

The Lone Wolf Terrorist: Past Lessons, Future Outlook, and Response Strategies



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Introduction

“The Lone Wolf Terrorist: Some Perspectives”

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From the dawn of history humanity has continuously faced two critical security challenges. The first is “natural” or “Mother Nature’s” disasters. It includes a wide range of disruptions and destruction of human lives and property. Hurricanes, tornadoes, earthquakes, tsunamis, monsoons, droughts, floods, heat waves, wildfires, and varieties of pandemics arising from biological pathogens cause some of the most frequent catastrophic costs to individuals, communities, and civilizations. The second permanent and equally significant security concern consists of “man-made” threats such as technological and economic calamities, ideological and political radicalization and extremism, terrorism, insurgencies, and wars.

The purpose of this report is to focus only on some of the specifically “lone wolf” challenges among the larger man-made security threats to the safety, welfare, and rights of ordinary people; the stability of the state system; the impact on national, regional, and global economic development; the expansion of democratic societies; and the prevention of the destruction of civilization by biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. Thus, this academic effort is by its very nature narrow in scope and reflects selected assessments of terrorist threats undertaken by individuals independent of direct sponsorship by groups and nation-states.

First, consider the conceptual fog surrounding the classification of “lone wolf” offenders. The list includes terms ranging from “crazies” and “criminals” to “crusaders” and “martyrs.” Other frequent identifications utilized invariably by both academic literature and the media include “anarchists,” “radicals,” “extremists,” “leaderless activists,” “hate militants,” “solo and autonomous terrorists,” “self-tested actors,” and “lone operatives.”

In this connection, some related historical and contemporary lessons come to mind when assessing the “lone wolf” challenge. For instance, Homer’s *Odyssey* (XVI) in 1000 B.C. observed that “the blade itself incites to violence.” Also, General Matthew B. Ridgway in a Cleveland speech on November 10, 1953, asserted: “There is still one absolute weapon ...that weapon is man himself.” And a famous Russian proverb reminds us that “even if the bear is gone, he left the place for the wolf.”

Despite these insights, the international community still does not have a universally accepted definition as to who are “lone wolf” perpetrators. Yet, limited attempts have been made to provide some definitional suggestions. For example, a U.S. official provision on the “lone wolf” is included in relation to terrorist wiretapping issues. H. Rept. 112-79 – FISA Sunsets Reauthorization Act of 2011 explains that the provision “allows the government to track a foreign national who engages in acts to prepare for a terrorist attack against the U.S. but is not affiliated, or cannot immediately be shown to

be affiliated, with a foreign terrorist organization. The lone wolf definition cannot be used to investigate U.S. persons, and only applies in cases of international terrorism.”*

To be sure, some other characterizations of the “lone wolf” are observable. These include individuals with little or no direct contact with “inspirational” extremist organizations; people who are poorly trained and less successful and who are often isolated within society; and those actors who give little advanced warning to pending attacks. However, characteristic differences also exist. For example, the age of the “lone wolf” perpetrator varies from young adults to seniors, and intelligence levels range from average to genius IQ. The process of radicalization of the “lone wolf” takes place through numerous ties with family, educational instruction, religious bodies, friends and neighbors, places of work, prisons, printed extremist literature, media influence, and Internet propaganda.

It is noteworthy that modern society in general, and particularly the technological advantages of the Internet, have made the spreading and radicalization of the “lone wolf” participants easier and potentially more dangerous and deadly. Additionally, radical social networking from right-wing websites to jihadist forums serve as meeting places for like-minded individuals and thereby lead to incitement of violence in names of “higher principles,” from “just war” to even “peace with justice.”

The existing literature, both published and unpublished, on the “lone wolf” distinguishes three different identifiable operations. First are individual attacks that aim only to harm a particular person rather than a larger target of a group of people. The second category consists of selected attacks targeting a specific group while excluding those who are not connected to or affiliated with the specific perceived “enemy.” The third type of operation is indiscriminate targeting which is designed to inflict massive damage and loss of life.

Motivated by political, ideological, and cultural discontent and nourishment, the “lone wolf” resorts to a broad range of primitive to more sophisticated tactics in justification of secular, theological, or single-issue causes.

Selected historical and contemporary cases include numerous assassinations by “lone wolf” perpetrators, including John Wilkes Booth (President Abraham Lincoln), Gaetano Bresci (King Umberto I of Italy), Leon Czolgosz (President William McKinley), Gavrilo Princip (Archduke Franz Ferdinand), Nathanuram Godsey (Mahatma Gandhi), Lee Harvey Oswald (President John F. Kennedy), Sirhan Sirhan (Senator Robert Kennedy), and Yigal Amir (Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin).

Another list of infamous “lone wolf” actors consists of people who have inflicted mass disruptions and wide-spread terror and death. Mention should be made of the legacy of Theodore Kaczynski (the “Unabomber”), Major Nidal Malik Hasan (Fort Hood, Texas), and Anders Breivik (Norway).

* United States. Cong. Committee on the Judiciary. *FISA Sunsets Reauthorization Act of 2011: Report Together with Dissenting Views (to Accompany H.R. 1800) (including Cost Estimate of the Congressional Budget Office)*. Cong. Rept. Washington, D.C.: U.S. G.P.O., 2011.

Against the backdrop of the foregoing brief discussion, as well as the expanded rise in contemporary “lone wolf” attacks around the world, it behooves all concerned nations to undertake “best practices” strategies that necessarily must be based on three main levels. First is the local response. It includes elements such as vigilance (“if you see something, say something”), resilience, community awareness and education, local law enforcement training, community outreach for citizens (e.g., grassroots programs for those with perceived injustices), fostering programs for young adults (e.g., mentoring), community-oriented policing, and family-oriented Internet filtering and monitoring.

The second level is that of national responses such as information sharing, local-national law enforcement synergy, safeguards against dangerous materials (e.g., licensing, red flags), public-private partnerships, successful immigration assimilation, representative and efficient government, protection of civil liberties, heightened monitoring/targeting/removal of extremist and “how to” websites, and review of legislation and prosecutions regarding “permissible speech.”

The third level is international and consists of partnerships/cooperation; knowledge/experience sharing; promotion of peace, tolerance, religious freedom, and democracy; the uniform combating of extremist ideology and rhetoric; economic development; utilization of soft power (positive outlets for alternative messages); and rewards for information programs.

The Current Report and Acknowledgements

Academic studies related to “lone wolf” terrorism are extensive. A selected bibliography includes some of the recent published books, journals, and reports. Clearly, the media are covering practically on a daily basis incidents related to “lone wolf” challenges.

This report is derived from the academic work of many institutions over half a century, including the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies and its affiliated universities and think tanks in over 40 countries. It draws from numerous conferences, seminars, and workshops on terrorism with national, regional, and global bodies such as the UN, OSCE, EU, and NATO, to mention a few. Three particular events are noteworthy. One was the international conference on “Lone Wolf Terrorism” organized by the National Centre for Terrorist Threat Assessment (November 1-2, 2011) in Stockholm, at which the writer delivered an academic paper. The second was an event on “The Lone Wolf Challenge: Past Experience and Future Outlook” held at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies on November 25, 2013. The third and final one was a seminar on “The Lone Wolf Terrorist: Past Lessons, Future Outlook, and Response Strategies” held on July 27, 2016 in Arlington, Virginia and organized by the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, the International Law Institute, and the Center for National Security Law at the University of Virginia School of Law.

This report includes the presentations of the following speakers from the two later events: Marion (Spike) Bowman (former Deputy General Counsel (National Security), Federal Bureau of Investigation; Distinguished Fellow, Center for National Security Law, University of Virginia School of Law), Professor Amit Kumar (Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University), Kyle B. Olson (President, The Olson Group,

Ltd.), Captain Dave Martin (Assistant Director, Maryland Coordination and Analysis Center, Frederick County (MD) Sheriff's Office), Professor Carol Flynn (30-year veteran of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); she held senior executive and clandestine positions in Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America. Currently, Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University and Managing Principal at Singa Consulting), Lisa Curtis (a former U.S. government official and currently Senior Research Fellow, Asian Studies Center, Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, The Heritage Foundation), Dr. Nimrod Raphaeli (Senior Analyst and editor of the Economic Blog at the Middle East Media Research Institute), and Professor Dean Alexander (Director, Homeland Security Research Program and Professor at the School of Law Enforcement and Justice Administration, Western Illinois University). They all deserve our gratitude for their valuable contributions to our program.

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Marion (Spike) Bowman

*Former Deputy General Counsel (National Security), Federal Bureau of Investigation; Distinguished Fellow, Center for National Security Law, University of Virginia School of Law**

I first started thinking about lone wolf terrorism right after 9/11. At the time I was the Deputy General Counsel for National Security Affairs at the FBI. We really did not know an awful lot about al-Qa'ida at that point in time. But we began to look into it very quickly, and among the things that we learned was that there were a number of training camps being run by al-Qa'ida in Afghanistan. The more we looked at it, the more we realized that while al-Qa'ida was trained in the camps in Afghanistan, a large number of other people had gone through there too, not necessarily affiliated with al-Qa'ida, not necessarily intending to immediately go out and do something on a terrorist plane, but perhaps going there for training to do something later on.

And so we began to think about what would happen if one of those people began to decide to do something unattached, unaffiliated. And the reason that made a big difference is because the way we looked for terrorists, and spies and so forth in the United States was largely through the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which is operated by a secret court. It has secret warrants for wiretaps and physical searches. But the predicate for a FISA warrant is that the target is either a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. And if you have a person who is acting on his own, it is pretty hard to assert that that person is an agent of a foreign power.

So, one of the things I did fairly soon after 9/11 was suggest that perhaps we could have an amendment to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to look at this single person, which caused a lot of consternation because it did change the way we had thought about the Act from the start. We eventually did get an amendment to the Act for that purpose, but we also began to realize some other things that might happen too.

One of the things that started me thinking on a slightly different line that was soon after 9/11 Dutch Foreign Intelligence produced three studies about radicals in its part of the world. And one of the really startling things that came out of that was that the Dutch did not find a lot of ideologues, they found a lot of people who seemed to have an affinity for violence, just wanted to do something violently. And as a consequence they started looking at those individuals and actually did disrupt, not only in the Netherlands but in other countries as well, some things that were planned to happen, simply because they were focused on these individuals.

Well, we began to look at that and then another thing happened. In 2005 we had the British Underground bombings. And we began to look at that point and think, you know, we have got people in the country that may be discontented too. Something we had not really focused on all that much past the Timothy McVeighs. And so now we're starting to think, well, we might have people who are not affiliated with al-Qa'ida or something similar, we might have people in our own communities who want to do violence, and so we began to think more and more that there might be some other thing to do about this.

* This presentation was delivered at an event on "The Lone Wolf Challenge: Past Experience and Future Outlook" held on November 25, 2013 at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies.

When I testified in 2002 to Congress, and asked for the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to be amended, I have to say that Congress was very skeptical. They were not really ready to accept the fact that we might have these other types of individuals in the United States, and it really took some period of time for Congress to come around. They eventually did.

The other thing that has happened through the years is that we have fairly well decimated the ability of al-Qa'ida and al-Qa'ida type affiliates to carry out the large complex type of operations that 9/11 represented. Could it happen again? Yeah. But what is more likely? And here I am going to give you a prediction. In the United States, and probably in most of the western countries as well, future terrorist acts are more likely to be less well organized that we saw with 9/11. They are likely to be less complex. They are less likely to succeed. They are less likely to be as lethal, if they do succeed. They are going to be more numerous. And in all likelihood, I believe they are going to be conducted mostly by citizens or long-term residents of the United States.

Now, why do I say that? First of all, I think that that's what the sequence of events that I have laid out points us towards. But secondly, if we stop and take a look at what has happened in the United States since 9/11, we have had, according to FBI reporting, over 50 terrorist attempts defeated, and we have also had a number of terrorist-associated persons arrested, and of those arrested who had some link to al-Qa'ida or al-Qa'ida type philosophy, more than half of them were United States citizens.

35 percent of them were born in the United States, 60 percent of them had a college degree, and 60 percent of them were either working or in school. These were not the people we were looking at right after 9/11. These were not the discontented Arabs who were going to the camps in Afghanistan, to try and learn how to make an explosive, to try and learn tactics, or maybe to learn to shoot a gun, who knows.

But we are looking today at an entirely different cadre of people than we thought about many years ago. And what bothers me about it is I do not think we are looking at it hard enough. I do not think we are focused as much on the lone wolf, the single individual, who might have no affiliation with anybody, who might not even be an ideologue, who might just want to go blow something up, because he is discontented. Again, you can think back to the example of Timothy McVeigh, but we have seen others in the United States who are like this as well. And I think that is what the future holds for us.

Professor Amit Kumar

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I am going to run through some important aspects of lone wolf terrorism, incorporating some south Asian examples, as well as others.

Basically, when we talk about what is lone wolf terrorism, most people conflate it with the fact that there is one person who plans, executes it and finances it. The reality, especially in context of what Professor Yonah Alexander calls “political terrorism,” is the radicalization process, wherein a single individual may perpetrate the act at the end stage but in terms of radicalization he may be more likely than not, radicalized through a group or the Internet or some army experience or what have you. So that is a distinction that one has to be very clear about. The knee-jerk response is that just because it is a single individual, he must be a kind of lone wolf terrorist. He may not be a terrorist at all, but he may be a terrorist as well and he may be a member, either covert or overt, of a terrorist organization, have some previous interface with a terrorist organization, may have undergone the radicalization process through the terrorist organization, or through some previous travel to terrorist camps. Like if you look at the Boston bombers; one of them had traveled to Central Asia. It is hard to really call the person who travels thus a lone wolf terrorist because he was indoctrinated in Dagestan, along with use of the Internet, of course.

Secondly, what are the types of lone wolf terrorists? They could be secular, a la Timothy McVeigh. They could be religious, the al-Qa’ida guys. They could be single issue, like Ted Kaczynski, the Unabomber. They could be criminal as well, and they could be idiosyncratic. When you say criminal it could be, for example, the anthrax attacker in 2001, Bruce Ivins, who passed away in 2009; he had criminal intent. It is hard to make watertight compartment that it has to be one or the other. It could be a mishmash of all the five categories or one or more of them.

What factors contribute to lone wolf terrorism? It could be social and political grievances; it could be documented psychological disorders, as we have discovered through investigating the Boston bomber and others. It could be affinity with or membership in terrorist organizations or criminal gangs.

Then there could be a broadcasting of terrorist intentions. In Norway, Anders Breivik communicated what he was going to do, so there are some tell-tale or warning signals that a lone wolf will be doing something spectacular.

Then there is the role of enablers in radicalization, for example, the Internet or previous military experience.

There are also catalytic agents in the radicalization process. There could be personal and political triggering events. For example, Timothy McVeigh went through radicalization after his experience in the first Gulf War, and after that he developed a loathing for the federal government. So you have all these basket case folks who may be radicalized in one or many ways.

* This presentation was delivered at an event on “The Lone Wolf Challenge: Past Experience and Future Outlook” held on November 25, 2013 at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies.

Then there is what we called stochastic terrorism, which occurs when folks like al-Zawahiri and bin Laden and Anwar al-Awlaki upload videos and exhort their al-Qa'ida brethren to engage in lone wolf attacks. So it could be what we could call a stochastic process, where the perpetrators of the act would be what some theorists call missiles, actually.

What do terrorist organizations achieve using lone wolf terrorism? I am going to focus a little more on how terrorist organizations might use or utilize lone wolf attackers. What do terrorist organizations achieve by using lone wolf terrorism? They are low cost, have greater impact, require little planning, and are difficult to predict and detect, and take counterterrorism measures against.

There is the aspect of plausible deniability. For example, if you look at the Mumbai bombings, or just after the Mumbai bombings in 2008, and this is topical because we are celebrating the heinous attacks in Mumbai – it was exactly on November 26, 2008 when the 60-hour carnage really began. Initially the news reports said it was an outfit called the Deccan Mujahideen, and then it was the Indian Mujahideen. Then we discovered Lashkar-e-Taiba was trying to engage in plausible deniability. It was not Lashkar-e-Taiba, it is an offshoot of it that had perpetrated the attacks. There could even be threats of the Indian mujahedin or a local criminal gang in India who might be responsible for the attacks. This has happened before. If you look at Lashkar-e-Taiba or if you look at David Coleman Headley's surveillance of the Mumbai targets in 2007, was he a lone wolf terrorist or was he sent there by Lashkar-e-Taiba to act as a lone wolf terrorist to make us believe that he was an individual who was planning attacks on his own?

There is the case of Dhiren Barot, who was involved in the plot to survey the financial institutions in New York and New Jersey and Washington. And then there is the need to obviate the requirement on the part of the lone wolf terrorist to communicate with other members of the group; in this way the terrorist organization can engage in plausible deniability. "It is the individual, I told you it's the individual, we aren't involved." Last but not the least these lone wolf attacks, as far as terrorist organizations go, show a would-be terrorist or would-be lone wolves, "Here is one guy, who's committed this act, all of you can go and do the same thing." That is what al-Awlaki has said, that is what Zawahiri said this September, exhorting would-be al-Qa'ida sympathizers and lone wolves to commit terrorist attacks.

Importantly enough, what kind of counterterrorism (CT) strategies can be used against lone wolf terrorism? There could be community policing, where civilians may be involved, easier said than done. But I think this Washington Metro buzz "say something if you see something" – that is a very typical example of what can be done. I would consider a lone wolf terrorist as someone who executes and finances and plans the attack, but is radicalized by an external agent, i.e., the terrorist organization. What I mean is whatever enablers they might have: the Internet, the military experience, previous travel, previous contact, being part of a sleeper cell, or what have you. Then there is the need for federal, state, and local coordination and information sharing. Trying to nip would-be lone-wolf attacks in the bud would be useful. Then there is monitoring Internet use, and that brings in an important civil liberties issue. With what powers can the government monitor the Internet? It obviously can, and it should

because whatever is taking place, the stew is brewing over the Internet. What kind of messaging, what kind of chatting, how does a would-be lone wolf terrorist finance plots? What kind of interactions does he have?

Then there is the question of rapid response. For example, if the Norwegian authorities had responded to Anders Breivik right after the first attack, again, it is difficult to predict what that basket case was going to do. But if they had responded to the first attack, he might not have perpetrated the second attack, which was the more heinous one, with larger casualties actually. Then there is the question of investigating not just lone wolf terrorist attacks, but the botched plots as well. There is so much more one can learn from a failed plot; Faisal Shahzad, for example, or the underwear bomber. There is so much more one can learn from a plot that has been foiled or botched.

What kind of implications does lone wolf terrorism have for counterterrorism measures? It is difficult to detect; therefore unorthodox strategies are called for, including some of the ones I mentioned such as community policing. The CT strategies need to be designed to prepare for, respond to, and prevent terrorist attacks. It is difficult to make out when we are doing this whether the attack is by a criminal or by a secular terrorist, a religious terrorist, or an idiosyncratic terrorist. It is difficult to tailor make the strategy to address the potential plot or potential perpetration of attacks.

There are issues of whether lone wolf terrorist attacks are more possible in developed societies than in developing societies. In the context of South Asian nations, particularly, their information sharing methods and their monitoring measures are not as good as ours or our allies in the developed world. There is this thinking among intelligence and law enforcement circles that it is harder to plan a lone wolf terrorist plot in a place like India or any other country in South Asia than in the developed world. There is an opportunity to study what is going on, in terms of the lack of lone wolf attacks in developing societies and the real possibility, as we have seen time in and time out, of having terrorist attacks here.

Lastly, I want to talk about radicalization. I want all of us to look carefully at what radicalization entails. What is al-Qa'ida? When we say bin Laden is gone, al-Qa'ida Central is damaged; we are a little bit obsessed with the organization of al-Qa'ida, the organization structure of al-Qa'ida. There is the al-Qa'ida ideology, which we have not been able to do much about. De-radicalization in prisons and counter-radicalization narratives for example, are important strategies to employ. Then there is the al-Qa'ida movement, which is still intact. Look at the ideology or the movement of al-Qa'ida to grab local separatist tendencies, in Kashmir, or the Tuareg rebellion in Mali, or other parts of the world or the separatist cause in South Asia, i.e., the Taliban. That, coupled with the fact that there is increased interaction among affiliates of al-Qa'ida, points to the fact that would-be or potential lone wolf terrorists may be a part of this movement. There is some connection, either ideological, or in-person, or both between lone-wolf terrorists and the terrorist organization which radicalizes them.

So it is difficult again to really spring to a judgment that if it is a single individual that appears to be involved, it is only an individual act. I would reckon that radicalization in some strange sense is a kind of material support as well. Most people would not recognize it, but we have got to go beyond the obvious. What appears on the surface may not be true, or entirely true. It is good to dig deep and look at more

important crucial aspects of radicalization. For example, a lot more can be done in terms of engagement with imprisoned individuals, including preventing someone who has been imprisoned for criminal activity from becoming a terrorist, addressing them through either religious or educational means, or looking at future employment outside prison. A lot of the literature deals with recidivists and folks who have been let out of Guantanamo Bay and then went on to perpetrate attacks by AQAP or by other outfits, either in Syria, or Yemen or elsewhere.

Kyle B. Olson*President, The Olson Group, Ltd.**

The lone wolf terrorist is obviously a subject of great interest and great concern. Professor Yonah Alexander asked whether or not the future for terrorism and the lone wolf terrorist could be on the scale of 9/11 or even worse. He also asked whether society and our freedoms can survive in that environment.

Echoing a couple of themes that have already been voiced, the lone wolf represents a unique problem. I think we sometimes throw the word “terrorism” around in a rather imprecise fashion. Sometimes a “terrorist” is a person out for revenge, in other cases an act of terror might be better characterized as criminal activity. Calling a violent act terrorism seems to put it in a comfortable basket or category, and that simplification, while reassuring on one hand can lead us down a slippery slope analytically.

I would also note that when we say “lone wolf,” we often see Timothy McVeigh as an example of the solo terrorist, but of course he had some help. So it may be fair to say that lone wolf or “semi-lone wolf” terrorism is a similar threat: significantly below the level of an al-Qa’ida or an al-Qa’ida affiliate, and representing something outside that construct.

The lone wolf or the very small “semi-lone wolf” group certainly potentially has access to weapons that we would lump into the weapon of mass destruction category. The WMD hierarchy – chemical, biological, radiological – is one that we can look at and see within the reach of an individual. Look at the notion of being able to access some quantity of toxic chemicals and finding some way to introduce those into a populated setting. The introduction of a toxic chemical into a school building, using access to cylinders of chlorine or some other material, for example, certainly has the potential to create a toxic event. Now, that does not need to result in a mass kill-off, it does not need to produce body counts in the hundreds. 9/11 scale? Probably not. But on the other hand, the threat is there.

There are certainly materials that are accessible: for example, by capturing, disrupting, or otherwise diverting truckloads of toxic chemicals. Or an attack on a production or storage facility, with significant collateral downwind effects. Someone with even a rudimentary education can understand that if there is a label on the side of a container saying “this is bad for you,” it is probably going to be bad for someone else as well.

On the other hand, a chemical weapons attack like the one we saw in the Tokyo subway attack in the mid-1990s was an event that required a very robust commitment on the part of a group of individuals. Aum Shinrikyo invested of tens of thousands of dollars and a dedication to work on that problem over a period of several years. That level of commitment distinguishes that kind of technologically and logistically challenging threat, maybe even pushing it beyond the capacity of the classic lone wolf. I do not ignore the fact that the Unabomber sustained a campaign over a number of

* This presentation was delivered at an event on “The Lone Wolf Challenge: Past Experience and Future Outlook” held on November 25, 2013 at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies.

years, but his focus was on small package bombs, for which he had developed a knack for producing.

But if chemical weapons – like nerve agents – are outside the scope of an individual, they may not be beyond the grasp of a small group.

Biological weapons, often labeled the “poor man’s nuclear weapon,” represent a legitimate threat in the sense that some biological weapons – specifically viral agents – can be self-replicating in the environment. With access to the right seed stocks up front, you do not need a large industrial base to produce BW. An infectious disease is an infectious disease, and as anyone who has ever survived flu season can tell you, that cute little girl or boy next door is an effective delivery device. The biological threat is also within reach of a talented dabbler, working privately in his own laboratory or diverting research facilities in a university or hospital setting. The technology is certainly there.

I think reference was previously made to the anthrax attacks of earlier in this decade. Anthrax technology is essentially 1950s weapons grade technology. Other biological agents have been used as weapons (with varying degrees of conscious thought) going back hundreds of years. An individual – with modern knowledge and technology – could certainly find a way to use a biological weapon in a selected attack.

Again, are we talking about a society killer or a city killer? Probably not. But on the other hand, the lone wolf operates – and this is true for all weapons of mass destruction scenarios and all mass killing scenarios involving the lone wolf terrorist – essentially within a vacuum in terms of supervision, in terms of social or political limitations, without any kind of filter on what is or is not acceptable. The true lone wolf terrorist is only answerable to him- or herself.

This also means that many of the traditional deterrent tactics we use as governments, as militaries, as law enforcement organizations – short of actually identifying and capturing the would-be attacker pre-event – are essentially not going to have very much impact. The lone wolf operates without committees; he never has to get approval from an appropriations board. He does what he can do, when he can do it, and he does it to his own timetable.

Obviously, high explosives fall well within the lone wolf arsenal. Unabomber, Oklahoma City, Olympic Park, to name three.

The WMD scenario that causes me the greatest concern, in terms of its actual and symbolic footprints, is the radiological weapon threat. For the last ten to fifteen years, one of the recurring unanswerable questions for security planners everywhere is the threat of a dirty bomb. Improvised radiological devices are technically the easiest weapon in that whole panoply of WMD choices – probably the easiest weapon to assemble, the easiest weapon to use. Obtain a small amount of radiological material (it does not have to be high grade), wrap it around a little bit of conventional explosive, place it/park it in the right spot, and detonate it. It does not even have to be lethal. The sociological, political, and economic aspects of detonating a radiological dispersal device in a major urban area – for example within the monumental core of the city of Washington – would be substantial. After the blast and the release of even a small

amount of radioactive material, the “all clear” notice is going to be one of the almost impossible things for a government to issue.

“Oh, yeah, that dirty bomb went off down the street, but don’t worry – we’ve determined that you’re safe. Go ahead. Return to your shopping.”

Also, let us not ignore the cyber attack. We can certainly argue, as many have, that recent actions of Anonymous as well as Edward Snowden’s theft and release of the NSA files constitute an act of terrorism. The impacts have been dramatic, they have been political in nature, with impacts far beyond what you might normally expect to achieve with a thumb drive. How are the decisions behind these actions, the work of an intelligent, arrogant, probably dissociative individual, feeling free to carry out what he felt to be a legitimate exercise of self-imposed authority, dramatically different from the decisions of a Timothy McVeigh?

So going back to the questions Professor Yonah Alexander asked: I would suggest that a 9/11-style spectacular, or an event with that kind of a body count, is probably beyond the reach of the Lone Wolf. Probably. You could have the perfect storm. Of course, you could argue that 9/11 itself was the perfect storm, far exceeding the expectations of its al-Qa’ida planners.

Will society survive? Yes, society will survive. It will survive because we are more resilient than one individual or one small group of individuals. We are a society of 315 million within a larger society of 6 billion. Yes, society will survive.

But at the end of the day you ask the question about democracy and our values and our rights and our privileges. Responding to or preventing the lone wolf may not be doable within our current system of values. It may not even be desirable.

The lone wolf operates without the restrictions, filters, or constraints that we associate with organizations. Even terrorist organizations like al-Qa’ida have a command structure and a decision matrix. This makes disruption of the lone wolf operation a profound challenge.

The lone wolf gets up in the morning, and if he feels like killing you, he will try to kill you.

Captain Dave Martin

*Assistant Director, Maryland Coordination and Analysis Center, Frederick County (MD)
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First, just to explain, I am actually a deputy sheriff; I am a captain with a sheriff's office. I am employed by the Frederick County Sheriff's Office in the central part of Maryland. I am detailed to the state fusion center, which is known as the Maryland Coordination and Analysis Center in Baltimore. There are 78 fusion centers around the United States and in the U.S. territories. And what the fusion center's purpose is, as they were formed after 9/11, was to help coordinate between federal, state, and local entities. I think post-9/11, one of the things we can all agree upon, is that there was a lack of information exchange among organizations which had pertinent information that could have helped to possibly prevent some attacks or at least to be a little bit hotter on the trail than we were that day.

The fusion center's role is to create a routine and predictable path for the information flow. Generally in the U.S., we have two different types of fusion centers: either "all crimes" – as we are in Maryland – or "all hazards" – places like the western region of Pennsylvania, called Region 13. It is an all-hazard center, so they do hazardous materials and weather-related events, as well as the threat picture.

Our main goal in the fusion centers and the national network of fusion centers is to share information nationally. This is because – unlike some European countries, in particular, where they have a single police force that covers the entire nation – we in the U.S. have many different police forces and law enforcement agencies. In Maryland, we have 120 law enforcement agencies, and in neighboring Pennsylvania, they have 1,200 law enforcement agencies. So you can imagine that by the time the officer on the street sees or learns something, it takes a little bit of time to be forwarded. You have to make sure the information is getting to the right place, and the fusion centers are that process for getting information shared.

Looking at some past lessons, I am going to focus on domestic incidents strictly based on my experiences. I will give a very quick definition of lone wolf terrorism from a 2015 DOJ (Department of Justice) study: "Lone wolf terrorism is political violence perpetrated by individuals who act alone; who do not belong to an organized terrorist group or network; who act without the direct influence of a leader or hierarchy; and whose tactics and methods are conceived and directed by the individual without any direct outside command or direction." Over the past few years, you have started to hear that we have morphed the terminology a little bit to try to account for what is happening. The latest thing that this definition does not really account for is "ISIL-inspired" terrorist attacks. That is something where someone is acting as a lone wolf; he is not receiving any direction from an outside source, but is taking inspiration from things that he has seen, or heard the call to take action.

Two of the attacks I was going to touch on today were fairly significant for different reasons; the first one was Eric Rudolph, who was the 1996 Olympic Park bomber from

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Atlanta. And if you know anything about Eric Rudolph, you know that was not the first time he committed an act of that nature. He had been involved in bombing numerous abortion clinics across the South in the previous years, and had not been identified as a suspect yet. Also, one of the trademarks of Eric Rudolph was that he would set secondary devices. The first device would go off, draw in the first responders, such as myself, and Fire/Rescue, and EMS, and then an hour later the second device would explode, injuring the first responders. Part of that was his view that these people are coming to help this organization that he so terribly against. That is why Eric Rudolph stood out to me; also the fact that he was on the run for more than five years afterwards in the hills of North Carolina, and ultimately was caught when he was going through the dumpster behind a supermarket or restaurant looking for some food, for some sustenance, and was run into by just a local rookie officer.

The second incident I wanted to touch on very briefly was from last year in December: the 2015 San Bernardino, California shootings – also lone wolf. Yes, there were two people, there were two suspects; but they were not receiving any outside direction, there was no master plan, and what they did was use firearms in order to commit their acts. They also had IEDs that did not detonate, some at the scene, some in their vehicle, and more found back at their residence in the searches that were conducted afterwards. Those are two pre-9/11 and post-9/11 situations that we have seen right here in the U.S.

Now to the investigation of lone wolf attacks: if it is terrorism in the United States, the FBI has jurisdiction over the investigation of terrorism events. Conversely, when someone dials 9-1-1, your call goes in to a local communications center. So your first responders are people like me who work for local organizations, local agencies, who come out, and we are the ones that begin the investigation. We do not know what it is until we get there, even though the media is right on top of the stuff because they hear the scanner calls go out that we're being dispatched somewhere for such and such. And they will actually call our front desk before we get our first person on the scene, and say, "What is going on there? What is involved?" – they are trying to write the story and it is very difficult to deal with that type of thing. So, it takes a while after you get on the scene until you are able to determine what is going on.

And I think that if I can say something about Orlando just a few months ago, that was a case there they did not immediately say "terrorism." We are in a great rush to put the label of terrorism on something because that is the buzzword right now. That is the thing that gets everyone stirred up, and watching the news and watching the coverage, and looking for that next report. But, we have to be careful to examine it closely enough to determine whether or not it is terrorism-related.

Our federal partners that do international work, such as Department of State and CIA, have definitions that define terrorism as "acts intended to influence a government." It really takes a while digging until you can determine if someone is trying to influence a government. And, actually what we are seeing now, and in the U.S. in particular, is a bit of a paradigm shift where it is not necessarily trying to influence a government as much as to take revenge against the government or other causes.

When a federal investigation is started on terrorism, such as by the FBI, the first place they are going and looking is to the local agencies. The reason that is, is because

the people that commit these acts are the ones who live in our communities. We are the ones who have had contact with them over the years. We are the ones who might have some type of background information that we are able to provide to get the investigation started.

Future outlook on terrorism: Some indicators of lone wolf terrorism, like I said in the international definition: it is about influencing government. What we are seeing here in lone wolf attacks, is that many times there is personal motivation in which to do something. You also have to remember that terrorism in and of itself, acts of terrorism are a crime. Again, if you break down to the local level, crimes consist of means, motive, and opportunity. And anything that I have mentioned before, whether it is the Olympic Park bombing or San Bernardino shootings, you can go back and dig down, and somewhere in the story you can find out – we know that they had the means because they committed the act. You can find out what their motive is: Again, is it personal? Is it politically motivated? And obviously the opportunity existed because they took advantage of that. San Bernardino was a holiday party at a government facility, and the suspect who worked there left – the male suspect – and when he returned with his wife the shooting started and the chaos erupted.

As far as the future goes too, the reason a lot of things are able to take place is because they are committed by individuals, and individuals are much harder to detect than organizations. So again, our federal partners have done an outstanding job in the past 15 years since 9/11 with detecting groups and organizations that are ramping up, which appear to have the intent to commit some type of act, and I would wager to say that there are many times that plots are disrupted, where we do not hear the story on the back end about what happened. And that is for reasons of security and the fact that perhaps that they are on to other investigations with that information.

Unfortunately, it takes these incidents to happen for us to learn from them. We do the best we can up front, of trying to figure out how would we approach these things, what would we do. But until they happen, we really do not know that we have the best way. Some of the things that have resulted not just from 9/11 but from other things like Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita, include the National Incident Management System – that is something we use at the local level, there are federal mandates for that; the National Response Framework; and from what we are talking about today, the National Strategy for Information Sharing. That is to say that we have information that we gather at the local level, that then gets put into a system where our federal partners, who can actually do some of these investigations, can see it. And then likewise there is an information exchange that takes place. The federal partners share information with us about the people that live locally in our jurisdictions, and we work together from the very beginning.

Some of the things that we can do: If you have heard of the Department of Homeland Security's "See Something, Say Something" campaign, it is simple, and that is the message that I always like to deliver. If you see something, say something; please report it. That is the message that we pass on to our citizens and our constituents in the field. Please let us know if you come across things that just seem out of the ordinary. I remember San Bernardino, where one of the neighbors thought the shooters were suspicious but they chose not to report it because they did not want to appear as though they were profiling them based on their heritage. They did not report it. You see the

result: 14 dead, 17 others wounded. They had, like I said, IEDs, and more than 5,000 rounds of ammunition that were not expended, so it could have been even worse than it was. That is what we are looking for.

As I mentioned, we are currently seeing a shift in the causes, the motive of the attackers, the lone wolf attackers, and a shift in the targets, too. I chose not to focus on the past couple of weeks, but again, law enforcement has become one of the targets in the past few weeks. The vast majority of the public is good and does work with law enforcement, realizing that here in this country we are essentially the first line of defense. When you call 9-1-1, it is one of us that shows up. The things that General Al Gray and foreign services have dedicated their lives to overseas, to keep the United States the best country in the world, those are the things that we are trying to do here at home, too.

We cannot do this alone. We depend on the public to be our eyes and ears, and especially in these recent times.

Professor Carol Flynn

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On the subject of lone wolf terrorism, there are a lot of different definitions of the term “lone wolf.” Some people even hate the idea of calling them lone wolves because it glorifies them. Some say it they should be called lone dogs – of course, that is an insult to dogs, I suppose – or lone offenders. But since we are calling them lone wolves today for this program, I am going to use the term lone wolves.

So definitions of lone wolves are all over the map. Last summer, I led a task force at Georgetown to look at this issue of who is a lone wolf and what is a lone wolf. And the definition we came up with was not a legalistic definition, but one that we thought would help us develop a framework whereby we could really analyze the different kinds of lone actors. We came up with a definition that a lone wolf first and foremost deliberately creates and exploits fear through violence or threat of violence. In other words, they are terrorists. They have an ideology, and they have a political agenda that they are trying to further through fear of violence or actual acts of violence.

The second criterion our task force came up with was that a lone wolf is a single actor. Now this is different from a lot of definitions. A lot of people will say the San Bernardino couple were lone wolves, the Tsarnaev brothers up in Boston were lone wolves. But the lone actor, operating completely alone, often has a different psychological profile, and the means by which you detect a person who truly is operating alone is different and more difficult. The process of radicalization is also a little bit different, and I will talk about that in a moment.

Third criterion: A lone wolf pursues political change linked to a formulated ideology. That relates to the first criterion – they are terrorists.

Finally, a lone wolf receives no command and control, or material support from an outside organization.

So for the purpose of our task force’s study, that is what we decided we would call a lone wolf. We have already talked about the difficulty of detecting lone wolves – they are notoriously difficult to detect, particularly if they are operating completely alone. The tools of intelligence and of law enforcement really do not work very well if you have an individual who is not talking to anybody else. This is because law enforcement and intelligence agencies use sources. In this case, a source is someone who is in contact with the lone wolf, who learns about the lone wolf’s plans. If you have an individual who is not talking to anybody, or even a couple who are just talking each other, it is very, very hard to detect them because the authorities would normally find out about them through sources or through their communication. If they are not communicating with anybody, you are not going to know about them. They are just devilishly difficult to detect.

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One of our task force's other findings was that you cannot use profiling as a detection tool. Most lone wolves are male. Most of them, but not all, are unmarried. They have often had a brush or two with the law in the past, sometimes minor, sometimes more serious. They often have issues of social isolation or they are not socially very competent. Unfortunately, this particular profile fits a pretty large proportion of the general population, so it is not very helpful if you are trying to figure out if a particular individual is a lone wolf terrorist.

Let me talk a little bit about the trends we are seeing with regard to lone wolves. The last few weeks have been just dreadful, given what has been going on in Europe and in the United States in terms of these seeming lone wolf attacks – and “lone wolf pack” attacks too, by which I mean not just a single actor, but a couple or a small group operating on their own.

First of all, there has been a growth in the number of lone wolf attacks over the last few decades. In the 1950s in the United States, we have on record just a handful of attacks. Now maybe that is a matter of what got reported and what did not, but there were not very many. There were about thirty attacks during the 2000s, thirty more or less, depending on how you count them. I do not have numbers for this decade, but seemingly these attacks are going up in number.

The barrier to entry for lone wolves is really, really low. If all I have to do is get a knife or a hatchet, I can go over to Home Depot and buy it. And I will not raise any kind of suspicion by doing that. Again, anybody can do this.

The other interesting thing is that as European authorities get better and better at preventing potential foreign fighters from traveling to Syria, the number of potential lone wolves in Europe is growing because these radicalized individuals are just stewing in Europe and not able to travel.

The other interesting trend is that ISIS has become very quick to give attribution. I often wonder whether ISIS really knows whether these lone wolves were actually motivated by them. Do these lone wolves have any sort of actual connection to ISIS, or is ISIS just quick to claim responsibility? I think more research and study, and more information about these recent attacks in Europe, for instance, will give us a better idea of when and how ISIS decides to claim responsibility.

Another phenomenon we have all talked about is how technology and social media have fueled the rise of these lone actors. In terms of radicalization, this is a big trend. There are more of these folks self-radicalizing and self-radicalizing more quickly.

Another really disturbing trend is the increasing use of social media during the attack itself. It is what I think of as the “selfie-generation” of lone wolves. They are taking selfies of themselves, they are taking videos of themselves, they are tweeting them out, they are communicating with 911. We saw it with Omar Mateen in Orlando; we saw it yesterday in the dreadful attack in Rouen where the terrorists took a video of their attack. Again, I think these are some of the trends worth watching.

In terms of the actual radicalization process, I will not go into all the details, as there are people who are absolute experts on radicalization. Historically, most terrorists get recruited through others. They have personal associations with someone who is involved in terrorism, maybe their community is sympathetic, maybe they have a relative or a brother – the Tsarnaevs in Boston are a good example of that. However, with lone wolves, it is really more self-radicalization. It is more about having an ideology or finding an ideology that is attractive to them. Personal grievance can also be a factor in radicalization. There is often a kernel of personal grievance or projection of their anger about some sort of historical events or foreign intervention, or, again, perceived social injustice that leads to radicalization.

So those are some of the trends I see. Again, I am afraid that at this point it is hard to be very optimistic about detecting lone wolves, given their lack of communication with others. There is one interesting statistic, though. It gets back to “see something, say something.” Even for these lone wolves who act alone, more than 60 percent of them tell somebody else what they are going to do. There is a neighbor, there is a relative, there is a buddy. If these associates of the lone wolf can be persuaded to report what they know, we will have a much greater chance of detecting and deterring these lone wolf attacks.

Dylan Roof, who a little over a year ago waged a dreadful attack on the AME church in Charleston, had a blog and a white supremacist ideology. He went drinking with a buddy a couple weeks before his attack. He had a little too much to drink and told his buddy exactly what he was going to do. Often when this happens the buddy dismisses it. “Oh, he was just drunk, he had a little bit too much to drink.” But I think it goes back to “See Something, Say Something” as a potential means to detect and deter attacks.

We have had another Georgetown task force this summer that is looking more broadly at countering violent extremism (CVE). One of the models we are using to analyze CVE is the public health model, wherein you have primary, secondary and tertiary prevention. For instance, if we are talking about heart disease, primary prevention is a good diet, exercise, going to the doctor regularly, avoiding stress. Secondary prevention comes into play when, for example, you are starting to get high blood pressure and start taking medication of some sort to lower your cholesterol. Tertiary prevention is called for when you actually have heart disease and must treat it with bypass surgery, or you have a heart attack and are given life-saving treatment. With terrorism, a lot of the causes for radicalization are pretty much the same causes that lead to other social ills, like drug abuse, gang activity, crime. The cure for these social ills, at the primary prevention stage, is to provide education, opportunity, job training, public health services – all those things that go into making strong and healthy communities.

Now you will never be able to produce a metric for the potential terrorist you prevented from radicalizing, but primary prevention programs are a lot easier than preventing terrorism at the tertiary stage when the terrorist is ready to throw a bomb.

Lisa Curtis

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The more we learn about the ISIS foreign fighter phenomena, the more we uncover domestic terror plots right here in the U.S., the more we see there is no one path to radicalization. We see it as a very complex process, and the motivations for engaging in this activity vary widely. The Heritage Foundation did a study bringing together many of our different regional analysts, looking at the ISIS foreign fighter pipeline and looking at a global approach to dealing with this. What we found was that initially, when people started looking at the foreign fighter problem a year to a year and a half ago, a lot of these people were being motivated by the atrocities being committed by the Bashar al-Assad regime against the Syrian people. However, now, what we see, are many people are motivated by religion – feeling that it is their religious duty to go fight for the caliphate in Iraq and Syria, or commit terrorist acts in their home countries.

We have seen since 9/11, 90 plots have been uncovered here in the U.S., 25 of those in just the last year and a half, and of those 25, 21 have had connections to ISIS. This means either people were inspired by ISIS ideology, or in some cases they actually had contacts with ISIS operatives, or were even directed by ISIS.

So first, I think we have to understand what contributes to the radicalization process.

Second, we also have to better understand how ISIS, seeks, finds, and nurtures people who have already started down that path of radicalization from their online activities.

This brings me to the case of Bangladesh, and I see we have the Bangladesh DCM here in the audience, so he can probably talk more about it later. But let me just say a few words about that horrifying terrorist incident that we saw on July 1, when five young Bangladeshi men attacked a café in an upscale neighborhood in Dhaka, the capitol of Bangladesh, and murdered 20 people, mostly foreigners. They had asked people to recite the Quran, and when they could not, they were brutally tortured and stabbed to death. Now what has really surprised Bangladeshis is that most of those involved in the attacks were actually from wealthy families and they went to expensive private education institutes. This is something that I think has really shocked the Bangladeshi nation and is something also that we need to keep in mind.

There was recently a raid, two days ago, on a local militant hideout. The militant group is the Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh, or JMB, and the government says they were behind the attacks, but there also seems to be an ISIS connection. Although the government denies any large scale ISIS presence in Bangladesh, it does look like these local militants had some kind of links to ISIS. We know this because there is a hunt on for three Bangladeshi expats from Canada, Australia, and Japan. It looks like they may have been running recruitment and training pipelines for ISIS in Bangladesh.

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A recent study from the National Bureau of Economic Research actually backs up this idea that ISIS is not necessarily targeting those from the lower echelons of society, those from lower socio-economic strata. Another study done by the EU found that out of 140 cases of so-called lone wolf terror attacks, only three of those were actually lone wolves. All of the others had some kind of contact with radical or extremist groups.

I think we need to dig deeper into this lone wolf phenomenon and explore how ISIS is perhaps tapping into these lone wolves. Do they start out as lone wolves but then have some contact, whether it is virtual or face-to-face, with ISIS operatives? I think looking at the Bangladesh example, when those investigations move forward and we find out more about them, that is going to help a lot in how we address ISIS globally.

The Obama Administration has been reluctant to talk about the ideological underpinnings of terrorism and the relationship between political Islam and terrorism. I think counter-terrorism efforts have to take into account this direct connection between Islamist ideology and the attacks that are often born of it. It would be impossible to uproot support for Islamic extremist ideology unless we can talk about it candidly in our society and political environment. A recent study by the Center on Religion and Geopolitics found that half of 100 violent jihadists who were surveyed initially came from non-violent Islamist groups. One in four came from the Muslim Brotherhood, or groups associated with Muslim Brotherhood.

So we have to think of political Islam as providing the fertile ground for extremist terrorist mindsets to grow and develop. At the same time, outlawing large Islamic political organizations like the Muslim Brotherhood or the Jamaat-e-Islami, or excluding them from the political processes of the countries that they are part of, is not the answer either. I think internationally, we have to find a way to counter Islamist ideologies without simultaneously driving the Islamist parties underground. And at home, we have to figure out how best to counter Islamist radicalism without trampling on Muslim civil liberties.

And here I would like to talk about a case, this was a report that was published by the New York Police Department in 2007 called “Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat.” It became very controversial and produced a backlash from the Muslim community in New York, who claimed that it tried to justify racial profiling and aggressive surveillance of mosques. Eventually, there was a lawsuit brought against the NYPD and it took down the report from its website as part of the settlement with the Muslim community there. But I will also say that this report in some ways was ahead of its time – this was back in 2007 when it was talking about lone wolves, and we should actually pay attention to some of the findings in that report, and not throw out the baby with the bathwater.

So what else can we do? We heard a lot from Captain Dave Martin about what our local law enforcement is doing. I cannot emphasize how important it is to develop relationships between local law enforcement and Muslim communities that can help produce intelligence on potential extremist networks and just continue to keep the communication flow going.

Now there is an inherent tension in this process, and here I will point out an example from Australia. Many of you remember the December 2014 attack in Sydney, Australia.

This is when a terrorist held hostages at a café in downtown Sydney. One of his requests from the local law enforcement was to have an Islamic State flag. So as part of the negotiating process, they were trying to find an Islamic State flag. And the police officers contacted some members of the Muslim community and asked them, “Could you find an Islamic State flag?” Well, it turns out that after the attack was over, law enforcement actually raided the homes of those people who the Muslim community leaders had contacted to get the Islamic State flag. So, obviously, that caused tension between the police and Muslim communities. But also, we can ask ourselves, is it legitimate to worry about someone who has an Islamic State flag? I would say yes.

Second, in terms of ways forward when it comes to countering radical messages, it is certainly the private sector that has to lead the way. The government is just not credible when it comes to trying to counter radicalization messages. I think the recently announced Department of Homeland Security program to provide \$10 million in grants to private organizations which are working on countering radicalization and violent extremism is actually a step in the right direction. And I also think the State Department is moving in the right direction by adapting the way it engages in the ideological battle against extremism. Previously, a small office called the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications in the State Department had its diplomat directly engage online with radicals and try to counter radical messages, but it was known that their messages were coming from the State Department – they had the State Department moniker. So they figured out that was not really working in achieving the objectives. Now they have replaced that office with the Office of Global Engagement, which focuses on partnering with non-governmental groups and also other governments in developing counter-messaging strategies rather than trying to directly engage online.

I also want to highlight the work of a nonprofit organization here in the U.S. called the World Organization for Resource Development and Education, or WORDE. They are located in Montgomery County, Maryland, which I have come to understand is a whole other world from Frederick county, even though they are next to each other. This group is doing really stellar work in talking about youth radicalization with the Muslim communities there, engaging and encouraging a lot of communication with other faith leaders, community groups, and law enforcement. They are a small group, so what they are doing really needs to be scaled up. But I think they can serve as a model for other groups working in this space.

Now I think also we have to consider talking about radicalization in our schools. We see that children are going online, ever younger and younger. We see that terrorists, even these lone wolves are getting younger and younger, teenagers in many cases. I think it is not out of the question to start teaching about these things. And if you think about it, the way extremists prey on younger minds over the internet is a lot like sexual predators and how they prey on children online, so I think we have to think about the problems in the same way.

So in conclusion, let me just say that thwarting homegrown terrorist plots in the U.S. requires both an understanding of the Islamist extremist ideology that drives them, and also a recognition that the religion of Islam itself is not responsible for the terrorism. It is rather the people who are acting in the name of the religion. This is important when we talk about upholding our values of religious freedom, and it is also important for

practical measures in that we need the cooperation of the vast majority of American Muslims who are peaceful and who are fighting the same fight that everyone else is.

I will just end by making a quick plug for the Heritage Foundation that has on its website an interactive timeline of all of the nearly 90 plots that have been uncovered over the last decade. Each incident has the full details as part of this interactive timeline. So I think it might be very useful for those of you who are researching this issue.

Dr. Nimrod Raphaeli

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One of the key principles of economics is comparative advantage, and as I look at the panel here I think my comparative advantage here is that I grew up in the Middle East and I speak the language of ISIS and al-Qa'ida.

By way of introduction, I would like to make two comments. First of all, the linkage and symbiotic relationship between the terrorist organizations and the social media networks, including publication of videos either promoting or depicting acts of violence, have become the most potent weapon in the hands of terrorist organizations in recruiting, training, indoctrinating, encouraging, directing, and glorifying lone wolf terrorists. These organizations have become savvy in informatics warfare. The war against them can no longer be limited to military action.

Second, 9/11 was perhaps the last of the most strategically well-planned and operationally effectively executed acts of terrorism in modern history. While there have been many such activities on a smaller scale since then, we are now beginning to witness smaller but more frequent operations carried out by lone wolves who may or may not be associated with terrorist organizations. In fact, today the *Washington Post* captured the change in an article on page one about the amateur attacks that mark a shift in ISIS strategy. The new strategy of leading terrorist organizations is to achieve maximum terror results with minimum inputs of resources and manpower; hence the rising importance of the role of the lone wolf.

I shall mention briefly three terrorist attacks, one in the U.S. and two recent ones in Europe, to underscore both the importance of social media and the role of the lone wolf. The first is the bombing at the Boston Marathon in April 2013, the second is the truck attack in Nice, and the third is the axe attack on the train commuters in Wuerzburg, Germany. The last two were carried out in July 2016.

The marathon bombing investigation has revealed that the two brothers involved in the carrying out of the bombing were inspired by the al-Qa'ida magazine ironically called *Inspire*, which published an article in 2010 "How to Make a Bomb in the Kitchen of your Mom." The article was found with the terrorists. Following the bombing, al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula, and that is one of the branches of al-Qa'ida, posted a special issue of the magazine *Inspire* on the "Blessed Boston Bombings." The magazine contained pages of glory and praise of the brothers, but it hit its emotional crescendo on page 26 with a luminescent photo of one of the two brothers, namely Tamerlan, the "martyr" who was killed by the police, against a background of heaven, a scarf tied loosely around his neck, designer sunglasses, a pair of doves, aloft in the clouds behind him.

Ayman al-Zawahiri, who was bin Laden's deputy and is now head of al-Qa'ida, also released a video in which he praised the Boston bombings and rallied lone wolves in America to carry out similar operations. These disperse attacks, he said, can be carried

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out by one brother or small number of brothers – a brother in this context refers to a Muslim brother. Such tactics will bleed America economically by provoking it to continue its massive expenditures on security. I should also point out that the *Inspire* magazine uses the word “*jihadology*” as a clearinghouse for jihad.

I will look now at the second case in Nice. A lone wolf terrorist by the name of Muhammed Lahouaiej Bouhlel, a French-Tunisian, ran a truck into a large crowd celebrating the Bastille Day in the city of Nice. The Islamic State, also referred to as ISIS, sometimes ISIL, and Da’esh in Arabic, publishes an electronic magazine in Arabic called *Aamaq* or “Depths.” In an article titled “Go Get a Truck,” addressed to ISIS fighters, and I quote the English translation, “Now my brother, let us be honest with one another. Let me tell you the truth. There aren’t many of us here but there are enough of us for the infidels. ‘Al-ḥamdu lillāh,’ they said. Allah be praised, we are facing the beast. We are breaking its teeth, and we hope to chop off its head. But we are in the belly of the beast, my brother. So if you want Islam to be victorious, why would you want to come out of the beast and face its fangs, when you could tear out its heart and its liver?” Since the Nice attack on July 14, supporters have posted dozens of banners on various Telegram channels gloating over the terror attack and threatening that ISIS will continue striking France until it conquers the country, raises its flag over the Eiffel tower, and on the roofs of Paris’s most notable landmarks.

The third case is the one in Germany on July 19. ISIS’s news agency *Aamaq*, “Depths,” released a video featuring a message by the perpetrator of the train attack in Wuerzburg recorded the day before the attack. ISIS claimed responsibility for the attack, which was carried out by a 17-year-old Afghan refugee. The video identifies the attacker as Muhammad Riyadh, explaining how he planned to attack the unbelievers, *kuffar* or apostates, while living on German soil, and vows to perpetrate an attack of greater magnitude than that in France.

Social media are also used by the terrorist organizations to encourage action by lone wolves. Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula published on July 19, 2016, on Telegram channel a piece titled “Inspire the Believers!” which identified a list of 17 targets for lone wolf attacks during the upcoming 2016 summer Olympics. The post included an English language schedule of events for the Olympic Games. It encourages lone wolves by claiming that the travel to Brazil is relatively cheap and easy, and I quote, “Lone wolves from anywhere in the world can now move to Brazil now. Visas and tickets and travel to Brazil will be very easy to get, *Inshallah*” it said, “God willing.” Suggestions for attacks include attaching small explosives on toy drones, perpetrating a knife attack against Americans and Israelis, and entering bars and pubs in the area to attack, kidnap, or rob drunk patrons.

Social media are also used to recruit volunteers for new initiatives. On February 20, 2016, ISIS announced the creation of the Islamic State Scientists and Engineers. It said these administrators trust that members of the group must have a BSc in a scientific or mathematical field such as chemistry or aeronautics.

Now what is the problem for the future? This is precisely the danger emanating from the lone wolves that has become a source of great concern to agencies dealing with terrorism in general and with lone wolves in particular. Gilles de Kerchove, in charge of EU counter-terrorism coordination, raises a serious question for the future, which is,

how does one capture some signs of someone who has no contact with any organization? Someone who is just inspired and started expressing some kind of allegiance to a terrorist organization such as the Islamic State. Most significant is the fear of self-radicalized assailants, which I would refer to as terrorism entrepreneurs, who have little or no communication with militant or terrorist groups that could be intercepted by intelligence agencies.

Quickly, I will make one comment on the difference between al-Qa'ida and the Islamic State. Al-Qa'ida, from the very beginning, was organized to attack western targets. ISIS, by contrast, is an organization determined to occupy territory and to introduce Islamic Sharia to those who are under its occupation. In keeping with the practice of the Prophet Muhammad, ISIS demands that those who come under its control declare *mobay'ah* or oath of allegiance to the head of the organization.

Now what is the Arab reaction to all of this? Most of the Arab world has been concerned by the emergence of Islamophobia as the result of terrorist actions in the West by organizations like ISIS. And here I quote Abdullah al-Utaibi, who is a Saudi writer, he writes in the pan-Arab daily *Asharq al-Awsat*. He wrote an article on "The Crime of Nice and the Roots of Terrorism," and I quote here, "Contemporary terrorism is largely associated with Islam. This is a fact. Many nations and peoples during many stages of their history have engaged in terrorism, but at this moment of human history, the vast majority who practice terrorism are those who claim Islam as their religion." And one more quotation on the significance of education and the relation between education and terrorism, on July 17, 2016, is in an article published by the Arab daily "*al-Hayat*" in London by a Palestinian writer and academic by the name Khaled Al Haroub. He called on Muslims to admit that terrorism perpetrated by Muslims is indeed tied to Islam, and that education in the schools and mosques establishes implicit support for ISIS. He then argues that people should work to uproot the phenomenon, as it does great harm. He writes, "We must first of all admit that education in our schools and mosques lays the foundation for implicit 'ISISism.' It is the largest and most important source feeding the barbaric 'ISISism' that has managed to acquire weapons and implement large part of the implicit ISISism that was not given a chance to express itself."

Finally, I will make one little comment and then I will finish: the glorification of the lone wolf or the *shahid*. As a rule, a person killed in "the line of duty" is considered a *shahid* or a martyr, and I have one particular case about which I wrote an article on February 28, 2005. A suicide bomber detonated a car bomb in front of a recruiting station for soldiers and policemen in the city of Hillah, south of Baghdad. The explosion killed 132 people and injured 120. The car bomb was the work of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the head of the Iraqi branch of al-Qa'ida, who made a name for himself as the sheikh of the slaughterers. He was eventually killed by U.S. forces. The so called martyr's family honored his act by holding a festive ceremony known as the "wedding of the martyr," or *'irs al-shahid* in Arabic, to symbolize his wedding in paradise with 72 virgins. During such occasions the guests congratulate the family for their son's martyrdom. These kinds of weddings are performed often.

Professor Dean Alexander

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In light of the background that was set out by my colleagues, I thought that it might be helpful to focus on a few different issues, one in particular: trying to find these lone wolves. More specifically, trying to find Islamic State-inspired individuals here in the U.S. But, some of the same lessons can be utilized with transnational jihadists or the same thing with lone wolves here, either with vis-à-vis traditional crime or other political extremism.

So, topics I am going to be covering are manifold, initially, dealing with a few cases of ISIS-inspired attacks here. As Professor Flynn noted, the issue of lone wolf is complex. In some cases you are talking about a unitary, a unit, one person, individual. In some cases you have a cabal, without a formal affiliation or designated as lone wolves. But generally speaking, I am focusing on the former, not the latter, but we will talk about some other issues as well.

A couple of items: next, my contention and others as well, that they do not operate in a vacuum, so some of these folks are discoverable and these are some methodologies that can be utilized, some interactive online and offline.

There are also eight steps of terrorism that in some cases, people follow step-by-step, whether it is lone wolves or multiple operatives.

We have also seen, unfortunately, some missed signs. Again, it is not my “Monday Morning quarterbacking,” but there are some examples where people were monitored by law enforcement either here or abroad subsequently undertook an attack. Again, it is impossible to find all lone wolves all of the time. There are also challenges to having so many radicals – according to one stat, there are over ten thousand radicals in France – and obviously limited manpower. People cannot be monitored 24/7. And, in some cases they are using electronic bracelets, as we saw with one of the two perpetrators at the attack yesterday at a church in France.

We have also noted other mechanisms to come across these folks, such as through use of leveraging traffic stops and calls for service. Noted before, also the use of informants, undercover agents. In addition, leveraging community-oriented policing and then, as well, reaching out to the private sector. And non-profits, NGOs – there has been some discussion here about CVE, Countering Violent Extremism. Also, there is a need to leverage international cooperation.

As we saw, the attack in Orlando, and its perpetrator, Omar Mateen, is an example of lone wolf terrorism. There is some discrepancy regarding what motivated him. According to the FBI, in the past week or two, he appeared to be not involved with any homosexual activity. During the attack, Mateen called 9-1-1 saying he was undertaking the attack on behalf of the Islamic State. He also referenced some other individuals, or

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other groups, when he negotiated with law enforcement. But in any case, generally speaking, that attack is viewed as a lone wolf attack. We will also see that there were some missed signs during the investigations of him, but there was not adequate evidence to prosecute. As a result, 49 people were killed and more than 50 injured in that incident.

Then, we have an attack at the University of California, Merced. The perpetrator, a college student, undertook the attack. He took a knife to a classroom, stabbed several of his classmates, and then several others. He was ultimately killed by a police officer at the campus. According to law enforcement, he was radicalized online, undertaking the attack on behalf of the Islamic State.

So again, we need to weigh the issue of whether someone declares that he is undertaking the attack on behalf of ideology “X, Y, or Z.” And obviously these folks, in many cases, have conflicting issues, possibly include some mental issues as well. But, we cannot discount it when these folks say that they are undertaking the attack on behalf of “X or Y” ideology.

Then, we have an attack against a police officer in Philadelphia, also undertaken on behalf of the Islamic State. Again, there were various socioeconomic backgrounds. One individual, Mr. Mohammed, came from an affluent family. Mr. Archer had a criminal record. So, there is not one cookie cutter by which you can say “a lone wolf comes from this background.” They may be economically marginalized, politically marginalized, or otherwise. But, in some cases, they come from affluent backgrounds, as was discussed by my colleagues.

Again, as I noted, lone wolves do not operate in a vacuum. They are not phantoms. In some cases they are, but mostly they are not. They have friends and families. They articulate, sometimes, their animosity to their target either online or offline, which we will get to. They are active in the economic system: they shop and have credit cards. In some cases, they purchase component parts for explosives or for weapons.

In some cases – we will see, later on – the private sector comes across these folks and some cases note some peculiarity in their interactions with a customer. The firm (ideally) then reaches out to law enforcement. In some cases, like we saw with the Omar Mateen investigation, clerks at a Florida gun shop were concerned about his interest in buying a large amount of ammunition and bulletproof vests. But they did not get his name, they did not get his phone number, they did not get his license plate. So, again, law enforcement can only work with what content is provided to it by the private sector and others.

Lone wolves as well go to schools, and attend recreational centers and religious institutions. We see sometimes the role of various religious institutions that are concerned about radicalization in their own communities and reach out to law enforcement. We have seen several dozen cases where the Muslim communities here in the U.S. have been concerned about operatives and contact law enforcement. Sometimes, sting operations and other modes precipitate discovery of a lone wolf.

Sometimes they also leave economic footprints. They may use encrypted technology or other sophisticated technologies so it is difficult to discern their activity. But, we have

also seen that in some cases they have a real desire to articulate their radical tenets, either online or offline. Sometimes they do it in a very unsophisticated manner, and only once they plan on undertaking the attack are they a little more concerned or circumspect regarding their activities.

Too, we have seen instances in which the radicalization process occurs very quickly. But in some cases, it can take a much longer time, much more elongated. Indeed, such lone wolves are not lone wolves. The terrorist lone wolf is affected ideologically. So, they are impacted by content that is disseminated by various extremist groups online and offline. One might be a lone wolf in terms of a specific single action, but the content that he is imbibing is coming from an outside actor.

There is indeed this notion of having mental health professionals becoming more involved in the CVE process and that is helpful. You can find them elsewhere, sometimes hiding or moving pre-attack or post-attack. We will talk about the Eight Signs of Terrorism as well.

As some of our other colleagues here noted about the active use of online materials by ISIS and other groups: They are disseminating 24/7, multiple languages, through different websites, different internet instrumentalities, leveraging social media, and utilizing Telegram and other mechanisms that are sometimes difficult to discern. There are also modes for discovery by law enforcement or tips from the community.

There is also a lot of content regarding different modes of radicalization, recruitment, who to target, and what modus operandi to utilize. So, again, these lone wolves, even if they are acting singly, are impacted externally.

We have a couple of examples. So there is this case in Kansas, where we have a Mr. Booker who, while he was in the U.S. military, reached out concurrently on Facebook saying he wanted to become a *shaheed*, a martyr. Then the FBI met with him. Subsequently, he interacted with an informant and tried to drive a van onto Fort Riley, Kansas, and commit a suicide bombing. He also received a \$100 “loan” from a man that he met at the mosque. His colleague knew that he planned on utilizing this money to undertake the attack, but he himself did not want to participate. So again, these lone wolves are not completely singular.

This is another incident: Mr. Suarez reached out online, also through Facebook. He invited different individuals to join the Islamic State. There was a tip from a recipient to a Sheriff's Deputy in Florida, who then contacted JTTF. The JTTF did a sting operation. Saurez was arrested for trying to place an explosive on a beach and kill dozens.

There are other opportunities for discovery, also offline, not only online. Offline settings are some of the same places where people become radicalized. In the interest of time, we will not focus on all of these, but among them are prisons and religious institutions. Also during investigations for traditional crimes, investigators may come across terrorists who raise funds for terror incidents.

The Eights Signs of Terrorism, whether undertaken by lone wolves, a cabal, or a directed attack by a group, either here or abroad, include:

- Conducting surveillance vis-à-vis the target.
- Gathering intelligence: It can be done online or in person. If it is done in person, obviously, a higher propensity for discovery depending on how the person interacts with the target or target personnel.
- Testing security: To see what level of security exists.
- Raising funds. The barrier to entry for some of these attacks IS very low. So, if you just purchase a knife, the need to garner funds is quite low in contrast to much more sophisticated attacks.
- Gathering supplies.
- Individuals acting suspiciously on their way to or undertaking the attacks. In the Nice attack, the perpetrator did a dry run as well. He had the truck along the path of the Nice boardwalk. When police interacted with him he said that he was going to distribute ice cream at the event. But, from what I recall, the police did not check the back of the truck. So, there are opportunities for law enforcement and the public to interact with these lone wolves. They are not phantoms.
- Conducting dry runs.
- Deploying assets before an attack. So sometimes you get tips from security guards or the public. As we saw, there was a suicide bombing a day or two ago where a security guard had some interaction with a suicide bomber in Germany and dissuaded him from entering the location.

Some of the missed signs: We talked about Omar Mateen. There were actually two tips. The FBI investigated both. Again, the same thing with the Tsarnaev brothers. Tamerlan Tsarnaev was under investigation by the FBI. I am not blaming anyone, but just showing that there are examples of some interaction with these perpetrators but that, given the thresholds that the law provides, it is not possible in some cases to arrest or prosecute individuals.

Other missed signs include the Bledsoe case. He was a U.S.-based individual radicalized while he was in Yemen. He came back to the U.S., met with FBI; they monitored him for a period. Then he undertook an attack in Arkansas in 2009 against an army recruiting station.

And with the Nidal Hassan incident in Fort Hood. You had two separate investigations by the FBI and also one by the Department of Defense regarding his radicalization. While Hassan was in the U.S. Army, he was interacting online with Anwar al-Awlaki. It is more or less the equivalent to being in the U.S. Army now, and interacting with al-Adnani, the spokesman for the Islamic State.

Then, a few other examples here: leveraging traffic stops to find lone wolves. You had an individual stopped in Michigan. At the same time as this traffic stop, you actually had two undercover agents who were interacting with him online regarding different plots. During the traffic stop, the individual had a weapon as well as marijuana. He is currently being detained on some weapons charges.

Then, in relation to calls for service, you have Mr. Sullivan. His parents called 9-1-1 about his trying to burn down the home. About four weeks later, Sullivan interacted with informants in relation to undertaking an attack in North Carolina. Another example

of utilizing informants: Mr. Cornell. Again, he planned to undertake an attack against the U.S. Capitol.

So, again, while these people may be marginalized economically, or politically, or may have some mental issues, they are not undertaking these activities on an island or in a vacuum. They do interact and want some cohesion, commonality, or camaraderie in many cases. Sometimes, they do not. But, in some cases, they do.

Then, with reference to finding these folks, there is the utilization of undercover agents. In many cases agents discover these hundred or so individuals who have been prosecuted in the past two and a half years in connection with ISIS activity. Some of them have been discovered through online activity. About 50 percent of the cases had sting operations. So in this case you had an undercover agent interacting with Mr. Wolfe. He was arrested at the Houston airport with his wife and children; he was planning on joining the Islamic State.

Some other modalities for undermining these types of activities: community-oriented policing, leveraging the community, and getting the police's capacities enlarged to deal with radicalization and recruitment. Also, community-oriented policing contributes to building bridges with community members, as well as inserting informants and undercover agents. There is, indeed, some tension between, on the one hand, reaching out to a community, and then concurrently, targeting some of its members. This dual approach is currently being utilized.

Also, there are different CVE initiatives that have been utilized both here and internationally with mixed success. Some are attempts to offer "off ramps" for radicals that do not allow for interactions with law enforcement. There is a higher likelihood of receptivity by these different communities.

So, now for an example: Mr. Nagi did two trips to Syria, one in 2012 and one in 2014. During these trips, he provided different military supplies and other assistance to the Islamic State. It was actually a tip from the Muslim community in Lackawanna, New York, that led to his ultimate arrest. The community source said that Nagi was very aggressive in trying to find other adherents to the Islamic State.

Now to the role of the private sector. Lone wolves often need to buy different products and services, again, depending on the complexity of the plot. Sometimes, they may try to acquire very large amounts of chemicals and other supplies. They purchase weaponry or rent storage facilities. So there is now a continued outreach by government to the private sector about the role it can play in reporting suspicious activities, persons, and customers. There are guidelines to reach out to two dozen business sectors, including storage facilities and chemical firms, to report and provide guidance regarding some suspicious activities and purchases or appearance of the purchaser. So, again, not to have hysteria regarding every commercial transaction, but, if there is some incongruity, there is a utility to reaching out.

As well, utilizing non-profits, non-governmental organizations that have some connections and credibility in disparate communities and leveraging them is important to deterring and discovering lone wolves. These organizations have some insights and contacts that can be utilized. They also have some bridges with the community that

perhaps government may not have. Also, government may not be viewed as a credible actor in some communities.

Next, we will focus on leveraging international cooperation. The lone wolf issue is indeed a global issue. You have about 300 U.S.-linked individuals who have traveled to Iraq and Syria, trying to join the Islamic State. As well, over 30,000 other persons from one hundred-plus countries have become foreign fighters on behalf of the group. So, there are opportunities for various entities – Interpol, Europol, and European Union – and others to raise greater attention on terrorism, and lone wolves. For instance, Interpol has databases that can be referenced regarding stolen weapons, passports, and foreign fighters. And also the role of U.S. law enforcement and different instrumentalities.

In conclusion, a couple of points to leave you with: some of these folks can be found prior to their attacks, but some of them, obviously, cannot for various reasons. There are very important roles that the public sector and the community can play in relation to finding these lone wolves. The propaganda and tools that ISIS is disseminating, as I mentioned, 24/7 in multiple languages, different media, videos and otherwise have been very effective both here and abroad. Currently, there are about 900 ISIS-related investigations here in the U.S., in all 50 states.

Lastly, this issue of how do you define the term lone wolves, lone wolf, in relation to terrorism, or in terms of traditional crime, (or if these folks have significant mental challenges) is complex. Some have even utilized the term “Loon” wolf.

Academic Centers

Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies (IUCTS)

Established in 1994, the activities of IUCTS are guided by an International Research Council that offers recommendations for study on different aspects of terrorism, both conventional and unconventional. IUCTS is cooperating academically with universities and think tanks in over 40 countries, as well as with governmental, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental bodies.

International Center for Terrorism Studies (ICTS)

Established in 1998 by the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, in Arlington, VA, ICTS administers IUCTS activities and sponsors an internship program in terrorism studies.

Inter-University Center for Legal Studies (IUCLS)

Established in 1999 and located at the International Law Institute in Washington, D.C., IUCLS conducts seminars and research on legal aspects of terrorism and administers training for law students.

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