

Europe: Quo Vadis?

Political, Legal, and Security
Perspectives

March 2015

INTER-UNIVERSITY CENTER
FOR
TERRORISM
STUDIES



B'NAI B'RITH
INTERNATIONAL

THE INTER-UNIVERSITY CENTER FOR TERRORISM STUDIES

Europe: Quo Vadis?
Political, Legal, and Security Perspectives

Table of Contents

Professor Don Wallace, Jr..... 3
Professor Yonah Alexander 5
Eric Fusfield..... 11
Dr. Robert Pollard..... 13
Peter Roudik..... 18
Dr. Amit Kumar 21
Geoffrey Harris 25

Disclaimer

The authors, editors, and the research staff cannot be held responsible for errors or any consequences arising from the use of information contained in this publication. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the institutions associated with this report.

Copyright © 2015 by the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies Directed by Professor Yonah Alexander. All rights reserved. No part of this report may be reproduced, stored, or distributed without the prior written consent of the copyright holder.

Please contact the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies,

901 North Stuart Street, Suite 200, Arlington, VA 22203
Tel. 703-562-4513, 703-525-0770 ext. 237 Fax 703-525-0299
yalexander@potomac institute.org www.potomac institute.org
www.terrorismelectronicjournal.org www.iucts.org

*cover includes image originally from United States Central Intelligence Agency's *The World Factbook* 2013-14.

Foreword

Professor Don Wallace, Jr.
Chairman, International Law Institute

I am happy to have been asked by Professor Alexander to prepare this foreword to “Europe: Quo Vadis? (Political, Legal, and Security Perspectives).” Yonah Alexander’s Introduction to this volume recites the many dimensions of our subject. Dimensions in which he, organizations in which he has been involved or with which he has cooperated, and programs that they have conducted, have touched upon and opened up.

To be sure, Professor Alexander’s central concern, the permanent need to be cognizant of, knowledgeable about and determined to resist the insidious threats of terrorism, is always front and center in his work. But “Europe: Quo Vadis?” encompasses much more, as does the world in which Europe finds itself today. The Eurozone, and the EU itself, is challenged by the financial and economic straits of some of its members. Its expenditures on defense and especially as these relate to NATO, and issues such as some of Turkey’s vagaries, are causes for concern. The antics and behavior of Vladimir Putin’s Russia, towards Ukraine and neighboring countries may be the greatest threat to Europe, and thus to us. How Europe relates itself to the rise of Asia, especially its economic rise, will be of paramount concern. But Europe’s economy and society remain powerfully attractive: to Africans risking their lives to find livelihood, and to terrorists seeking to upend its values, as in the cowardly assaults in Paris on Charlie Hebdo, and a Jewish supermarket on that day. Extremists of various ilk challenge mainstream political parties. And one of Europe’s most lethal bacilli, anti-semitism, as Yonah points out in his Introduction, has returned, in several strains, traditional as in Greece and Hungary, and possibly in an equally virulent form in France and elsewhere.

The reference to Pope Francis, by Yonah, implicates the ultimate questions for Europe: quo vadis its values, its spirit, its will? Its true security depends on the answers to those questions.

I trust you find our report of value.

Introduction

Professor Yonah Alexander

Director, Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies

Senior Fellow, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies

Since the 1960's, our academic work related to terrorism in general, with a particular focus on Europe, consisted of extensive seminars, research, and publications. It is noteworthy to mention the work of the Institute for Studies in International Terrorism, State University of New York; the Graduate School of Journalism, Columbia University; the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University; the Institute of Social and Behavioral Pathology, the University of Chicago; the Terrorism Studies Program, the George Washington University; and the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies (IUCTS), administered by the International Center for Terrorism Studies at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies (PIPS), and the Inter-University Center for Legal Studies at the International Law Institute (ILI).

The above-mentioned institutions, together with other Europe-focused organizations, have cosponsored and collaborated in developing various inter-disciplinary programs. On November 14-18, 1978, the Aspen Institute's office in West Berlin organized a scientific international conference on terrorism with wide attendance from the U.S. and many European countries. The proceedings of this event were subsequently published in a special issue of *Terrorism: An International Journal* (vol. III, nos. 3-4, 1980).

Following that academic effort, other studies have been conducted on related European security concerns during the next thirty-five years. Report topics include "Western Europe in Soviet Global Strategy," "Extremism in Europe," "Terrorism in Ireland," and "Counterterrorism Strategies," the latter covering responses by France, Germany, and Italy, with a contribution by José María Aznar (former Prime Minister of Spain). The latest publication in the area is *NATO: from Regional to Global Security Provider* (Lexington Books, 2015), conducted jointly by the IUCTS and the U.S. State Department's staff. That book deals with issues such as asymmetric threats, piracy, terrorism, Afghanistan, the Ukraine crisis, cyber challenges, and NATO's role as a global security provider.

The following discussion provides a brief context for the publication "Europe: Quo Vadis? (Political, Legal, and Security Perspectives)" (March 2015), which examines Europe's terrorism challenges over the past two years and also looks into the future.

While Pope Francis was beginning his religious pilgrimage to the Holy Land on May 24, 2014 with a message of inter-faith tolerance and peace between and among nations, an "unidentified gunman" in Brussels opened fire at a Jewish Museum, killing four people, Jews

and non-Jews. On the following day, two young Jewish brothers were beaten by “unidentified attackers” with brass knuckles as they left a synagogue in Paris.

Pope Francis immediately expressed his “deep horror for this criminal act of anti-Semitic hatred” represented by these attacks. Similarly, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon condemned the attacks as well as, decrying “all forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance.” In France, President François Hollande pledged that “the will of France is to allow all Jews... to feel perfect security and calm.” Finally, José Manuel Barroso, European Commission President, denounced the “terrible” assault on “European values which we cannot tolerate.”

More recently, on January 7-9, 2015, “France’s 911” (as dubbed by the media) took place in a horrific three days of a terrorism attacks in Paris. Not since the Algerian War of 1954-62 has France been subjected to such unprecedented fear, chaos, and bloodshed. The human toll was exceptionally high. Seventeen French citizens—Christians, Jews, and Muslims—were killed and many more were wounded in several city locations: First at the offices of Charlie Hebdo (a satirical weekly magazine), and second at a Jewish supermarket. The three perpetrators, also French nationals of Algerian and Senegalese descent, were directly or indirectly associated in the brazen plot with radical Islamic groups in the Middle East, including al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula and the so-called “Islamic State” (also known as Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, ISIS, ISIL, Daesh, or the Islamic Caliphate).

The identified terrorists, brothers Said and Cherif Kouachi (acting together at the first site and later in a standoff with police at a printing facility in Paris) reportedly coordinated the attacks with Amedy Coulibaly (who took employees and shoppers hostage at the Jewish Market). In nearly simultaneous operations, French forces killed the three terrorists and rescued sixteen hostages, including women and children. Another suspected operative, Hayat Boumeddiene, a French Muslim and wife of Coulibaly, remained in Syria.

In the face of these developments, French President Hollande raised the nationwide terror alert to its highest status. Subsequently, Manuel Valls, French Prime Minister, declared the country at “war” with militants of “radical Islam” living in Europe and “...against everything that is intended to break fraternity, liberty, and solidarity.”¹

Throughout the country, public rallies of mourning and unity were held, with the participation of approximately 3.7 million citizens and other nationals. And an impressive gathering of French and foreign leaders joined in a march of defiance and resolve to combat extremist theological-based and any other forms of violence around the world. In anticipation of potential future attacks, French authorities deployed some 10,000 troops to guard “sensitive

¹ [The Washington Post](#), January 11, 2015.

sites” including Jewish synagogues and schools, Muslim mosques, airports, and tourist locations. Despite these efforts, on January 9 alone some 15 attacks took place against Muslims, including attacks on property and religious institutions, gunfire, and verbal harassment.

Of particular concern is a recent media report that France has been tracking approximately 400 possible “sleeper cells” affiliated with al-Qa’ida and the Islamic State (the emerging so-called “Caliphate” in Iraq and Syria).²

In the face of this worrisome situation, France undertook a number of responses in early 2015. These included passing a decree allowing the government to block websites accused of promoting terrorism without a court order; requesting Google, Facebook, and Twitter to immediately remove terrorist propaganda when the French authorities alert them to it; seizing passports of alleged jihadists planning to leave for Syria to join jihadist fighters; and deploying the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle to the Persian Gulf to aid operations against the Islamic State.

Other European countries such as Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Poland, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom have also been forced to adopt more stringent counterterrorism strategies to combat terrorism at home and abroad. The European Union joined in tasking the new law enforcement agency, the Internet Referral Unit, to remove radical and extremist content from the Internet.

This report addresses another regional security aspect that relates to the results and turnout for the European Parliament elections in May 2014, which holds potential political implications for European stability.

As a percentage of the European population, this election had the highest turnout ever for a European Parliamentary vote. The existing “political groups” are as follows: European People’s Party (EPP); the Socialists and Democrats (S&D, includes PES and others); the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats (ALDE); the Greens (Greens-EFA); the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR); the United Left (GLU-NGL); Europe of Freedom and Democracy (EFD); and National Movements alliance (NI). Each group, to be recognized, must control at least 25 seats, coming from at least seven EU countries. Establishment parties, despite significant losses in this election, particularly among UK, French, and Danish voters, still hold about 70% of EU parliament seats.

The European People’s Party, and the Socialist and Democrats, were the two big establishment winners, garnering 28% and 26% of the Europe-wide vote, respectively. It is generally believed that much of the success by Euro-skeptics in the election represented protest

² [Fox News](#), February 18, 2015.

votes against sitting national governments, austerity measures, and bailouts of some of the weaker EU economies.

The two case studies of Greece and Hungary illustrate the nature of the new regional political developments.

In Greece, the far-left party Syriza won six seats with 26.60% of the vote. Golden Dawn, the far-right ultranationalist party known for violent attacks on tourists and immigrants, came in third with three seats and 9.38%.

Syriza, also known as the Coalition of the Radical Left, became the second largest party and main opposition in the Greek parliament in 2012. Although Syriza has been accused of anti-Semitism to a much lesser degree than Golden Dawn, it has not escaped criticism from Jewish groups. In early 2014, Theodoros Karypidis, Syriza's candidate for Governor in Western Macedonia, claimed that Greece's public broadcasting channel, NERIT, had Jewish roots and that Prime Minister Antonis Samaras's visit to the Thessaloniki Synagogue was an act that threatened Greece. Syriza and Prime Minister Samaras quickly denounced Karypidis, and David Harris, Executive Director of the American Jewish Council, described the remarks as "vile, outrageous expressions of anti-Semitism."

At the same time, Nikolaos G. Michaloliakos, Golden Dawn's founder and current leader, declared that his first parliamentary action would be: "All the illegal immigration out! Out of my country, out of my home!" Ilias Kasidiaris, a Golden Dawn party spokesman, recently has spoken in defense of Hitler and sports a swastika tattoo. In 2013, Michaloliakos was charged with belonging to a criminal organization, and four Golden Dawn MPs and 15 party members face charges including murder, extortion, possession of unlicensed weapons, and involvement in the disappearance of up to 100 migrants, who are presumed dead. The party faced a major scandal in 2013 when a 45-year-old man claiming allegiance to Golden Dawn murdered Pavlos Fyssas, a left-wing rapper. Party members have been accused of being behind dozens of violent attacks on immigrants in Greece. After a concerted effort to tone down its Neo-Nazi image and appeal to those sickened by Greece's social and economic crisis, Golden Dawn found significant support at the polls for its anti-EU, anti-austerity, and anti-immigration platform.

The second case is Hungary's experience. Here, the Movement for a Better Hungary, or Jobbik, retained its 3 seats, winning 14.68% of the vote. The party is known for its radical Christian nationalism, anti-Roma (gypsy) rhetoric, and anti-Semitism. They won over 20% of the vote in the Hungarian national parliamentary elections in April 2014.

The party has regional influence in Eastern Europe, with partners in Poland, Slovakia, Croatia, and Bulgaria. One of its most important leaders, Marton Gyongyosi, has called Jews a

threat to national security and argued that lists should be kept of all Jewish government officials. Jobbik has accused the World Jewish Congress (WJC) of trying to “buy up Hungary” by hosting a meeting in the country. The WJC has called upon the Hungarian government to ban the party. Some of Jobbik’s Eastern European far-right allies have advocated racial segregation and Roma sterilization. One Jobbik party member, elected in April, claimed that the “gypsy people” were a “biological weapon” of the Jews.

Jobbik’s paramilitary wing, Magyar Garda, was disbanded by court order in 2008 because it was found to be a threat to the “dignity of the Roma and Jewish people.” It was quickly replaced. Other extremist parties such as the FN and the PVV have distanced themselves from Jobbik. The British National Party, which lost its only 2 seats in the May 2014 elections, is one of the only exceptions. They had been working with Jobbik to establish a nationalist, far-right coalition in the EU parliament. Jobbik does not, however, have any partnership with Greece’s Golden Dawn.

Europe’s growing security concerns, particularly terrorism and the Ukraine crisis, and the implications of European Parliament elections have been the subject of several seminars co-sponsored by the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies and B’nai B’rith International (an NGO global Jewish advocacy group and social service organization).

Three panels in particular should be noted. The first, dealing with “Terrorism and Europe: Threats and Responses,” was held at the European Parliament on September 6, 2008, and was hosted by Parliament Members Alexander Alvaro (ALDE), Paulo Casaca (PES), Jana Hybaskova (EPP), Jozef Pinior (PES), and Helga Trupel (Greens). The speakers included Gilles de Kerchove (Counter-terrorism Coordinator for the EU); Guy Roberts (Deputy Assistant Secretary General for WMD Policy and Director, Nuclear Policy Planning Directorate for NATO); Daniel Mariaschin (Executive Vice President, B’nai B’rith International); and Professor Yonah Alexander (Director, Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies).

The second seminar, on “Europe’s Post Parliament Elections 2014: Political, Social, Economic, and Security Implications,” was conducted on July 30, 2014, at the International Law Institute. It was co-sponsored by the IUCTS, the International Center for Terrorism Studies at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, the Inter-University Center for Legal Studies at the International Law Institute, the Center for National Security Law at the University of Virginia’s School of Law, and B’nai B’rith International. The speakers included Dr. Robert A. Pollard (Senior Foreign Service Officer, U.S. Department of State); Peter Roudik (Director, Global Legal Research Center, Law Library of Congress); Professor Amit Kumar (Adjunct Associate Professor, Georgetown University); Geoffrey Harris (Deputy Head, European Parliament’s Liaison Office with the U.S. Congress, and former Head of the Human Rights Unit, Secretariat General of the European Parliament); Professor Don Wallace, Jr. (Chairman, International Law

Institute); Eric Fusfield (Deputy Director, B'nai B'rith International Center for Human Rights and Public Policy); and Professor Alexander (Director, IUCTS). Some of the edited remarks have been incorporated in this current report on "Europe: Quo Vadis? (Political, Legal, and Security Perspectives)."

The third panel, "After the NATO Summit: Challenges and Opportunities," was held on September 10, 2014, at the European Parliament. It was co-sponsored by the IUCTS and B'nai B'rith International (Office of European Union Affairs). Moderated by Eric Fusfield (Deputy Director, B'nai B'rith International Center for Human Rights and Public Policy), the panel included Zsolt Rabai (Public Diplomacy Coordinator, NATO); and European Parliament Members (MEP) Doru-Claudian Frunzulica (Romania, S&D) and Indrek Tarand (Estonia, Greens). Conducted under Chatham House Rules, the panel focused in general on the outlook for NATO's dual mission as a regional and global security provider.

Several acknowledgements are in order regarding publication of the "Europe: Quo Vadis? (Political, Legal, and Security Perspectives)" report (March 2015). Special thanks are due to Michael S. Swetnam (CEO and Chairman, PIPS), General (Ret.) Alfred Gray (Twenty-Ninth Commandant, United States Marine Corps; Senior Fellow and Chairman of the Board of Regents, PIPS), and Professor Don Wallace, Jr. (Chairman, ILI), for their encouragement and support of our work. Daniel Mariaschin and Eric Fusfield of B'nai B'rith International also deserve appreciation for their collaboration regarding academic programs on human rights and security concerns.

The intern teams at the IUCTS in the Summer 2014 and Spring 2015, coordinated ably by Sharon Layani (Research Associate) provided useful background material. The teams included Cristina Alston (University at Albany, SUNY), Dillon Bowman (University of Rochester), Andrew Coley (Quinnipiac University), David Daoud (Suffolk University Law School), Andrew DuBois (Trinity University), Stephanie Emerson (University of Chicago), Tyler Engler (Georgetown University), Gabriella Gricius (Boston University), Ilana Hale (Arizona State University), Avioz Hanan (University of Maryland), Ryan Hendrickson (SUNY Oneonta), Uri Lerner (American University), Frank Randall (St. Francis College), Benjamin Schaefer (Hofstra University), Thomas Turner (University of Virginia), Sonam Virk (University of the Pacific), Anikh Wadhawan (University of California, Riverside), Jacob Westerberg (University of California, Riverside), and Reed Woodrum (Princeton University).

Eric Fusfield

Deputy Director, B'nai B'rith International Center for Human Rights and Public Policy

I am here representing B'nai B'rith International, one of the co-sponsors of this program. We are a global Jewish advocacy and social service organization and I serve as their Director of Legislative Affairs, and also Deputy Director of their International Center for Human Rights and Public Policy. And I would like to thank the organizers for the opportunity to involve B'nai B'rith in this very timely and important program.

With respect to the title of the program, I think it is interesting that it leaves itself open to some interpretation. I am prepared to, just by way of framing the topic, speak about the post-election scenario; a post-Europe scenario might require more creativity and vision than I am able to muster on a Wednesday afternoon. But in any event, B'nai B'rith is an organization with a presence in both the United States and Europe that dates back to the 1800s and we follow developments throughout the European Union with great interest and great hope. With our deep roots in pre-war Europe and our current representation in Brussels and throughout contemporary Europe, B'nai B'rith has played an active role in advocating for the trans-Atlantic partnership and for a strong European umbrella.

The robust enlargement of the EU since 2004 is a highly welcome development, as is the EU's growth ever since the Treaty of Rome 57 years ago, as well as the enlargement of other vital multilateral organizations such as NATO, the OSCE, the Council of Europe, and the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance. Continued support for a vibrant trans-Atlantic coalition is crucial, as the sizable predicaments facing both Americans and Europeans will require increasing cooperation between governments and institutions on both sides of the ocean. There is no doubt that the growth of the European Union over the past decade has furthered the broader goal of a peaceful, undivided, and democratic Europe – and with it, the spread of peace, stability, and respect for human rights and democratic principles, as the thought of war between European countries has become a distant relic of the Cold War.

But today, the current global financial crisis and the rise of Euroskeptics and extremists in the May parliamentary elections have raised questions about the future of a united Europe and the possible need to restructure European institutions. Many daunting obstacles lie ahead. The recent electoral success of extremist parties in a number of EU member states is of particular concern, with openly racist and xenophobic factions such as Hungary's Jobbik and Greece's Golden Dawn making significant gains in the European Parliament. Indeed, Udo Voigt, of the German neo-Nazi National Democratic Party, a man who has minimized the Holocaust and defended Hitler as a "great man," has recently been named to the parliament's Civil Liberties, Justice, and Home Affairs Committee, thus taking his place as one of the parliament's guardians of human rights.

While we do not yet know the extent to which these parties will be able to influence European policy, there is no question that their presence in the parliament has given them a prominent platform for disseminating their message of hatred. At a time when anti-Semitism and racism are already escalating across Europe, often in the form of violent incidents, a strong, unified voice will be necessary to counter this disturbing trend. Incidents such as the one last week in the Parisian suburb of Sarcelles, France, in which anti-Israel protesters hurled a firebomb at a synagogue during an unauthorized demonstration, have become more frequent and are revealing the urgency of this human rights problem.

Meanwhile, a striking array of international crises has emerged, underscoring the need for active leadership by the trans-Atlantic partnership. Last week's affirmation by the European Council of Ministers of Israel's right to defend itself from Hamas rocket attacks was encouraging, but as the war in Gaza continues indefinitely, how long is Europe's position likely to hold? And should there be a role for NATO in that arena? Actions taken by the EU and the US yesterday to impose tough new sanctions on Russia in response to the Ukraine conflict represent an important breakthrough, but it followed months of hesitation. The downing of a Malaysia Airlines' flight has drawn attention to the inability of Western countries, until now, to even provide a security perimeter that would allow a proper investigation of the crash to proceed.

The rise of ISIS, whose supporters rallied in the streets of the Hague just last week chanting "Death to the Jews," and the reemergence of Al-Qa'ida, which is helping to bankroll itself by kidnapping Europeans for ransom, as we saw on the front page of the New York Times this morning, have brought the struggle against radical extremists to European soil in a very immediate way. And finally, the specter of Iran's nuclear program continues to pose perhaps the greatest threat to international stability, fueling controversy over the agreement this month by the P5 + 1 powers to extend negotiations till November.

How Europe will navigate the unfolding changes to its own landscape, and how the United States and Europe will come together to address the multitude of current dilemmas, even as European society and European institutions evolve, are topics ripe for today's discussion. We have a very distinguished panel of experts assembled here and I look forward to an informative program and a spirited exchange of views.

Dr. Robert Pollard

Senior Foreign Service Officer with 30 years of international experience, including service in Europe and Visiting State Department Fellow, Europe Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies

I am not going to go over my bio but I will just mention a couple of relevant details. And that is that I served most recently abroad at and chief of the economic section of the US mission to the European Union (EU) in Brussels. So I have some background on the EU and also previously in Berlin, same kind of job, heading up the economic section in Berlin. Working on issues like the Eurozone crisis, data privacy, the trade negotiations with the EU and sanctions against Iran among many other issues. And as a good State Department representative I am supposed to say right up front that I am speaking in my personal capacity and all the views that I express here are entirely my own. Thank you for that.

Through my current position, I am very fortunate to know Geoffrey Harris. He will be able to correct any errors I make in my presentation. In the interest of having a lively debate, I am going to deliberately try to juxtapose one position against the position that I think Geoffrey may be taking even though we know each other privately and we actually get along very well.

My thesis is that the May parliamentary elections in Europe changed the political landscape in Europe in discrete but significant ways. It shook the establishment parties and it will slow European integration. Now, if you are a normal person, you do not know a lot about these elections so I am just going to tell you a couple of facts and then will go into greater depth.

There are twenty-eight countries in the EU. There was open voting in all these countries. Participation ran at about 43%, about where it was last time. Every five years there are these elections. These are not national elections, these are for the Parliament. And then after the Parliament is chosen, there is a process for selecting the next President of the EU commission, which is like the Executive of the EU in Brussels, and also the Council President, who is the person who chairs the group of heads of states who come together approximately every month in Brussels to make major decisions, including on issues that you care about. So that is just a quick background.

Anyway, in this election, in several countries there was a strong showing of populist national movements as Eric [Fusfield] pointed out. And you could say that this signaled the erosion of some of the governing political coalitions in certain countries and a growing fragmentation of the political spectrum.

The election also did little to narrow what is so-called the democratic deficit in the European Union; that is the sense of people, as you often hear about Washington, that Brussels

does not represent the man and woman in the street in the street. In fact, the new convoluted system to choose the EU commission president, which is the most powerful job in Brussels, may actually increase popular disillusionment with the EU. After promising to increase popular participation, the selection process gave way to traditional backroom maneuvering among member states that produced a competent but, shall we say, uninspiring new president, and a deadlock on the other most important jobs in Brussels, which are the Council President, the High Representative, which is the Foreign Minister, the Eurozone Chair, and the very important Commissioner positions which are similar to Cabinet positions in our system. The European Council met in mid-July and was supposed to come up with some decisions on those jobs. Well, it deadlocked, reflecting in part the results of the election, and it will not meet again until August 30th. So that means that the next College of Commissioners, the guys who run Brussels, who run the EU, will not actually take office, possibly as late as November, which is a month later than expected. So, you could say the EU will have something of a lame duck government for six months.

Now I hasten to add that, to their credit, the system still works. The EU government still functions. The bureaucracy is still there, the commission still cranks out new regulations. It negotiates trade agreements with the United States; the European Court of Justice issues rulings on data privacy; the European External Action Service, which is their foreign ministry, seeks to help the new Ukrainian government; and the European Central Bank seeks to stimulate growth with easy monetary policy.

So the system keeps working, but it is hard to take any new initiatives, for example, to come to closure on some of the tough issues in the trade negotiations with the US, without the new Commission in place. And one of the main obstacles and peculiarities of the EU system is that they have an informal system of quotas to determine who gets to run the place. And those quotas are based on party, on country and region, and gender. For example, the quota system at least initially, determined that the next High Rep, the foreign minister, should be a Socialist, preferably from a southern country, and preferably a woman. So it produced the Italian Foreign Minister, Federica Mogherini, although she had relatively little experience and she had made an unfortunate decision early in her term to meet with Mr. Putin just as he was launching an offensive in Eastern Ukraine. So I do not know, Geoffrey may know more than I, but I suspect her candidacy is now in trouble. In any case that just gives you an idea of some of the dynamics of the system.

I am just going to tell you up front some shorthand thoughts about the implications for the United States of these elections before I go into greater detail on them. I would say that, first of all you are likely to have -- in fact, you already do have -- a temporary slowdown in the pace of the negotiations of what is called the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, TTIP, which is a very large, comprehensive, important agreement which many people believe will

underpin and strengthen the transatlantic alliance if it succeeds. You will have greater parliamentary scrutiny of sensitive topics within those negotiations, of things like data privacy, foreign investment, food safety, and the like. Also, you will have a possible deceleration of the momentum behind banking union, which is one of the things that is supposed to prevent another financial crisis. (By the way there is an ongoing challenge in the German Constitutional Court on this right now.) You will have probably looser fiscal discipline than we have had, a little less austerity, and continued stalemate on important single market initiatives. You will have tougher measures to discourage immigration, both external immigration from the outside of the EU and internal migration within the EU. And on balance, I would argue, a Europe that remains economically weak, and politically more fragmented than we would like.

Now, I wish to point out that since I wrote a piece on this in June, already some things have changed. And the noteworthy fact that Eric has already mentioned is that the tragedy concerning the Malaysian airliner has triggered a vigorous European response in the form of tough sanctions against Russia, which I have to say it came as a very pleasant surprise. So it shows that the system can work sometimes. It did take that airline disaster to get Europe moving, but there are now some very tough financial measures that should have significant impact. And that happened despite this deadlock over who is going to be the foreign minister because member states like Germany, France, the UK, and of course, the Netherlands, with most of the victims, decided enough was enough and decided to punish Putin.

Now, this may be a little far afield from the centerpiece of your studies but I should just mention that this episode confirms that on certain issues the European External Action Service, their foreign ministry, will remain a secondary instrument of foreign policy in Europe, compared with the member states. Basically, when it concerns existential issues like the Eurozone or national security issues, the member states still trump the EU.

So what happened in that election? It was a protest vote. Both the French Prime Minister and others called it a “political earthquake”. These elections shook governments in many of the EU’s 28 member states, may be a harbinger of what is to come in their own national elections, for example in the UK. Eurosceptic and anti-establishment parties won over 1/5 of the 751 seats of the European Parliament, and they took the top billing in the UK, in France, Denmark, and Greece. By the way, just a footnote, the Greek Awakening did not do as well as expected and the French party, led by Marie la Penne, was unable to form a coalition within Parliament. If you throw in the European Conservatives and Reformists, that is a group that was initially created by a breakaway group of British Conservatives, and now has people from a lot of other countries who are stern critics of Brussels, well you then could say that the Eurosceptics have as much as a third of the European Parliament.

I am sure Geoffrey will emphasize this point as well though: the establishment parties still remain in control. Even though it was the biggest loser numerically, the center right European People's party, which represents the same party as Angela Merkel, for example, ended up with 221 seats. Even though they and other mainstream parties like the Socialist Democrats, the Centrist Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, and the Greens, which are all establishment parties, lost seats, the Conservatives and the Socialists alone still have enough votes to form a coalition going forward.

There were three specific issues in the elections that captured people's attention and dominated the debate, and those were the Eurozone crisis, unemployment, and immigration. But even though you could say that those issues were common to the debate in many countries, the policy message was not all that crystal clear. For example, the protest vote against the EU's handling of the financial crisis meant one thing in creditor countries like Germany, Finland, and the Netherlands, where sentiment against the rescue of the debtor countries ran deep, and quite another thing in Greece and Spain, where many citizens blamed Brussels's austerity medicine for worsening their economic situation. Likewise, concerns over unemployment elicited different policy solutions in the various member states.

Now, the message on immigration was clear, albeit not a very positive one. Many voters want to restrict immigration, both from outside and, more controversially, given its charter, within the EU.

But I would argue that the central message coming out of the elections, the most important result, was growing popular discontent with the concept of "more Europe," that is, the growing concentration of political power in Brussels. For many years, voters have complained about the growing clout of EU institutions, which some critics have disparaged as profoundly undemocratic, not anti-democratic, but undemocratic. Indeed, voters from France and the Netherlands, which are two of the founding states, the original 6 of the European Community, had decisively rejected a proposed constitution for Europe in a 2005 referendum. And Ireland subsequently had to be coaxed twice to vote just to support a more watered down Treaty of Lisbon in 2009. Now even the reforms under that treaty, which were supposed to improve democratic legitimacy by giving more authority to the directly elected European Parliament, did little to assuage popular indignation. The way people see it is that the unelected bureaucrats in Brussels still draft and shape legislation over everything from financial regulations to industrial standards to trade and citizenship policies, while the citizens from the constituent states have to foot the bill. Sounds familiar right?

Now, it is important to remember, when we are talking about the importance of the unity of Europe from our perspective, that modern day Europe has been a success. There have not been wars, except at the periphery, for over 50 years, and there has been unparalleled prosperity. And

so long as the Brussels appeared to deliver the goods, that is, peace, prosperity, and jobs, voter discontent simmered beneath the surface, showing up only occasionally in squabbles over things like agricultural subsidies and the like. That all changed with the financial crisis of 2008. So that is what you are seeing now, the result of several bad years in a row.

And this year's elections did not improve the situation, getting back to my main point. The first order of business was the choice of the EU commission president, the top job in Brussels. Remember, this is the person that President Obama meets with along with the Council President. It is a significant decision not just because the Commission president is a powerful figure but also because it will determine who, the European Council, who represent the elected heads of state, or the Parliament, will run Brussels.

Now, with just 29% of the overall vote, the center-right Conservatives, European People's Party, claimed to have won the election, giving its candidate, former Luxembourg Prime Minister Jean-Claude Juncker, first claim to be the next commission president. When you look at it, however, since only 43% of eligible voters took part in the election, Juncker only received the *indirect* support -- remember, they were voting for Parliament Members, not the commission president -- the indirect support of less than 13% of the electorate. Even in countries like Germany where the new system was well known, only a tiny minority of citizens were apparently aware they were casting votes for one candidate or the other. So the point of all this is that none of the candidates for Commission President could by any stretch of the imagination be described as the "people's choice". Nor could the European elections be said to have resolved Europe's democratic deficit.

Now, for American observers, what matters is the quality of the leadership and the future direction Europe will take, not the process by which they reach that. And I know a very legitimate point that many of my friends from the EU make is that, look, talking about democratic deficits, look at the opinion polls in the United States on the popularity and trust in our Congress. We have our own problems and I am not trying to say in any way that their system is necessarily inferior to ours. I am just saying, based on its own merits, the EU system has not produced the result that was hoped for.

Before it can become a more effective and regional and global actor, I would argue the EU needs a stronger democratic mandate and stronger leadership, and that will probably need to wait another election.

Peter Roudik
Director, Global Legal Research Center, Law Library of Congress

Before I start, I would like to say that I am a federal employee, and my agency, the Library of Congress, is not responsible for anything that I will say here. All conclusions are my own. I am working for the Law Library of Congress, which has a mission to provide research on foreign, comparative and international law for the US Congress and other branches of government. All our specialists have jurisdictional responsibilities and cover individual countries. My jurisdictional responsibility includes former post-Soviet states and countries of Eastern Europe. That is why I thought it would be logical for me to assess European Parliament election results in the Baltic States, which were different from the rest of Europe.

First, turnout of voters in these countries was lower than in other Member States. This might be a concern for countries with the established democratic system because people usually come to the polling places when they are not happy with the current politics and do not actively vote when they are satisfied with ongoing political process. While the general turnout over the continent was around 42.6%, in the Baltic States it was over about 30%, and 26 in Estonia specifically. Of course it was not the minimum level as it was in the Czech Republic or in Slovakia; however, it showed that this election was not at the top of the population priorities.³

Second, the re-election rate. It was also lower than in other European countries. This fact demonstrates some trust in political establishment. In the Baltic states, the governing parties won the elections. Representatives from these countries joined the Alliance of Librarals and Democrats for Europe and the European People's Party. I would suggest that some kind of stability and social unity was demonstrated in these states. I think that the unity of these countries' representatives to the European Parliament can be confirmed by recognition of common goals. Andrus Ansip, former Prime Minister of Estonia and Member of the European Parliament named security, energy, and financial obligations among main priorities. He emphasized that it is extremely important that all representatives in the European Parliament understand security alike.⁴ Security is historically a huge problem for these three small countries. The security problem of these states shall be considered in connection with their NATO obligations, small size and relatively limited capabilities of their armed forces, and many associated problems, such as economic development, high unemployment, and demographic problems.⁵ The security issue even more acute in view of current events in Ukraine.

³ *Conservatives Strong in EP Poll Results*, THE BALTIC TIMES, June 4, 2014 at www.baltictimes.com/tools/print_article/34904/

⁴ *Id.*

⁵ *Viesturs Janis Drupa, Saeima Elections and Latvia's Political Challenge*, THE BALTIC TIMES, Jul. 3, 2014, at www.baltictimes.com/tools/print_article/35084/

What can be done by the European Parliament to stop the Russian aggression in Ukraine and guarantee security of the Baltic states? Probably the Baltic states shall become Ukrainian advocates in the European Parliament. This way, they will raise awareness and may initiate political support for the Ukrainian defense of its integrity. Not long ago, the European parliament passed a resolution but condemning Russian activities and supporting Ukrainian government. They made statements aimed at protecting Crimean Tartars, an active minority in the Russian Crimea, and started to discuss whether a ban on Russian arms sales needs to be imposed. The Chairman of the Foreign Affairs committee of the European Parliament just recently recognized annexation of Crimea as an illegal action even though he stopped short from recognizing activities in Eastern Ukraine as terrorist activities, and did not support sending troops to secure the area. The Parliament's Foreign Affairs committee conducted debates with the Ukrainian Foreign Minister and observers from support missions from international organizations. It is an interesting fact, but now Ukraine has its own representative in the European parliament. An Ukrainian citizen was elected to the Parliament. This person has a dual citizenship – Ukrainian and Hungarian, and while she lives on the Ukrainian territory next to the Hungarian border, she was elected as a member of the Hungarian parliamentary delegation because Hungarian election law allows the Hungarians living in Ukraine to participate in elections.

What can be done? I think that it will good even if they can simply keep up the pressure. They can continue to insist on withdrawal of troops from Ukraine, insist on stopping occupation of Crimea. They shall continue to bring the Ukrainian question to the attention of the parliamentarians and remind their colleagues that no business as usual shall be conducted with Russia until Ukrainian border is restored.⁶ Sanctions shall target not just general industries or interests but specific businesses which are critical for the Russian Federation. It is probably good that the sanctions were placed in regard to the banks, but probably banks need to be forced to release information on private accounts of Russian leaders, and expose how much money they have stolen from the Russian people and placed in foreign banks. Maybe these sanctions need to be expanded to members of the families of those who are now under these sanctions. Strong position of the European Parliament led by countries most interested in raising security awareness among the Member States will defy Putin's view that Europe is weak and politically fragmented. . Support for the plan announced by the Ukrainian President Poroshenko is another thing that is required. This plan provides for security practice for negotiators, for humanitarian corridors and recovery of hostages, it encourages laying down of arms by illegal formations, creating a buffer zone on the border for six miles, disarmament of the region, and restoration of government institutions. Constitutional amendments, which would provide for more involvement of local territories in the nomination of governors, and formation of new forms of

⁶ *Keep Up the Pressure* (Editorial), THE BALTIC TIMES, Jul. 3, 2014 at www.baltictimes.com/tools/print_article/35082/

government are proposed also.⁷ Also, I believe that active involvement of the countries which relatively recently joined the European Union in forming European policy will show Ukraine how it can develop within the European institutions. Even a simple comparison of legislative activities recently occurred in Russia and in the Baltic states shows what a different approach these countries take to regulating major social and political issues. This may prove to Ukraine that alliance with the European Union is the only way for this country to achieve prosperity in the future. For example, Estonia recently approved electronic residence, which allows investors to get Estonian citizenship and be more effective in these countries' affairs. All three Baltic countries passed legislation on language protection, a huge problem for Ukraine, which as the Baltic experience shows can be resolved democratically to the benefit of all ethnic groups residing in the country. Opening of the KGB archives and lustration process in the Baltic States is another area where Ukraine can take a lesson while Russian government continues to restrict public access to official documents issued in the 1920s and 1930s. Civil rights keep expanding in the Baltics. Estonia, for example, recognized cohabiting couples in an attempt to integrate more people. Liberalization of economy is another ongoing trend in the Baltic states. All three states like many other developed countries just recently liberalized their laws about bitcoin transactions. In Russia, at the same time, bitcoins are almost completely banned, and recently there was a special statement saying that anyone who trades in bitcoins will be accused of money laundering. Restrictions are enforced on usage of Internet, on sport fan behavior; dual citizenship is now a punishable offense. These are just a few examples of legislative developments in Russia and in the former Soviet, and now EU Member States.

Does Ukraine take its lesson? It is difficult to make changes but some minor improvements do occur. Since February, when the new government came to power, they started military reform and passed a number of laws, which provide more funds to their armed forces which did not receive almost any funds for the several last years. They National Guard was created. Now they are amending tax legislation, legislation which will regulate the use of gas and other energy sources. An austerity program was passed in March, which provides for serious government cuts. Legislation related to judicial reform and appointment of judges was adopted. It is not clear if all these measures will work but it is important to have good legislation. With support of the European Union, and the European Parliament which under the Lisbon Treaty has more authority now, there is a chance that more quality in legislative work will be achieved. If this will happen then the European Parliament will demonstrate its importance in finding solutions to ongoing conflicts and securing global order.

⁷ *Petro Poroshenko Announced a Peace Plan to De-Escalate the Situation in Eastern Ukraine*, Jun. 20, 2014, website of the President of Ukraine at <http://www.president.gov.ua/ru/news/30566.html> .

Dr. Amit Kumar
Adjunct Associate Professor at Georgetown University

I am going to try to look from the standpoint of not just a European but an Asian looking westward, not just a European looking eastward. So I have kind of an important task here and will concentrate more on Europe's security policy which includes counterterrorism and ISIS and so on and so forth.

Firstly, in a nutshell about the impact of the elections to the European Parliament as far as the common security and defense policy concerns go. My sense is that it would not be marked, it would not change much because the Euro-skeptics have grown slightly in numbers, but the pro-Euro guys are still strong, they have quite a huge majority.

My first question is-Do all European countries speak the same language when it comes to foreign policy and counter-terrorism and security issues? Look at Germany's dissent on Iraq as far as the Gulf War was concerned; the Spaniards leaving the coalition in Iraq after the Madrid bombings; Germany's belated acceptance of sanctions against Ukraine, or sanctions against Russia on the Ukraine issue. So there are certain discordant noises we hear and it shows kind of a lack of a coherent foreign policy and security policy on all matters.

Secondly, does Europe have its independent stance in foreign affairs and security issues? If you look at the US-led NATO coalition under the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, there, Europeans joined in large numbers comparatively speaking but in other matters they have their own individual country views as in the case of the US-led Iraq invasion that I mentioned earlier.

Next, does Europe expect the US to do the heavy lifting as far as security and defense matters go or does it have its independent stance as well to take charge of security issues? When you look at the NATO issue in Afghanistan or the OSCE which is, again, comprised of both European and non-European members or other organizations like that, can Europeans take charge of defense matters on their own apart from the Americans or others? A very happy case in point is the success of the 'Operation Atalanta' where the Europeans on their own have done a remarkable job at trying to patrol and curb piracy off the coast of Somalia, so that is definitely a great example.

Now, looking eastward, which are the best avenues and vehicles and institutional mechanisms for Europe to engage in Asia? Is it going to be the OSCE, which is pretty active in Central Asia, for example, is it going to be the EU or is it going to be the kind of not heard of much institutional mechanism called the ASEM or the Asia Europe Meeting, which has assumed increasing importance in recent years? Or is it going to be the EU-Asian engagement at the

country level? For example, EU-India, EU-Japan, EU-Malaysia, or is it going to be EU's engagement with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which has really assumed a lot of importance also over the last several years?

The next question I have is- How does Europe balance its trade and investment interests in Asia with its security concerns? For example, the actions of the Germans and the English and the French to engage China in defense ties whereas the EU still has an embargo post-Tiananmen Square on China shows that leading countries in Europe may have an independent voice also and they make like to try to balance the security concerns with their commercial interests also.

Can the EU and OSCE strengthen capacity building in Central Asia? They are already doing that especially with the spillover from what's happening in Afghanistan. There is a great danger not only of terrorism in Central Asia, but also of what the Europeans love to call the non-traditional security threats like drug-trafficking, money laundering, terrorist financing and so on and so forth. So a lot of capacity building has been done both by OSCE as well as the EU. The EU coordinator was in Central Asia a few months back trying to gauge the preparedness or the lack of capacity or the presence of adequate capacity to deal with the upshot of the NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan in terms of terrorism and other non-traditional security threats.

Again talking about Central Asia, how does Europe balance its concerns for democracy with those of human rights? If you look at most of Central Asian republics, they are dictatorships and they tend to do away with the human rights element, rule of law, democracy and so on. So you have the security interests of the EU, you may have commercial interest also because of the oil and gas richness of Central Asia, at least some of the countries like Turkmenistan, so how do you balance these concerns? Because they look like conflicting issues and the EU has to strike a very fine balance between them.

Now, coming down to EU and India for example, their relationship has progressed quite a lot, there are institutional mechanisms, there is a constant dialogue every year almost and with the new government in New Delhi there is going to be even more clamor for a stronger relationship not only at the commercial and the investment level but also in matters relating to counterterrorism and intelligence information sharing per se because obviously these issues are very important to both India and Europe.

From the standpoint of Asian countries in general, or Asia, they always have this ambivalence whether to deal with an institutional mechanism like an EU or to deal with countries one-on-one. There is independent defense relationship with the UK, with the French, with the Germans and so on. So there is this thing in the Asian mind, "whom do I deal with?" because people in Asia are not that conversant with trading blocs or with regional groupings. So

it is kind of a new thing from their standpoint, so they always pause and wonder, “Do we do business with EU or do we do business with the big countries of the EU, one-on-one?”

Also, what is the future of the EU relationship with China, for example? As I mentioned earlier, a few countries went against the trade embargo imposed by the EU on China when it came to defense ties. But in terms of balancing their interests in Asia, what is their stance on the South China Sea dispute? What is their stance on the East China Sea dispute? Do they side with Japan? Are they quiet? Are they saying enough? Is there enough posturing as far as their positions on these so-called discordant issues are concerned? Do they tow the non-Chinese line of the Philippines and the Vietnamese, and the Japanese or do they kind of antagonize China or do they not antagonize China? These are balances that from the EU standpoint are very important to strike.

I would also want to mention, since it is a very hot topic now, the ISIS phenomenon. There is this talk of foreign fighters, the threat of them and actually some of them, like Mehdi Nemmouche who, for example, perpetrated a dastardly act on the Jewish Museum in Brussels a few months back, end of May, I think. And then there are other possible things too, threats that are real, threats that are in the pipeline. That calls for inspection as long as the EU is concerned. Is the Schengen Information System (SIS) functioning to its capacity? Are there drawbacks there? How can that be improved? For example, Mehdi Nemmouche was intercepted first by the Germans and the Germans gave information about him to the French, but the French did not really pass it on to the Belgians. There is always this possibility that these guys, the Jihadis that return home to Europe from ISIS in Iraq/Syria, may attack third states and not their own countries as happened in the case of Mehdi Nemmouche. This is a clarion call, really, for seamless information sharing to the extent that we can have, though I know it is difficult, we still do not have it here as in most countries, but obviously online real time information sharing and intelligence sharing is very important. Hopefully, this realization of ISIS and its nefarious designs would really be instrumental in greater efforts to revive this information sharing.

Now, when it comes to the Gaza issue, Hamas for example, it has being heard and read that Hamas trained ISIS in tunnel digging, for example. That is a trait that they learned from the Hizballah. That is one thing. This other thing I think Eric mentioned at the outset is all these anti-Jewish gatherings in Europe, for example at the Hague last week where black ISIS flags were being hoisted also. So you have this relationship between Hamas and Al-Qa’ida, which is becoming more prominent now; many people don’t go into it obviously thinking that Hamas is only a local question, a regional question. ISIS really is fueled by internationalizing, as Yonah mentioned, the Hamas issue. And that’s one case in point. If you look at the identification of the targets, for example, an ISIS, Al-Qa’ida linked Mehdi Nemmouche goes and attacks a Jewish museum in Brussels, and Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorists go and attack the Chabad house in Mumbai. So there is this thing of the mingling and the co-mingling of Hamas ideology with the al-Qai’da

ideology, which I think is an important, striking development for all of us in the field to really look at.

Obviously, one of the things that I mentioned in terms of counterterrorism that is important is-Can Europe at large hook up the Schengen Information System (SIS), (I will not go into the technical details because I am not qualified to answer those), hook the SIS outside Europe to friendly countries to get real-time information, for example to Jordan and Egypt and Israel and in India in South Asia? Because there is this phenomenon of terrorists belonging to one country being indoctrinated in a second country and committing acts in a third country. Also the Indians are quite, quite concerned about Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorists, the Indian Mujahedeen terrorists, or even Al-Qa'ida terrorists coming in from abroad and perpetrating acts in India. And they would love to have the information sharing mechanism that I am sure the Israelis already do or may like to have just as the Jordanians and the Egyptians would; we do not have too many friends in that part of the world, but obviously the few that we have we should rely on them and build partnerships when it comes to information sharing.

I mentioned that the Asians generally are not very adept, they have not really gone through the mill over the last 54 years or so, or 56 years that the EU has since its conception in 1958, to go through the experience of running and fomenting and establishing a trade bloc or a regional grouping. So in terms of the way EU has progressed politically, economically, demographically, commercially that would have lessons for Asia, for example, for ASEAN, for the ASEM institutional mechanism, for South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in South Asia. These are important lessons in terms of best practices that are really significant. I would also say that as far as the Asians are concerned, there are obviously a lot of countries, like the BRICs countries, the Indians and the Chinese that are left out of the IMF, the World Bank, and feel kind of estranged because they do not get representation in these and other international financial groupings that is commensurate with their economic growth, and are turning to a BRICs mechanisms, for example, which is an important mechanism that does not include Europe unless you include Russia as a part of Europe, but that is another question, given the reality. So I guess whether its BRICs or ASEM or SAARC, there is so much more that the Asians, the Indians, the Chinese, and the Japanese can learn from the successes of EU. It is going to be a quantum leap thinking about a common security and defense policy for Asia because given the diversity and the size of Asia and the competing ambitions of different countries and the lack of trust which is very important, that is kind of a constraint, but as far as the economic harmonization is concerned, as far as the free trade area is concerned there could be lessons if not for all of Asia, for at least for the evolving trade blocks within Asia.

Geoffrey Harris

Deputy Head of European Parliament's Liaison Office with the U.S. Congress, and former Head of Human Rights Unit, Secretariat General of the European Parliament (Directorate General for External Policies DGEXPO)

I am not sure if it will leave you optimistic or pessimistic, but I just want to simplify things very clearly in your minds as we have gone far and wide in relation to the initial subject. The basic question is whether we are living through the end of the West dominance as a cultural, political and economic force. I do not use those words lightly. There is a very old friend of mine who has been a Professor at Oxford for the last twenty-five years. He started out as a Labour MP, rebelling against the Party line and supporting British membership in the European Community in the early 1970s—Professor Marquand. His book, "The End of the West—The once and future Europe," is well worth reading.

So if you want to know what I think, read someone who presents things in a more elegant and brilliant way. Read his book, because in it I found the perspective of someone who was looking at the institutions from the outside, but really understood what has gone on, and what might go on—referencing trends that continue today.

Actually I quite like the title of this afternoon's session because you have mixed everything up, and I think that is exactly as it should be. Obviously the Ukrainian crisis is influencing events and choices about who will occupy key positions in the European Union in the coming years. Developments in the Middle East are playing out against a rise of anti-Semitism in Western Europe and in other parts of the world, something which is deeply disturbing. Indeed, if there is one emblematic event that you had to pick out to understand what is going on in Europe today, you could probably write a novel, a book, a background document, or a movie about the tragic shooting near the Jewish museum in Brussels on the eve of the May 2014 European elections. That museum, which I know well—I know the guy who set it up—is a couple of miles away from where I worked for 30 years. The fact somebody should attack that place was a horrendous act, a horrendous political message. That they should bomb it on the eve of the European elections makes you wonder whether such people are not more aware of what they are trying to tell us than we might ever imagine. The fact that the man arrested for the attack is a returnee from Syria, reportedly linked to jihadi groups, really shows the dimensions of the challenges which we all face, the European Union included.

I agree with Bob on many of his observations about the political intrigue, which takes place with regard to filling the top positions in the European Union. I do not think, however, that you will find a great deal of complacency inside the European Union institutions at present with people saying "we have got Mr. Juncker—we are all going to be okay!" I think there is genuine concern about prospects for the future of the European Union. As for future enlargement in the

immediate term, I think Jean Claude Juncker is right that there won't be further enlargement in the next five years.

A great deal boils down to the economy. But before we get too pessimistic, let us give ourselves a bit of historical perspective because I also think there is a big process of generational change taking place in Europe, and maybe this will also explain some of the phenomena that we see.

If we compare today with the Europe of 1945, the European Union is a huge success. Europe is now composed of 500 million EU citizens. The EU faces huge challenges but the success of peaceful integration is very clear. There is a war going on at the borders on the European Union. There has been war in the Balkans and Caucasus and there are occasional tensions to some extent between Hungary and its neighbors, and some remarkable statements by the Prime Minister of Hungary. But within the European Union, it has basically achieved its objective of democracy, human rights, rule of law, free elections, and free elections even if you do not like the results. We should not lose sight of that.

I believe it is basically a successful process, but it has always been a process wracked by crisis. In 1951, they established the Coal and Steel Community, just after the establishment of the Council of Europe. Three years later, the French parliament voted down the European Defense Community, which at that time was considered an extremely important US-sponsored initiative aimed to stabilize peace in the heart of Europe during the Cold War. That went awry so the leaders went for a European Economic Community. The British woke up in the 1960s and decided we had better join this process, which also led to all sorts of problems: The De Gaulle veto, the empty chair, all of these kind of things. Europe has been through crises before. That does not mean we should be complacent. Even now, there is nothing new about this in a complex, democratic, law-based political system where people decide, the citizens vote, sometimes by referendum and sometimes in a way the elites do not appreciate. But even in 1989, which we can consider the triumph of our values, Gorbachev started a reform process to try and save the un-saveable Soviet Union, where the system collapsed. Countries established democratic systems and one by one they slowly but surely joined the European Union, which now has 28 member states.

But even then, three years after 1989, the *Annus Mirabilis*, if you like, came 1992 and the *Annus Horribilis*, with the huge economic crisis. 1992 was a really big mess, and let us not overlook the fact—we will talk about Britain a little later—the project of the euro still raises many controversial questions: Should there have been a political union first? Should the budgetary criteria be more strongly enforced? Even that project, a French project, designed to bring Germany into joint leadership of the European Union on a stable basis, even that project was nearly voted down by the French people in a referendum.

So the European project has always been challenged. Indeed, precisely because it is such an ambitious project it can serve as model for other regions of the world. It has to live through these challenges, even the Le Pen phenomenon and the rise of the extreme right are not really new. It so happens that one of the subjects I studied as part of my professional career has been the extreme right in Europe. Thirty years ago, Jean-Marie Le Pen had a brilliant score in the French European elections, the second European elections in June 1984. His daughter in 2014 had a fairly brilliant score, and prospects for the next presidential election in France are certainly very worrying. That this is not entirely new does not mean it is okay. I am not suggesting that for one minute. I am arguing that the populist challenge to European integration did not just start with the financial crisis, though clearly that has contributed to it a great deal.

In the 2002 French Presidential elections, Le Pen even got through to the second round. So I am saying if we are going to get perspective, we have to be clear about where we are coming from and what we have already been through, as well as where we might be going. Reference was rightly made to the fact that this was really a very revealing event, possible they say to blame it all on Tony Blair. He announced there would be a referendum on the European Constitution. Then the French and the Dutch thought, well if there is going to be a referendum in Britain, we will set the ball rolling and we will have a referendum first. The French and Dutch were founding members of the European Economic Community, but their voters rejected the European Constitution. This was a sign and the European "elite" did not ignore it, but did not consider it sufficient reason to abandon the whole process. They opted for the Lisbon Treaty, a watered down version of the Constitution, without reducing, for example, the number of members in the European Commission, without having a hymn and flag and this sort of thing. So, in fact, there are certain signs of strain which have been around in Europe for quite some time.

Just one point about the 2014 election being a harbinger of things to come: Could be—could be not. Politics can sometimes be a rather disappointing business. If you are the leader of the opposition in Britain, the main thing you care about is the next national election. Ed Milliband visited Barack Obama last week. He is sitting, according to polls, on a 60-70-seat majority in the British Parliament next year. That is what he is there for, he is the leader of his party, and you might say, I would say, many of my friends who were MEPs would have said, he should have done more the mobilize the Labour vote in the European Election. He wanted to leave the UKIP enough space to irritate the Conservatives for the rest of their term of office. In the meantime Mr. Cameron, on a matter of principle, decided to have a fight about Mr. Juncker as President of the next European Commission, and now he has made his government a little more Euro-skeptic than it was a month ago. Politics is always an involved process. He is now further behind in opinion polls than he was at the time of the European election.

On the other hand, Mr. Renzi had a brilliant success in the Italian elections, let us see. Let us see how long he lasts. Hopefully he will be a success. What will happen in France, no one can say. Certainly there is right-wing extremism present in the European Parliament. If we have a European Parliament, it must be representative of the citizens. If there is a large number, twenty percent of the people, who genuinely sympathize with such abhorrent ideas, in my view, if we believe in democracy, bring those ideas out into the open, and let's see what this chat will turn up. Certainly the Chairman of Parliament's Civil Liberties Committee has deplored this fact, but that there are extremists even on his Committee, that is the way it works. The European Union prides itself on giving everybody the opportunity to speak, to express their opinion and to play their part: to see if they actually have any ideas to present. It could be argued that those who take such extreme positions will actually not have very much to contribute day by day in the European Parliament. In the weeks since the Euro-elections, UKIP itself has already surged backwards in the opinion polls.

Is a "surge backwards" possible?

Yes. Where they will be in the next election is quite unclear. If there are people who are beginning to think along the lines of racism and xenophobia, its better we know they exist and they have the option to be heard. Censorship exists. We have the opportunity for anti-Semitic statements, denial of the holocaust to be challenged, and there are laws which enable Parliamentarians' immunity to be suspended, so they can be prosecuted. A Hungarian member from the last parliament from the Jobbik party was investigated for being a Russian spy. I am not being remotely complacent about it, but whether the elections are such a catastrophe or represent a harbinger of things to come, I am not so sure.

Now let us get on to the issue of what happens next.

First of all, the election campaign, in the official view of the European Parliament, the president, official communication strategy, is that the participation rate has not gone down much, so 43.1% is considered not too bad. Though as is pointed out, according to Mr. Barroso, there was a lot of mobilization by extreme right voters who are against the whole thing, but who boosted turnout by taking part in the elections. They helped to legitimize the institution.

The election campaign for the first time used a line from the Lisbon treaty, which goes in the direction of the elections being taken into account for the European Council to nominate someone as President of the European Commission. The election was a little different from in the past. There were debates between leading candidates at the European level. It was not new for each political party/political family to have a common program, but they had a leading candidate and the way it unfolded after the elections took many people by surprise. And by definition there was a lot of positioning. It so happens that the dominant political figure in Europe today is quite

clearly the Chancellor of Germany. She comes from the German Christian Democrats, and they are part of the EPP. She initially made it clear she did not seem that keen on Mr. Juncker becoming the President. But, because they have a coalition in Germany, they hit on an idea which suited those two parties. The rest of the European political leadership, particularly the Christian Democrats, the people's party, the winning party, were unanimously in favor of Mr. Juncker with one exception, the Hungarians, who are still in the EPP, which is special. But they all supported him.

The Socialists had quite a lively debate initiated by their leading candidate, Mr. Martin Schulz. He argued that as the Socialists (PES) participated in this election, they should accept that the EPP candidate was the winner. This is an important constitutional development. We will have to see how this process takes place in the future.

The prospects now, as I have said, are a bit strange, the European Council has appointed Mr. Juncker and he has since been elected by the European Parliament. The European Council has not yet made other key appointments. There will have to be a decision later on. I think when this whole experience is analyzed, maybe some people will say yes, we agreed on Mr. Juncker, but maybe we were a little quick, as a quid pro quo, agreeing to accept Mr. Schulz to be President (of the European Parliament) and leave the rest separately. That is a question of negotiation between parties and leaders.

Certainly the European Parliament, its members, officials, President, do not start this legislature thinking, now we are in charge of everything, we decide everything. The whole institutional structure of the EU is based on the sharing of power between the European Parliament, and the member states sitting in the Council of Ministers. The European Commission is a very important body but I question whether the President of the Commission is the most important president out of all of the Presidents of EU institutions. The Commission proposes the laws. The Commission executes the laws. The laws are adopted in a procedure which is broadly similar to the US system. Without the European Parliament representing the citizens, and Council representing the States, nothing gets adopted. No budget, no laws, no treaties with new states, no new countries' accession without both of those bodies agreeing, sometimes by special majorities. So certainly the choice of Mr. Juncker is very important, but it is not the only leadership position which carries weight.

Let us not be complacent. The mood in Brussels is uncertain but I find it extremely unlikely that among the 28 members, any will leave the EU in coming years. I think many British people, from all parties, were not very impressed about how Mr. Juncker got his job. It is a British view, which is shared across the political consensus in Westminster. But the conclusion was that Mr. Cameron made a hash of presenting a good point. He made empty threats and then put everyone's back up against him.

I have been a member of the British Labour Party, which was initially against and then for the EU. Labour even organized, as a government, the first referendum on Europe in 1975, and then we lost to Mrs. Thatcher in 1979 and decided we were against the whole thing. Twenty years on, we came back with a more European approach but only part of the leadership was in favor of the Euro so we are still using the pound. A real crisis may arise in 2 or 3 years' time if next May the British people elect a majority Conservative government, which would then be obliged to try to carry out of its program of renegotiating the terms of British membership. This may happen but it is by no means obvious and we are less than nine months away from the British election. There is not yet an overwhelming feeling in Britain that we should to get out of the EU. British voters do not love the EU and have always have been reluctant about it. Even the new generation of British people still seem to be unconvinced of the merits of the EU. On the other hand they are not convinced it would be wiser to leave.

I have gone well beyond my time, but let me make a couple points.

As part of my job, I report back to the European Parliament on important developments here, and occasionally to make my colleagues think: I send them an interesting newspaper article. I could not resist the temptation yesterday morning sending them Fareed Zakaria's *The EU Is The World's Great "No Show."* Very good and very convincing argument on many points, although some of the judgments are not entirely valid, especially where Zakaria rightly says the liberal international order is being challenged, by Russia and China. Taking the case of Ukraine, he then puts the blame entirely on Europe for this. If I may say so, here in Washington DC, I think another large country has its own share in actively undermining respect for international law and human rights. The US and Europe now share the responsibility to turn this situation around, and if we want to get back towards a strong international liberal order, we all have to do some hard thinking, together.

Now, is Ukraine a game changer? It possibly is. That remains to be seen. It is an unfolding series of events. It appears, at this point in time, President Putin has not the slightest intention of stepping back, as he sees a weak EU.

In relation to some of the other these issues, such as the extreme right, there is an active role of Russia, Russian companies, Russia media, Russian secret service, in fomenting the extreme right in Western Europe. I do continue to find it a bit strange that the Prime Minister of Hungary should receive the endorsement of the EPP. He recently actually announced, himself, that he was in favor of an "illiberal" constitution. How the EU handles that will be an important signal as the majority of the Parliament did already vote in favor of a report extremely critical of Hungary.

Finally I would like to underline the importance of an often overlooked factor: Generational change. Hillary Clinton mentioned it in her au revoir speech at Brookings, and German Foreign Minister Steinmeier also mentioned it in a speech at the same venue, referring to his own daughter and how she sees Europe. The fact is, I think that myself having been there as an activist in support of the yes campaign in the 1975 referendum, the idea of another referendum 40 years later is strange, but it is a matter of democratic choice by the British people. In 2017 they might vote yes and they might vote no. The voters in 2017 are a new set of British people as compared with 1975. I can see that when I talk to the members of my family in Britain. Not only do they have a different approach to European political issues, they also have a different historical memory.

The basic argument is that indeed Europe has achieved very much since 1945. But if I was addressing a group of students in England, they might not be very impressed by this argument as it sounds too much like ancient history.

Many Americans are sometimes disappointed, as they do not see the European Union as something strong the US can work with. A new generation of European leaders will have to emerge and convince a new generation of Europeans that the idea, which inspired a fairly successful project, is worth continuing. I can assure you that if you come to Brussels or Strasbourg, you will not find a particular degree of complacency.

Academic Centers

Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies (IUCTS)

Established in 1994, the activities of IUCTS are guided by an International Research Council that offers recommendations for study on different aspects of terrorism, both conventional and unconventional. IUCTS is cooperating academically with universities and think tanks in over 40 countries, as well as with governmental, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental bodies.

International Center for Terrorism Studies (ICTS)

Established in 1998 by the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, in Arlington, VA, ICTS administers IUCTS activities and sponsors an internship program in terrorism studies.

Inter-University Center for Legal Studies (IUCLS)

Established in 1999 and located at the International Law Institute in Washington, D.C., IUCLS conducts seminars and research on legal aspects of terrorism and administers training for law students.

International Advisory and Research Council

Honorary Chairman

<i>Prof. A. Abou-el Wafa</i>	<i>Cairo University</i>	<i>Prof. Edward Teller *</i>	<i>Hoover Institution</i>		
<i>Prof. Jayantha W. Atukorala</i>	<i>Sri Lanka</i>		<i>Prof. Asher Maoz</i>		<i>Tel Aviv University</i>
<i>Prof. Paolo Benvenuti</i>	<i>Universita Di Firenze</i>		<i>Prof. Serio Marchisio</i>		<i>Instituto di Studi Giuridic sulla</i> <i>Comunita Inernazionale</i>
<i>Prof. Edgar Brenner *</i>	<i>Inter-University Center for Legal Studies</i>	<i>Prof. Dr. Herman Matthijis</i>			<i>Free University Brussels</i>
<i>Prof. Ian Brownlie</i>	<i>Oxford University</i>	<i>Prof. Jerzy Menkes</i>			<i>Poland</i>
<i>Prof. Abdelkader Larbi Chaht</i>	<i>Universite D-Oran-Es-Senia</i>	<i>Prof. Eric Moonman</i>			<i>City University of London</i>
<i>Prof. Mario Chiavario</i>	<i>Universita Degli Studie Di Torino</i>	<i>Prof. Yuval Ne'eman *</i>			<i>Tel Aviv University</i>
<i>Prof. Irwin Cotler</i>	<i>McGill University</i>	<i>Prof. Michael Noone</i>			<i>The Catholic University of America</i>
<i>Prof. Horst Fischer</i>	<i>Ruhr University</i>	<i>Prof. William Olson</i>			<i>National Defense University</i>
<i>Prof. Andreas Follesdal</i>	<i>University of Oslo</i>	<i>Prof. V.A. Parandiker</i>			<i>Centre for Policy Research</i>
<i>Prof. Gideon Frieder</i>	<i>The George Washington University</i>	<i>Prof. Paul Rogers</i>			<i>University of Bradford</i>
<i>Prof. Lauri Hannikaninen</i>	<i>University of Turku, Finland</i>	<i>Prof. Beate Rudolf</i>			<i>Heinrich Heine University</i>
<i>Prof. Hanspeter Heuhold</i>	<i>Austrian Institute of International Affairs</i>	<i>Prof. Kingsley De Silva</i>			<i>International Center for Ethnic Studies</i>
<i>Prof. Ivo Josipovic</i>	<i>University of Zagreb</i>	<i>Prof. Paul Tavernier</i>			<i>Paris-Sud University</i>
<i>Prof. Christopher C. Joyner *</i>	<i>Georgetown University</i>	<i>Prof. B. Tusruki</i>			<i>University of Tokyo</i>
<i>Prof. Tanel Kerkmae</i>	<i>Tartu University, Estonia</i>	<i>Prof. Amechi Uchegbu</i>			<i>University of Lagos</i>
<i>Prof. Borhan Uddin Khan</i>	<i>University of Dhaka</i>	<i>Prof. Richard Ward</i>			<i>The University of Illinois at Chicago</i>
<i>Prof. Walter Laqueur</i>	<i>CSIS</i>	<i>Prof. Yong Zhang</i>			<i>Nankai University, China</i>
<i>Francisco Jose Paco Llera</i>	<i>Universidad del Pais Vasco</i>		<i>*Deceased</i>		

Director

Professor Yonah Alexander

Senior Advisors

Michael S. Swetnam
CEO and Chairman, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies

Prof. Don Wallace, Jr.
Chairman, International Law Institute

Senior Staff

Sharon Layani

Technical Advisor

Mary Ann Culver
Reed Culver

Summer 2014, Fall 2014, and Spring 2015 Internship Program

Cristina Alston	University at Albany, SUNY	Uri Lerner	American University
Andrew Coley	Quinnipiac University	Frank Randall	St. Francis College
Dillon Bowman	University of Rochester	Vijay Randhawa	George Mason University
David Daoud	Suffolk University Law School	Benjamin Schaefer	Hofstra University
Andrew DuBois	Trinity University	Susanna Seltzer	Carnegie Mellon University
Stephanie Emerson	University of Chicago	Thomas Turner	University of Virginia
Tyler Engler	Georgetown University	Sonam Virk	University of the Pacific
Gabriella Griuciu	Boston University	Anikh Wadhawan	University of California, Riverside
Ilana Hale	Arizona State University	Jacob Westerberg	University of California, Riverside
Avioz Hanan	University of Maryland	Addison Winger	University of Wisconsin-Madison
Christopher Hartnett	The George Washington University	Reed Woodrum	Princeton University
Ryan Hendrickson	SUNY Oneonta		

Please contact the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 901 North Stuart Street, Suite 200, Arlington, VA 22203. Tel.: 703-525-0770 Email: yalexander@potomac institute.org, ICTS@potomac institute.org

