. I am not sure if they were trying to make a statement about it, but it is interesting that the attacks happened on the same day four years later.

There is also the sense of empathy and solidarity with co-ethnics. We see Pakistani fighters, from an ethnically similar background, who fought in Afghanistan when the Soviets tried to invade. Then you have the young Palestinian rock throwers during the intifadas, which they would have been watching on TV in the 1980s. So they could see themselves in this group, and I would also use the term co-religionist, or other Muslims. I am pretty sure I made that word up, but I can do that as I am a Marine and we do that a lot. My point here is that this ties into a sense of identity, cosmology, and
world outlook, and who they believe they are. They’re British, they’re Pakistani, they’re also Muslim, and they’re also other kinds of regional classifications within those units.

There’s also the possibility of enrichments in host countries that tolerate pluralism. Although socioeconomically, and I can prove through studies they’re the least educated group and not doing well economically, they really have done well compared to their brethren back in Pakistan. And they send a lot of money back there and actually, prop up some of the economy. But this is the interesting thing to me. What was happening during the time when they came over as this group, and started these brand new communities? In the 60s and 70s, think about air transportation. It was a lot faster and a lot cheaper and now they can fly back and forth all the time. Think about what else is going on. Now you have better telephone technology, now they can keep in touch with cell phone technology. Also through satellite and cable TV, they can watch Al Jazeera or something specifically focused in on Pakistani communities. So all these things enabled them to import their local religious leaders and customs such as arranged marriages from home countries so that they can maintain the extended family by marrying their first cousins. But it keeps them insular which is a problem. So they have extended global families. So what happens is that the first generation recreates their community in Pakistan, and then they maintain that link. You can image the second and third generations caught between these two dynamic worlds; one which is very conservative Muslim where you don’t drink, you’re not supposed to smoke, or use drugs, or go out partying, the other this British pub culture, and soccer playing, and hooliganism and all that stuff. So they’re under pressure from both. And the part about bringing in religious scholars, that’s really interesting. Because when they bring in the religious scholar from the village, its somebody that doesn’t speak English too well, and the kids don’t speak Urdu too well, and trying
to translate the Koran from Arabic to Urdu, and then into English, there’s a lot lost in translation. So what I noted is recruiters can come in with this politicized form of Islam that they want to impart on a young mind. So kind of a key point here is that with transnationalism and globalization, what’s going on during the world during the time that this community is growing, think about some of the things going on, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Gulf War in 1991, which they said here’s the West killing Muslims, then the intifadas in Israel where they are watching young Palestinians just like themselves out on the street fighting police. Then quickly followed by 9/11, the War in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the 7/7 Bombings for example.

So what you have is this diaspora community, and you have all these pressures; you have religious and cultural pressures like the first-cousin marriages. That’s not a religious thing in Islam, but the first generations will say you have to marry your cousin – that’s religion – but that’s not religion – its culture. Then they have government pressures; they have the anti-terrorism acts there, similar to the Patriot Act here. Then you have the media, how Muslims are portrayed in the media. And then community pressure, both internal and external, because even within Islam, and even within the Pakistani communities, there are different sects that often have internal struggles. So you can see the pressures there listed, and you got this British bobby walking the beat, and look at all the different ethnicities – East African, Southeast Asian, Arab – and he’s walking a global, local beat. See being a police officer on the beat I’m the one that has to look at the community every day, two years after the bombing, and still deal with those people after everybody else has left. So I take this in a more personal sense. And it’s all about learning and understanding your community so you can do some outreach to them. So I thought this was a fascinating picture. But talk about globalization and transnationalism. Three famous Belgian beers that you can’t drink, and then all these western women showing their legs, then you have the transnational aspect of the cell phones, and this image is for casino gambling. And this
is all outside the mosque. Think about the social pressures. One minute you’re in the mosque, and then you walk outside your in another environment. All I need is the plane flying by and you have the whole picture there.

So what I came to find was, that if you can imagine these communities, a diaspora community, where globalization and transnationalism are in effect, and then they’re linked to an unstable homeland, with al Qaeda influence or maybe radical Shia causes, think Lebanese diaspora to the U.S., and they’re insular in their language culture and their ethnic makeup, and have these conflicts of identity, you have generation gaps and relative socioeconomic deprivation. Well what you have is this idea, which I think is really dangers, real or perceived discrimination that is linked to Muslim causes globally. Now as a cop in L.A., I would pull over people and they would say stuff like, “you’re just pulling me over because I’m x”. But they would say, “you’re just pulling me over because I’m Muslim, this is what
you do to Muslims”. That’s really something. They’re really seeing themselves in this global context of the West versus Muslims.

So of course I’m not saying that any community supports terrorism, or crime, or any of that. What I’m saying is that you have in a diaspora community, the potential for support, and it ranges from moral, social, monetary, potential to pull recruits, to operational support. You also have a community that has no involvement in it, but they’re affected when anything happens. After a terrorist attack, maybe Muslims get beat up or things like that. I don’t know if you all just saw that a Britain of Palestinian descent was just killed in Syria fighting for one of the rebel factions against the government. So he was able to make his way all the way back to Syria, and that’s not unusual. Some of them made their way to Bosnia in the 1990s, they made their way to Afghanistan and Pakistan more recently, including the 7/7 bombers. Two of them went to Pakistan. This is what was fascinating to me. The first arrest that we made out there, when I went out with the British police, was of a Pakistani male dressed in jeans, very western-style dress like you would think of rap, hip-hop culture here, an L.A. baseball cap, and he’s selling little bags of weed in the street. You know I always try to get my rap on with these guys, and I use sports and music, and say, “Hey what music do you like, what movies do you like?” “Oh man I like Tupac, I like Biggie, I like Fifty Cent,” and I’m just thinking this is what we are exporting to this country and to these kids. So you think about it. A Pakistani, Muslim kid is selling drugs and fascinated by American rap and hip-hop culture.

So I got to meet with this group and work with them a little bit, they were a gang beating people up, selling drugs, terrorizing Afro-Caribbeans because there’s that racial aspect, and they were called the Hare Hills Mujahedeen Soldiers. When I saw their graffiti, which was in a mosque, I was just fascinated by the cosmology in this graffiti because it reminded me of South-central L.A. On the other hand, it had an international characteristic. So here’s their gang name, Hare Hills, which is where they’re from, Mujahedeen – the Islamic fighters – and then Soldier – so it has that militant component.
Now look at the international context. You see the Islamic crescent which is on fire – see the bomb going off right here? See the handcuffs – the relationship with law enforcement? See the bullet holes in the wall? Here’s the general indictment of society right here. Look at this, “money is a major issue,” and you heard this from our other two speakers. See the rolled joint. And it says welcome to Hare Hills and it’s all cracked because it’s a socioeconomically deprived area. And it also says, “rest in peace to all the fallen soldiers. The good die young, so what have I got left but to breathe.” And so what a fascinating cosmology with these guys, and their outlook.

When I came back to L.A., I started looking at some of the aspects between gangs and terrorism. If you saw the movie “Gangs of New York,” it’s based off this 1928 book by Herbert Asbury, and it really talks about the Irish diaspora, and the experience of gangs. It talks about influencing politics, and eventually some of them become supporters of the IRA. It’s no different than Muslim diaspora communities. But what concerns me is that gangsters are heavily armed, they’re very tactical, they learn to be street soldiers, and they’re very resourceful. And what worried me were groups like...
the mujahedeen Hare Hills soldiers, to be recruited by people who wanted them to do bad things.

Now in California, this is a definition of a gang, and we go after gangs following this definition. But that’s not much different. You could put terrorist activity on there and it would be almost synonymous. And why, because gangs are part of popular culture. I’ll be at Disney Land with my family, and there will be a gang family behind me. In L.A. and California that’s normal, and it’s present in television, movies, and the rap industry.

Kathleen O’toole, a former Boston police commissioner, and I had to do a presentation at IACP a couple of years ago, and we came up with this explanation of why people join gangs. Interestingly it’s also why many people join the Marine Corps; money, excitement, camaraderie, social, and protection. But mainly it’s about drugs and

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Image courtesy of Mark Stainbrook.
money. Drugs equal money, and guns are needed to protect this money. So gangsters are basically in it for the money. But what I worry about is that small percentage that has an ideological or religious justification for what they’re doing. We have gangs forming in L.A., such as the Black Rider Liberation Party, that are filling with all kinds of ideology. Also in L.A. you have the JIS case, which were formed by black prison converts, and they were enemies on the street, but they came together as converts and had planned to target Jewish and military institutions such as recruiting stations.

I often thought the implications of transnationalism and globalization on diasporas is very similar to that on gangs. This picture of a plane is of us deporting people back to their home country. I remember working MS-13 in the 1990s, and I loved deporting them back to El Salvador. But what were we actually doing? We were transporting them to El Salvador and what did they do, they recreated the gang there, and then exported it exponentially back to the United States. They have also figured out different ways to use technology to communicate.

I just want to run through a couple of examples of American gangs with international reach, and why I think they are interesting. When I got back from the UK, we started noticing young Somali men start disappearing from Minneapolis. It turns out that they were going back to Somalia, and the primary reason for this was nationalism. They were convinced by recruiters, and some were gang members, to go back and fight against the Ethiopian invasion in 2006. But for some of them that nationalist pride got formed into al Shabaab, and al Shabaab eventually got connected with East African Al Qaeda.

When they came in the 1980s and 1990s, and think about that Pakistani context, it was scary to me how well they matched up. They were fleeing a home country, an unstable country with Al Qaeda connections, they didn’t really want to come to the United States, and when they got here, they didn’t fit in with the ambient culture. Some tried to join African-American gangs but were rejected, but because they had so many of their own, they could form
their own gangs based primarily on what clan they were. And sometimes they would take on aspects of Crip or Blood gangs – they would take what they liked from American gang culture. And they’re very active in drug trafficking and sex trafficking. Another interesting case here is that when I went to the San Diego Police Department, a Somali from North Carolina came and met a Somali from San Diego. The Somali from North Carolina had been previous U.S. military, and they met with two Hispanics who were doing a drug deal connection to the Cartel south of the border. I think this is a prime example of what Tony and Vanda were mentioning. In another example Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), a diaspora community from El Salvador, came to the United States, and now we even have a few in northern Virginia. This gang runs a lot of their operations out of the prisons. I’m a big fan of Douglas Farah, and I read one of his articles recently where he showed that not only is MS-13 getting politically active, but probably delivered missiles to the FARC in Colombia. And so their connections keep extending. Also 18th Street gang, one of the biggest gangs in L.A., has been aligned with La Eme, the prison gang, and has also aligned with the Armenian Power gang to aid with money laundering. Lebanese criminal gangs have the same thing, a diaspora, and fled the civil war, and mix in very well with Hispanic communities.

So again the commonalities are diaspora communities, they band together initially for protection, they typically have a return movement to their unstable homeland, they establish international connections, and then they learn criminal behavior of American street gangs. I’m not saying that all of these people come over here to become criminals, but some of them are, and are increasing their political activity, which as Vanda pointed out, is in large part connected to money. And so the last couple of things, and what I have

“I often thought the implications of transnationalism and globalism on diasporas is very similar to that on gangs...”
learned, is that cops need to enter a community with an understanding that they are walking a global beat. And you shouldn’t go into a community until you have learned all these things. Also, I really think that we need to balance the covert side with the overt side. And that’s where local law enforcement can do great things. Unlike some federal agencies, we’re there for 30 years sometimes, and we see these people for long periods of time, and local cops develop relations with people in diaspora communities that can then provide information. So the goal for law enforcement is not
long-term prevention, its detection. We want to integrate these communities, and weave them into the fabric of America. But that’s not the only thing. Law enforcement can promote American values, and think of every officer as a first preventer. So this is my story and I’m sticking to it. Thank you very much.
Audience Member: I wonder if you could address the situation in Singapore because my understanding is that they do indeed have control over most of the adverse issues that we have been talking about today. Maybe that’s a myth, and if it’s a reality, maybe we can learn something.

Anthony Placido: I’ll offer a caveat that I am not an expert of Singapore, but my point would be that the experience in Singapore not only has a dimension of scope and scale around it as a city state, but I think there are cultural dimensions that don’t translate. Recently there was an American who was caned over there for graffiti on a car. I think when you try and translate that into the American construct, there are a lot of people who talk law and order here, but if it was there child that had gone out and done something, and you’re talking about corporal punishment and caning somebody, it just wouldn’t fly. So there’s clearly a cultural dimension to it. I was struck by some of the conversation when I went on a trip to Israel with the district commander for Jerusalem during the second intifada. One of the things that was amazing there, and when we talk about this terror crime nexus, is not talking to the first responders and the police so much as it was people who run security in outdoor shopping malls and eating areas. They take a very tough view on this thing, for if the goal of terrorism is to terrorize, we can’t allow that to happen. So in a crime scene like Boston, that we would have had open for weeks, it’s a matter of national pride that they have it closed in three hours, and that people who weren’t going to be out on the sidewalk cafes deliberately go out and have a glass of wine so as to say that you won’t chase me off the street. I don’t know if all of this translates, but we in America tend to talk a tough game, but when it comes down to it, we don’t really play hardball.
**Vanda Felbab-Brown:** I certainly cannot claim that I am an expert on Singapore, or that I have deeply studied it, but I have had some interaction with the country and law enforcement community there. Singapore and Hong Kong are often put forth as models, and of course they are problematic models because they are city-states, and some of the scope and resource issues that come with law enforcement and control – in fact, authoritarian control – are manifested differently. Moreover, both Hong Kong and Singapore need to be evaluated and understood in the context of a long and deep relationship in Southeast Asia between criminality and political life, and the use of criminal gangs for political purposes, such as the delivery of votes or extortion for financial contribution to political parties. Such crime-politics nexus, incidentally, has its own manifestation and resonance in Latin America. Now the big difference is that in many Latin American contexts, like Mexico, the political control of crime at some point cracked, and organized crime groups got uppity and stopped obeying the political overlords. We have not seen such rupture and rebalancing of power between crime and political powerbrokers in Southeast Asia and South Asia, perhaps with the exception of Pakistan. Nor have we seen that in the specific and easier cases like Hong Kong and Singapore – easier because of the size and scale, as well as because of the deep entrenchment and continuation of the political dispensation. Indeed, one of the most interesting cases is Indonesia, which had gone since the 1930s and the anticolonial struggle through massive upheavals and massive changes to political order, yet preserved a rather smooth continuation of the use of crime for political purposes. Changing political authorities and institutions, despite the upheavals and political ruptures, have essentially maintained political control of criminality, including today in ways that might make us question whether such arrangements and control are consistent with democracy and rule of law at all. Nonetheless, the outcome has been that violence has not exploded in the overt confrontation between criminals and political entities in Southeast Asia in the same way that it has in many parts of Latin America or Africa. Why is that? Is it because law enforcement institutions, even as they are heavily politicized and per-
haps not democratic, have nonetheless been effective at maintaining control? Now the interesting thing that is happening is that not so much Singapore, but particularly Malaysia is experiencing rising crime rates, and there is a widespread perception among citizens that crime has escalated. All of a sudden, there is much more visible extortion, murder rates are up, there are more visible robberies, and there is a sense that order might be breaking, and that political management is no longer effective. We are waiting to see how law enforcement institutions and politicians will react and what, if any, policies will change. One important aspect to watch is whether anti-crime policy responses will be anything other than quite ethnically-based responses by law enforcement that could potentially be highly problematic, discriminatory, politically destabilizing, and even counterproductive with respect to suppressing crime. Indeed, in Malaysia there is still significant privileging of the Malay groups, and minorities face a very unequal access to political and economic power. One of the risks is that crime will be perpetrated by those who have not had a chance to be fully integrated, and that law enforcement response will be unfairly directed against ethnic minorities that are underprivileged within the political system. So there is much turmoil in the political realm of some of the Southeast Asian countries; and in some of them also in the criminal realm, in places that have very different experience with manifestations of crime than, for example, Latin America.

Audience Member: Mark, I remember you were implying in your talk that if we legalize marijuana it would be the same multinational that would move over to things such as cocaine. What about things such as clean needles programs, what do you think of that where you’re actually removing the need or the drive of the addicts to go out of their way to buy from illicit sources? And for Vanda, you were talking about in some places criminals become the governing body of an area. I want you to comment on the fact that a lot of the infrastructure that developed in Miami during the 60s and 70s came about because of the cocaine culture. What do you have to say about that?
Mark Stainbrook: I’ll just say; I’m a big fan of Malcolm Gladwell, I don’t know if you have read any of his books about David and Goliath, but he discusses the drug culture in Vietnam amongst soldiers, and that about 20% of them are addicted to opium, and that when they came back, there was a big fear of opium addiction. But actually for a lot of them, the culture that they reentered didn’t accept opium use. Specifically when talking about one gentleman that went back to Minnesota, his girlfriend wasn’t going to let him smoke opium, and so he started working and doing other things. Thus they didn’t see that 20% actually translate when they came back, and actually ended up being about 1%. He suggests that it’s not about making unnecessary laws; it’s about having a culture where you don’t accept it. Unfortunately what I see as a culture in the U.S. is that we are starting to accept marijuana use as being a norm, and not a bad thing. But it shouldn’t be a norm, and it is a bad thing. We can sometimes hardly hire police officers because it seems everyone has smoked marijuana or done something harder than that. So I think we need to look at ourselves and stop making excuses that we need more laws or legalize it, because I don’t think that’s going to help. I think it’s about setting a cultural tone that were not going to tolerate that kind of nonsense. As Tony pointed out, our need, our fuel for these drugs as a nation, is what is funding terrorism and what is funding these criminals. And shame on anybody in the United States that does hard drugs or even not hard drugs because they are funding cops dying and that cop’s head being on a stick. That’s just the truth of it. Nobody wants to say it.

Vanda Felbab-Brown: The reality is that illegal, criminal activity often is the engine of other forms of economic growth, and often underpins legal economic activity also, particularly in areas that have a comparative disadvantage in other legal economies. That’s also a critical reason why you have political capital developing for effective sponsors of these illicit economies, as well as why many governing entities, official governments at the local or national level,
are reluctant to go after particular illegal economies. Suppression of illegal economic activity could have very real and large economic repercussions, such as a significant economic downturn, with acute political consequences.

I would, however, also point out to the flip side. That is it’s not only that the presence of illegal activity will often enable and generate spillovers and growth of legal economic activity, but that the reverse also takes place: the development of urban spaces enables and directs what kind of economic, legal or illegal, activity will take place.

Increasingly we are facing large urbanization trends in many parts of the world where national and local governments simply do not have the capacity to keep up with population movement to cities. So the communities that are migrating there will end up in much worse conditions than the Pakistani communities in Bradford or Somali communities in Eastleigh, which is the neighborhood of Nairobi where many Somali migrants end up. It’s not quite slummy – actually, parts are rather developed – but if you go to other parts of Nairobi, where either some parts of the Somali diaspora or other communities are moving to, parts of Eastleigh exhibit significant underdevelopment and poverty.

In places of rapid, essentially unplanned urbanization, the lack of physical infrastructure can prevent people from accessing other parts of the city and thus accessing legal economic opportunities. In the slum areas, there might be no cops – there is no beat, or even a concept of a beat – and the structures of governance that emerge are either quite dangerous or completely removed from the state. And even if there is not direct manifestation of terrorist mobilization or organized crime, there tends to be a fundamental population-state disconnect, a fundamental absence of a social contract between the state and the citizens. In Mexico, much of the very violent contestation in places like Tijuana or Ciudad Juarez has taken place precisely in the colonias that emerged from the maquila growth, where many people from other parts of Mexico have been migrating since the 1970s and particularly since the 1990s, but
where the state never bothered to create any sort of access to socioeconomic goods or public goods. It can easily require, for people living in those marginal areas, that parents leave home at 4 am to take their kids on private buses to school, then go to work in the maquila for 12 hours, and then travel at seven in the evening to pick up their children from somewhere, perhaps from the street where they might have been interacting with or joined a gang. This lack of or poor urban design can stimulate illicit economies and alternative forms of government as much as illegal economic activity can foster legal economic growth.

Anthony Placido: I think that in the same way that Vanda sort of cautioned nuance and to look at the complexity of the issue, clearly there is a linkage between the government creating rules and criminal organizations exploiting those rules, and if you look at the number of people who are abusing drugs, there is a breakdown between what’s illegal but, what is accepted. I think at the macroeconomic level, what many people fail to realize is that aside from street-level, local, there is a transnational industry. That industry is resilient, it’s not going away. Some people have made tens and hundreds of millions of dollars in illicit profits, and if you could make that go away by legalizing the marijuana trade or handing out free needles, you haven’t actually eliminated the problem, you have just changed it. We actually saw that in the real world in Mark’s town when the Arellano Felix brothers from Baja, California, were very strong and controlled the Logan Heights gang on the San Diego side, but have been largely decimated through rivalry with other gangs and law enforcement action, and so they were moved out of the drug trade. But now they’re doing extortions, they’re doing arson for hire, and there engaged in every other kind of crime that’s out there. So it may be possible to move them from one form of criminality to another, but I don’t think it’s as simple as saying we were going to change one rule and then were going to get a large transnational organization to surrender and go legit.
**Audience Member:** Being a bit more forward leaning and going to your point on authorities, do you think today that U.S. policy for the convergence of crime and terror is overly broad and being narrowly employed, or narrowly broad and broadly employed.

**Anthony Placido:** From my view as somebody who has spent 30 years in law enforcement, there is a clear imbalance between missions and authorities and funding. What I saw over the span of my career, is that the missions and authorities prior to the global war on terrorism largely rested with law enforcement, while the money and resources rested with DOD. Thankfully the central transfer account, the deputy assistant secretary for counternarcotics and global threats, was actually able to rectify some of those imbalances. The global war on terrorism has given the military a much broader role, and I think linked to the authorized use of military force and the GWOT, we see particularly special operations command and others engaged from DOD in a much broader way. My concern that I think I voiced previously, is that it’s easy to make a leap from what started off as radical Islamic terrorists who attacked the United States on 9/11, to extend that and say for example, that the Cartels in Mexico are engaging in violent activity with the goal of undermining governance and our nearest neighbor. And therefore that same authorized use of military force and the same tactics, might be employed. There are all kinds of dynamics that make that not useful, but I think it is quite possible to stretch this to a point where we get ourselves in a lot of trouble.

**Vanda Felbab-Brown:** I don’t think it’s so much of an issue of broad or narrow. What disturbs me most is the lack of specificity and nuance, and a tendency to transplant policies from one setting to another, partly because we are used to adopting these policies in other contexts, and then shoving them into different contexts and settings where they might be ineffective and even counterproductive.
Mark Stainbrook: Well, it’s easy to blow stuff up, it’s kind of hard to change people’s minds. My point that overt things can be applied nationally, I don’t know that the whole NSA issue is making us a lot of friends around the world or helping us with our allies. I know I was in civil affairs with the Marine Corps, so we were out there trying to win the hearts and minds, and pretty much all the resources in the missions were towards special ops and we went doing combat missions which are good, but then a couple of people are left holding the bag at the end trying to do that nation building with nothing. I remember being out in Kosovo having nothing to give or to share to help anybody with. But having to run around and actually coordinate all these other nonprofit groups and international groups to try and help the community and get it functioning. As Vanda said, when there’s a gap in there, a vacuum, whoever can come in there and fill it will fill it. And so we have seen, and we haven’t really done a good job if we are going to look honestly at ourselves, when we go into these nations. I was in Iraq when we first took it over, but we didn’t have the plan for what should happen next. Are we going to keep repeating that mistake? Are we going to beef up the other side of it?

Michael Swetnam: We are going to end the session today but if you will allow me to give a few presents to our the presenters who have given us their time and thoughts today including a medallion from the Potomac Institute and our latest book on al-Qa’ida. Thank you all very much for coming.
SPEAKER BIOGRAPHIES

MICHAEL S. SWETNAM
CEO and Chairman, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies

Michael Swetnam assisted in founding the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies in 1994. Since its inception, he has served as Chairman of the Board and currently serves as the Institute’s Chief Executive Officer.

He has authored and edited several books and articles including: Al-Qa’ida: Ten Years After 9/11 and Beyond, co-authored with Yonah Alexander; Cyber Terrorism and Information Warfare, a four volume set he co-edited; Usama bin Laden’s al-Qaida: Profile of a Terrorist Network, co-authored with Yonah Alexander; ETA: Profile of a Terrorist Group, co-authored with Yonah Alexander and Herbert M. Levine; and Best Available Science: Its Evolution, Taxonomy, and Application, co-authored with Dennis K. McBride, A. Alan Moghissi, Betty R. Love and Sorin R. Straja.

Mr. Swetnam is currently a member of the Technical Advisory Group to the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. In this capacity, he provides expert advice to the U.S. Senate on the R&D investment strategy of the U.S. Intelligence Community. He also served on the Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on Counterterrorism and the Task Force on Intelligence Support to the War on Terrorism.
From 1990 to 1992, Mr. Swetnam served as a Special Consultant to President Bush’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) where he provided expert advice on Intelligence Community issues including budget, community architecture, and major programs. He also assisted in authoring the Board’s assessment of Intelligence Community support to Desert Storm/Shield.

Prior to forming the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, Mr. Swetnam worked in private industry as a Vice President of Engineering at the Pacific-Sierra Research Corporation, Director of Information Processing Systems at GTE, and Manager of Strategic Planning for GTE Government Systems.

Prior to joining GTE, he worked for the Director of Central Intelligence as a Program Monitor on the Intelligence Community Staff (1986-1990). He was responsible for the development and presentation to Congress of the budget of the National Security Agency, and helped develop, monitor and present to Congress the DOE Intelligence Budget. Mr. Swetnam was also assigned as the IC Staff representative to intergovernmental groups that developed the INF and START treaties. He assisted in presenting these treaties to Congress for ratification. Collateral duties included serving as the host to the DCI’s Nuclear Intelligence Panel and Co-Chairman of the S&T Requirements Analysis Working Group.

Mr. Swetnam served in the U.S. Navy for 24 years as an active duty and reserve officer, Special Duty Cryptology. He has served in several public and community positions including Northern United Kingdom Scout Master (1984-85); Chairman, Term limits Referendum Committee (1992-93); President (1993) of the Montgomery County Corporate Volunteer Council, Montgomery County Corporate Partnership for Managerial Excellence (1993); and the Maryland Business Roundtable (1993). He is also on the Board of Directors of Space and Defense Systems Inc., Dragon Hawk Entertainment Inc., and the Governing Board of The Potomac Institute of New Zealand.
MARK STAINBROOK
Assistant Chief, San Diego Harbor Police

Assistant Chief Mark G. Stainbrook is the second-in-command of the San Diego Harbor Police Department (HPD), which is the premier police presence in San Diego Bay, the San Diego International Airport (also known as Lindbergh Field), and on all Tidelands around the Bay. The department is comprised of 160 employees and has jurisdiction in the five member cities of the Port District, which include San Diego, Chula Vista, Coronado, Imperial Beach, and National City.

Mark retired as a lieutenant from the Los Angeles Police Department, where he served in a variety of assignments including patrol, gangs, internal affairs, intelligence and counter-terrorism. Mark is a graduate of the FBI National Academy in Quantico, Virginia. He has over sixty LAPD commendations.

In his second career, Mark is a Lieutenant Colonel in the United States Marine Corps Reserve with over twenty-six years of military service. He is currently assigned to Security Battalion, Camp Pendleton, California. Mark’s personal awards include the Navy-Marine Corps Medal for heroism, as well as the Army Commendation Medal and the Navy Achievement Medal.
While serving in Iraq in April 2003, Mark was tasked to reconstitute Iraqi police units in Baghdad. His experiences were chronicled in the article “Seven Days in Baghdad” (Police Magazine, December 2003). Mark was extensively interviewed and quoted during Operation Iraqi Freedom by CNN, Good Morning America, Inside Edition, The Washington Post, and the BBC.

Mark graduated with honors from California State University Long Beach with a Master’s Degree in Public Policy Administration. His Master’s thesis, Attitudes of American-Muslims towards Law Enforcement: A Comparison of before and after September 11, 2001, was the catalyst for his selection to a Fulbright Police Fellowship.

During his Fulbright, Mark was a visiting fellow at Leeds University in the Religious and Theology Department, and was also seconded to the West Yorkshire Police Force. He studied and worked in local West Yorkshire Muslim communities for six months, including the suburbs of Beeston, where the “7/7 London bombers” resided.

Mark is the author of several law enforcement articles in Police Chief Magazine, including, “Learning from the Lessons of the 2008 Mumbai Terrorist Attacks” and “Policing with Muslim Communities in the Age of Terrorism.”
VANDA FELBAB-BROWN  
Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, The Brookings Institution

Vanda Felbab-Brown is a senior fellow with the Center for 21st Century Security and Intelligence in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution. She is an expert on international and internal conflicts and nontraditional security threats, including insurgency, organized crime, urban violence, and illicit economies. Her fieldwork and research have covered, among others, Afghanistan, South Asia, Burma, Indonesia, the Andean region, Mexico, Morocco, Somalia, and eastern Africa.

Dr. Felbab-Brown is the author of *Aspiration and Ambivalence: Strategies and Realities of Counterinsurgency and State-Building in Afghanistan* (The Brookings Institution Press, 2012) and *Shooting Up: Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs* (Brookings Institution Press, 2009) which examines military conflict and illegal economies in Colombia, Peru, Afghanistan, Burma, Northern Ireland, India, and Turkey. She is also the author of numerous policy reports, academic articles, and opinion pieces. A frequent commentator in U.S. and international media, Dr. Felbab-Brown regularly provides congressional testimony on these issues. She received her Ph.D. in political science from MIT and her B.A. from Harvard University.
Among her recent publications are: Nuclear and Radiological Attacks by Terrorist Groups (Brookings, forthcoming); Crime-War Battlefields (Survival, May 2013); Focused Deterrence, Selective Targeting, Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime (IDPC, February 2013); The Orangutan’s Road: Illegal Logging and Mining in Indonesia (Brookings, February 2013); Crime as Mirror of Politics: Urban Gangs in Indonesia (Brookings, February 2013); Pena Nieto’s Pinata: The Promise and Pitfalls of Mexico’s New Security Policy against Organized Crime (Brookings, 2013); Chaos in Kabul (Brookings, January 2013); Political Violence and the Illicit Economies of West Africa” (Terrorism and Political Violence, 2012); Fighting the Nexus of Organized Crime and Violent Conflict while Enhancing Human Security (U.S. Army War College, 2012); Bringing the State to the Slum: Confronting Organized Crime and Urban Violence in Latin America (Brookings 2011); Calderón’s Caldron: Lessons from Mexico’s Battle Against Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking in Tijuana, Ciudad Juárez, and Michoacán (Brookings, 2011); and Not as Easy as Falling off a Log: The Illegal Timber Trade in the Asia-Pacific Region and Possible Mitigation Strategies (Brookings, 2011).
ANTHONY PLACIDO  
Principal, Booz Allen Hamilton

Mr. Placido is the former Assistant Administrator and Chief of Intelligence at the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. He is a subject matter expert in the areas of counterterrorism, money laundering, border security and Latin America affairs, and currently works as the Principal for Booz Allen Hamilton. Mr. Placido also holds a B.S. from Northeastern University, a M.A. in Public Administration from Golden Gate University, is a graduate of the Certificate Program in Legislative Studies from Georgetown University’s Government Affairs Institute, and a Change Management Advanced Professional from Georgetown.

During his employment at the U.S. Department of Justice, Drug Enforcement Administration, Mr. Placido served in multiple intelligence positions. Amongst these were, Senior Officer for the Intelligence Community; Assistant Administrator & Chief of Intelligence; Special Agent in Charge of New York Field Division; Regional Director of México and Central America; Country Attaché-Bolivia Country Office; Executive Assistant to the Deputy Administrator; Senior Inspector-Office of Professional Responsibility; Supervisory Special Agent-Ft. Lauderdale,
Florida; Senior Special Agent-Lima, Peru; Special Agent-Washington, D.C.; and intelligence research specialist.

Mr. Placido also holds multiple awards and honors including: National Intelligence Distinguished Service Medal; Distinguished Intelligence Medal-Colombian Ministry of Defense; Presidential Rank of Distinguished Executive-President George W. Bush; multiple Senior Executive Service Performance Awards; Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association Award for Group Achievement; International Narcotic Enforcement Officer’s Association Award of Honor; and Special Recognition Plaque-Peruvian National Police.

His achievements are also numerous. Mr. Placido served as the founding Director of the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) Intelligence Fusion Center, an interagency effort whose program is to target, investigate and prosecute individuals who organize, direct, finance or otherwise engage in illegal drug trafficking enterprises. Mr. Placido, along with the Director of CIA’s Crime and Narcotics Center, served as Co-Chair of the Anti-Drug Intelligence Community Team (ADICT). This inter-agency body was adopted by the Director of National Intelligence, and serves as the de facto issue manager for the counter-drug portfolio within the intelligence community.
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